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ABSTRACT
EXPORT OF ENGINEERING GOODS FROM INDIA
by
Mark Frankena
Submitted to the Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, on 16 August 1971 in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The thesis examines the export of engineering goods from India
in the 1960s as a case study of new manufactured exports from develop-
ing countries. It is concerned with the problems of transition from
import substitution to export by countries which followed inward-
oriented strategies of industrialization under regimes of protection
and bureaucratic controls. A major purpose is to determine the effect
of industrial and trade policies which accompanied import substitution
on the incentive to export and the cost of foreign exchange earned by
export.
After a review of the development of the engineering industries
and the policies which accompanied import substitution, the study deals
with three aspects of the transition from import substitution to export.
First, it considers policies of the Indian government which discrim-
inated between production of engineering goods for the domestic market
and export. A basic feature of policies to promote industrialization
was a bias toward import substitution or self-sufficiency in production.
The most important aspect of discrimination against export was a higher
implicit exchange rate on production for the domestic market than export
as a result of protection and overvaluation. After the early 1960s,
export promotion policies progressively reduced the gap between implicit
exchange rates on production for the domestic market and export. The
study considers the contribution of export promotion measures as well
as excess-capacity to the expansion of exports of engineering goods in
the late 1960s.
Second, the study considers policies of the Indian government
which increased the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned
by export of engineering goods. One important area of policy which
I
3had this effect was import licensing and other bureaucratic controls
over the supply of tradable inputs. Industrial and trade policies
also reduced the incentive to produce goods to designs which were
efficient for export, and export promotion policies were themselves
a source of inefficiency.
Third, the study considers several factors, other than policies
of the Indian government, which limited the transition from import
substitution to export. These include export marketing problems which
forced Indian exporters to sell at prices substantially below those
received by competitors from advanced countries, foreign collaboration
agreements which discriminated against exports, transport costs, and
trade barriers abroad.
Thesis Supervisor: Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Title: Professor of Economics.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This examination of the export of engineering goods from India
in the 1960s was undertaken as a case study of new manufactured exports
from developing countries. It is concerned with the transition from
import substitution to export by countries which followed inward-orien-
ted strategies of industrialization under regimes of protection and
bureaucratic controls. The engineering industries were chosen because
of their central role in planned industrial development and their impor-
tance in recent Indian exports. Although the detailed analysis is con-
fined to the Indian experience, its relevance is more general: many
aspects of this experience with both import substitution and export
were shared by other semi-industrial countries like Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico and the East European countries, and a number of less indus-
trialized countries have been heading in the same direction.
One of the major purposes of the study is to determine the effect
of industrial and trade policies which accompanied import substitution
on the incentive to export and the cost of foreign exchange earned by
export. Consequently, considerable attention is given to the opera-
tion of these policies and the incentives which they created.1
This emphasis reflects a judgment that government policies
iIn selection of material an attempt has been made to complement
and support the recent analyses of trade and industrial policies by
II
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were responsible for a phenomenal waste of resources measured by the
difference between the actual productivity of industrial investment and
what could have been achieved under a more efficient set of policies.
The study deals with three aspects of the transition from import
substitution to export: (i) policies of the Indian government which
discriminated between production of engineering goods for the domestic
market and export; (ii) policies of Indian government which increased
the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned by export of
engineering goods; and (iii) factors other than policies of the Indian
government which discriminated against production for export compared
to the domestic market. These concerns are elaborated below.
(i) A basic feature of policies to promote industrialization was
a bias toward self-sufficiency in production or toward saving rather
than earning foreign exchange. The most important aspect of discrimina-
tion against export was a higher implicit exchange rate on production
for the domestic market than export within each industry as a result of
protection and overvaluation. In certain cases, mainly steel and alu-
minum, the government also imposed restrictive export licensing.
This discrimination was a key factor limiting exports of engineer-
ing goods, which consequently depended heavily on excess capacity and
Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Padma Desai (India: Planning for Industrial-
ization) and by Ian Little, Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott (Industry
and Trade in Some Developing Countries) with a minimum of duplication.
Familiarity with the analyses in these works, Bhagwati and Desai, 1970,
and Little et al., 1970, is consequently assumed in this study.
______ _(_II___
export subsidies. The study considers in detail the supply factors
which contributed to the expansion of exports of engineering goods
from India in the late 1960s, particularly excess capacity and export
promotion policies which reduced the gap between implicit exchange
rates on production for the domestic market and for export.
Discrimination against export explains the fact that no firm
was established or substantially expanded to produce engineering
goods mainly for export during the period of planned industrial
development and the fact that firms seldom modified product designs
or invested in export marketing to increase the profitability of
export. Had there been no discrimination between production for
export and for the domestic market, firms might have achieved greater
economies of scale and engaged in more competitive activities like
designing. Thus, government policies contributed to higher costs of
production in small firms limited to the domestic market and to lower
prices realized on exports because of design and marketing problems,
and consequently were responsible for higher domestic resource costs
of foreign exchange earned by export.
(ii) An important weakness of the industrial and trade poli-
cies designed to encourage import substitution was that they increased
the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned by exports of
engineering goods. Government policies created an inefficient
I'
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industrial structure in terms of scale of production, degree of
vertical integration, lack of standardization, obsolete designs, etc.
This emphasizes the mistake involved in following inward-oriented
policies to achieve industrialization and considering comparative
advantage, efficiency, and export only at a later stage.
One important area of policy which had this effect was import
licensing and other bureaucratic controls over the supply of tradable
inputs. These controls were responsible for higher costs of both
current inputs and value added. Policies also reduced the incentive
to produce goods to designs which were efficient for export, and
export promotion policies were themselves a source of inefficiency.
(iii) Finally, the transition from import substitution to
export was limited by several factors, other than policies of the
Indian government, which discriminated against production for export.
These included transport costs and delivery times, trade barriers
abroad, export marketing problems which forced Indian exporters to
sell at prices below those received by competitors from advanqed
countries, and foreign collaboration agreements which discriminated
against exports in royalty rates or prohibited export to all but a
few countries. Even in these areas government policies played a
role by increasing delivery times, limiting the incentive and
ability of firms to invest in export marketing, and permitting
export restrictions in collaboration agreements.
-~ Ititi~-~-CICIQ*d-~i _-_~L=-
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To justify the critical evaluation which this study makes of
Indian trade and industrial policies, it is important to emphasize
that India had policy alternatives which would not have required a
sacrifice of the level of industrialization. First, the lack of
efficiency criteria in bureaucratic decision-making and the ineffi-
cient incentives for decentralized decisions created by economic
policies cannot be justified on the grounds that they contributed to
industrialization or exports: the same levels of domestic value
added or employment in the engineering industries and of net foreign
exchange earned by export of engineering goods could have been achieved
at a lower cost by efficient policies.
Second, as Bhagwati and Desai have argued, India could have
relied more on market mechanisms rather than bureautic controls in
allocation of resources:
When Indian planning efforts began in 1950/1 and especially by
1956/7, India had already experienced nearly a century of in-
dustrial expansion, growth of industrial entrepreneurship,
social overheads, and financial institutions..The sheer growth
in size of the modern, factory sector was significant. At the
same time, India had inherited from the British an efficient
civil service and traditions of responsible administration.
There was thus a remarkable endownment of agents and institu-
tions for making rational economic decisions in response to a
set of economic policies. India could thus have planned for
its further industrialization by exploiting these advantages,
and was not constrained in quite the way that several develop-
ing countries (only beginning to embark on their industrial-
ization) happens to be. 1
This point is supported in Chapter II.B by an examination of the develop-
ment of the engineering industries prior to the second world war.
IBhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 7, and Chapters 2 - 3.
OW
Third, the experience of the small East Asian countries, includ-
ing Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea, provides evidence concerning
the feasibility of an alternative strategy of industrialization involv-
ing reliance on market mechanisms for allocation of resources, liberal
access to tradable inputs, and little or no discrimination between pro-
duction for the domestic market and export (or even preferences for
exports).1
While the Indian government liberalized a number of economic pol-
icies between 1964 and 1970, each of these steps was very incomplete and
the general program of liberalization was short-lived. By 1969-70 there
was little evidence of economic liberalism in India, and the substance
of Bhagwati and Desai's critique for the period to 1966 was still appli-
cable.
1Export-oriented industrialization in the small East Asian coun-
tries is discussed in Frankena, 1970.
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CHAPTER II
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF ENGINEERING GOODS
This chapter outlines the major features of Indian production
and exports of engineering goods. One purpose is to provide descriptive
data on the industries and exports analyzed in the succeeding chapters.
Another is to show by means of an historical sketch of the development
of the engineering industries prior to planning that in a period of
moderate tariff protection and reliance on market mechanisms entrepre-
neurs and other factors were induced into production of engineering
goods for the domestic market and, in the case of pig iron, for export.
This supports Bhagwati and Desai's argument (cited in Chapter I) con-
cerning the existence of alternatives to detailed direct government
controls and their related sketch for the manufacturing sector as a
whole: there is every reason to believe that industrial development in
the 1950s and 1960s could have been carried out with substantially more
reliance on market mechanisms in trade and industrial policies.
A. Industrial Coverage of Study
This study covers iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires.
Iron and steel, the 24 engineering goods with exports of $1.3 million
or more in any year between 1966-67 and 1969-70, and tires were selec-
ted for detailed study, while other engineering goods were covered less
systematically. To facilitate presentation of data, several tables with
II
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an industrial breakdown are confined to the 26 industries studied
in detail and present data for these industries (sometimes with
omissions) in the order shown in Table II.1.
C ----- ---~--
TABLE II-1
Twenty-Six Industries Selected for Detailed Study
A. Iron and Steel
1. Iron and steel
B. Engineering Goods
2. Steel pipes, tubes, and fittings
3. Bright steel bars and shaftings
4. Iron and steel castings
5. Steel wire ropes
6. Electric wires and cables
7. Hand, small, and cutting tools
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets, and foils
9. Transmission line towers
10. Fabricated steel structures other than (9)
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile machinery and parts
13. Machine tools
14. Electric machinery
15. Commercial vehicles and jeeps
16. Dry and storage batteries
17. Radios and components
18. Data processing machines
19. Bicycles
20. Stationary diesel engines and parts
21. Automobile parts
22. Vehicular engines and engine parts
23. Bicycle parts
24. Electric fans and parts
25. Builders' hardware including locks
C. Tires
26. Tires and tubes
U'
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B. Development of the Engineering Industries Prior to Planning
A very large majority of capacity in the iron and steel, engi-
neering, and tire industries at the end of the 1960s was the result of
net investment after the introduction of planning in 1951. Neverthe-
less, India entered the planning period with significant capacity and
entrepreneurship in these industries, especially in steel. 1
1. Workshops: 1850-1910
The initial phase in the establishment of engineering industries
in India occurred between the 1850s and 1910, particularly in the last
two decades of this period. Although there were firms manufacturing
engineering goods as early as the 1830s,2 the first significant develop-
ments were in response to demands from the cotton and jute textile in-
dustries, railways, and coal mining, all of which began in the 1850s.
The engineering industries in this period were limited to repair and
maintenance workshops and foundries serving equipment users in non-
engineering manufacturing, mining, and transportation industries, above
all the railways; constructional engineering and structural fabrication;
production of iron; government ordnance factories; and a limited amount
of cottage production of simple goods, including domestic utensils and
agricultural implements.
IFor an account of the development of engineering industries in
Brazil, see Leff, 1968.
2By the 1830s there were iron works (which failed), structural
fabricators, foundries, an ordnance factory, shipyards (including pro-
duction of steamships), and production of screws and clocks.
_Z
These activities, particularly those catering to the railways,
continued to account for a major share of engineering employment and
production throughout the period to the second world war. (See
Table 11-2).
The limited scope of the developments in this period is indi-
cated by Gadgil, who reports that before the first world war "almost
every mechanical appliance used in the country, down to the many simple
agricultural implements used on plantations, had to be imported,"' and
by Myers and JKannappan, who report that during the first world war "the
almost complete lack of organized industry in light engineering meant
a trickle of inferior replacements to industries subject to heavy wartime
strains."2
2. Factory Production
Factory production of iron and steel and engineering goods began,
with the exception of the Bengal Iron Company established in 1874, in
1907-1911 when the first successful steel mill was established by Tata
Iron and Steel (TISCO). The growth of the iron and steel industry is
shown in Table 11-3.
The first world war increased the demand for Indian iron and steel
and engineering goods, but interruption of the supply of imported
lGadgil, 4th ed., 1942, p. 190.
2Myers and Kannappan, 1970, p. 39. Buchanan, (1934) 1966, p. 140,
states that in the first world war "a few concerns, especially in the
neighborhood of Calcutta, furnished the principal machinery for several
jute mills," but there is no other evidence of this.
____ _ _ I __
TABLE II-2
Factory Employment in Basic Metals and Engineering Industries, 1899-1961
(000 workers)
Industry
Railway workshops
1899 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1961
93 134 136 104 108 151
General and electrical
engineering
Iron and steel
n.a. n.a.
1 7b 24
b
30 53 58 136 n.a.
21 32 41 60 148
Ordnance 1 3a 15 24 22 31 84 n.a.
Through 1939 data are for British India.
a: 1905
b: includes brass foundries
n.a.: not available
Source: Myers and Kannappan, 1970, p. 42. Myers and Kannappan note a
number of reservations concerning these data.
The 1911 Census of India reported 50 machinery and engineering
workshops employing 23,000, 36 railway workshops employing 99,000,
and iron foundries employing between 10,000 and 20,000. Ten of the
machinery and engineering workshops and none of the railway workshops
were owned and managed by Indians. (Bagchi, 1970, p. 249.)
The 1929 Industrial Census of larger establishments reported:
Railway workshops
General engineering
Iron and steel
Ordnance
Shipbuilding and
engineering
Number of
Establishments
154
306
6
19
24
Employees
(000 workers)
142
50
37
24
22
(Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, p. 274.)
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TABLE II-3
Production, Import, and Export of Steel, 1907 to 1969-70
(000 tons)
Production
Pig Irona Steelb
1907
1913-14
1916-17
1920-21
1929-30
1938-39
1945-46
1950-51
1965-66
1969-70
50c
n.a.
2 67e
n.a.
1376
1576
n.a.
1690
7093
7383
0
49d
99
122
425
738
987
1040
4509
5048
Steel
Imports
n.a.
1215
n.a.
770
968
264
178
344
872
390
Steel
Exports
0
1
n.a.
1
1
24
1
9
150
794
a: includes pig iron used to produce steel
b: finished steel
c: Bengal Iron Company
d: TISCO's initial capacity was 160,000 tons
100,000 tons of steel per year
e: Bengal Iron Company, 120, TISCO, 147.
n.a.: not available
of pig iron and
Sources:
Pig Iron:
1907 to 1938-39: Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, pp. xvi, 251-52.
1950-51: EE, R&S, Vol. 21-3, p. 146.
1965-66 to 1969-70: IEA, HS, 1969-70, p. 165.
Steel:
1907 to 1945-46: Johnson, 1966, pp. 14-15, 18, except 1916-17:
Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, pp. xvi, 251-52.
1950-51 to 1969-70: same as pig iron.
Year
capital goods limited ability to expand capacity. The steel, ordnance,
and shipbuilding industries were expanded, and there were some exports
of military supplies.
In the post-war boom TISCO was expanded and two new companies
were set up to produce pig iron, largely for export to Japan. The latter
were the only significant investments ever made in India for production
of iron and steel or engineering goods for export. Production of rail-
way wagons began in 1918, and between 1920 and 1923 companies began pro-
duction of agricultural implements and machinery, tinplate, and copper
cables. While production data are not available, Table 11-4 provides a
list of companies involved in these and subsequent developments before
the second world war.
3. Free Trade and Discrimination Against Local Manufacturing
Until 1924-1930, the government of British India did not support
local manufacturing. It not only adhered to a policy of free trade,
refusing to give even temporary protection to infant industries, but
generally discriminated in government procurement in favor of British
suppliers against local ones. The furthest the government went to sup-
port local manufacturing prior to the 1920s was to guarantee purchases
1Table 11-4 does not include ordnance or small scale production,
largely in the Punjab: agricultural implements (1920s), sewing machine
parts (1925), machine tools including cone-pulley lathes and shapers
(1930s), cycle parts and accessories, power-driven sugar-cane mills.
Buchanan stated in 1934 that "textile machinery, especially jute
machinery, is being constructed, and army factories turn out a variety
of military equipment." (Buchanan, (1934) 1966, p. 141.) However,
Myers and Kannappan report that production of textile machinery did not
start until the second world war. (Myers and Kannappan, 1970, p. 39.)
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TABLE II-4
Firms Established to Produce Iron and Steel, Engineering Goods, and Tires
Before the Second World War
Date
Estab. Prod.
Companya Affiliation Whether in Pro-
duction in late
1960s
1. Iron and
Steel
Iron
Steel
Steel re-
1874 1875
1918 1922
1918 1923
1907 1911
1936
1939
rolling 1936
1937
b
Tinplate 1922
2. Steel pipes
and tubes
4. Iron and steel
castings
Iron 1874
Steel
1936
1937
b
1929
1923
1931
Bengal Iron Company (ater IISCO)
Indian Iron and Steel (IISCO)
Mysore Iron and Steel
Tata Iron and Steel (TISCO)
Mysore Iron and Steel
IISCO
J.K. Iron and Steel
Mukand Iron and Steel
Tinplate Company of India
Indian Hume Pipe
Bengal Iron Company (later IISCO)
Many other foundries
Bhartia Electric Steel
J.K. Iron and Steel
Mukand Iron and Steel
1928
1929
Burn, British agency,
(later Martin Burn)
Martin Burn, British
agency
State government
Tata
State government
Martin Burn, British
agency
Singhania
Bajaj
Shaw Wallace, British
agency; Burmah Oil, U.K.;
perhaps Tata
Walchand
B" n, British agency
(later Martin Burn)
Hukum Chand
Singhania
Bajaj
K ____-- ------------- -
Product
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
-
Date
Estab. Prod.
TABLE II-4 (continued)
Companya Affiliation Whether in
Production in
late 1960s
6. Electric wires and
cables
Copper cables
7. Hand, small and
cutting tools
Small tools
8. Aluminum ingots,
sheets, and foils
Ingots
Sheets
10. Fabricated steel
structures
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile
machinery
13. Machine Tools
1920 1923
1937
1938
1937
1938
1774/
1895
1788
1884
1930
1918
1943
1944
1941
Indian Cable
Indian Tool Manufacturers
Indian Aluminium
AluminiumCorp. of India
Indian Aluminium
Burn
Jessop
Alcock, Ashdown
Braithwaite
Many other firms
Indian Standard Wagon
1936 Jessop
1939 1943 Textile Machinery Co. ('TEXMACO)
1935 Kirloskar Brothers/Mysore
Kirloskar
1937 Cooper Engineering
1937 India Machinery
BICC, U.K.
Birla
Alcan, Canada
Singhania
Alcan, Canada
Burn, British agency (later
Martin Burn)
Independent
Turner Morrison, British agency
Jardine Henderson, British
agency
Martin Burn, British agency
Independent
Birla
Kirloskar
Dhanjishah B. Cooper
(became Walchand 1940)
Indian
Product
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n.a.
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TABLE II-4 (continued)
Companya Affiliation Whether in
Production in
late 1960s
14. Electric machinery
Transformers
Electric motors 1937
15. Commercial vehicles
and jeeps
1926
1936 Government Electric Factory
Crompton Greaves
Ford (assembly only)
Indian
Greaves; Crompton Parkinson,
U.K.
Ford, U.S.
General Motors (assembly only)G.M., U.S.
16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry
Storage
19. Bicycles
20. Stationary diesel
engines
24. Electric fans
25. Builders' hardware
26. Tires
27. Other engineering
industries
Unspecified
Spare parts
Agricultural
implements
1939
1931
1939
1937
1924
1935
1937
1920s
1926 Union Carbide
Estrela Batteries
Tropical Accumulators
Hnd Cycles
1933c Cooper Engineering
1939 Ruston and Hornsby
Indian Electric Works
Jay Engineering
Crompton Greaves
Unspecified producer of
galvanized hardware
1936 Dunlop
1939 Firestone
1896
1917
1920
Godrej and Boyce
Britannia Engineering
Kirloskar Brothers
Union Carbide, U.S.
Indian.
n.a.
Birla
Dhanjishah B. Cooper
(became Walchand 1940)
Greaves; Ruston and Hornsby,
n.a.
Shri Ram
Greaves; Crompton Parkinson,
n.a.
Dunlop, U.K.
Firestone, U.S.
Godrej
Foreign (later Indian)
Kirloskar
Product
Yes
Yes
No (closed
1953)
No (closed
1953)
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
Yes
U.K. Yes
n.a.
Yes
U.K. Yes
n.a.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
U _~_1 ,,~~-- -. ~-
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Date
Estab. Prod.
TABLE II-4 (continued)
Companya Affiliation Whether in
Production in
late 1960s
Agricultural
implements
Sugar cane crushers
Power-driven pumps
Bolts and nuts
Wire and wire nails
Enamelled ironware
Ships
Copper ingot
Aluminum utensils
Tinplate containers
Sewing machines
Electric lamp bulbs
Dairy machinery
1922 Cooper Engineering
1920s Kirloskar Brothers
1920s Cooper Engineering
1922
1924
1926.
1935
1939
Kirloskar Brothers
Jyoti
Ruston and Hornsby
Guest, Keen, Williams
Indian Steel and Wire Pro-
1935 ducts
1920s Enamelled Ironwares
by 1927 Unspecified
1924 1929 Indian Copper Corp.
1929 Jeevanlal
1933 Metal Box
1939 Modi Industries
1935 Jay Engineering
1936 Mysore Lamp Works
1938 1941 Bajaj Electricals
1939 Electric Lamp Manufacturers
1938 Larsen and Toubro
Dhanjishah B. Cooper
(became Walchand 1940)
Kirloskar
Dhanjishah B. Cooper
(became Walchand 1940)
Kirloskar
Amin
Greaves; Ruston and Hornsby, U.K.
Henry Williams (taken over by
Guest, Keen, Nettlefold,
U.K. in 1931)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
U.K.
Alcan, Canada (later Indian)
Metal Box, U.K.
Modi
Shri Ram
n.a.
Bajaj
AEI, U.K.
Two Danish engineers
Notes to Table 11-4:
a: Company names are those used after the Second World War. In several cases these differ from the names
used when the companies were established.
b: Manufacturing began earlier under different management.
c: Produced with technical collaboration of Duncan Stratton, U.K.
d: Kirloskar began production of agricultural implements in a workshop before establishing Kirloskar Brothers.
n.a.: not available
4 ~ Zi:1
Product
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n.a.
n.a.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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from a few firms at prices equal to those of competing imports.1
According to Bagchi, the government followed a buy-British policy
for procurement in 1900-1930:
The government of India continued to buy only British-made iron
and steel products for all purposes; the railways also...would
buy, with rare and insignificant exceptions, railway materials
made of iron and steel only from the U.K ... The policy had the
effect of stunting the growth of railway industries in India,
even though railway workshops were set up by all the important
railway lines. 2
Kidron reports that:
An early attempt at locomotive production foundered when the
government and the Railway Board decided to continue their
patronage of British manufacturing after the First World War.
Plans for shipbuilding and motor-car production took the same
course.3
Gadgil states that "complaints were made that during the years 1924 to
1927 some orders (for railway wagons) were unnecessarily placed abroad
by Indian railways." 4
Moreover, there was government and institutional discrimination
1Guarantees included one in the 1890s to the Bengal Iron Company
for iron and iron castings at 5 percent below the price of imports; one
to TISCO when it was set up for steel rails at the price of imports;
and one to Indian Standard Wagon in 1918-1924 for railway wagons if
prices did not exceed those of imports. It also subsidized an abortive
attempt to produce steel at Bengal Iron Company in 1903. (Buchanan,
(1934) 1966, pp. 281, 285; Johnson, 1966, p. 12; Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942,
p. 259.)
2Bagchi, 1970, p. 227. Kidron states that "railway building had
little 'spread effect': permission to buy government stores in India
came only in 1928 and preference for local manufacturers in 1931."
(Kidron, 1965, p. 14.)
lKidron, 1965, p. 15.
4Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, p. 259.
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in favor of foreign and against Indian enterprise in India.1 According
to Bagchi, discussing the period 1900-1930:
One important industry where government patronage was crucial
and where Indians were rarely to be found was the engineering
industry. Large government contracts for construction and
engineering were rarely if ever given to Indian firms. Since
engineering firms in a poor economy with little industry had
to depend mainly on contracts placed by public authorities,
there were practically no large Indian firms.2
(Indian) entry into modern industry was barred by European con-
trol over foreign trade, wholesale trade, and finance. It re-
quired a loosening of this grip--facilitated both by the First
World War and the growing importance of internal trade in rela-
to external trade which came about in the 1920s and 1930s--
before Indian businessmen could effectively challenge the
Europeans in the industrial field.3
4. Protection: 1924-1939
In 1924 the government abandoned free trade and finally, between
1927 and 1931, shifted from discrimination in favor of British suppliers
to discrimination in favor of local suppliers.
Actually, the movement away from free trade began somewhat before
this. Buchanan reports that "the general (revenue) tariff was raised by
degrees from five percent in 1916 to 15 percent in 1922... This gave real
protection to a number of industries."4 However:
1See Kidron, 1965, pp. 12-16.
2Bagchi, 1970, p. 226.
3Bagchi, 1970, p. 241. The rate of British investment in India
declined from the beginning of the first world war and became negative
in 1931-32 to 1936-37. (Kidron, 1965, p. 10.)
4Buchanan, (1934) 1966, pp. 163-64. According to GOI, DPI,
(annual), the general revenue tariff on engineering goods was 10 percent
in 1928 and 25 percent in 1933.
_~ i~eb~-i~- i~----~--
Until 1923, the Indian fiscal system, although it gave a
certain amount of protection to Indian industries, did so
only in an unscientific and haphazard manner, since the
tariff had been devised for purely revenue requirements.1
The major steps taken by the government after 1924 to increase
effective protection of local production of steel and engineering goods
were:
(i) Protective tariffs (1924-1939): In 1924 the import duty on cate-
gories of steel produced by TISCO was increased from the "revenue" rate
of 10 percent to the "protective" rate of roughly 15 to 33 1/3 percent.2
The duty on "fabricated steel," which appears to have been defined as
engineering goods made from protected indigenous steel, was raised from
10 to 25 percent. These duties were increased in 1927 and were subse-
quently adjusted a number of times.
Tariff protection was given to other engineering goods on a selec-
tive basis: wire and wire nails were protected until 1928 and in 1932-
1934 but not during 1928-1932; railway wagons and ships were not pro-
tected at least until 1931; galvanized iron and steel sheets and pipes
were protected in 1931-33, nuts and bolts and railway track materials
in 1931, and tinplate at some point.
GOI, DPI, 1926-27, p. 68.
2Kidron, 1965, p. 13, states that the tariff on steel was 33 1/3
percent. Buchanan reports that it was 15 to 25 percent and that "by
1931 most iron and steel products, including pig iron...were protected
to the extent of 15 5/8 to 21 1/4 percent ad valorem (against British
imports), plus an addition for non-British goods." (Buchanan, (1934)
1966, p. 286.) The 1924 tariff was set at a specific rate of Rs 30 to
Rs 40 per ton (e.g. Rs 40 on steel bars) compared to a price of Rs 110
per ton (plus a subsidy of Rs 36) at which the government agreed in
1926 to purchase rails from TISCO.
dl
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(ii) Cash subsidies (1925-1928): Cash subsidies were given on steel
and railway wagons produced in India. State governments also absorbed
losses on wire and wire nails and on iron produced by Mysore Iron and
Steel.
(iii) Duty-free access to imported inputs (from 1927): In 1927 the
government removed the revenue duty on zinc used in production of
galvanized hardware and on certain classes of machinery and mill stores
used in production of cotton textiles. In the 1930s certain commodities
were "admitted either free of duty or at exceptionally low rates, e.g.
agricultural implements, power machinery, certain classes of railway
material," and as of 1933 the regular 25 percent revenue duty on ma-
chinery was reduced to 0-10 percent on certain items "in the interests
of agriculture and (user) industries."l
(iv) Local preferences in procurement (from 1927): In 1926 the govern-
ment agreed to purchase steel rails from TISCO at a specified price
during 1927-1934. In 1928 the government instructed the railways to
restrict purchases of wagons and components to India, and Gadgil reports
that in the 1930s it was "accepted that distinct preference should be
given (in government procurement) to articles of indigenous manufacture
as long as the price is 'reasonable. "f 2
These measures indicate a complex structure of effective protec-
tion, with rates frequently changed and discrimination among products.
1 GOI, DPI, 1933-34.
2Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, p. 302.
The interesting features of the protection were:
(i) There was almost exclusive reliance on price mechanisms, i.e. tar-
iffs, subsidies, and purchase contracts and preferences at prices set
with reference to those of imports. Local preference for procurement
of railway wagons after 1928 was the only case found where there was
not price competition with imports in spite of protection.
(ii) Except in the case of steel, which was the major beneficiary of
protection, the level of effective protection was moderate compared to
the level reached under quantitative restrictions after 1950. Much of
the nominal protection given was to offset protection of steel used as
an input.
(iii) Protection was not automatic or universal. A number of engineer-
ing industries like electric cables were denied protection, and protec-
tion was withdrawn in other cases like wire and wire nails. It appears
that most items of machinery like pumps, stationary diesel engines, and
machine tools were not protected apart from revenue tariffs:
The production of centrifugal pumps appears to have been estab-
lished in the year 1925...The pioneering firms had to struggle
hard to exist in the face of heavy competition against imported
ones which were being freely allowed to be imported. 1
5. Entrepreneurship
In spite of the limited level of effective protection, and even
discrimination against local manufacturing and Indian entrepreneurship
until about 1930, a number of industries were established before the
GOI, DGTD, 1965, p. 18.
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second world war: iron and steel, 16 of the 24 engineering industries
subject to detailed examination in the present study, and tires. More-
over, except for the central government, all the major sources of
entrepreneurship in the planning period were involved in these early
developments:
(i) British managing agencies: Bird, Martin Burn, Jardine Henderson,
Shaw Wallace, and Turner Morrison. The first two of these were among
the 20 largest industrial houses in India in the late 1960s and the
other three were among the next 53 industrial houses. 1
(ii) Indian industrial houses: Birla, Shri Ram, Singhania, Tata, Wal-
chand, Amin, Bajaj, Kirloskar, Modi. The first five of these were among
the 20 largest industrial houses in India in the late 1960s and the
other four were among the next 53 industrial houses.
(iii) Foreign companies: AEI, Alcan, British Insulated Callender's
Cables, Crompton Parkinson, Dunlop, Firestone, Ford, GM, Guest Keen
Nettlefolds, Metal Box, Union Carbide.
Furthermore, almost all the companies listed in Table 11-4 were
large in the late 1960s, and many of them were among the top ones listed
in Table II-10. Moreover, a substantial proportion of the largest pri-
vate sector companies of the late 1960s listed in Table II-10 began pro-
duction prior to the second world war.
It can be concluded that while the economic policies of the plan-
ning period had a major impact on the development of the iron and steel,
1The large industrial houses are listed in GOI, MIDITCA, 1969,
Appendix 2.
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engineering, and tire industries, detailed direct government interven-
tion in the economy was not necessary to achieve industrial development
in the 1950s and 1960s. India already had experience in these indus-
tries under a regime of market mechanisms.
6. Production Costs and Exports of Iron and Steel
The Bengal Iron Company and IISCO exported a large amount of pig
iron during the interwar period, mainly in the 1920s to Japan and the
UK, and "the Tariff Board wrote in 1924 that India 'already produces
pig iron more cheaply than any other country in the world. ,,, In the
early 1930s Buchanan reported that "pig iron and coarse (iron) cast-
ings, such as sewer and water piping, are produced cheaply."2 Protec-
tion for steel was justified in terms of infant industry considerations
and later foreign dumping; it is reported that "the Tariff Board found
that...eventually the (steel) industry would be able to exist without
protection."3 Johnson states that:
By 1939 TISCO's mill, one of the largest steel mills in the
British Empire, was also one of the lowest cost producers
in the world...India's...production at relatively low costs
1Gadgil, 4th ed., 1942, p. 255.
2Buchanan, (1934) 1966, p. 291; see also p. 284.
3Gadgil, 4th ed., p. 253. In 1934 Buchanan reported that "steel
manufacture is still far more expensive than elsewhere...Whether cheap
materials and labor can overcome lack of skill is not yet demonstrated
...The hopes of the Tariff Board for lower costs of production were
not realized and in 1930 and 1931 further favors were requested and
received...This appears, however, to have been due to the fall in
demand." (Buchanan, (1934) 1966, pp. 291-92.)
4After 1932, Indian pig iron and semi-finished steel were
admitted duty-free into the U.K.
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is very good evidence that India possesses a comparative advan-
tage in the production of steel.1
In the 1930s, because of excess capacity TISCO exported semi-finished
steel under British tariff preferences.2
7. Engineering Industries in 1950
Like the first world war but on a larger scale, the second world
war stimulated expansion and diversification of the engineering indus-
tries,3 although progress was again constrained by the limited supply
of capital goods. Imports were liberalized after the war and production
of engineering goods declined temporarily, but starting in 1947 tariffs
and import licensing were used to protect domestic industry.
Table II-5 presents data for the basic metals and engineering
industries in 1946, the first year for which output data are available.
Because of problems valuing output, however, the employment data are
probably a more useful measure of the status of the industries. They
can be compared with the data in Tables 11-2 and 11-7.
Table 11-6 presents more useful production data for selected
industries in 1950-51, immediately before the first plan, and 1955-56,
immediately before the second. The data reveal that most of these
SJohnson, 1966, pp. 12-13.
2Indian exports and re-exports of steel excluding pig iron to-
taled 150,000 tons in 1930-31 to 1938-39 (Johnson, 1966, pp. 14-15.)
3For example, GOI, MC, 1947, reports that production of machine
tools expanded from about 100 machines manufactured by 4 firms in 1939
to 4,100 machines manufactured by 22 "graded" firms in 1946 plus
4,700 machines manufactured by small, "ungraded" firms, mainly in the
Punjab. Grading was based on quality standards for government procure-
ment.
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TABLE II-5
Production of Basic Metals and Engineering Goods in 1946
Industry Number
of
Factories
Employ-
ment
(000
workers)
Output
(Rs.
mil.)
Iron and steel, smelting,
rolling, and re-rolling 107
General engineering, and
electrical engineering
(n.e.s.) 1053
Aluminum, copper, brass 133
Electric fans 34
Bicycles 5
Electric lamps 6
Producer gas plants 5
Sewing machines 3
Total 1346
n.e.s.: not elsewhere specified.
59.1 339.0 160.2
100.6
17.4
4.5
1.6.
0.6
0.3
0.7
184.6
270.5
131.1
15.6
4.4
3.5
1.0
1.0
766.1
113.2
47.8
7.9
2.3
0.9
0.6
0.5
333.4
Note: Rupees in current prices. Exchange rate in 1946 was Rs. 3.32 = U.S.$1.
Coverage of data: Establishments employing 20 or more workers in any
manufacturing process carried on with power.
Source: GOI, Census of Manufacturing Industries (1946), cited by Bhagwati
and Desai, 1970, pp. 41-42.
Value
Added
(Rs.
mil.)
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TABLE II-6
Production of Iron and Steel, Engineering Goods, and Tires, 1950-51 and 1955-56
1950-51
Ratio to late
Units Units 1960s peak
1. Iron and Steel
Pig iron
Pig iron for sale
Ingot steel
Finished steel
2. Steel pipes and
tubes
3. Bright steel bars
and shaftings
4. Iron and steel
castings
Steel
5. Steel wire ropes
6. Electric wires
and cables
Aluminum con-
ductors
Bare copper con-
ductors
Rubber and plastic
insulated
Paper insulated
7. Hand, small, and
cutting tools
Hacksaw blades
Steel files
Tungsten carbide
Twist drills
mil.ton
mil .ton
mil.ton
mil.ton
1.69
0.4
1.47
1.04
000 ton n.a.
000 ton n.a.
000 ton n.a.
000 ton n.a.
000 ton 1.7
000 ton 5.0
mil.mtr n.a.
0 km 0
mil.nos. n.a.
mil.nos. n.a.
ton n.a.
mil.nos. n.a.
2
161
0
1955-56
Ratio to Late 1960s peak
Units late 1960s peak (1965-66 to 1969-70)
Units
1.95
0.4
1.73
1.30
30c
0.3
15
3.0d
8.2
8.6
79
0
1.3
0.5
0
0.7
7.39
1.54
6.60
5.05
280
42.1
56
17.6
72.5
277 3.1
399
478
29.7
12.9
118
9.2
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TABLE II-6 (continued)
1950-51 1955-56
Units Units
.Ratio to late
1960s peak
Ratio to late
Units 1960s peak
Late 1960s peak (1965-66
to 1969-70)
Units
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets,
and foils
Ingots
Sheets and circles
Foils
9 & 10. Fabricated steel
structures
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile
machinery
Looms
Ring spinning frames
Carding Engines
13. Machine toolse
14. Electric machinery
Power transformers
Electric motors
Switchgear
15. Commercial vehicles
and jeeps
Commercial vehicles
Jeeps
16. Dry and storage
batteries
Dry
Storage
17. Radios
18. Data processing
machines
19. Bicycles
20. Stationary diesel
engines
000 ton
000 ton
000 ton
3.5
4.3a
n.a.
000 ton n.a.
000 nos. 2.9
Rs.mil.
000 nos.
000 nos.
000 nos.
Rs.mil.
mil KVA
000 h.p.
Rs.mil.
n.a.
1.9
0.26
n.a.
3
0.18
99
n.a.
000 nos. 1.9 . 5
000 nos. 0 0
mil. nos.
000 nos.
000 nos.
137
200
54
nos. 0
mil.nos. 0.10
000 nos. 6 4 10 7
7.4
10.2
1.3
25
85
41
38
2 to 4
15.3
54
2.9
0.86
0.65
8 to 15
0.63
272
4
9.2
2.9
161
235
102
0
0.51
135.0
38.1
4.5
271
26.5
216
3.4
2.11
1.71
354
5.41
2291
170 b
35.9
10.4
469
1184
1748
3000
1.97
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TABLE II-6 (continued)
1950-51 1955-56
Ratio to late Ratio to late Late 1960s peak (1965-66
Units Units 1960s peak Units 1960s peak to 1969-70) Units
21. Automobile parts Rs. mil. n.a. 20 2 960
22. Vehicular engines 000 nos. 0 0 3.4a  42 8.1
23. Bicycle parts Rs. mil. n.a. 14 12 114
24. Electric fans mil.nos. 0.20 13 0.29 19 1.55
25. Building hardware 000 ton n.a. 3.5 38 9.2
26. Tires and tubes
Auto tires mil.nos. 0.86 35 0.88 35 2.48 c
Bicycle tires mil.nos. 3.95 18 5.75 26 22.34 c
Auto tubes mil.nos. 0.53 19 0.79 29 2.75c
a: 1952
b: 1965, not necessarily peak
c: 1967, not necessarily peak
d: Capacity, not production
e: Includes machine tool accessories and related items as well as metal-working machine tools and hence
is more inclusive than the definition of machine tools in Table II-9.
n.a.: not available.
Source: GOI, MCI, 1962b and 1962c; GOI, PC, and GOI, TC, publications listed in bibliography.
----- ;.~
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industries were started by 1950. The most important exceptions were
commercial vehicles (until about 1953 local operations were limited
to assembly), vehicular engines, and automobile parts. Although
Table 11-6 indicates a wide range among industries in the ratio of
output in 1950-51 to the peak achieved in the late 1960s, Tables 11-5,
11-7, and 11-8 indicate that aggregate employment and output in basic
metals and engineering industries in 1950-51 were about 15 percent of
the levels in 1966.
According to a RBI study, of the 495 private sector companies in
basic metals and engineering industries operating in 1964 with foreign
technical or financial collaboration, 100 or 20 percent were incorpor-
ated by the end of 1947.1
The conclusion one can draw from these data is that, while there
was a great expansion and diversification during 1951-1966, India began
the planning period with a substantial base in the iron and steel,
engineering, and tire industries.
C. Government Intervention in Industrialization after 1950
Government planning of economic development began in 1951 with a
series of five-year plans. The following features were characteristic
of the planning and promotion of industrial development, particularly
after the first plan and the initial foreign exchange crisis in 1956-58.
They had a major impact on the incentive to export engineering goods and
1GOI, RBI, 1968, pp. 12, 41, 69. For coverage of data see
Table II-11.
the cost of foreign exchange earned.l
(i) There was a strong, explicit bias toward autarchic development and
movement toward self-sufficiency in production, with discrimination in
direct controls and implicit exchange rates in favor of import substitu-
tion and against exports.
(ii) There was a strong bias toward allocation of resources to manufac-
turing, particularly basic metals, capital goods, and chemical indus-
tries, rather than agriculture or consumer goods, and there was a bias
toward investment rather than current production.
(iii) Political power and other goals constrained efficient allocation,
with biases toward regional balance and small scale and against major-
ity foreign ownership. There was substantial investment in government
sector companies in steel and engineering industries, particularly heavy
capital goods.
(iv) There was a tendency to plan total investment at a level beyond
feasible domestic savings and net foreign capital inflow, to underesti-
mate foreign exchange requirements of industrial investment and produc-
tion as well as other uses like food and military supplies, and to over-
estimate the rate of growth. High ex-ante absorption discouraged exports
and led to depletion of foreign exchange reserves, accumulation of a
large external debt, and after 1963-64 inflation. Plan targets could
1See Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, for a full discussion. See also
GOI, PC (Hazari), 1967b,and GOI, LSS, 1968, for a critical government
review of policies.
_ __ _ 
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not be achieved according to schedule and there were unintended imbal-
ances, with both shortages in capacity and production which could not
be covered by imports and excess capacity.
(v) There was a strong bias toward detailed bureaucratic allocation of
resources and controls over all aspects of industrial development and
trade rather than reliance on the market.
(vi) Within the sphere of decisions taken over by the government and
bureaucracy, detailed capacity and production targets were set without
reference to costs or detailed study of demand, and no attempt was made
to minimize the cost of achieving targets in selection or implementa-
tion of projects. According to Hazari:
The Planning Commission has never, on its own, set out the cri-
teria for fixation of priorities...To my knowledge, no exercise
has been undertaken to assess the relative costs of securing
additional output from existing against fresh investment or of
domestic manufacture against imports. Setting and licensing of
physical targets have not been reinforced with considerations
of unit costs and over-all financing.1
In the case of public sector investment and allocation of investment
licenses to the private sector, no attempt was made to choose efficient
project locations, scales, or technologies, even subject to the con-
straints in (iii). Import licenses and scarce materials like steel
were allocated without regard to efficiency and reallocation was pro-
hibited. Protection afforded by industrial and import licensing and
toleration of losses by public sector firms made socially inefficient
investments privately profitable or at least able to survive losses.
1GOI, PC (Hazari), 1967b, p. 19.
__ 
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(vii) Although other decisions were left to individual enterprises and
market mechanisms, government policy created incentives for substantial
social inefficiency in allocation of resources by these profit maximiz-
ing units. No upper limit was fixed on effective protection in manu-
facturing, and even operations with negative value added at international
prices were privately profitable. Regardless of domestic production
costs, quality, design, and service, import of a product was automat-
ically banned if it was manufactured in India, or where allowed import
was restricted to a point where effective protection and order backlogs
for domestic production remained high. Domestic content and export
requirements made production contingent on activities which independently
were not only privately unprofitable but highly inefficient. There
were wide variations in effective exchange rates for similar activities,
including export of different products. Allocation of inputs in rela-
tion to capacity encouraged expansion while there was excess capacity.
Foreign exchange, capital, and steel were underpriced. Protection,
excess capacity, price controls based on costs, and government procure-
ment rules emphasizing price reduced or eliminated the response of
profits to improvements in management of production, quality, marketing,
and design while dependence of profits on bureaucratic approvals and
allocations diverted entrepreneurial resources into government liaison.
There were many restrictions without economic rationale, and government
regulations not only constrained the set of actions which could be taken
to maximize profits but their complexity delayed and increased the cost
m
I__
of investment and operation.
In short, planned industrialization took place under a regime of
inefficient economic policies.
D. Industrial Structure in the 1960s
I. Level of Production
Table 11-7 shows capital, employment, output, and value added in
the basic metals and engineering industries in 1966, when these indus-
tries accounted for 30-36 percent of all Indian manufacturing activity
measured by inputs or outputs. At Indian prices the gross output of the
basic metals industries was $1040 million while the gross output of the
engineering industries (excluding aluminum) was $1840 million.1
Tables 11-8 and 11-9 show the increase in output in the aggregate
and for individual industries. For the aggregate, expansion was roughly
seven-fold between 1951 and 1970. Table 11-8 provides index numbers of
production while Table 11-9 provides data on capacity and production
from 1960-61 to 1969-70 for the 26 industries examined in detail in this
study. The production data are comparable to those for 1950-51 and
1955-56 in Table 11-6. However, capacity data are unreliable.2
The ratio of domestic production to imports of basic metals and
engineering goods indicates a high degree of self-sufficiency by
IVery roughly, at international prices these were $900 million
and $1300 million, respectively.
2See notes to Table 11-9.
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TABLE IL-7
Capital, Employent, Output, and Value Added in Production
of Basic Metals and Engineering Goods, 1966
Capktl Employment Output
($ mil) (000 workers) ($ mil)
Value Added
($ mil)
I. Basic Metals
Iron and steel
Non-ferrous metals
II. Engineering Goods
Total (I) - (II)
1825
1607
217
1689
3514
321
293
28
817
1138
1038
866
172
1839
2877
258
203
534
792
Notes:
Values converted at Rs. 7.50 = $U.S. $1
Capital includes fixed and working capital.
Value added excludes depreciation as well as current inputs.
Aluminum is included in "non-ferrous metals" and excluded from "engineer-
ing goods".
ASI data cover all units employing 10 or more persons with power or 20
or more persons without power, excluding factories under control of
the Ministry of Defence. Ministry of Defence factories manufacture
ammunition, weapons, motor vehicles, and military stores. It is reported
that "in 1968, the value of arms, ammunition and vehicles produced in
the Ordnance and Departmental factories exceeded Rs. 100 crores ($133
million) excluding clothing, high altitude equipment and general stores."
(Dagli, 1969, p. 195).
Source: GOI, CSO, Annual Survey of Industries (1966). Data are reproduced
in EE, 26 December 1969, pp. 1343-49.
_
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TABLE II-8
Index Numbers of Production of Basic Metals and Engineering Goods,
1951-1970
Basic Metals and
Engineering Goods
15
36
58
107
100
98
103
110
109
Basic Metals
25
30
62
95
100
96
102
110
108
Engineering Goods
11
39
57
112
100
99
103
109
109
a: January to May, 1970.
These are quantity indices at 1960 relative prices, scaled so that the
indices for 1966 equal 100.
Source: GOI, CSO, MSPSII, November-December 1968, and IEA, HS, 1969-70,
p.8.
Year
1951
1956
1961
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970a
_ _ =
TABLE II-9
Capacity and Production in Iron and Steel, Engineering, and Tire Industries, 1960-61 to 1969-70
1. Iron and Steel
(million tons)
Pig Iron
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 .1966-67 1967-68
2.82
4.31
153
5.64 5.64 5.64
6.53
116
5.64
6.67
118
5.64 5.64
7.09 7.00
126 124
5.64
6.89
122
1968-69 1969-70
8.00
7.29
91
8.96
7.39
82
1.16 1.09 1.18 1.01 1.22 1.50 1.54
Ingot steel
Finished
steel
2. Steel Pipes
and Tubes
(000 tons)
3. Bright Steel
Bars
(000 tons)
4. Iron and Steel
Castings
(000 tons)
1.57
3.42
218
4.57
4.3
94
4.57
5.4
118
4.57
5.94
130
4.57 4.57
6.14 6.53
134 143
1.76 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64 3.64
2.39 2.8 4.0 4.30 4.43 4.51
136 80 110 118 122 124
187
105
56
5.3
5.0
94
187
139
74
187 240
156 215
83 90
4.57
'.. 60
144
3.64
4.49
123
7.00
6.33
90
7.059
4.05
57
9.10 9.05f
6.51 6.43
72 71
6.90
4.90
71
7.05 f h
5.05
72
282 272 316 409 589 472
258 241 .265 213 256 280
91 89 84 52 43 59
28.7
14.0 29.6
103
30.7 50.8
29.2 25.2
95 50
50.8
34.0
67
57.5
42.1
73
196 193 280 282 330
188" 231 248 226 145
96 120 89 80 44
470 438
13 3c 
135c
28 31
Pig iron
for sale P 1.1 1.0 1.1
Cast Iron
Spun Pipes
_ ------------- --
TABLE II-9 (continued)
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 196.6-67 1967-68 1968-69
Iron Castingsd
Malleable Iron
Castingsd
Steel Castings
350
12 14 15e
123
53
43
410
283 176
43
38
14
37
118
50
42
24
11
46
185
47
25
1969-70
385
158
41
22
13
59
126
46
37
5. Steel Wire Ropes
(000 tons)
6. Electric Wires
and Cables
Aluminum Con-
ductors
(000 tons)
Bare Copper Con-
ductors
(000 tons)
Rubber and Plas-
tic Insulated
Cables (mil.
meters)
6.4
3.3
52
6.4
2.8
54
10.0
3.7
37
10.0 18.6
7.0 12.1
70 65
19.6 19.6 27.6 42.6 42.6
22.8 22.8 28.8 32.4 49.1
116 116 104 76 115
Ca 18.1
pb 9.9
U 55
239
209
87
18.1
7.6
42
239
210
88
18.1
4.9
27
362
276
76
18.1
4.4
24
18.1
5.3
29
362 362
320 373"
88 103
21.8
12.9
59
28.4 28.4
12.3 13.2
43 46
59.9 75.5
40.6 52.7
68 70
15.4 15.4
3.1 1.8
20 12
653 782
364 399
56 51
89.2
72.5
81
14.4
0.8
6
861
367
43
34.4 36.2
14.0 17.6
41 49
103.0
55.3
54
19.0
1.0
.5
858
376
44
94.8
62.6
66
14.4
2.1
15
883
395
45
II~~~_~ __ I~ ___
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TABLE II-9 (continued)
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
Paper Insulated Ca
Power Cables pb
(10 km) U
7. Hand, small,
and Cutting Tools
Hacksaw Blades
(mil.nos.)
Steel Files
(mil.nos.)
Tungsten Car-
bide (tons
Twist Drills
(mil.nos.)
38.0
11.8
31
4.6
3.0
65
3.1
1.5
50
38.0
19.2
51
44.9
17.5
39
5.3 6.6
3.6 6.0
68 91
3.5
2.7 3.8
108
44.9
21.5
48.
7.8
6.6
85
4.0
4.7
116
50.2
29.7
59
7.8
5.6
72
22
32
145
4.0
7.2
177
50.2
29.7
59
8.6
8.2
95
43.6.
19.7
45
10.4
9.7
93
6.9 10.2
8.0 7.7
117 76
43.6
26.4
61
10.4
10.3
99
10.2
7.6
75
10.1
.12.6 12.9
123
Forged Hand Ca
Tools (Rs.mil.) pb
U
Tungsten Car- Ca
bide Tipped pb
Tools (000 U
nos.)
31.0 36.4
26.7 31.3 42.6
101 117
880 930
660 560 540
64 58
62
92
147
62
121
195
142
206
145
142
246
173
142
316
223
637
478
75
637
435
68
836
245
29
944
241
26
1345
224
17
27.1
24.2
89
41.0
24.1
59
127
61
48
146
118
81
10.1
9.2
92
10.0
8.5
85
--- ; -- ------------------------------------
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8. Aluminum Ingots,
Sheets, and Foils
(000 tons)
Ingots
Sheets and Cicles
Foils
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68
18
18
101
20.4
16.3
80
2.0
3.0
148
53
54
101
53
55
103
73
.52
85
94
100
107
21.6 22.2 22.2 22.2 43.9 43.9 44.0
16.9 16.3 22.3 22.6 25.2 31.8 22.6
78 73 100 102 57 72 51
3.0
3.2
107
3.0
2.6
86
.3.0
2.4
81
3.0
2.6
87
6.5
2.7
42
6.5
3.9
60
6.5
4.5
69
1968-69 1969-70
117
125
107
60.6
35.2
58
6.5
4.0
62
169
135
80
60.6
38.1
63
6.5
4.3
66
9 & 10. Fabricated
Steel Structures
(000 tons)
Fabricated
structurals in-
cluding trans-
mission line
towers
Transmission
line towers
347
150 241J 2923
22 34
54 69
43 44 43
R 62
650
142
496
170
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TABLE II-9 (continued)
Fabricated steel
structurals
Light and mediumd
Ca
PC
Heavy
1960-61 1961-62 1962-6-3 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
300 125
113
102
90
234
e
71 54
136
77
57
138
24
17
11. Railway Wagons
(000 nos in terms
of 4-wheeelers)
12. Cotton Textile
Machinery (Rs.
million)
Looms (000 nos)
Ring spinning
frames (000
nos)
Carding engines
(000 nos)
Shuttles (000
nos)
10.8 16.8 25.2 30.0 24.2
120
104
87
10.6
5.6
53
125
125
100
10.6
7.6
72
2.04 2.04
1.13 1.40
55 69
C
a
pb
U
Ca
Pb
U
2.64
1.08
41
132
127
96
2.64
1.32
50
132
154
117
130
130
100
10.6
5.9
56
190
185
97
10.6
5.2
49
2.04 2.04
1.57 1.99
77 .98
2.40
1.50
63
132
184
139
2.40
1.60
67
132
181
137
220
216
98
14.4
3.6
25
3.76
2.24
60
2.56
1.97
77
29.9
26.5 15.0 12.0
40
400
216 169
42
8.1 8.2
3.4 2.5
42 30
1.68 1.68
2.11 1.21
126 72
1.08 1.08
1.71 0.88
158 81
132 132 132
191 120 114
145 91 86
400
158
40
8.7
1.7
20
1.68
1.14
68
1.08
0.45
42
132
90
68
34.1
13.4 12.0
35
400 .450
14 5c 139
c
36 31
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TABLE II-9 (continued)
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
175
205
117
13. Machine Tools
(Rs.million)
14. Electric ma-
chinery
301 324
232 270
77 83
Power Trans-
formers
(mil.KVA)
Electric
Motors (000
h.p.)
Motor Starters Ca
(000 nos) pb
U
15. Commercial Ve-
hicles and jeeps
(000 nos)
Commercial Ca
Vehicles Pb
1.25
1.28
102
600
696
116
1.25
1.80
144
600
828
138
108
1.40
2.30
164
1140
984
86
156
132
85
2.00 2.00 2.12 2.18
2.63 3.83 4.46 4.95
132 192 210 227
1140
1188.
104
204
192
94
1140 1356
1435 1756
126 129
204
225
110
1356
2095
154
276 288
311 426
113 148
27.5 25.6 26.9 28.4 36.9 35.4 35.6
5.07
5.33
105
1416
2030
143
294
419
143
5.73
4.80
84
6.00
5.41
90
2548 2980
2130 2291
84 77
234
360
154
378
453
120
62.0 57.0 57.5
30.8 35.9 35.5
50 63 62
Jeeps
8.9 10.4 - 10.1
10.0 10.0
4.4 7.8
44 78
381
196
51
509
180
35
514c
206
40
10.0
8.5
85
7.1 7.6 8.25.5
TABLE II-9 (continued)
16. Dry and storage
batteries
Dry (mil.
nos.)
Storage (000
nos.)
17. Radios (000 nos.)
18. Data Processing
Machines (nos.)
19. Bicycles (mil.
nos.)
20. Stationary diesel
engines (000 nos)
21. Automobile parts
(Rs. million)
Major itemsm
(Rs. million
1960-61
224
208
93
379
508
134
280
269
96
1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
224
214
95
379
521
137
280
326
117
224
240
107
379
565
149
332
343
103
224
276
123
660
691
105
390
418
107
224
298
133
660
774
117
390
510
131
289
284
98
673
708
105
391
606
155
289
359
124
673
753
112
492
760
154
359
316
88
796
815
102
439
436
99
479
469
98
782 1068
938 1184
120 111
800 799
925 1483
116 186
2330
1748
75
4024 4024 4024
66 583 1034 2002 2230 2793 3000
55 69 75
1.07
1.05
99
36
442
116
1.21 1.44
1.05 1.12
87 78
41
45
108
41
43
103
1.44 1.68 1.68 1.68
1.17 1.44 1.57 1.58
81 86 94 94
44
56
127
49
74
152
72
93
129
72
112
155
pb 120
1.68
1.68
100
125
114
91
840
97 156 234 321 402
2.18
1.97
91
2.18
1.93
89
150
116
77
840
635
150
143
95
960
557 551
TABLE II-9 (continued)
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
22. Vehicular engines
(000 nos)
Engine partsm
(Rs.million)
23. Bicycle parts
(Rs.million)
-24. Electric fans
(mil.nos.)
25. Builders'hard-
wared (000 tons)
26. Tires and tubes
Auto tires (mil.
nos.)
Bicycle tires
(mil.nos.)
Off-the-road
tires
(000 nos.)
6.0
10.6
176
6.0
9.8
164
9.0 9.0
8.4 9.0
93 100
81 104 139
37 57
0.89
1.07
120
0.87
1.01
116
10.9
9.2
84
1.34
1.37
102
9.0
8.2
91
176
61 71 89
1.38 1.38
1.13 1.14
82 83
1.48
1.27
86
8.3
1.51
1.56
103
14.5 16.9
10.8 11.4
75 67
3.00 3.00
3.43 6.18
114 206
1.76 2.18
1.72 1.93
97 88
13.7 14.2
11.9 14.2
87 100
4.20
6.86
163
6.60
8.33
126
2.50
2.09
84
14.2
16.2
114
10.00
9.3
93
9.0 9.0
8.1 6.8
90 76
9.0
2.3
26
9.0 9.0
2.5 2.7
28 30
212 261 291 327
96 102
1.52
1.36
89
114 106 93
1.52 1.58 1.49
1.36 1.38 1.49
89 87 100
11.0 2.2
9.2 9 .0e 7.0 0.8
64 36
2.47 2.60
2.35 2.35
95 90
16.6
18.1
109
10.20
7.9
78
1.82'
1.55
85
4.2
4.7
112
2.75
2.47
90
19.4 20.5
19.7 22.3
101 109
10.2
8.4
83
12.5
7.3
58
Pb
TABLE II-9 (continued)
1960-61 1961-62 1962-63 1963-64 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
Auto tubes (mil.nos.) Cc  1.24 1.53 1.76 1.92 2.53 2.46 2.61 2.80
pC 1.28 1.49 1.64 2.03 2.21 2.36 2.21 2.76
U 104 99 93 106 87 96 84 99
Notes to Table II-9
Data are for fiscal years and from sources listed below except as footnoted:
a: Calendar years through 1966-67,.i.e., 1960 for 1960-61, etc; March 1967 for 1967-68; April 1968 for
1968-69; December 1969 for 1969-70.
b: Calendar years through 1963-64, i.e., 1960 for 1960-61, etc.
c: Calendar years, i.e., 1960 for 1960-61, etc.
d: Some small units covered by data up to January 1968 were dropped in January 1968.
e: Estimated by IEA.
f: Arya, 1969, pp. 4, 48.
g: GOI, MSHI, 1969.
h: 10.37 counting re-rollers.
j: IEA.
k: GOI, MCI, 1962c.
m: All India Association of Automobile and Ancillary Industries Association data, cited by Krueger, 1970, p. 63.
C: Installed capacity
P: Production
U: (P/C) x 100.
Blank: Not available. Lines for "C" and "U" have been omitted when capacity data were not available.
Sources: GOI, CSO, MSPSII, November-December 1968, and data reproduced in IEA, HS 1967, 1968-68, 1969-70.
The CSO gets its data from the DGTD, except for textile machinery (Textile Commissioner), railway wagons
(Railway Board), and iron and steel (Iron and Steel Controller). These government offices in turn esti-
mate the figures for production from returns submitted voluntarily by firms. Data cover only firms in the
"organized sector," i.e., units with fixed assets of more than $100,000. Small firms not covered by the
data accounted for a significant minority (over 10 per cent) of production in a number of industries, e.g.,
iron castings, electric motors, radios, bicycles, stationary diesel engines, automobile parts, bicycle parts,
electric fans, and builders' hardware.
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TABLE II-9 (continued)
Sources:
The capacity and utilization data in Table II-9 have not been used in the analysis in this study, which
has relied on information from interviews, company and trade association reports, and industry studies.
Apart from the problem of an economic definition of capacity, there are many weaknesses in the official
data: (i) there is no uniformity or consistency in the number of shifts at which capacity is measured;
(ii) assumptions about the per cent of purchased parts are not explicit; (iii) there are possibilities
for substitution between industries, especially in multi-industry firms; (iv) data sometimes include
capacity which has been licensed but has not yet been installed, while neglecting capacity which has been
installed without licenses either illegally or in the small scale sector which is exempt from licensing;
(v) because maintenance import licensing sometimes depended on capacity, there was an incentive for
firms to overstate capacity. For documentation of these weaknesses, see GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report,
p. 37, and NCAER, 1966a, p. vi. Comparisons with information in annual reports of major firms and
trade association data revealed numerous discrepancies, e.g., railway wagons, transformers.
The capacity data are based on the following numbers of shifts per day:
(i) one shift, industries 3, 4, 7 (except ingots), 8, 14, 15, 16 (dry), 17, 19, 20, 22, 24;
(ii) two shifts, 2, 5, 6, 11, 13, 16 (storage);
(iii) continuous production, 1, 7 (ingots);
(iv) not available, 9, 10, 12, 18, 25, 26. (GOI, RBI, Bulletin, April 1969, pp. 487-90.)
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1968-69.1 The major imports were mild steel flat products, alloy and
special steels, non-ferrous metals, components, and capital goods of
types not produced in India. In 1968-69 imported basic metals worth
$234 million and engineering goods worth $704 million accounted for
about 20 percent and 30-35 percent, respectively, of total supplies
at international prices. 2
2. Scale of Production
Table 1-10 lists the largest manufacturers of engineering goods
by sales in 1967. Excluding the four producers of aluminum (nos. 9, 12,
50, and 55), the 58 producers of engineering goods in Table II-10
accounted for $1085 million in sales in 1967 or about 50 to 60 percent
of the total in the same industries for all firms covered by the Annual
Survey of Industries (ASI). Virtually all pig iron and semi-finished
steel and about 80 percent of finished steel was produced by three inte-
grated producers, HSL, TISCO, and IISCO.3 Seven firms produced motor
vehicle tires.
1See Desai, 1969, and Ahmad, 1966, for studies of import substi-
tution.
2For import data see IEA, HS 1967, p. 57, and HS 1969-70, p. 199.
For details of mild steel imports, see Table II-3. According to GOI,
MIDCA, 1969, p. 19, imports accounted for 21 percent of plant and ma-
chinery supplies in 1966-67 and 1967-68.
3 Sales in 1967 were: HSL, $308.0 million; TISCO, $176.3 million;
IISCO, $96.3 million.
4Sales in 1967 were: Dunlop India, $86.9 million; Goodyear India,
$29.9 million; Ceat Tyres, $24.4 million; Madras Rubber Factory, $18.7
million; Premier Tyres, $13.5 million; Inchek Tyres, $11.3 million;
Firestone, sales data not available.
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TABLE II-10
Production and Exports of the 62 Largest Producers of Engineering Goods Measured by 1967 Sales,
Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
1. Tata Engineering and
Locomotive (TELCO)
(c) Tata 1945
very small % W.Ger.
2. Hindustan Motors
(c) Birla 1942
very small % U.K.
3. Hindustan Aero-
nautics
(a) government 1964
4. Guest, Keen, Williams
(b) 60% U.K. 1933
5. Ashok Leyland
(b) 60% U.K. 1948
6. Premier Automobiles
(c) v#alchand 1948
very small % Italy
7. Union Carbide
(b) 60% U.S. 1926-34
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
1967-68 to 1969-70
Products
Yes Commercial vehicles, loco-
motives, industrial shunters,
excavators, machine tools
Yes Passenger cars, commercial
vehicles, excavators
Yes Airplanes
Yes Fasteners, railway track
material, bright steel
bars, (also steel re-
rolling, alloy steels)
Yes Commercial vehicles
Yes Passenger cars, commercial
vehicles
Yes Dry batteries, flashlights,
(also chemicals)
Last Sales, Com-
Month of pany year
Company ending 4/67-
Ypar 3/68,etc.
March
March
March
Dec.
Sept.
June
Dec.
126.7
n.a
n.a
56.7
n.a.
n.a.
55.2
n.a.
n.a.
38.4
n.a.
n.a.
37.1
n.a.
38.7
n.a.
35.7
40.3
35.6
45.3
58.7
Exports
4/61-3/68
etc.
1.69
4.17
9.63
n.a.
n.a.
1.42
0.08
n.a.
n.a.
0.71
1.19
0.75
0.04
0.61
0.78
0.04
n.a.
0.63
1.34
1.03
Exports as
percent of
sales
1.3
3.3
7.6
n.a.
n.a.
2.5.
0.1
n.a.
n.a.
1.9
3.1
2.0
0.1
1.6
2.0
0.0
0.1
n.a.
1.8
3.0
1.8
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TABLE II-10 (continued)
Comrpany
Affiliation/Date Establ.
8. Metal 3ox
(b) 60% U.K. 1933
9. Hindustan Aluminium
(c) Birla 1958
27% U.S.
10. Philips India
(b) 52% Nleth. 1930(?)
11. Indian Tube
(c) Tata
minority U.K. 1954
12. Indian Aluminium(b) 65% Canada 1938
13. Mahindra and Mahindra
(c) Mahindra
15% U.S. 1945
14. Siemens India
(b) 51% W. Ger. 1956
Khatau
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Yes
Yes
Yes
Products
Crown corks, tinplate con-
tainers, sealing machines
Aluminum
Last
Month of
Company
Year
March
Dec.
Radios and components, electric
lamps, electronic components Dec.'
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes
Yes
Yes
15. Indian Telephone Industries Yes
(a) Govt. 1950
Aluminum
Dec.
Dec.
Oct.Jeeps
Electric machinery
Telephone equipment
n.a.
Mar.
Sales, Com-
pany year
ending 4/67-
3/68, etc.
33.1
34.0
36.0
32.3
45.7
53.1
31.2
n.a.
40.3
S29.2
32.4
33.2
28.8
28.1
35.2
28.4
n.a.
35.4
26.8
n.a.
n.a.
26.5
n.a.
28.0
Exports Exports as
4/67-3/68,percent of
etc. sales
0.54
0.63
0.85
0.35
8.23
5.95
0.02
0.26
1.07
1.13
2.53
3.68
0.23
1.90
0.32
0.00
0.03
1.63
0.37
0.38
0.67
0.69
0.96
1.34
1.6
1.9
2.4
1.1
18.0
11.2
0.1
0.8
2.7
3.9
7.8
11.1
0.8
6.8
0.9
0.0
0.1
4.6
1.4
1.4
2.5
2.6
3.6
4.8
TABLE II-10 (continued)
Comoany
Affiliation/Date Establ.
16. Larsen and Toubro
(d) Independent 1938/46
some Denmark
17. Simpson
(c) Simpson 1840/1953
18. Crompton Greaves
(c) Thapur
50% U.K.
1937
19. Kirloskar Oil Engines
(c) Kirloskar 1946
20. Hindustan Machine Tools
(IHMT)
(a) Govt. 1953
21. Bharat Electronics
(a) Govt. 1954
22. Escorts
(d) Independent 1944
1% U.S.
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Yes
Yes
Yes
Products
Machinery and equipment
for dairy, chemical, etc.
industries; electric machin-
ery, petrol pumps
Vehicular diesel engines,
automobile parts, commercial
vehicle bodies
Electric machinery, electric
fans
Yes Stationary diesel engines
Yes
Yes
Yes
Machine tools, watches
Electronic equipment
Pistons, motor cycles,
tractors and implements,
X-ray equipment
Last
Month of
Company
Year
Mar.
n.a.
June
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Dec.
Sales, Com-
pany year
ending 4/67-
3/68 etc.
24.9
31.2
31.2
23.7@
n.a.
n.a.
21.1
n.a.
27.1
20.8
30.0#
31.2
20.0
19.6
20.5
18.3
27.6
n.a.
17.9
n.a.
n.a.
Exports Exports as
4/67-3/68 percent of
etc. sales
0.13
0.25
0.58
0.01
0.06
0.19
0.18
0.21
n.a.
1.27
1.31
1.44
0.39
1.21
1.32
0.01
0.07
n.a.
0.04
0.02
0.21
0.5
0.8
1.9
0.0
0.3
0.8
0.9
1.0
n.a.
6.1
4.4
4.6
2.0
6.2
6.4
0.0
0.3
n.a.
0.2
0.1
1.2 00
... -------- ; - ;--
Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
23. Jessop
(d) Independent 1788/
1932
50% Govt.after 1968
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
TABLE 11-10 (continued)
Products
Railway wagons, fabricated
Yes steel structures, road
rollers
Last
Month of
Company
Year
Oct.
Sales, Com- Exports Exports as
pany Year
ending 4/67-
3/68, etc.
17.2
16.3
18.7
4/67-3/68percent of
etc. sales
0.32
2.98
0.96
1.9
18.3
5.1
24. Jay Engineering
(c) Shri Ram 1935
25. Indian Cable
(b) 40% U.K. (control)
1920
26. Heavy Electricals,
Bhopal
(a) Govt. 1956
27. Central India
Machinery Mfg.
(c) Eirla 1943
28. Textile Machinery
Corp. (TEYXMACO)
(c) Birla 1939
29. Tube Investments
(b) Over 50% U.K.1949
Murugappa Chettiar
30. Motor Industries (MICO)
(b) Over 50% W. Ger. 1951
Yes Electric fans, sewing
machines
Yes Electric wires and cables
Yes Heavy electrical machinery
n.a. Cotton textile machinery,
railway wagons, fabricated
steel structures
Yes Cotton textile machinery,
railway wagons, machine
tools
Yes Bicycles and parts, steel
tubes
Yes Automobile parts
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Dec.
July
n.a.
16.5
19.3
21.3
15.9
n.a.
n.a.
14.8
32.0
n.a.
13.9
n.a.
n.a.
13.6
n.a.
n.a.
13.3
n.a.
n.a.
13.3@
n.a.
n.a.
1.59
1.78
1.86
0.70
0.89
1.30
0.00
0.02
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.01
2.81
0.73
2.11
0.33
0.50
0.70
0.21
0.50
0.81
9.6
9.2
8.7
4.4
5.6
8.2
0.0
0.1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.1
20.7
5.4
15.5
2.5
3.8
5.3
1.6 o
3.8
6.1
w~" "~ ~"~ '~'-~~ -- ----'
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TABLE II-10 (continued)
Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
al. il.oskar rothers
(c) Kirloskar 1920
32. Hindustan Brown
Boveri
(b) over 50% Switz. 1942
33. Braithwaite
(c) Jardine Henderson
1930
34. Bharat Steel Tubes
(d) Independent? 1962
39% TU.S.
35. Kirloskar Electric
(c) Kirloskar n.a.
36. Associatea Electrical
Industries (AEI)
(b) 100% U.K. 1924
37. Sen Raleigh
(d) Independent 1949
17% U.K. at
least, probably
substantially more
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Last
Month of
Company
Yealr
rto Y ea rf
Products
Yes Agricultural machinery,
pumps, machine tools
Yes Electric machinery, electric
cables
Yes Railway wagons, fabricated
steel structures, road
rollers
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Electric machinery
Yes Electric machinery
Yes Bicycles and parts
July
April
Dec.
Mar.
June
Oct.
Sept.
Sales, Com- Exports Exports as
pany Year
Ending 4/67-
I/68 ecr+r
13.1
13.1
16.9
n.a.
12.7
14.1
12.4
7.2
12.0
11.6
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
11.5
n.a.
11.5
n.a.
n.a.
10.4
11.2
10.8
4/67-3/68 percent
etc. of sales
0.22
0.26
0.29
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.05
4.22
0.67
1.49
2.61
3.17
0.10
0.19
0.63
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.25
0.28
0.24
1.7
2.0
1.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.4
58.6
5.6
12.8
22.5
27.3
0.9
1.7
5.5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2.4
2.5
2.2
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TABLE 11-10 (continued)
Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
38. Aluminium Industries
(c) Seshasayee
small % France
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
1946
39. Tractors and Farm
Equipment n.a.
(c) 51% Simpson
49% Canada through U.K. sul
40. Bajaj Auto
(c) Bajaj 1945
41. National Engg.
Industries
(c) Birla
42. Bajaj Electricals
(c) Bajaj
n.a.
1938
43. Orient General Industries
(c) Birla 1954
44. Cooper Engineering
(c) Walchand
45. Kamani Engg. Corp.
(c) Kamani
1922/1940
Products
Yes Electric cables
Yes Tractors
Yes Motor scooters and three-
wheelers
Yes Bearings, axle boxes for
railway wagons
Yes Electric machinery, appli-
ances, instruments
Yes Electric fans, automobile
parts, electric machinery
Yes Stationary diesel engines,
cotton textile machinery,
machine tools
n.a. Yes Transmission line towers
Last
Month of
Company
Year
Mar.
n.a.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
June
Sept.
Sales, Com-
pany Year
Ending 4/67-
3/66, etc.
10.4
6.1
8.9
9.7@
n.a.
n.a.
9.6
n.a.
n.a.
9.1@
n.a.
n.a.
9.1
7.6
8.3
8.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
8.7
n.a.
8.5
Exports Exports as
4/67-3/68 percent
etc. of sales
0.09
0.12
0.28
0.08
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.03
0.02
n.a.
0.15
0.05
n.a.
0.51
0.64
0.70
0.17
0.20
0.41
1.61
n.a. 1.12
11.7 6.21
0.9
2.0
3.1
0.0
0.8
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.3
0.2
n.a.
1.6
0.7
n.a.
5.7
7.2
7.9
2.0
2.3
4.7
18.9
13.2
53.1
- -
TABLE 1I-10 (continued)
Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
46. Hindustan Cables
(a) Govt.
47. Automobile Products
of India
(d) Independent
48. Cable Corp. of India
(c) Khatau
26% W. Ger.
Foreign
Collabo-
rain
1952
1949
1957
49. National Machinery Manu-
facturers
(d) Independent 1947
.50. Madras Aluminium
(c) Naidu
20% Italy
51. Electric Const. and
Equip.
(c) Birla
52. Atlas Cycle Industries
n.a.
1945
n.a.
53. Voltas (Thana Works)
(c) Tata n.a.
12% U.K. and Sweden
Products
Yes Telecommunication cables
Yes Motor scooters, auto-
mobile parts
Yes Electric wires and
cables
n.a. Cotton textile
machinery
Yes Aluminum
1960
Yes Electric machinery
Yes Bicycles and parts
Last
Month of
Company
Year
Mar.
July
Sales, Com-
pany Year
Ending 4/67-
3/68. etc.
8.4@
12.1
n.a.
8.4
n.a.
n.a.
Dec. - 8.4
n.a.
n.a.
Dec.
Dec.
Oct.
Dec.
Yes Airconditioners, refrig., Aug.
fork lift trucks, water well
drills
8.3
7.9
8.1
8.1
7.8
8.5
8.0
9.2
8.4.
7.7
8.9
9.2
7.7
n.a.
n.a.
Exports Exports as
4/67- percent of
3/68 etc. sales
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.01
0.07
0.26
0.84
0.48
n.a.
n.a.
0.75
0.14
0.09
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.11
0.16
0.42
0.00
0.02
0.19
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.1
0.8
3.1
10.0
5.7
n.a.
n.a.
9.3
1.7
1.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1.4
1.8
4.6
0.0
0.3
2.5
Year.3.6 . e --c.
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Company
Affiliation/Date Establ.
54. International Tractor
(c) Mahindra
Tata (Voltas)
17% U.S. through
U.K. sub.
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
1963
Yes
TABLE II-10 (continued)
Last Sales, Com-
Month of pany Year
Products
Tractors and implements
Company
Year
Mar.
Ending 4/67-
3/68, etc
7.6
9.6
13.1
Exports Exports
4/67-3/68 as per-
etc. cent of
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
sales
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
55. Aluminium Corp. of India
(c) Singhania 1937
56. Bharat Earth Movers
(a) Govt.
57. Kalinga Tubes
n.a.
58. Universal Cables
(c) Birla'
some U.K.
1964
n.a.
1945-61
59. Hyderabad Allwyn Metal
(c) Birla
60. Burn and Co.
(c) Martin Burn
some U.K. 1774
1942
-1895
61. Associated Battery (ABMEL)
(b) 30% + UK (control) 1947
62. Zenith Steel Pipes
(c) Birla 1960
Yes Aluminum, electric cables
Yes Earth-moving equipment,
rail coaches
n.a. Steel pipes and .tubes
Yes Electric wires and cables
Yes Refrigerators, bus bodies,
steel furniture
n.a. Railway wagons, fabricated
steel structures
Yes Storage batteries
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
Mar.
April
April
Aug.
April
7.6
8.1
n.a.
7.5
28.7
n.a.
7.3@
n.a.
n.a.
7.3
n.a.
n.a.
7.2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.2
n.a.
6.9
7.9
8.9
n.a.
6.8
9.3
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.0
0.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.52
0.20
0.57
0.52
0.01
0.02
n.a.
0.00
0.03
*
0.59
0.81
0.67
2.04
2.10
2.51
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.0
0.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
7.1
2.7
7.8
7.1
0.1
0.3
n.a.
0.0
0.4
0.0
8.6
10.3
7.5
30.0
30.9
27.0
~--- Y hrrl_.~V.
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NOTES TO TABLE II-10
Affiliation: (see part II.D.3 for details)
a: government
b: foreign majority
c: large industrial house
d: independent
Foreign collaboration: "Yes" means that there was over 10 per cent
ownership by a foreign company or there was (or had been) a foreign
technical collaboration agreement covering part of production.
Sales: sales are for the three company years ending between April and
March of fiscal 1967-68, 1968-69, and 1969-70.
Exports: exports are for the three fiscal years April-March 1967-68,
1968-68, 1969-70.
Export as percent of sales: percentage calculated for exports and
sales on the same line; where the value of sales for the year was
not available, the last available year's sales was used. This
calculation leads to a minor overestimate of the ratio of exports
to sales in value terms.
*: exports less than $0.005 million.
@: 1966 or 1966-67.
?: questionable.
n.a.: not available
Sources: Sales for 1967-68: Commerce, Annual Number 1968, pp. 308-316.
Exports: Table II-18 and EEPC.
Affiliation: GOI, MIDITCA, 1969; Directory
of Foreign Collaborations in India, Vols. 1
and 2, 1968 and 1969, and a large number of
other sources.
_ ~E~i_ _I __
An ESRF study reports that in the period 1964-65 to 1966-67 there
were 166 firms in the basic metals and engineering industries with paid-
up capital of $0.67 million or more each. The annual average of their
total sales in the three-year period was $1723 million, or 58 percent of
the total in the same industries for all firms covered by the 1965 ASI.1
The 1250 firms with an investment of $67,000 or more each ac-
counted for $2361 million in production or 80 percent of the total in
the basic metals and engineering industries for all firms covered by the
ASI in 1965. The remaining $580 million in production or 20 percent of
the total was accounted for by 10,277 small firms with an investment of
less than $67,000 each. 2
3. Ownership and Control
Indian industrial firms can be divided into four groups on the
basis of ownership and control: (a) government firms; (b) foreign
'majority' subsidiaries, including firms with over 50 percent ownership
by a foreign company and firms with over 25 percent foreign ownership
and no single Indian investor with as large a share of the equity; (c)
firms belonging to 73 large Indian industrial houses, including some
foreign 'minority' firms with 50 percent or less foreign ownership;3
1 ESRF, 1967, p. 11. See also GOI, RBI, 1970.
GOI, CSO, ASI (1965). Data are reproduced in IEA, HS 1969-70,
p. 152. The small firms accounted for 6 percent of total fixed capital,
28 percent of total employees, and 16 percent of total value added. An
exchange rate of Rs. 7.5 = $1 has been used rather than the official
rate before the 1966 devaluation.
3Classification of large industrial houses is based on the report
of the Dutt Committee, GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Appendix 2.
II
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(d) independent firms not falling in the above three groups, including
some foreign 'minority' firms.
These forms of ownership have been distinguished for the large
firms in Table II-10 and, to the extent possible, for the exporters in
Table 11-18. Of the 62 firms producing engineering goods with the high-
est sales in 1967, seven belonged to group (a), 13 to group (b), 33 to
group (c), seven to group (d), and two could not be classified.1 Eleven
of the firms in groups (c) and (d) were foreign 'minority' firms with
more than 10 percent foreign ownership. Thus in the case of 24 of the
60 classified firms over 10 percent of the equity was held by a foreign
company. However, small amounts of foreign ownership are difficult to
identify, and it is quite likely that in the case of a few other firms
10 to 25 percent of the equity was held by foreign companies.
The data in Table II-11 show that in 1963-64 production by the
64 firms in the basic metals and engineering industries with over 50
percent foreign ownership was $297 million while production by the 146
firms with 50 percent of less (but some) foreign ownership was $428
million. On the basis of data in Tables 11-7 and II-8, this indicates
that roughly 40 percent of production in these industries, excluding
iron and steel where there was no foreign ownership, for all firms cov-
ered by the ASI was by firms with foreign equity participation.2 Of the
firms with over 50 percent foreign ownership, 22 were incorporated
In two cases (nos. 18 and 37), firms classified in groups (c)
and (d) may have belonged to group (b).
2 In this calculation the same exchange rate was used for 1963-64
and 1966.
TABLE II-11
Foreign Investment and Technical Collaboration in the Private Sector of the Basic Metals and
Engineering Industries, 1963-1964
($ million)
Equity Capital
Percent
Total Foreign Foreign Capital Employed Production
Firms with foreign equity
Over 50 per cent foreign
50 per cent or less foreign
Firms with foreign technical
collaboration only
TOTAL
210 286
64 107
146
285
495
179
n.a.
Coverage: "Limited" companies with foreign investment on 31 March 1964 and limited companies with
foreign technical collaboration on any date between 1 April 1961 and 31 March 1964.
Foreign branches (e.g. IBM) and companies whose technical collaboration agreements
had expired by 1 April 1961 are excluded.
Source: GOI, RBI, 1968, pp. 12, 22, 41, 51, 116, 122, 126.
Number
of Firms
127 1003
360
643
n.a.
127
726
297
428
540
1266
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before 1948, including several of the firms in Table 11-4. In spite of
a general policy not to allow foreign ownership greater than 50 percent,
the government approved 10 cases in 1948-1955 and 32 in 1956-1964.
Beginning in 1950 the central government became a major investor
in the iron and steel and engineering industries. Central government
investment at the end of 1968-69 is reported to have been $1740 million
in iron and steel and $1280 million in engineering industries. Table
11-12 lists the 13 government firms with the largest investments. Al-
though data on the value of capital are difficult to interpret, rough
comparisons indicate that in 1969 somewhat more than half of total
capital in basic metals and engineering industries in firms covered by
the ASI was in the public sector, concentrated in steel and heavy
capital goods. However, except in steel these investments were not
fully reflected in production data: judging from the data in Table II-
12, public sector plants accounted for only about 20 percent of produc-
tion of engineering goods in 1968-69.
4. Foreign Technical Collaboration
Production of basic metals and engineering goods in the 1960s was
heavily dependent on foreign technical collaboration. Table 11-13 shows
that between 1957 and 1969 the government approved 1616 foreign collab-
oration agreements in the basic metals and engineering industries. In
1964, in addition to the 210 firms with some foreign ownership,
IEA, HS 1969-70, p. 260. These figures may not include invest-
ments by the Ministry of Defence (see notes to Table 11-7) and the
Ministry of Railways (see nos. 9-11 in Table 11-12.)
--~ - =~ --
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TABLE II-12
Investment, Employment, Sales, and Exports for Major Public Sector Iron and Steel and
Engineering Firms, 1968-69
Capital
Firm
I. Iron and Steel
1. Hindustan Steel
Date
* Establ.
** Prod.
* 1954
** 1959
II. Engineering Goods
Total(2)-(10), (12)-(13)
2. Heavy Engineering * 1958
Corp.
3. Hindustan Aero-
nautics
4. Bharat Heavy
Electricals
* 1964a
* 1964
** 1965
5. Heavy Electricals * 1956
(India) ** 1960
6. Mining and Allied * 1965C
Machinery Corp.
7. Hindustan Machine * 1953
Tools (HMT) ** 1956
Investment
by end of
1968-69
($ mil.)
1465
1126 f
299
263
216
149
70
39
Cost of
Project
by end of
1967-68
($ mil.)
1491
907
284
137
190
99
39
49
Employ- Sales
ment
1967-68 1968-49
(000 workers) ($ milJ
119
n.a.
n.a.
30
14
15
7
13
427
306
Exports 1968-69
Value
($ mil.)
55.40
3.29
Percent
of Sales
13.0
1.1
0.1
0.0
0.02 0.1
0.0
1.21 5.8
I
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TABLE II-12 (continued)
Date Capital
* Establ. Investment Cost of
** Prod. by end of Project Employ-
1968-69 by end of ment
1967-68 1967-68
($ mil.) ($ mil.) (000 workers)
Sales Exports 1968-69
Percent
1968-69 Value of Sales
($ mil) ($ mil)
8. Bharat Earth Movers
9. Integral Coach Factory
(ICF)
10. Diesel Locomotive Works
11. Chittaranjan Locomotive
Works
12. Bharat Electronics
13. Indian Telephone
Industries (ITI)
* 1964
b
** 1968
** 1955
** 1964
* 1950
* 1954
** 1956
22
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
15
26
20e
20e
1 9 e
13
5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
* 1950
29 0.0
9 0.95 10.6
20 0.0
n.a.
28 0.07 0.3
28 0.96 3.4
Notes to Table 11-12:
*: date established.
**s date of initial production.
a: formed by merger of existing companies, one of which was established in 1940.
b: coach-building division was established 1948.
c: established to take over part of (2) set up earlier, about 1962.
d: 1967-68.
e:-original cost of project when set up.
f: includes cost of project for (9)-(11).
g: 0.03 in 1969-70.
h: .0.06 in 1969-70.
Source: IEA, HS, 1969-70, pp. 89-108, 264-66; GOI, EEPC; Table 11-18.
Firm
~i
-- - - - -- - -- -------- -- ------- ------- - -- ------- -
0.0 
h
n.a.: not available.
TABLE 11-13
Foreign Collaboration Agreements Approved, 1948-1970
Number of Agreements Approved
Year All Activities Basic Metals and
Engineering Industries
(a) (b)
1948-1955 36
(average per year)
1956 82
1957 81 26
1958 103 27
1959 52
1960 201
1961 223
1962 135
1963 161
1964 197 206
1965 125 145
1966 157 147
1967 119
1968 101
1969 92
1970 (Jan.-June) 67
Notes: The reason for the difference between (a) and (b) could not be
determined.
Not all agreements which were approved were implemented.
Coverage: new agreements, amendments, and renewals.
Source: All Activities: GOI, RBI, 1968, p. 4.
Basic Metals and Engineering: (a) Directory of Foreign Collabora-
tions in India, 1968, Vol. 1, Section 2, p. 135;
(b) IEA, HS, 1969-70, p. 253.
ii
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285 private sector firms and all important government firms in these
industries had foreign technical collaboration for at least part of
their production. Tables II-10 and 11-18 indicate firms at which at
least part of production was under foreign technical collaboration.
While this information is incomplete, in the case of at least 58 of
the 62 firms in Table II-10 and 71 of the 100 firms in Table 11-18
there was over 10 percent ownership by a foreign company or a foreign
technical collaboration agreement.
E. Costs and Prices of Engineering Goods
This section presents evidence on the ratio of Indian private
costs and prices to international prices of engineering goods in the
1960's.2 These comparisons are summarized in Table II-14 and are dis-
cussed below.
This evidence indicates that, at the official exchange rate and
without export subsidies, export prices of many engineering goods would
not have covered average costs of production, even before allowing for
considerations like inefficient designs and discounts below prices
charged by suppliers in advanced countries. It should be emphasized that
while high ratios of domestic costs or prices to international prices
may indicate the extent of nominal protection of production for the
See Table II-11 for production by the private sector firms in
1963-64. For a list of foreign collaboration agreements by public
sector firms, see Dagli, 1969, pp. 236-44, and see IEA, HS 1969-70,
pp. 89-108.
2Additional data for tradable inputs are presented in Chapter
IV.C.
~
TABLE II-14
Cost of Engineering Goods in India
Text Product
Ref-
erence
Companies Years
Pro-
Import Date
Con-
duced tent
Nature of
Cost Comparison
Indian
Ratio of Indian to
Foreign Cost/
Foreign Price
India
(i) DGTD engineering
goods and
chemicals
(ii) Com- electrical
pany equipment
state-
ments
electronic
computer,
ICL 1901A
tractor
passenger
car, Fiat
ship an-
cillary
equipment
(iii) Baran- diesel
son engine,
Cummins
products in
which there
was import
substitution
in 1960-67
Siemens in
India and
West Ger-
many
Bharat Elec-
tronics &
ICL, UK
HMT & Czech
collaborator
2 to 9 n.a. 1969
several low exc. 1967
non-
* ferrous
metals
1 high
4 20%
Premier Auto- many
mobiles &
Fiat, Italy
15%
unspecified unspec. unspec.
Kirloskar 1 85%
Cummins &
Cummins Engine,
U.S.
cost
cost
1970 cost
(est.)
1973 cost
(est.)
19 66a price
(excl.
taxi
1969 price
1965 cost
import price 1.30 to 1.40
c.i.f. (average)
cost,. W.Ger. 1.25
import price 1.40
c.i.f. or
landed
import price 1.50
landed
import price,l.60
f.o.b. Italy
import price, 1.35
landed
cost, U.S. 3.5 to 4.1
(2.8 to 3.3)
GOI, DGTD,
1969
EPW, 18
Nov.1967,
p.2033
Industrial
Times, 15
Sept. 1969,
p.12.
FE, 13 Nov.
1969.
Baranson,
1969, pp.
33,94.
FE, 29
July 1969.
Baranson,
1967, p.82
Source
I~ I ----- -----
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TABLE 11-14 (continued)
Nature of Cos/Price Comparison
Indian Foreign
Date 'fair ex- c.i.f. supplier Ratio
works price' import
price
Product
6. Electric wires and cables
Aluminum conductors
Bare copper conductors
7. Hand, small, and cutting tools
Steel files
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets, and
foils
Ingots
Sheets and circles
12. Cotton textile machinery and
parts
n.a.
Japan
1960
1966a
1960
1963
1960.
1968
1960
n.a.
1.0 - 1.4*
0.9 - 1.1
0.9 - 1.0*
Canada 0.8 - 1.2
n.a.
U.S.
n.a.
1.1 - 1.2*
1.1
0.8 - 1.0*
Looms (automatic)
Ring spinning frames
complete
it
components
spindles
spinning rings
fluted rollers
it
1960
1966a
1960
1 96 6a
1966a
1966 a
1960
1966 a
U.K. 1.3
Switz. 0.8
Japan 1.3
Switz. 0.4
Japan
n.a.
U.K.
U.K.
0.9
0.4
0.7
0.9
Text
Reference
(iv) Tariff
Commission
Ir"il~a~aa* ~ i .I
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TABLE II-14 (continued)
Nature of Cost/Price Comparison
Indian Foreign
Date .'fair ex- c.i.f. supplier
works price' import
14. Electric machinery
Transformers
Electric motors
16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry
19. Bicycles
21 & 22. Automobile and vehicular
engine parts
Auto spark plugs
It I of
Diesel fuel in-
jection equipment
Pumps
it
Nozzle holders
It
Piston Assemblies
Complete
Piston rings
Auto leaf springs
price
n.a.
U.K.
n.a.
n.a.
1960
1965
1958
1965
1953
1960
1960
1960
1965
1959
1963
1959
1963
1960
1966b
1960
0.7 - 1.3*
0.6 - 1.5
1.0 - 1.3*
0.4 - 1.8
Hong Kong 1.1 - 1.2*
U.K.
Japan
n.a.
U.K.
n.a.
W.Ger.
n.a.
W.Ger.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1959 n.a.
1.0
1.5
1.5 - 2.0*
1.6
0.7 - 0.8*
0.7 - 0.9
1.5 - 2.0*
0.7
1.2 - 1.3*
1.2 - 1.7
0.8 - 0.9*
0.8 - 0.9*
2
Text
Reference Product Ratio
~ -r. a ....
TABLE II-14 (continued)
Nature of Cost/Price Comparison
Indian
'fair ex-
Product Date works price'
Foreign
c.i.f. supplier
import
price
23. Bicycle parts
27. Miscellaneous
Auto hand tire in-
flator
Bearings
Mild steel wood
screws
Mild steel machine
screws
Sewing machines
Oil pressure lamps.
Brass, copper, zinc
sheets arid tubes
1960
1960
1960
1965
1960
1959
1959
1954
1957
1959
1965
a: post-devaluation exchange rate
b: pre-devaluation exchange rate
Source of Tariff Commission data: GOI, TC, reports listed in bibliography, and
marked with an asterisk (*), MacDougall, 1964, pp. 210-211.
in the case of entries
Text
Reference
Ratio
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
U.K.
Japan
Sweden
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.8 - 2.8
0.8 - 0.9*
2.0+ *
2.4
0.8 - 0.9
0.9 - 1.6
0.8 - 1.0
0.7 - 0.8
0.7 - 0.8*
0.9 - 2.0*
1.3 - 1.5
-- I ~x-.e ~-~C~-."'. ..~ . ..-I .~ .~~ -,-----n- --s----~---
domestic market, they do not permit conclusions concerning India's com-
parative advantage or technical efficiency of production because the
ratios reflect overvaluation.
However, the evidence in Tariff Commission reports indicates that
there was a wide range in the ratios of Indian costs to international
prices for different goods and that in a number of cases Indian costs
were below c.i.f. import prices.
(i) DGTD: According to the DGTD, in 1969 the average cost of production
in India for the engineering goods and chemicals in which there was
import substitution between 1960 and 1967 was 30 to 40 percent above
the c.i.f. price of imports.1 The DGTD does not provide evidence in
support of its conclusion and does not explain how it was reached. Con-
sequently, this claim cannot be given much weight.
(ii) Company statements: Published statements by company officials sug-
gest that costs and domestic prices of Indian engineering goods were
commonly 25 to 75 percent above international levels, and even higher in
the case of some components. Such statements rarely suggest that Indian
costs or prices were competitive with c.i.f. import prices for any
engineering products, except certain ferrous metals and aluminum. How-
ever, published statements are probably a biased sample, since there
were a number of incentives against revealing competitive costs.2 In
interviews a number of firms reported that the production cost of
GOI, DGTD, 1969.
2iases are discussed in the Appendix.
II
batch-manufactured machinery in India was less than 25 percent above the
c.i.f. import price.1
(iii) Baranson on Diesel Engines: In his study of the problems of manu-
facturing Cummins diesel engines in India in 1965, Baranson calculates
that "Indian costs run anywhere from 3.5 to 4.1 times U.S. costs" (re-
vised to 2.8 to 3.3 after the 1966 devaluation).2 This is far outside
the range of other cost ratios in Table II-14 and is the result of a
special situation which was misinterpreted by Baranson. Data collected
in India indicate that the actual cost ratio in 1969 was about 1.5.
The basic problem is that Baranson's cost calculation is for a
product with a "domestic content averaging 15 percent or less, of which
about 10 percent is assembly costs," during its first year of commercial
production in India, and yet Baranson concludes that the cost premium
was due to inefficiencies on the part of Kirloskar Cummins and its
Indian suppliers:
(a) a much smaller scale of production relative to internation-
ally competitive plants, and (b) high procurement costs of
materials and parts also produced in small scale plants under
a protectionist regime. 3
In fact, it is clear from his data that the main reason for the
higher cost in India was the high price of materials and components
1These cases are discussed further in Chapter IV.E. See also
Chapter IV.C.3.
2Baranson, 1967, pp. 82 ff; 1966, p. 262. Later, because of de-
valuation, Baranson revised this to 2.8 to 3.3. (Baranson, 1967,
pp. 82n, 129; 1969, p. 35.)
3Baranson, 1969, p. 35.
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imported from the U.S. collaborator before domestic production and pro-
curement were established. Compared to a production cost of $2100 for
the engine in the U.S., including assembly costs, the U.S. collaborator
charged $3276 f.o.b. for the components alone. Assuming that assembly
accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. costs, this means the U.S. parent
charged a mark-up of 73 percent on the components. In addition, the
Indian company paid $1045 in duty and $328 in freight, and hence the duty-
paid price of the imported components was $4649, or 2.5 times U.S. produc-
tion costs. Baranson's cost calculation is also influenced by the fact
that production was at only 20 percent of capacity in the initial year
and by the assumption, made without supporting evidence, that the quality
and hence value of the engines produced in India were only 70 percent of
the quality and value of those produced in the U.S., even though 95 per-
cent of the parts in the Indian engines were imported from the U.S.
Under the circumstances, the data presented by Baranson do not
allow any significant conclusion about the relative costs of production
in India and advanced countries, apart from illustrating the high prices
of imported components.
(iv) Tariff Commission: In connection with applications for tariff pro-
tection the Tariff Commission attempted to compare the "fair ex-works
prices" of Indian engineering goods with c.i.f. import prices. In each
case the coamission calculated the fair-ex-works price of a product as
the average cost plus a return of 12 to 15 percent on capital employed
at between one and three Indian companies. 1
1Capital employed is fixed assets, net of depreciation, plus work-
ing capital, the latter assumed equal to 4 to 6 months' cost of
-I
II
Often the Indian cost including return on equity reported by these
studies was higher than the price of imports. Nevertheless, there were
a number of cases where the Indian cost was lower than the import price.
The Commission's findings indicate that the ratio between the Indian
cost of production including return on equity and the c.i.f. import price
varied widely among products, with high frequency throughout the range
from 0.7 to 2.0.
F. Indian Exports of Engineering Goods
Between the Korean war and 1960 total Indian export earnings stag-
nated while India's share of world trade declined compared to 1947-49
both in the aggregate and for most major commodities. This was explained
largely by macroeconomic policies and discrimination against exports by
trade and industrial policies. After about 1961 discrimination against
exports was reduced by export subsidies and the 1966 devaluation, and
although export earnings declined during the droughts in 1965-67, they
increased moderately between 1960 and 1970. (See Table 11-15.)
The most striking feature of Indian exports in the 1960s was that
46 percent of the net increase in total annual export earnings between
1960 and 1969 and the entire net increase between 1963 and 1969 (or
between 1964 and 1970) can be attributed to the expansion of exports of
iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires. 2
production exclusive of depreciation.
1See Singh, M., 1964; Cohen, 1963 and 1964; and Bhagwati and
Desai, 1970, pp. 368-95.
2Also, about $69 to $74 million of the increase in total exports
between 1960 and 1963 was due to an increase in coverage of export data.
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In the late 1960s the Indian government was counting heavily on
further expansion of these non-traditional manufactured exports. Accord-
ing to the 1969 draft fourth plan's projection of export earnings for
1980-81:
The growth of our major traditional exports and in particular
tea, jute and cotton textiles is likely to be slow. The major
directions of future diversification will lie in metals and
metal manufactures, iron ore, chemicals and allied products.l
While this plan projected a 7 percent annual rate of growth for total
export earnings between 1968-69 and 1980-81, it projected only a 2.7 per-
cent annual rate of growth for export earnings from tea, jute manufac-
tures, and cotton textiles, which accounted for 34 percent of export
earnings in 1968-69. During 1969-70 the Planning Commission, the Minis-
try of Foreign Trade, and the EEPC projected increases in export earnings
from iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires of 15 percent per year
or more during the fourth and fifth plans.
Tables 11-15 through 11-18 provide export data for iron and steel,
engineering goods, and tires. Table II-15 provides aggregate data for
iron and steel and engineering goods for 1956-57 through 1969-70. These
exports increased from $13 million to $243 million, or from 1 percent to
13 percent of total exports, during the decade 1959-60 to 1969-70.2
Table II-16 provides a breakdown of exports of engineering goods
by destination. In the late 1960s developing countries accounted for
See Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 396-97.
1GOI, PC, 1969, p. 40. Tires are included in chemicals and
allied products.
2This does not include tires.
II
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about 70 percent of exports, East Europe for about 10 percent, and
advanced market economies for about 15 percent.
Table 11-17 provides export data for each of the 26 industries
examined in detail in this study for each year from 1964-65 to 1969-70.
The share of total exports of engineering goods accounted for by the
24 engineering industries included in the table increased from 48 per-
cent in 1964-65 to 76 percent in 1969-70.
Table II-18 provides a breakdown of exports of engineering goods
for 1965-66 to 1969-70 for the 100 largest exporters of 1968-69. In
1968-69 ten firms accounted for 34 percent of exports, 25 for 50 percent,
and 100 for 74 percent. Data for firms with lower exports, not presented
here, show that 445 firms with exports of over $13,000 each (including
the firms in Table 11-18) accounted for 89 percent of exports.
The aggregate ratio of exports to production for iron and steel,
engineering goods, and tires was about 8 percent in 1969-70. The ratio
was about 15 percent for iron and steel, 6 percent for engineering goods,
and 2-3 percent for tires. 1
Data on the ratio of exports to production broken down by pro-
ducer and industry are presented in Tables II-10 and 11-12 and in
Table 111-7. The data in Table 111-7 indicate that while exports were
40 percent or more of production for four industries in 1969-70, they
1These ratios and those in the next paragraph were calculated in
value terms, using f.o.b. prices for exports and domestic prices for
domestic sales. Ratios would be about the same for iron and steel but
about 9 percent for engineering goods and 4 percent for tires using
domestic prices for export sales.
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were less than 10 percent of production even for several of the 26
major export products examined in detail in this study. Among the
13 major public sector firms, only two (nos. 1 and 9 in Table 11-12)
exported 10 percent or more of production in 1968-69 and only two more
exported more than 1 percent of production. Among the 62 largest
engineering firms in Table II-10, exports were 10 percent or more of
sales for only 8 in 1968-69 (nos. 9, 23, 33, 34, 45, 48, 61, 62).
El
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TABLE II-15
Exports of All Products and of Iron and Steel and Engineering Goods,
1956-57 to 1969-70
Year Total Exports,
All Productsa
($ Mil.)
1956-57
1957-58
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
1970-71
1300
1379
1221
1304
1333
1396
1403
1631
1749
1686
1606
1613
1753
1833
1957
Iron and Steel and
Engineering Goods
($ mil.) (% of
total)
7.2
8.3
8.2
13.4
17.8
20.8
20.7
30.8
41.2
51.3
67.5
126.6
205.7
242.8
n.a.
0.6
0.6
0.7
1.0
1.3
1.5
1.5
1.9
2.4
3.0
4.2
7.8
11.2
13.2
n.a.
Iron and Steel
($ mil.) (% of
total)
2.8 b
3.7
4.4
0.9
2.6
5.9
11.6
26.0
71.3
92.4
101.0
n.a.
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.7
1.6
4.4
5.3
5.5
n.a.
Engineering
Goods
($ mil.)(% of
total)
7.2
8.3
8.2
10.6
14.1
16.4
19.8
28.2
35.3
39.7
41.5
55.3
113.3
141.8
153.0
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
1.1
1.2
1.4
1.7
2.0
2.4
2.6
3.4
6.5
7.7
7.8
All values in current prices.
a: calendar years 1956 through 1970
b: calendar 1959
*: negligible
.n.a.: not available
For export data on iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires and tubes
before 1956-57 see: Iron and steel: Johnson, 1966, p. 18. (Steel peak
1949-50, 18,000 tons).
Engineering goods: Singh, R.K., 1965, p. 205. (Peak
1952, $9.3 million).
Tires and tubes: Datta et al., 1962, pp. 164-77.
(Peak 1953-54, $0.3 million).
Sources: Total Exports: International Financial Statistics.
Engineering Goods: GOI, EEPC, 1IB, 12 September 1968, 30 July 1970.
Iron and Steel: 1959: GOI, DCIS, MSFTI, Vol. 1, Dec. 1959.
Other: IEA, HS, 1968-69, p. 73, and HS, 1969-70,
p.79.
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Destination of Indian Exports
1956-57
TABLE II-16
of Engineering Goods, 1956-57 to 1969-70
1960-61 1964-65 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68
Developing Countries 97.2 74.7 82.8
South and east Asia
except Japan 34.0 35.7 38.3
West Asia 37.9 21.9 26.1
Africa 23.0 15.0 16.5
Western hemisphere,
except U.S. and Canada,
plus miscellaneous
islands 2.3 2.1 1.9
East Europe 0.0 0.1 3.4
Advanced Market Countries 2.9 25.1 13.9
West Europe 0.9 22.1 7.3
U.S. and Canada 0.5 1.9 3.6
Australia and New Zealand 1.5 0.6 1.2
Japan 0.0 0.5 1.8
Note: Table excludes iron and steel and tires.
Source: GOI, EEPC, HBB, 1 August 1966, 25 July 1968, 12
78.4 71.5 65.7
32.8
24.2
19.3
2.1
7.5
13.9
9.8
3.0
0.9
0.2
27.1
21.6
20.1
2.7
9.6
18.9
8.9
7.8
1.5
0.7
25.3
21.2
17.4
1.8
15.9
18.3
7.7
7.1
3.4
0.1
II
September 1968, 30 July 1970.
(Percent)
1968-69
73.1
27.3
26.2
18.9
0.7
10.6
16.1
4.9
5.6
4.0
1.6
----~C-L-^ ---tl
1969-70
74.4
23.2
22.2
27.8
1.2
10.1
15.7
8.6
4.9
2.1
0.1
___ .. ."' I~-~-----
TABLE II-17
Export of Iron and Steel, Engineering Goods, and Tires by Industry,
1964-65 to 1969-70
($ million)
Industry
I. Iron and Steel
1. Iron and steel
1964- 1965- 1966- 1967- 1968- 1969-
65 66 67 68 69 70
5.92 11.62 26.01* 71.31* 92.39 100.95
II. Engineering Goods
2. Steel pipes, tubes, and
fittings
3. Bright steel bars and
shaftings
4. Iron and steel castings
5. Steel wire ropes
6. Electric wires and cables
7. Hand, small, and cutting
tools
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets,
and foils
9. Transmission line towers
10. Fabricated steel structures
other than (9)
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile machinery
and parts
13. Machine tools
14. Electric machinery
15. Commercial vehicles and
jeeps
16. Dry and storage batteries
17. Radios and components
18. Data processing machines
19. Bicycles
20. Stationary diesel engines
and parts
21. Automobile parts other
than engines and engine
parts
22. Vehicular engines and
engine parts
23. Bicycle parts
24. Electric fans and parts
25. Builders' hardware in-
cluding locks
III. Tires and tubes
26. Tires and tubes
1.74 4.41 6.09 6.50* 14.26*
1.13 1.48
0.03 0.21
1.22 1.56
1.63*
0.89*
1.60+
0.74*
2.35*
0.89
2.16+
0.99
3.27*
1.24
10.23*
0.49 1.08 1.32+ 2.86+ 3.71
0.46 0.13 0.11 0.89 9.82
0.72 0.23 0.78* 1.67* 1.38*
0.14 0.30 0.41* 0.54* 1.14*
0.09 0.02 1.24* 3.01* 11.08*
0.19 0.43
0.28 0.72
0.12 0.19
0.45
0.98
0.09
0.75
0.57
1.02
2.11
0.41
1.00
0.87
0.50*
0.78
0.37
0.73*
1.95+
0.07
0.57
0.70
0.88*
0.76*
0.36+
1.20*
1.65+
0.10
1.87
1.46
1.71*
2.09*
1.55+
2.87*
2.35
0.57
1.85
1.85
15.01
2.12
3.92*
2.24
14.81*
3.55
5.43
3.94*
2.52*
0.70*
8.58*
3.69*
3.38
11.01*
2.04
1.65
2.57
2.13*
2.64 2.65 1.74 1.63 2.43 3.04
0.98 1.43 1.36 1.60* 4.22
1.00
2.07
0.01
1.55
2.20
1.17
2.13
0.01+
1.45
2.23
0.21+
3.19*
2.41
5.52
1.39+
4.04*
2.83
0.74 0.94 0.46 0.79 1.48 1.26
3.17 3.94 4.72+ 3.97 5.42 6.07
-~ --- --i
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Notes to TABLE II-17
*: production of industry below previous peak
+: production of some important products of industry below previous
peak
Sources: Iron and steel: Table II-15
Engineering goods: GOI, EEPC, HB, 1 August 1966, 25 July 1968,
30 July 1970.
Tires and tubes: GOI, CAPEPC, 1970.
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TABLE II-18
Exports of Engineerin2 Goods by Firm for the 100 Largest Exporters of 1968-69
Firm and Affiliation
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
1965-66 to 1969-70
Product
($ million)
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
1. Hindustan Aluminium
(c) Birla
27% U.S.
2. K.T. Steel Industries
(d) Independent
3. Braithwaite
(c) Jardine Henderson
4. Tata Engg. and Loco
Co. (TELCO)
(c) Tata
very small % W.Ger.
5. Mukand Iron and Steel
(c) Bajaj
6. Jessop
(d) Independent, became
50% Government in 1968
7. Jaipur Metals and Electri-
cals
(c) Kamini
Yes Aluminum ingots, sheets
and circles
Yes Railway wagons
Yes Railway wagons, fabri-
cated steel structures
Yes Commercial vehicles,
excavators
Yes Railway wagon parts
(cast steel bogies)
Yes Railway wagons, fabri-
cated steel structures
Yes Electric cables
n.a. n.a. 0.35 8.23 5.95
n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.73 n.a.
n.a. n.a. 0.05 4.22 0.67
0.94" 1.75 1.69 4.17 9.63
n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.98 0.66
0.03 0.03 0.32 2.98 0.96
n.a. 0.02 0.05 2.69 3.61
Rank by
Value
of Ex-
ports in
1968-69
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Firm and Affiliation
8. Bharat Steel Tubes
(d) Independent
39% U.S.
9. Indian Tube
(c) Tata
Minority U.K.
10. Zenith Steel Pipes
(c) Birla
11. Indian Aluminium
(b) 65% Canada
12. Jay Engineering
(c) Shri Ram
13. IBM World Trade Corp.
(b) 100% U.S.
14. Hindustan Steel
(a) Government
15. Union Carbide
(b) 60% U.S.
16. Kirloskar Oil
Engines
(c) Kirloskar
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Foreign
Collabo- Product
ration
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Aluminum ingots, foils
Yes Electric fans and parts,
sewing machines
Yes Data processing machines
Yes Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Dry batteries, flashlights
Yes Stationary diesel engines
and parts
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
n.a. 0.68 1.49 2.61 3.17
1.01 1.98 1.13 2.53
1.67
n.a.
1.67
1.00
n.a.
1.05
2.42
1.41
0.04
1.83
0.98
n.a.
0.90
1.96
2.04
0.23
1.59
1.82
n.a.
0.63
1.27
2.10
1.90
1.78
1.73
1.36
1.34
1.31
3.68
2.51
0.32
1.86
2.18
n.a.
1.03
1.44
Rank by
Value of Ex-
ports in
1968-69
I C- e~~ qllarrsl* *I~PlilC~kii~:b,.-, ...,, ~~_,.~~ _ _ ~~
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Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
Firm and Affiliation
TABLE
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
17. Gedore Tools
(b) 60% W. Ger.
18. Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT)
(a) Government
19. Guest, Keen, Williams
(b) 60% U.K.
20. Kamani Engineering
(c) Kamani
21. Gujarat Steel Tubes
Indian
22. Indian Telephone Industries(ITI)
(a) Government
23. Integral Coach Factory
(a) Government
24. Metro Exporterse
n.a.
25. Indian Cable
(b) 40% U.K.(control)
26. Cable Corp. of India
(c) Khatau
26% W. Ger.
II-18 (continued)
Product
Yes Hand tools
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Machine tools 0.37
Fasteners, railway track
material, bright steel.
bars 0.32
Transmission line 0.16
towers, electric cables
Steel pipes and tubes 0.27
Telephone equipment 0.20
Railway wagon parts n.a.
(bogies)
Bicycles and parts, 0.52
steel furniture
Electric cables 0.18
Electric wires and 0.10
cables
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-68 19C9-70
0.17 0.67 0.52 1.31 1.69
0.43 0.39 1.21 1.32
0.64
0.73
0.40
1.15
n.a.
0.63
0.20
0.46
0.71
1.61
1.24
0.69
0.14
0.59
0.70
0.26
1.19
1.12
0.98
0.96
0.95
0.94
0.89
0.84
0.75
6.21
1.47
1.34
n.a.
1.29
1.30
0.48
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Rank by
Value of
Exports in Firm and Affiliation
1968-69
27. Associated Battery (ABMEL)
(b) 30% UK(control)
28. Shri Ambica Tubes
Indian
29. Textile Machinery Corp. (TEXMACO)
(c) Birla)
30. Oriental Power Cables
n.a.
31. Orient General Industries
(c) Birla
32. Metal Box
(b) 60% U.K.
33. Ashok Leyland
(b) 60% U.K.
34. Universal Cables
(c) Birla, some U.K.
35. Simac Group
n.a.
36. Gramophone Co.
(b) 100% U.K.
37. Easun Engineering
(d) Independent
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Product
Yes Storage batteries
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
Steel pipes and tubes
Railway wagons, cotton
textile machinery
Electric wires and cables
Electric fans, automobile
parts
Crown corks, tinplate con-
tainers
Commercial vehicles
.Electric wires and cables
Knitting machines
Gramophone records
Yes Switchgear', transformers,
transmission line towers,
electric cables
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
0.64 1.05 0.59 0.81 0.67
0.48
n.a.
n.a.
0.58
0.63
n.a.
n.a.
0.13
0.47
n.a.
0.61
1.23
n.a.
0.59
0.46
n.a.
n.a.
0.09
0.61
0.70
2.81
n.a.
0.51
0.54
0.04
0.20
0.07
0.54
0.74
0.73
0.64
0.64
0.63
0.61
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.97
* 2.11
*n.a.
0.70
0.85
0.78
0.52
0.61
0.62
n.a. * 0.53 n.a.
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Firm and Affiliation
TABLE 11-18 (continued)
Foreign
Collabo- Product 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
ration
38. Paunak International
...a.
39. TI Cycles of India
(Div. of Tube Investments)
(b) over 50% U.K.
Murugappa Chettiar
40. Motor Industries (MICO)
(b) over 50% W. Ger.
41. Devidayal Cables
Indian
42. Bharat Exportse
n.a.
43. Fort Gloster
(c) Bangur
44. Lallubhai Amin Chand
n.a.
45. Jindal
n.a.
46. Usha Martin Black (Wire Ropes)
21% U.K.
47. Ralliwolf
(c) Rallis, 45% U.K.
n.a. Steel pipes and
tubes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Bicycles and parts
.Automobile parts
Electric cables,
winding wires
n.a. Electric fans,
electric cables, bi-
cycles, buckets
Yes Electric wires and
cables
n.a. Aluminum utensils,
Stainless steel
utensils
*n.a. Steel pipes and tubes
Yes
Yes
Steel wire ropes
n.a. n.a. 0.37 0.53 0.50
0.12 0.18 0.33 0.50 0.70
0.12 0.13 0.21 0.50 0.81
n.a. * 0.34 0.49 . n.a.
0.19 0.27 0.36 0.48 n.a.
n.a. 0.06 0.63 0.47 n.a.
0.53 0.33 0.53 0.47 0.46
0.27 0.52 0.47 0.79
0.14 0.67 0.45 0.46 1.06
Electric hand tools 0.05
Rank by
Value of
Exporzs i&n
1968-69
lib~l~ _*I~LLL. .( ^~^*- ii~
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0.10 0.22 0.45 n.a.
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Firm and Affiliation
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Product 1965-66 1966 67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
48. R.S. Iron Industries
n.a.
49. Kam.ani Met&ls and Alloys
(c) Kamani
50. Indian Tools Manufacturers
(c) Birla
51. Hindustan Dowidat Tools
(c) Birla,22% W. Ger.
52. Godrej and Boyce
(d) Independent
53. India Pistons
(c) 70% Simpson, 17% U.K.
54. Electrical Manufacturing Co.(EMC)
n.a.
55. Kesoram Spun Pipes (Div.
Kesoram Industries)
(c) Birla
56. Indian Implements
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
Iron castings
Brass and copper semis
Small tools (twist
drills)
Hand tools
Steel furniture
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.11
0.22
Vehicular engine 0.10
parts (pistons)
Transmission line n.a.
towers, electric cables
Iron castings (spun n.a.
pipes)
n.a. Locks, mathematical
instruments
0.02
n.a.
0.24
0.16
0.21
0.23
0.06
0.11
0.13
n.a.
0.33
0.21
0.22
0.17
0.37
0.17
0.42
0.40
0.40
0.39
0.39
0.39
0.38
0.38
0.49
0.45
0.23
0.46
0.44
0.54
n.a.
0.50
0.42 0.04 0.40 0.38 0.32
PA.- by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
-- -------~.-. - -^I'''"~~'~. *izlru--w __
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Firm and Affiliation
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
TABLE If-18 (continued)
Product 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
57. Siemens India
(b) 51% W.Ger.,Khatau
58. Victory Iron Work3
n.a.
59. Hind Cycles
(c) Birla
60. Jeewanlal
n.a.
61. Kamani Tubes
(c) Kamani
62. Indo Engineering
n.a.
63. Raymond Woollen Mills
(J.K.Engineers File Div.)
(c) Singhania
64. Sen Raleigh
(d) Sen and Pandit
17% U.K.
65. Famatex India
n.a.
66. Aluminim Cables and
Conductors
n.a.
Yes Electric cables, electric
n.a.
Yes
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
motors, switchgear
Iron Castings
Bicycles and parts
Aluminum utensils
Brass and copper semis
Electric cables
Steel files
Yes Bicycles and parts
n.a. Textile machinery
n.a. Electric cables
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.43
n.a.
n.a.
0.20
0.37 0.38 0.670.69f
0.04
0.04
0.29
0.05
n.a.
0.31
0.16
0.28
0.38
0.47
n.a.
0.72
n.a. 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.24
n.a. n.a. 0.07
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
0.37
0.36
0.36
0.35
0.35
0.29
n.a.
0.35
0.31
0.30
0.27
0.39
0.28
0.28
0.52
0.73
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
67.
Firm and Affiliation
Industrial Cables India
n.a.
68. NGEF
(a) Government (State)
69. Jain Tube
n.a.
70. Philips India
(b) 52% Netherlands
71. Walchandnagar Industries
(c) Walchand
72. Kirloskar Brothers
(c) Kirloskar
73. Hero Cycles
n.a.
74. Larsen and Toubro
(d) Independent,
small % Denmark
75. Murphy India
(b) majority U.K.
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Product
Yes Electric wires and cables
Yes Transformers, electric
motors, motor starters
n.a. Steel pipes and tubes
Yes Radios and components,
lamps and components
Yes Sugar machinery
Yes Agricultural machinery,
pumps
n.a. Bicycles and parts
Yes Electric switchgear, petrol
pump meters
Yes Radios and components
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
S * 0.14
0.0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.20
n.a.
0.01
0.0
0.02
0.07
n.a.
0.18
0.11
0.08
n.a. n.a.
0.0
0.05
0.02
n.a.
0.22
0.23
0.13
0.27 0.74
0.27 0.34
0.26 0.58
0.26 1.07
0.26 0.35
0.26 0.29
0.26 0.37
0.25 0.58
* 0.25 n.a.
~Y ic~~r~a~i~idislEi~ i~u~i~u~k -~-~--
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Firm and Affiliation
76. Aero Engg. Works
n.a.
Teksons
n.a.
Bhagwati Steel
n.a.
Shree Krishna
n.a.
Batliboie
n.a..
Groz-Beckert Saboo
(b) 60% W. Ger.
Cossul and Co.
n.a.
National Insulated Cable
some U.K.
Bharat Diamond Industries
n.a.
85. Road Master Industries
n.a.
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Foreign
Collabo- Product
ration
n.a. Bicycles and parts
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
Automobile parts
Fabricated steel
structures
Fasteners, iron castings,
buckets
Electric machinery,
stationary diesel engines,
pumps, machine tools
Textile machinery parts
(needles)
Agricultural implements
Electric cables
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
0.08 0.08 0.22 0.24 0.29
n.a.
n.a.
0.14
0.19
n.a.
n.a.
0.10
0.28
0.11
0.03
0.16
0.28
0.12 0.15 0.20
n.a. n.a. 0.23
0.13 0.32 0.21
n.a. n.a. 0.37
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.47
0.31
0.26
0.50
0.29
0.23
0.29
n.a.
0.17 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.35
Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
n.a. Cutting tools
n.a. Bicycles and parts
----
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Firm and Affiliation
TABLE II-18 (continued)
Foreign
Collabo- Product 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
ration
86. Shree Laxmi Iron and Steel
Works
n.a.
87. Crompton Greaves
(c) Thapur, 50% U.K.
88. Greaves Cotton
(c) Thapur
89. Andrew Yule
Andrew Yule
90. Ruston and Hornsby
(c) 74% Thapur, 26% U.K.
91. Indo-Asian Traderse
n.a.
92. Cooper Engineering
(c) Walchand
93. Bhartia Commercial
n.a.
94. Addison
(c) Simpson
95. Standard Batteries
Indian
n.a. Railway track
Yes
Yes
n.a.
Yes
n.a.
Yes
n.a.
n.a.
Yes
materials
Electric fans, electric 0.10
motors, transformers
Diamond drills n.a.
Tea machinery n.a.
Stationary diesel 0.10
engines and parts
Transformers n.a.
Stationary diesel 0.35
engines, machine tools,
cotton textile machinery
Bright steel bars n.a.
Small tools 0.09
Storage batteries 0.51
n.a. n.a. 0.34 0.21 0.19
0.09 0.18
0.03
n.a. 0.16
0.14 0.18
0.01 0.03
0.25 0.17
n.a.
0.11
0.07
0.14
0.14
0.48
Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.20
n.a.
0.08
0.24
0.41
n.a.
0.41
0.19
0.25
n.a.
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TABLE II-18 (continued)
Firm and Affiliation
Foreign
Collabo-
ration
Product 1965-66 1966-67 1967-68 1968-69 1969-70
96. Numex Engineers
n.a.
97. Kirloskar Electric
(c) Kirloskar
98. Power Cables
n.a.
99. Indian Aluminium Cable
50% Japan
100. Optimohar Industries
some W. Ger.
n.a. Stationary diesel engines, n.a.
water pumps, oil mill
machinery
Yes Electric motors, trans-
formers, motor starters
Yes Electric wires and cables
Yes Electric cables
Yes Pressure stoves and lanterns
n.a.
n.a. 0.13
0.39 0.20 n.a.
0.10 0.19 0.63
n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.19 0.,42
n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.19 0.54
0.11 0.12 0.18 0.26
Notes:
Affiliation: (see part II.D.3 for details)
a: government
b: foreign majority
c: large industrial house
d: independent
e: trading company (Batliboi is also a manufacturer)
f: observation is for the period October 1965-September 1966.
*: less than $0.005 million
n.a.: not available
Foreign collaboration: "Yes" means that there was. at least 10 percent ownership by a foreign company
or technical collaboration for part of production.
Source: GOI, EEPC.
Rank by
Value of
Exports in
1968-69
I
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CHAPTER III
SUPPLY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO EXPORTS
The data in Table II-15 reveal that between 1959-60 and 1969-70
exports of iron and steel and engineering goods increased substantially
relative both to the 1959-60 base and to total exports. Exports of
engineering goods increased in every year during this period and exports
of iron and steel increased in every year after 1963-64. The growth of
exports was particularly great after 1966-67.
This chapter considers developments in India during the 1960s
that contributed to these exports through the relation between the
supply of iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires for export and
the dollar prices of exports. One reason for emphasizing supply is that
the expansion of exports in this period can be explained primarily by
changes that occurred in India rather than in export demand, especially:
(A) expansion and diversification of the production base; (B) develop-
ment of capacity in excess of domestic demand in many industries; and
(C) government export promotion measures, including devaluation, which
reduced the gap between implicit exchange rates on production for the
domestic market and for export.1 Similar attention is not given to
1 The same coincidence of circumstances was important in Argentina:
"In 1963, total exports of engineering products increased abruptly from
less than $5 million to about $18 million (per year), partly in response
to the devaluation and the introduction of a number of export promotion
measures, and partly as an effect of the decline in internal demand
during the 1962-63 recession." GATT, 1969, p. 69.
~
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export demand, but a brief list of factors that affected demand is
suggested in part III.E.
The analysis in this chapter was undertaken for three reasons:
(i) It is important to understand the circumstances under which these
exports were made to determine how a semi-industrial country like India
began to move from import substitution to export. Without such an
understanding it would be easy to make unwarranted inferences about
"dynamic" comparative advantage from the pattern of Indian exports.
(ii) In connection with the discussion in Chapter VIII.C of the cost
of foreign exchange earned by exports of engineering goods, it is
important to determine the incentives under which Indian firms exported.
Calculation of implicit exchange rates on exports makes possible infer-
ences about the costs of foreign exchange earned.
(iii) Most important, the chapter provides the basis for a critique of
Indian export promotion policies in part III.D and Chapter VIII.A.
There is no doubt that efficiency criteria called for export promotion
measures to reduce the gap between implicit exchange rates on import
substitution and export, but it will be seen that the measures adopted
encouraged an inefficient allocation of the resources devoted to exports
of engineering goods.
A. The Production Base for Exports
Virtually no firm was established in India to produce iron and
steel, engineering goods, or tires mainly for export. Only two export-
oriented investments were discovered during this study. The first,
_ ____~ _I
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which was described in Chapter II.B, was for production of pig iron
in the early part of the present century and is no longer directly
relevant. The second is described by the following 1965 report:
In Punjab there are a number of foundries which have been
established in recent years for exclusive production of
pipes for export to USA....Such foundries are either ex-
tensions to existing foundries or have been set up as new
units altogether. Pig iron has been made available to
them from Export Quota...All such foundries have to close
down if exports for any reasons come to a standstill as
pig iron is not available to them (for production for the
domestic market) .
Another report suggests that the foundries in question were actually
set up to supply the domestic market, not to export, and that they
exported because pig iron was allocated for export production.2 With
these exceptions, exports were dependent on firms oriented to supply-
ing the Indian market. This is clear from the data on export-produc-
tion ratios in Tables II-10, 11-12, and 111-7.
Because investments for production for the protected .domestic
market were made without consideration of comparative advantage or
1GOI, MIS, 1967, p. 33. Parenthesis added. Indian exports of
cast iron pipes and fittings in 1964-65 and 1965-66 were $0.80 million
($0.35 million to the US) and $0.62 million ($0.14 million to the US)
compared to total exports of engineering goods excluding iron and steel
of $35.3 million and $39.7 million, respectively. The highest level
reached was in 1968-69, $1.77 million ($0.58 million to the US) com-
pared to a total of $113.3 million.
2According to IIFT, 1966b, pp. 5, 31, foundries in the Punjab
with excess capacity because of shortage of pig iron participated in
a "Cast Iron Soil Pipes Export Project" initiated in 1963-64 by the
Punjab Export Corporation. They accounted for 500 tons of exports in
1963-64 and 2000 tons, or a quarter of the total for India, in 1964-
65.
_ 
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export demand by either government planners or investors, there is
little reason to expect that the expansion of the production base which
occurred in the 1960s would have accounted for more than a proportional
increase in exports if implicit exchange rates had remained unchanged.
Even the assumption of a proportional increase in exports is tenuous
since there was a shift in the industrial composition of the production
base and a decline in the share of the industries which had a higher-
than-average ratio of exports to production in 1959-60, especially
simple metal products like those in Table 111-2. Although it is some-
times argued that semi-industrial countries have a comparative advan-
tage in production of capital goods for the home market,I it seems
unlikely that the composition of engineering industries shifted in
the direction of India's comparative advantage after 1959-60, particu-
larly when one allows for increasing indigenous content.
Table III-1 shows that there was a substantial increase in the
ratio of aggregate exports to the production base for iron and steel
and engineering goods. With a constant ratio, the expansion of the
production base between 1959 and 1969 would have accounted for only
11 percent of the actual increase in exports including iron and steel
or 16 percent excluding iron and steel. This involves some under-
estimation of the effect of the increase in production given the
assumption of proportionality because the production index uses constant
prices while exports are measured in current prices and because the
1Pack and Todaro, 1969.
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TABLE III-1
.atio of Exports to Production Base for Engineering Goods and Iron and Steel, 1959-60 to 1969-70
Year Index Numbers of Production1
(Base: 1960 = 100)
Basic Metals and Engineering Basic
Engineering Goods Goods Metals
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
84
100
117
142
162
183
213
219*
222*
229*
242*
87
100
116
141
157
187
228
232*
236*
244*
257*
78
100
119
143
172
174
180
190
190*
194
210
Index Numbers of Export/Production Ratio2
(Bases 1969-70 - 100)
Iron and Steel Engineering Iron and
and Engineering Goads Steel
Goods
16
18
18
15
19
23
24
31
57
90
100
34
32
32
43
84
100
8
8
8
1
3
7
13
28
78
99
100
Notes:
1
The index numbers of production were derived from the official Indian data with one adjustment.
In any year when the level of the production index for any of the five component industrial groups
(non-electric machinery, electric machinery, transport equipment, metal products, basic metals) was
below a previous value of the index, the previous peak value was used. Figures affected by this adjust-
ment are marked with an asterisk (*).
2
The index numbers of export/production ratio are derived by dividing the export data in Table II-15 by
the index numbers of production and then scaling them so that the value in 1969-70 was 100.
Sources: Index Numbers of Production: GOI, CSO, MSPSII, November and December, 1968, and IEA, HS, 1969-70,
p.8.
Exports: Table 11-15.
t-A
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production index excludes new industries as a result of the 1960 base.1
Moreover, the assumption of a constant ratio of exports to capacity
rather than production would account for a somewhat larger share of
the expansion of exports, but reliable capacity data are not available.
However, there was not a similar expansion in the ratio of
exports to production for a number of the major export products of
1959-60, particularly simple metal products amenable to small scale
production like utensils, trunks, buckets, and furniture. Although
production data are not available for these industries, the stagnation
of such exports is evident from the data in Table 111-2. The total
value of exports for the seven industries listed increased only from
$2.9 million to $3.2 million between 1959-60 and 1969-70, while the
share of these industries in total exports of engineering goods
declined from 28 to 2 percent. Since Hong Kong and Taiwan has similar
experience with some simple metal products, this might be explained by
import substitution in the developing countries which were the major
markets, i.e. demand factors. Such import substitution was reported
by a number of foreign market surveys.2 The stagnation of these
exports might also reflect the high material content of these products
and the material supply problems, discussed in Chapter IV, which were
particularly great for small producers after 1959.
1 Also, this index measures gross factory output and does not
record the increase in domestic value added which occured when a firm
produced a component which was previously imported and incorporated
the component in the same item it was previously producing. The index
does count components produced by one firm for use by another.
2 See also the discussion in Singh, M., 1964, pp. 219-21.
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TABLE III-2
Exports of Simple Metal Products which were Important in
1959-60
($ Millions)
Product
Aluminum utensils,
capsules, etc.
Steel trunks
Galvanized iron buckets,
drums, etc.
Steel furniture
Umbrellas and fittings
Crown corks (bottle caps)
Brass and copper utensils
Total
Exports in Exports in
1959-60 1969-70
0.87
0.54
0.44
0.43
0.23
0.23
0.18
2.92
0.89
0.47
0.18
0.66
0.30
0.37
0.31
3.18
Source: GOI, EEPC, HB, 12 September 1968, 30 July 1970.
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Parts III.B and III.C discuss changes in supply factors which
appear to be the major explanations of the increase in exports, at
least in relation to production and capacity, namely development of
underutilization of capacity because of lack of domestic demand and
reduction of the gap between implicit exchange rates on production for
the domestic market and for export as a result of government export
promotion measures and devaluation. Three additional factors which
may have affected supply for export but for which data are lacking are:
(i) Because of cost reductions as a result of infant industry phenomena,
achievement of economies of scale, and external economies, there could
have been a shift in the export supply function. There were increases
in scale of production. (ii) There was an increase in the number of
products which could be exported because of expiration of the export
restrictions in some foreign collaboration agreements. Because of the
large number of agreements made in 1958-1962 with durations of 5 to
10 years, many agreements expired in the late 1960s. (iii) There was
an increase in the share of domestic value added in production. While
one would expect that (i) and (ii) would have contributed to an
increase in exports, (iii) probably would have deterred exports.
B. Overexpansion of Capacity, Material Supply Constraints, and
Recession
In the short run, the price at which a firm would export depends
on (i) its production capacity based on fixed inputs; (ii) domestic
demand; and (iii) prices and the availability of variable inputs for
production for the domestic market and for export. This part considers
El
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how changes in (i) - (iii) influenced the export supply function for
engineering goods during the 1960s, particularly the change which
occurred in about 1966.
During the entire period after 1956-58, there was substantial
underutilization of capacity in many engineering industries. Excess
capacity was primarily a result of supply conditions for materials and
the level of domestic demand combined with inefficient investment in-
centives and errors in planning.
1. 1960 to 1966
a. Shortage of Materials
In the first half of the 1960s, the binding constraint on pro-
duction where there was excess capacity was almost always the supply
of materials, components, and spares. These shortages and the high
black market premia on materials will be discussed in Chapter IV.
Supply conditions for materials limited production in the sense
that output would have been expanded given existing capacity and
domestic demand if materials had been freely available at the landed
cost of imports or even at the control prices of domestic materials.
Licenses for maintenance imports and certain indigenously produced
materials like steel were rationed bureaucratically, and there were
prohibitions on their redistribution among firms. Output was sometimes
constrained below capacity by the availability of rationed inputs for
which additional supplies were not available at any price. In other
cases, additional supplies were available in the open market, but
=__
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marginal revenue was less than marginal cost using materials at high
open market prices, in spite of excess capacity and domestic prices
for output above international prices.
During this period excess capacity was a result of not only
unexpected shortages of materials but inefficient investment incentives
created by the policy of allocating maintenance import licenses on the
basis of capacity. Because of the high rate of profit on sales in the
domestic market and the fact that supplies of imported materials were
the binding constraint on production, firms had a strong incentive to
expand capacity even when there was already excess capacity.
Since virtually anything produced by the existing industries in
the first half of the 1960s could have been sold domestically at higher
marginal revenue than was obtained on exports before allowing for export
promotion schemes, the existence of excess capacity alone did not
explain exports. Exports were deterred by material supply conditions
and the profitability of sales in the protected domestic market.
Nevertheless, given the export promotion schemes considered in
part III.C, the existence of excess capacity reduced the price at which
some firms were willing to export. Two export promotion schemes relaxed
material supply constraints for exporters, namely priority in allocation
of certain rationed indigenous materials and the import entitlement
license scheme. Since transfer of the rationed indigenous materials
to other users was prohibited, the value of the special allocations was
greater for firms because they had excess capacity due to shortage of
materials. The same was initially true of import entitlement licenses,
i
____L_
119
but the government became increasingly liberal in allowing transfer
of entitlement licenses at a premium.1
Lack of reliable data on capacity makes it impossible to test
whether there was any relation between incidence of excess capacity
and export between industries or over time in the first half of the
1960s, or even to determine the share of exports accounted for indus-
tries with excess capacity during this period. It is clear from the
annual reports of a number of major exporters of engineering goods,
however, that any excess capacity which existed was not a result of
inadequate domestic demand but ofmaterial supply constraints and that
exports depended on special provisions for supply of materials, the
import entitlement scheme, and other incentives.
It can be concluded that the incentive provided by export pro-
motion schemes which relaxed material supply constraints on production
was a critical factor behind a large share of the exports made in this
period. This supports the general conclusion reached in part III.D
that export promotion measures played an important role in the expan-
sion of exports.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that, because of widespread
excess capacity, a significant share of the exports of engineering
goods probably were made on the basis of short-run marginal costs and
iThe Indian Electrical Manufacturers' Association reported that
the licenses were not transferable in 1960-61. (IEMA, AR 1960-61.)
Jay Engineering reported selling the licenses in 1963. (EW, 30 November
1963, p. 1974.) Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 327n, state that "import
entitlements, under the Export Promotion Schemes, were made legally
transferable, and a market developed for them around 1965."
_ 
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would not have been made on the basis of long-run marginal costs even
with the export promotion schemes. Consequently, the existence of
excess capacity was probably also critical for some exports even prior
to 1966. Thus, it is important to recall the fact, mentioned in part
III.A, that with the possible exception of cast iron spun pipes no
export-oriented investment was made in the engineering industries during
this period.
b. Insufficient Domestic Demand
Apart from material supply problems, reports on the period men-
tion the following as secondary causes of excess capacity in certain
cases: power shortages during droughts, transportation bottlenecks,
shortages of skilled labor, strikes, inadequate project planning and
weaknesses in management, and inadequate demand. Only the last is con-
sidered here. Domestic demand conditions were occasionally a constraint
on production in the sense that firms did not produce even at the level
possible using existing capacity and supplies of imported and domestic
materials available under rationing at landed or control prices.
Temporary excess capacity due to inadequate domestic demand was
a major factor in the export of pig iron and semi-finished steel by
Hindustan Steel (HSL) in 1959-60 to 1961-62. In 1959, "availability
of merchant iron...was considered in excess of the likely demand, which
led to the closing down of the Kulti blast furnaces and export of sur-
plus iron."l Johnson reports that:
1GOI, MIS, 1967, p. 8.
~ __ _ _~_ _~ _ __~___I~
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Export markets have provided an outlet for surplus production
of semi-finished steel (ingots, blooms, slabs, billets)...This
surplus production was a normal consequence of the phased com-
missioning of the new units erected under the Second Plan (i.e.
the lag in commissioning of the rolling mills.)1
The temporary nature of the exports of pig iron and semi-finished steel
is evident from the data in Table 111.3.
Even in this case, ad hoc export incentives (import licenses for
finished steel)2 and the higher prices obtained under restricted US aid 3
also played a role. Furthermore, exports of iron and steel were subject
to goverment controls and allowed only when the government decided that
"the quantity is surplus to the requirements of the country."4 Thus,
these exports were not a simple market response to excess capacity due
to lack of domestic demand.
With the exception of iron and semi-finished steel, reports on
the first half of the 1960s virtually never mention lack of demand as
a reason for excess capacity. The only specific cases found were:
cement machinery, 1963-1965; paper machinery, 1963-1965; asbestos
cement products machinery, 1965; iron castings including railway sleep-
ers, 1965; mining and coal washing machinery, 1965; and steel pipes and
1Johnson, 1966, p. 148. Parenthesis added.
2The arrangements under which the Ministry of Finance approved
export of $10.3 million of semi-finished steel in 1960 by firms which
were allowed to use the entire proceeds to import finished steel are
described in GOI, LSS, 1966, pp. 51-106.
3Some of the exports were under US aid tied to purchases in the
US and developing countries and hence presumably took place at prices
higher than those available in competitive markets. (EW, 18 May 1963,
p. 831.)
4The wording is from GOI, MSMM, ISCMB, May 1968, p. 369.
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TABLE III-3
Exports of Pig Iron and Semi-Finished Steel, 1958-59 to 1964-65
Pig Iron
'000 tons
Oa
101
74
19
0
0
$ million
Semi-Finished Steel
'000 tons
5.1
3.9
1.0
$ million
0
Ob
5.3
4.4
0
0
0
a: Calendar 1958.
b: Calendar 1959
Source: Pig Iron: 1958-58: GOI, MIS, 1967, p. 8.
1959-60: GOI, DCIS, MSFTI, vol. 1, December 1959.
1960-61 to 1964-65: NCAER, 1968, p. 449.
Semi-Finished Steel: 1958-59: Johnson, 1966, p. 18.
1959-60 to 1964-65: same as pig iron.
El
1958-59
1959-60
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
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tubes, 1965. Of these, only steel pipes and tubes ($4.4 million in
1965-66) were exported in a substantial quantity.
It can be concluded that except in the case of iron and steel
exports by HSL In 1959-60 to 1961-62, capacity in excess of domestic
demand was a minor factor in exports prior to 1966.
2. 1966-1969
a. Liberalization of Import of Materials
The importance of material shortages as a cause of excess capac-
ity reached a peak in 1965-1966 as a result of severe restrictions on
imports. After the devaluation in June 1966 the government liberalized
imports of materials. It announced that "for the 59 priority industries
raw materials, components and spares required for production up to full
capacity for six months will be provided,"2 and in 1966-67 the foreign
exchange available for maintenance imports was not fully used because
of the recession.
Liberalized import licensing after mid-1966 led to a relaxation
of material supply constraints on production after arrival of materials
late in 1966-67. The change is evident in the annual reports of the
major producer and exporter of storage batteries, which reported in
1964-65 that "insufficiency of import licenses necessitated our buying
lead in the Indian market at up to three times prevailing world prices"
and in 1966-67 that "with the liberalisation of import licenses,
1$0.8 million in steel pipes and tubes were exported already in
1963-64 when there was a domestic order backlog.
2Cited by Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 483. See also Chapter
IV.L below.
~
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material shortages have ceased to be the limiting factor of produc-
tion."1  Similarly, the major producer and exporter of tires reported:
The main feature of the year (1966) was devaluation...Until
that happened our production had to be curtailed through lack
of raw materials. The liberalisation of import licenses fol-
lowing devaluation enabled us to resume full production from
July onwards.2
The major producer and exporter of electric cables stated:
One of the greatest problems in the past few years has been
the scarcity of imported metals and other raw materials.
This state of affairs was reversed from 7 July 1966 by
Government's announcement of its liberalised licensing policy.
With liberal issues of import licenses the supply of raw
material was more than adequate (in 196 7-68).
Other things equal, because fewer firms would have had to forego
domestic sales in order to export and because the open market prices of
materials were reduced, this liberalization of imports probably would
have reduced the prices at which many firms would have been willing to
export. However, the same liberalization of imports reduced the premium
on import licenses issued against exports and hence the implicit ex-
change rate on exports.
b. Recession
(1) Background
The following is a brief summary of the government's explanation
of the industrial recession which began late in 1965-66:
1ABMEL, AR 1964-65, p. 34, and AR 1966-67, p. 37.
2Dunlop Rubber (India), EPW, 6 May 1967, p. 859.
3Indian Cable Company, AR 1966-67, AR 1967-68.
I.
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The "recession" occurred primarily in agriculture-based in-
dustries and in equipment industries other than those cater-
ing for the requirements of agriculture. It was the result
of declines in agricultural output in two successive years.
On the supply side, agricultural raw materials like sugar-
cane, raw cotton and oilseeds were available in reduced quan-
tities. The demand for consumer goods was affected by the
reduction in farm incomes. It became necessary to adopt
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies in order to hold
inflation in check; and the restraint on public investment
affected the demand for the output of steel and equipment
industries. A slowing down in private investment also
occurred, in part because of a less optimistic outlook on
the part of industrialists. The ability of industry to
finance new investment was also affected by the rise in cost
of inputs at a time when output could not be raised in a
number of industries because of slack demand conditions.
Non-government sources often added another factor to the explanation
of increasing excess capacity:
The present recession can be traced to the unrealistically
high demand estimates projected by the Planning Commission
in the successive Plans and large capacities established
to fulfil them.2
The level of domestic demand rather than material supply con-
ditions explained excess capacity in a number of capital goods indus-
tries as early as the second half of fiscal 1965-66. The extent of
excess capacity and the number of industries in which it occurred
because of inadequate demand reached a peak in 1966-67 and 1967-68.3
1001, MF, ES 1968-69, p. 11.
2 Mukand Iron and Steel, AR 1966-67, p. 4.
3See GOI, DGTD, AR 1966-67, 1967-68. Apart from the general
recession, in 1966 manufacture of PILC cables up to and including 1.1
kv for the domestic market was banned to avoid import of lead. Major
export orders from Kuwait in 1967 included orders for 1.1 kv PILC
cables.
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Although demand for some of these products began to recover in the
latter part of 1968-69 and an increasing number of companies reported
that production was once again constrained by the supply of materials,
particularly iron and steel, lack of domestic demand continued to be
an important explanation of excess capacity in many capital goods
industries through 1969-70.
There were thus important changes in domestic markets for basic
metals and engineering goods which contributed substantially to the
expansion of exports. The major changes were (i) overexpansion of capac-
ity in many capital goods industries, including some which operated
near capacity until about 1965;1 (ii) a decline in domestic demand;
and (iii) relaxation of material supply constraints on production as
a result of import liberalization. The decline in demand was apparent
in a reduction of new orders and order backlogs and in rising stocks
of finished goods.
The result in many industries was a decline in production and
increase in excess capacity, an increase in competition and reduction
in domestic prices, and a decline in domestic profit margins (even when
calculated as price less average variable cost). Data documenting the
decline in production of capital goods and iron and steel are presented
in Table 11-9. Two surveys in 1967 revealed the domestic price reduc-
tions in Table III-4 compared to 1 to 2 years earlier. A survey by the
IThis was particularly true of steel tubes (Indian Tube Co.),
PILC power cables (Indian Cable Co.), aluminum ingots (Hindustan
Aluminium), machine tools (HMT), and generally (i.e. at least 80 per-
cent of capacity in 1964) of iron and steel (except 1961), steel cast-
ings, railway wagons, structural steelwork, commercial vehicles.
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TABLE I1-4
Reductions in Domestic Prices of Engineerin2 Goods, 1965-66 to 1967
Product Domestic Price Reduction
(per cent)
Tungsten carbide 4 - 10
Electric consumer goods 5 - 10
Boilers 5 - 25
Lifts 5 - 25
Cotter pins 7 - 13
Air conditioners 9
Water coolers 9 - 15
Platform trucks 10
Industrial fans 10 - 12
Industrial furnaces 10 - 15
Electric plant items 10 - 20
Cranes 10 - 25
Welding electrodes 15 - 30
Steel structurals and 20
structural fabrication 20 - 25
Transformers and switchgear 20 - 45
Steel castings 20 - 45
Electric cables 25
Sanitaryware 25 - 40
Sources: EE, 22 September 1967, p. 547, and Tata Quarterly, July - October,
1967, p. 64.
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Indian Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association indicated that one-third
of the producers reduced domestic prices of machine tools between 1967
and 1968 while the rest left prices unchanged. Company and industry
reports stated that there were price reductions for railway wagons,
steel bars and wire rods produced by re-rollers, and aluminum as well
as for several of the same items listed in Table III-4.1 It should be
noted, however, that virtually none of the official price indices in
Table III-16 record a decline in average price during these years, al-
though price indices for machinery and transport equipment were quite
stable in 1967-1969.2
The following generalizations about the distribution of excess
capacity in 1966-67 and after are useful in evaluating the incentive
to export: 3
(i) The capital goods and basic metals industries experienced the
greatest decline in demand and production and had the lowest capacity
utilization, commonly estimated at 50 percent or less except for basic
1For example, Jessop, AR 1966-67, railway wagons; Braithwaite,
AR 1967, railway wagons; Mukand Iron and Steel, AR 1966-67, p. 14,
steel castings, and AR 1967-68, p. 13, rolled steel; Batala Engineer-
ing, AR 1967, steel bars, wire rods, and machine tools; Indian Cable
Company, AR 1967-68, aluminum and electric cables; EPW, 12 August 1967,
p. 1424, commercial vehicles. Krueger, 1970, p. 50, reports that the
ex-factory prices of commercial vehicles increased by 22 percent (for
Tata-Mercedes Benz trucks and Mahindra and Mahindra Jeeps, the main
exports) to 65 percent between 1965 and 1969.
2Whether this implies that the data in Table III-4 are unrepre-
sentative or that the indices in Table 111-16 are inaccurate is not
clear.
3See Table II-9 for detailed production data.
1 _ __ ____~ ~~_~~__ -
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metals. Excess capacity was especially high in industries which
depended primarily on orders from the government and capital goods
industries. Except for basic metals and commercial vehicles, excess
capacity was expected to continue in most of these industries through
the revised fourth plan or 1974.
(ii) There was excess capacity in a number of light engineering indus-
tries to a much lesser extent and with shorter duration.
(iii) Capacity utilization was high in engineering industries producing
agricultural equipment and a number of consumer goods.
(2) Effect on Export Profit Calculations
The considerations listed below were important in the export
profit calculations of many firms in 1966-67 and after because of the
recession and other developments discussed above:
(i) A substantial share of the costs of value added in manufacturing
were fixed, and hence the short-run marginal cost of value added was
below the long-run marginal cost. Thus the realization required for
export to be profitable was less than in the long-run. Capital equip-
ment had a low opportunity cost, given constraints on diversification
for the home market because of specialized equipment, lack of designs
and manufacturing know-how, and licensing restrictions. Labor similarly
often had a low opportunity cost because long-run labor requirements,
retrenchment allowances, the danger of retaliatory strikes, and polit-
ical pressures limited reductions in employment. For example, Braith-
waite reported that:
I __
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All attempts to solve the problem of 40 percent redundancy in
our labour force by temporarily reducing the man hours received
complete resistance and we had no option but to carry this
burden.1
(ii) Because material and capacity constraints were not binding on pro-
duction, export did not require foregoing domestic sales. In any case,
it can be inferred from the increase in competition and decline in
prices that the marginal revenue on any domestic sales foregone because
of exports was reduced. Thus, the marginal realization required to
make exports profitable was less than would have been necessary if there
had been a binding supply constraint on production and a highly profit-
able domestic market.
(iii) Because of reduced demand, expanded production capacity, and
liberalized import licensing for materials, open market prices of
certain materials including steel and aluminum (although not landed
prices of imports or control prices of domestic materials in most
cases) declined in 1966-67 and 1967-68.2
(iv) Interest costs gave some industries an incentive to liquidate
inventories, and because of government restrictions firms were not
allowed to sell imported or certain indigenous materials without
processing. For example, in 1967 cable manufacturers had large inven-
tories of copper and aluminum, and according to the largest manufac-
turer and exporter:
1 Braithwaite, AR 1967, p. 9.
2 1n 1968 open market prices of steel bars were even below control
prices. EPW, 10 August 1968, p. 1228, and ET, 17 October 1968.
NiI .. . .-- rui
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Huge quantities of expensive metals imported by the cable
manufacturers blocked substantial funds, the financing of
which was progressively more expensive as money became
dearer. As a result, there was a scramble amongst cable
manufacturers to process and dispose of as much of these
metals as possible, leading to progressive lowering of
prices. 1
Several companies reported that such inventories affected their export
decisions.
(v) In addition, the Indian government varied export restrictions and
incentives countercyclically. Controls on exports of iron, steel, and
aluminum reinforced the effects of fluctuations in domestic demand on
exports.2 The same appears to have been true in the case of enforce-
ment of export comnitments, which were relaxed for the aluminum indus-
try in 1970 because of domestic shortages. Approval of Indian foreign
investment was also related to domestic market conditions for equipment:
Joint venture schemes...for establishment of overseas fac-
tories...were examined...with reference to the essential-
ity and indigenous availability of plant and equipment for
export.3
(3) Test of the Role of Excess Capacity
The export data in Table II-17 for the 26 industries examined in
detail in this study were analyzed to determine the role of excess capac-
ity due to inadequate domestic demand in the expansion of exports
lIndian Cable Company, AR 1967-68, p. 11.
2 GOI, MSMM, ISaCB, May 1968, p. 369, states that exports of iron
and steel were allowed only when "the Iron and Steel Controller is sat-
isfied that the quantity is surplus to the requirements of the country."
3GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 76.
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after 1965-66. The 26 industries were classified into three groups:
Group I, those with substantial excess capacity due to inadequate
domestic demand (industries 1 through 15); Group II, those without
excess capacity (industries 16 through 20 and 26); and Group III,
those for which capacity utilization could not be determined or for
which it varied significantly between products in the industry (indus-
tries 21 through 25). This classification of industries was based on
information from interviews, company and trade association reports,
and industry studies rather than the government data for capacity
utilization in Table II-9. Official data on capacity are widely
acknowledged to be grossly inaccurate and are useless for economic
analysis. 1
Only Groups I and II were analyzed. The 21 industries in
Groups I and II are not representative of other engineering industries.
This can be seen from the fact that their share of total exports in-
creased from 61 to 82 percent of the total over the period from 1965-
1966 to 1968-69. However, since they accounted for 82 percent of
total exports of iron and steel, all engineering goods, and tires in
1968-69 and 88 percent of the increase from 1965-66 and 1968-69, they
provide a basis for useful conclusions.
To emphasize the existence of excess capacity, the value of
exports in Table II-17 during each year when production (including
exports) was below a previous peak is marked with an asterisk (or a
See notes to Table 11-9.
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"+" when this was true for only some of the important products of the
industry.) Of the industries in Group I, only the aluminum industry
did not experience an actual decline in production in spite of the in-
crease in exports while production in many was below a previous peak
in most or all of the following four years.
There are three complications in the classification of indus-
tries:
(i) Capacity temporarily exceeded domestic demand in the aluminum indus-
try in 1968 and early 1969, but during the rest of the period there was
no excess capacity. The aluminum industry is classified in Group I be-
cause excess capacity due to lack of domestic demand was the dominant
factor behind the industry's exports.
(ii) The classifications for two industries are incorrect for the
second half of 1969-70. In the commercial vehicle industry, which is
classified in Group I, three major exporters operated near capacity
(including export production) in late 1969-70. Two of the companies
had order backlogs and their production was constrained by capacity,
material supplies, and labor troubles. In the stationary diesel engine
industry, which is classified in Group II, there was a major decline
in demand and a reduction in production in the second half of 1969-70.
(iii) There were brief, mild declines in production in three other in-
dustries listed in Group II. In the case of batteries, the decline in
1967-68 was a result of a strike. The causes of the other declines
could not be determined.
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In the light of the first two of these complications and the
discussion of 1969-71 in section III.B.3 below, the present analysis
applies primarily to 1966-67 through 1968-69 and requires some quali-
fications for 1969-70.
Table III-5 summarizes the data in Table II-17 for industries
in Groups I and II. It can be seen that 75 percent of total exports
of iron and steel, all engineering goods (including those not listed
in Table 11-17), and tires in 1968-69, and 86 percent of the increase
in exports between 1965-66 and 1968-69, was accounted for by the in-
dustries in Group I with excess capacity due to inadequate domestic
demand. These percentages would obviously be higher if all engineer-
ing industries were classified in Groups I and II.
Furthermore, while exports by the industries in Group I in-
creased by 570 percent between 1965-66 and 1968-69 (or 460 percent
excluding iron and steel), exports by the industries in Group II in-
creased by only 32 percent. There is a similar contrast between
export-production ratios in the two groups. While exports were 10 to
47 percent of output for 10 of the 15 industries in Group I during
1969-70, exports were 4 to 7 percent of output for four of the six
industries in Group II. (See Table 111-7.) The high export-production
ratio of one of the remaining industries in Group II, the data proces-
sing machine industry, is explained by the special licensing provisions
described in section III.C.2.b.
These figures suggest that excess capacity was an important
iSi - ~- -- -- --~--~~~~~-
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TABLE 111-5
Exports by Industries with and without Excess Capacity due to
Insufficient Domestic Demand after 1966, 1964-65 to 1969-70
Industries
Group I: Excess Capacity
Industries (1) - (15)
Value ($ million)
Per cent of total*
Industries (2) - (15)
Value ($ million)
Per cent of total
Group I1: No Excess Capacity
Industries (16)-(20),(26)
Value ($ million)
Per cent of total
1964- 1965- 1966- 1967- 1968- 1969-
65 66 67 68 69 70
12.98 23.40 42.46 96.11 157.74 181.83
29 41 59 74 75 73
7.06 11.77 16.45 24.80 65.34 80.88
16 21 23 19 31 32
8.21 10.99
18 .20
9.75 10.69 14.46 17.50
14 8 7 7
* Total exports of iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires
Source: Table 11-17.
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factor contributing to the increase in exports. 1 In interviews and
in their annual reports the firms involved confirmed that excess cap-
acity played an important role in the decision to export and in deter-
mining export prices. It will be seen in part III.D.3 that even after
allowing for export promotion schemes a significant share of exports of
engineering goods appears to have taken place at realizations which did
not cover long-run average costs (and probably did not cover long-run
marginal costs) or match realizations in the domestic market, particu-
larly (i) before preferential maintenance import licensing for export-
ers began in 1968-69, (ii) in the case of firms which did not export
enough to qualify for these preferences, and (iii) on the margin for
firms which exported beyond the level necessary to qualify for these
preferences. It can be concluded that excess capacity was critical for
export by a number of industries in cases (i) - (iii), given the
1A number of studies indicate that the level of excess capacity
or fluctuations in domestic demand have had an important influence on
the volume of exports of engineering goods and metals from other semi-
industrial countries. In discussing "the sudden upsurge in total
exports of engineering goods...since the late 1950s or early 1960s"
from semi-industrial countries which had followed inward-oriented
strategies of industrialization, a GATT study notes that "signifi-
cantly, exports of engineering products from several of these countries
showed sharply accelerated growth at times of depressed internal demand,
such as Argentina in 1963, in Brazil between 1963 and 1965, and in India
in 1967 and, particularly, 1968." (GATT, 1969, p. 88). In discussing
the Argentine experience, Felix states that "the fact that industrial
exports reached a peak in the 1963 depression and fell off in the 1964-
1965 revival of domestic activity reinforces scattered direct evidence
that much of the exporting, despite the tax and (LAFTA) tariff conces-
sions, was at less than full cost." (Felix, 1968, p. 90). Little
et al. report that Brazilian "exports of steel were abnormally high in
1965, and fell in 1966, thus leading to a fall in total exports of
manufactures in 1966. Expansion was resumed in 1967, but fell back
again in 1968 with the recovery of home demand." (Little et al., 1970,
p. 380.)
_ _I_____~_I__~ ~_ __ _ _ __ _ ~_i~
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implicit exchange rate on export.
However, there are several limitations on the conclusions that can
be drawn from the preceding analysis because industries which did not
export were not included. Excess capacity due to lack of demand was
clearly neither necessary nor sufficient for export in general. First,
a small yet significant share of exports in 1968-69 (7 percent), but
very little of the increase between 1965-66 and 1968-69 (2 percent), was
accounted for by the industries in Group II.
Second, some major industries, notably heavy electrical genera-
ting, metallurgical, and mining equipment (i.e. the largest public sec-
tor firms other than HSL) did not export in spite of vast excess capac-
ity due largely but not exclusively to lack of domestic demand. (See
Table 111-6.) Moreover, even in many industries which did export, only
a small share of excess capacity was employed in export production.
Third, export, like performance in general, differed substan-
tially among firms in the same industry, particularly in the case of
non-commodity-like products. In the commercial vehicle industry, the
ratio of exports to capacity was positively related to utilization of
capacity for domestic production, with TELCO dominating both the domes-
tic market and exports and Hindustan Motors and Premier Automobiles
making a poor showing in both. The differences in performance in this
case seem to have been related to the quality of management and of the
vehicles produced. 1
1EPW, 17 February 1968, p. 315, reports that "it is the groups
with engineering bias and tradition--Tata (TELCO), Mahindra (Mahindra
and Mahindra), and Leyland (Ashok Leyland)--which give rise to the
least complaints about their products. Birla (Hindustan Motors) and
I _~_~c~ii*ii - ,
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TABLE III-6
Capacity Utilization in Heavy Machinery Industries,
1968-69
Industry Capacity Ratio of
Output to
Capacity
Exports
1. Heavy electrical
generating equipment
Turbines, hydro
Turbines, thermal
Power Boilers
2. Metallurgical and
other heavy equipment
3. Coal and other mining
machinery
0.5 mil. KW
1.5 mil. KW
1.5 mil. KW
85,000 tons
50,000 tons
Source: IEA, HS, 1969-70, p. 145.
0.20
0.27
0.27
0.29
0.16
- ---
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3. 1969-1971: Steel Shortage
Domestic demand for a number of the engineering goods for which
production declined during the recession began to recover in the second
half of 1968-69. Reports of domestic price increases for engineering
goods were common in late 1969-70 and are supported by the data in
Table 111-16. However, apart from the aluminum industry and some units
in the commercial vehicle industry, capacity constraints did not limit
output by these industries during 1969-70.
The important development which began in early 1969 was a par-
tial return to the material supply conditions of the first half of
the 1960s. Chapter IV will discuss the adverse impact of these material
supply problems, particularly shortage of steel, on production and ex-
ports. The EEPC argued that during 1969-70 shortage of steel was the
main factor limiting execution of existing export orders and booking of
new ones, i.e. that exports were again deterred because production was
constrained by the supply of materials and domestic sales were more
profitable than exports.
C. Government Export Promotion Schemes
The rupee was overvalued at the official exchange rate, particu-
larly between the late 1950s and devaluation in 1966. Protection
afforded by tariffs and restrictive import licensing generally raised
the effective exchange rate on industrial production for the domestic
Walchand (Premier Automobiles) have still to acquire this quality con-
sciousness. The quality of their products has gone down with every
increase in indigenous content." See also EPW, 28 June 1969, p. 1024.
-T- c- -
140
market considerably above the official rate but reduced the effective
exchange rate on export before allowing for export subsidies below
even the overvalued official rate by forcing use of expensive domestic
inputs and imported inputs for which prices were increased by tariffs
and scarcity premia. The resulting structure of effective exchange
rates created a strong bias toward production for the domestic market
rather than for export. 1
Although export promotion measures can be traced back as far as
the foreign exchange crisis of 1956-58, the government's reaction to
that crisis was to restrict imports and promote import substitution
rather than to encourage exports. However, after about 1959-60, and
particularly after intensification of the foreign exchange shortage in
1962, the bias in effective exchange rates against exports was progres-
sively reduced in the case of non-traditional manufactured goods by
export promotion schemes and devaluation, as well as by the recession
after 1966.
This part examines each of the export promotion schemes which
applied to iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires during the
1960s. This discussion provides the basis for conclusions in part III.D
concerning the effect of export promotion schemes on implicit exchange
rates and on the volume of exports and in Chapter VIII.A concerning the
efficiency of export promotion policies.
1 See Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 354-61, for measurements of
effective protection in a number of engineering industries in 1961-62.
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TABLE III-7
Summary of Export Subsidies, 1969
Exportsa
1969-70
($ mil.)
1. Iron and steel
Pig Iron
Billets
Structurals
Bars and rods
Rails
2. Steel pipes, tubes,
Pipes and tubes
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
Fittings
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
101.0
and fittings 15.0
•14.6
0.4
2.13. Bright steel bars and shaftings
Cash
Subsidy
1969-70
(% f.o.b.
10/0
10/0
15/0
22.5/0
5
46/30
20
Indirectc
Tax Re-..
bate 1969
)(% f.o.b.)
10
26
20
18
n.a.
19-27
Import Licenses
for Exporterse
Steel Entitle- Replen-
Subsidy ment ishment
mid-'69 1964/66 1966-70
(% f.o.b.)(% f.o.b) (% f.o.b.)
n.a.
14 40
n.a. n.a. n.a.
220
n.a. n.a. 75 40
4. Iron and steel castings
Iron
Steel
3.9 25
3.6
0.4
2.2 20 19-20 n.a. 75 40
Product
5-6
n.a. 4
1
-- -- - ----- - ---1 -- i--- --  -- ---- -------- ----
5. Steel wire ropes
TABLE III-7 (continued)
Preferential Maintenance Import Licensing for
Exoorters
Obligation Priority Preference
to Export Status by for Exporting
5% of Out- Exportg 10% of Outputh
putf
(Date Imposed)
Percent
of Output
Exportedt
(1969-70)
Percent of
Exports to
Soft Cur-
rency Areas
19 69-70J
I. ron and Steel
Pig iron
Billets
Structurals
Bars and rods
Rails
2. Steel pipes, tubes, and
fittings
Pipes and tubes
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
Fittings
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
3. Bright steel bars and
shaftings
4. Iron and steel castings
Iron
Steel
5. Steel wire ropes
1970-71
Yes 15P
0(1968-69)
) 32(1968-69)
Eligibility No
uncertain
(except rails)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No Yes
No P
1968-69 P
Yes
Someq
Yes
47 1
n.a. 17
40 46
Eligibility
uncertain
Eligibility
uncertain
k
Medium
and Long-
Term
Credit
Eligible
under Tied
Equity
Investment
Schemem
f
""""
--- - I ---- ----- - -- - ---
TABLE III-7 (continued)
Product
6. Electric wires and cables
Bare conductors
Aluminum
Copper
Insulated cables
Aluminum
Copper
PILC 1.1 kv and over
Other
Cash
Exports Subsidy
1969-70 1969-70
14.8
5.2
4.6
5.0
10
Indirect
Tax Re-
bate 1969
Steel
Subsidy
mid-'69
Import Licenses for
Exporterse
Entitle- Replen-
ment ishment
1964/66 1966-70
0 100/75
28
11
n.a.
7. Hand, small and cutting tools
Hand
Steel files
Twist drills
Other
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets and foils
Ingots
Sheets and circles
Foils
9. Transmission line towers
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
10. Fabricated steel structures other than (9)
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
3.5
15(20)
0.6 15(22.5)
0.5 15(22.5)
15(22.5)
5.4
4.8
0.3
0.3
3.9
2.5
2
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
28
31 or 49s
n.a.
9-10
0
100/75
100/75
8 40/60
8 40
10
20
4:
W
Xlilll
TABLE III-7 (continued)
Preferential Maintenance Import Licensing for Exporters
Obligation
to Export
5% of Output f
(Date Imposed)
Priority
Status by
Exportg
Preference
for Exporting
10% of Outputh
Percent
of Output
Exportedi
(1969-70)
Percent of Medium
Exports to and Long-
Soft Cur- Term
rency Areas Creditk
1969-70J
6. Electric wires and cables
Bare conductors
Aluminum
Copper
Insulated cables
Aluminum
Copper
PILC 1.1 kv and above
Other
Yes
13
90-100
39 r
Yes No
Yes
Yes
Yes
7. Hand, small, and cutting tools 1968-69 P
Hand
Steel files
Twist drills
Other
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets, and see note y P
foils
Ingots
Sheets and circles
Foils
Yes
No (1969-70)
Yes (1968-69)
2 5 v
25"
see note x
No No
72 Eligibility No
uncertain
9. Transmission line towers
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
10. Fabricated steel structures
other than (9)
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
1970-71 ' P Yes
Yes
21 Yes
23 Eligible Yes (minor)
Eligible
under Tied
Equity
Investment
Scheme"
-I
~--;M.~;:"n-;i'h:TI.I:~~il*iP-;:sr W~' %
~i'ii
V .---------
TABLE 111-7 (continued)
Product
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile machinery and parts
13. Machine tools
14. Electric machinery
Transformers
Motors
Motor starters
Other switchgear
15. Commercial vehicles and jeeps
.16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry
Storage
17. Radios and components
18. Data processing machines-*
19. Bicycles
Sports light roadsters
Other
Cash
Exports Subsidy
1969-70 1969-70
0.7
8.6
3.7
3.4
1.5
0.7
0.1
0.7
11.0
2.0
1.0
1.0
1.6
10-12.5
25
Indirect
Tax Re-
bate 1969
n.a.
n.a.
3-5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
15
2.6
2.1
Steel
Subsidy
mid-'69
n.a.
n.a.
1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Import Licenses for
Exporters
e
Entitle- Replen-
ment ishment
1964/66 1966-70
40 20
40
(75 parts)
40
60-75
100
30
100
---- -- ---- 
-- ---- -- ------- ---- ----;-------- ---------------------- -------- -
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TABLE III-7 (continued)
Obligation Priority
to Export Status
5% of Out- by
putf  Exportg
(Date Imposed)
11. Railway wagons
Preference
for Export-
ing 10% of
outputh
No (1969-70)
Yes (1968-69)
Percent
of Out-
put Ex-
ported
(1969-70)
Percent Medium Eligible
of Ex- and under Tied
ports to Long- Equity
Soft Cur-Term Investment
rency Creditk Schemem
Areas
1969-703
0(1969-70)44(1969-70) Yes No
11(1968-69) 3(1968-69)
12. Cotton textile machinery and parts
13. Machine tools
Yes
Yes
20
1 0 z
No n.a.14. Electric machinery
Transformers
Motors
Motor starters
Other switchgear
Yes Yes
Eligible Yes
Eligible Yes(minor)
15. Commercial vehicles and jeeps
16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry
Storage
17. Radios and components
18. Data processing machines
19. Bicycles
Sports light roadsters
Other
1968-69 P
n.a.
No
n.a.
not applicable (see note*)
1968-69 P
n.a.
5 iii
n.a.
Yes No
No No
No No
No No
No No
~-r-r?*uYL~i~n~Ylrus~n~ r(-C-WYPI-*1U~ 2
- - - -- --:i --- ------ -- - -- -- --- -- -------------------- ------ --
-.4
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TABLE 111-7 (continued)
Product
20. Stationary diesel engines and parts
Engines
Parts
21. Automobile.parts
22. Vehicular engines and engine parts
Engines
Parts
23. Bicycle parts
24. Electric fans and parts
25. Builders' hardware including. locks
Ferrous
Aluminum
Other nonferrous
Cash
Exports Subsidy
1969-70 1969-70
3.0
5.5
1.4
4;0
2.8
1.3
Indirect
Tax Re--
bate 1969
n.a.
5
Steel
Import Licenses for
Exporterse
Entitle- Replen-
Subsidy ment ishment
mid-'69 1964/66 1966-70
n.a.
10 n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a.
75 2 0ii
75 20
20-75
40 20
n.a. 40
0 100/75
0 100/75
6.1
0.6
5.5
26. Tires and tubes
Bicycle
Other than bicycle
Butyl tubes
Nylon tires
Other
n.a. 0
TABLE III-7 (continuedl
Obligation Priority
to Export Status
5% of Out- by Ex-
putf  portg
(Date Imposed)
20.Stationary diesel engines and
parts
Engines
Parts
21. Automobile parts
1968-69
1968-69&
1969-70
1968-69 &
1969-70
Preference Percent
for Export- of Out-
ing 10% of put Ex-
Outputh portedi
(1969-70)
No
n.a.
Percent
of Ex-
ports to
Soft Cur-
rency
Areas
1969-70j
Medium Eligible Under
and Long Tied Equity
Term Investfent
Creditk Scheme
Eligible
4
n.a.
22. Vehicular engines and engine parts
Engines No
Parts 1968-69 &
1969-70
23. Bicycle parts- 1968-69 &
1969-70
24. Electric fans and parts Yes
25. Builders' hardware including No
locks
Ferrous
Aluminum
Other nonferrous
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.ivn2a. 75 Eligibility
uncertain
n.a.
Yes
n.a. n.a.
26. Tires and tubes
Bicycle
Other than bicycle
Butyl tubes
Nylon tires
Other
see note vi
n.a.
No
n.a.
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Notes to Table 111-7
Where two numbers in a column are separated by a hyphen, they repre-
sent the range of rates for different items. Where they are separated
by a slash (/), the left-hand number refers to the beginning of the
period and the right-hand number to the end. When the second number
is enclosed in a parenthesis, they have the same meanings as in Table
III-9, note b.
n.a.: not available
a: Export data are from Table 11-17.
b: See part III.C.l.b. Subsidy rates are from Table 111-9.
c: See part III.C.l.e. Rates on items (1) to (10) and (19) were derived
from specific rates and average values of exports. Rates on (20)
and (21) were specified in ad valorem terms. The rate for (13) was
set for exports of two firms on the basis of actual taxes paid.
Sources: All except (13): GOI, MC, 1968b, and amendments to
November 1969.
Item (13): Two Indian manufacturers.
d: See Chapter IV.M.1. Rates were derived from subsidy rates in
Table IV-19 and average values of exports.
e: See part III.C.2.a. Rates of import licenses are the percentages of
f.o.b. value of exports given in import licenses. For market values
see text and Table 111-12. Sources are:
1964: Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 439-44.
1966: MCIEC, July 1966, p. v.
i 1966-70: GOI, EEPC, 1967a, and GOI, MFTS, 1969, Vol. II,
Section II.
f: See part III.C.3.b. "No" means the-scheme did not apply. Dates are
the initial years in .which the scheme applied. Once imposed, all
obligations continued through 1970-71.
g: See part III.C.3.a. All industries were classified by the government
as priority or non-priority for maintenance import licensing. Beginning
in 1968-69 a firm in a non-priority industry could earn priority
status if it exported 10 percent of output. "P" signifies the
industry was originally classified as priority so this scheme did not
apply. "NP" means the industry was classified as non-priority but
it could not be' determined whether firms earned priority status by
export. "Yes" means non-priority firms earned priority status by
export.
h: See part III.C.3.a. "Yes" means total exports were 10 percent of
output or more and hence at least the major exporters qualified for
preferences in maintenance import licensing. "No" means this was
not the case. "Some" means that "Yes" and "No" applied to different
prolducts in the industry.
150
Notes to Table III-7 (continued)
i: Average ratio of export to output for the industry as a whole.
Production data are only for the organized sector, and hence
the ratio is biased upward.
j: See Chapter VI. Soft currency areas: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Yugoslavia;
Sudan, UAR; Afghanistan; and Ceylon.
k: See Chapter VI. "Yes" means that credit was approved during
1968-70; "eligible" that the industry was eligible to export
on credit but did not; "no" that the industry was not allowed
to export on credit over 18 months.
m: See part III.C.5.
n: Beginning in February 1968 re-rollers received a subsidy of 6 percent
of the f.o.b. value of exports of bars and rods because the freight
equalization levy was refunded. (Mukand Iron and Steel, AR 1967-68,
p.14).
p: Percent of output exported was 36 for pig iron for sale (excluding
pig iron used in steel-making) and 13 for finished steel.
q: Kesoram Spun Pipes exported 35 percent of output in 1969-70.
r: Figure of 39 percent is for all paper insulated cables.
s: Rate of 31 applied to sheets manufactured from indigenous aluminum,
rate of 49 to sheets manufactured from imported aluminum.
t: Rate of 20 applied in 1968-69. Rate was set on a case-by-case basis
in 1969-70.
u: Basic rate was 10 percent but an ad hoc increase to 12.5 applied to
sales to the UAR which accounted for the bulk of exports.
v: Gedore Tools exported 40 percent of output in 1968-69.
w: Raymond Woollen Mills (J.K. Engineers File Div.) exported 34 percent
of output in 1969 and 53 percent of output in 1970.
x: Indian Tool Manufacturers exported 4 percent of output in 1969-70.
y: An obligation to export 10 percent of output was imposed in all
industrial or capital goods import licenses for expansion in the
aluminum industry in the latter 1960s. See part IrI.C.4.c.
z: Traub India exported 25 percent of output in 1970, but the majority
of exports were by firms which exported less than 10 percent of output.
_ __L_ _ _ __~_111 __ _ __ __ I___~__
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Notes to Table III-7 (continued)
*: Nominally there was a cash subsidy of 10 percent of f.o.b. value
and an import replenishment license of 30 percent of f.o.b. value
on exports of data processing machines, but instead of receiving
these subsidies the data processing machine industry was allowed
to use all export earnings to import inputs. Regular maintenance
import licensing did not apply to data processing machines.
See part III.C.2.b.
ii: The rate on oil seals and laminated springs was 40 percent and on
radiators was 50 percent.
iii: ABMEL exported 19 percent of output of automobile batteries (not
of entire production) in 1968-69.
iv: Kirloskar Cummins exported 20 percent of output in 1969-70.
vi: An obligation to export 10 percent of output was imposed in all
industrial licenses for expansion in the tire industry in the
latter 1960s. See part III.C.4.o.
El
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Table 111-7 provides a breakdown of the subsidy rates and other
incentives under a number of these schemes for the 26 industries con-
sidered in detail in this study.
1. Fiscal Subsidies for Export and Levies and Price Controls on
Domestic Sales
a. Income Tax Concessions
From 1962-63 until devaluation in mid-1966, the tax rate on
profits earned on exports was 45 percent rather than the normal 50 per-
cent. For purposes of calculating the tax, it was assumed that the
proportion of total profits that was earned on exports was equal to
that of exports in total sales. This implied a subsidy of about 1 per-
cent (taxable) on the f.o.b. value of exports for each 10 percent of
average sales value represented by profits. In addition, from 1963-64
until devaluation the income tax liability of a company was reduced by
the average rate of tax times 2 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports.
This implied an additional subsidy of 2 percent (taxable) on the f.o.b.
value of exports. Consequently, in the three years preceding devalu-
ation, exports received a tax concession approximately equivalent to a
taxable cash subsidy of 3 percent of f.o.b. value, although the rate
varied among firms depending on the ratio of profits to sales and the
tax rate. An additional tax credit scheme announced in 1965 did not
apply to iron and steel, engineering goods, or tires. These tax con-
cessions were abolished at devaluation, and no such concession in income
tax was given for exports between devaluation and 1970.
_1_1_~_ __11111__~_____~___________
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b. Direct Cash Subsidy
For a short period prior to the 1966 devaluation,1 39 percent
of exports of iron and steel and engineering goods received direct
cash subsidies of 4 to 39 percent of f.o.b. value. (See Table 111-8.)
Other engineering goods did not receive such cash subsidies. This
scheme was ended at devaluation.
In August 1966 the government initiated a new scheme of direct
cash subsidies of up to 20 percent of f.o.b. value for exports of iron
and steel, engineering goods, and tires. The government subsequently
increased the rates of subsidy using four techniques discussed below.
The only rate reductions occurred when export prices for iron and steel
rose relative to domestic control prices and when a special scheme for
steel pipes and tubes broke down. The resulting rates of cash subsidy
in five periods between August 1966 and March 1971 for the 26 indus-
tries considered in detail are listed in Table 111-9.
The first step taken by the government to increase cash subsidies
was to raise the rate for 13 of these 26 industries by 5 to 10 percent
of f.o.b. value in June or September 1967.
Second, in 1968-69 the government announced that the rate of
subsidy would be increased by 2.5 to 10 percent of f.o.b. value for
individual firms in 11 of these 26 industries provided their exports
in 1968-69 exceeded those in 1967-68 by 10 percent. This was renewed
in 1969-70 with the condition that exports in 1969-70 had to exceed
'The subsidies were evidently given for about a year, during
1965-66 and until devaluation.
I I ~ -~ -
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TABLE III-8
Rates of Cash Subsidy on Exports, 1965-66
Product Subsidy Value of Exports
(% f.o.b.) ($ mil.)
1. Steel 5 11.62
2. Steel pipes and tubes 20 4.41
4. Iron castings 4 1.48
19. Bicycles 39 0.87
23. Bicycle parts 30 1.55
Wire nails and screws 4 0.23
Total of above 20.2
All other engineering
goods 0 31.1
Source: Iron and steel: GOI, RBI, Bulletin, October 1970, p. 1715.
Engineering goods: GOI, EEPC, Letter Ref. EPC:WO: 301, dated
22 June 1971.
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TABLE III-9
Rates of Cash Subsidy on Exports, 1966-67 to
1970-71
(per cent of f.o.b. value)
Product
1. Iron and steelc
Pig iron
Billets
Structurals
Bars and rods
Rails
2. Steel pipes, tubes,
and fittings
Pipes and tubes
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
Fittings
3. Bright steel bars and
shaftings 10
4. Iron and steel castings
Iron 20
Steel 20
5. Steel wire ropes 20
6. Electric wires and
cables
Bare conductors
Aluminum 10
Copper 0
Insulated cables
Aluminum 10
Copper
PILC 1.1 kv and over 0
Other 0
7. Hand, small, and cutting
tools
Hand 15
Others 10
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets,
and foils
Ingots 0
Sheets and circles 10
Foils 10
Excluding ad hoc subsidies
8/66 to 6-9/67 3/68 to 4/69 to 4/70 to Additional
5-8/67 to 2/68 3/69 3/70 3/71 ad hoc
subsidies
10-20d 20-25
e
10
10
10
22.5a
5
Of
0
0
0
5
46ag 30a
46ag 30a
20 20
n.a.
30
25
20
1 5h 15h 1 5h 15
25a 25a 25
25 25 25
20 20 20 20
10 10 10
0 0 0
10 10 10 15
l01 10i
0 0
10i
0
101
0
5(1967)
15 15 1 5 ( 2 0)b 20a
15 15 15(22.5) b 2 2 . 5a
_~i_ _ __gF__
_ __~__ __ 
~
Product
9. Transmission line
towers
Ungalvanized
Galvanized
10. Fabricated steel
structures other
than (9)
TABLE III-9 (continued)
Excluding ad hoc subsidies
8/66 to 6-9/67 3/68 to 4/69 to 4/70 to
5-8/67 to 2/68 3/69 3/70 3/71
20 20
20 20
20 20
11. Railway wagons case by case
12. Cotton textile
machinery and
parts
13. Machine tools
10 10
10 20
14. Electric machin-
ery
Transformers 15
Motors 15
Motor starters 15
Other switchgear 15
20 20
2 0 (2 5 )b 2 5a
20 20
20 20
10 '10
25a
25 a
15
2 5a
2 5a
25a
25a
15
25a
25a
Additional
ad hoc
subsidies
some (1968)
20 5(1967)
10 2.5(1969)
25
25
15
25
25
15. Commercial vehicles
and jeeps 10 10 17 .5a 20a
16. Dry and storage
batteries
17. Radios and com-
ponents
18. Data processing
machinesJ
19. Bicycles
Sports light
roadsters
other
20. Stationary diesel
engines and parts
21. Automobile parts
22. Vehicular engines
and parts
10 10
10 10
20 25
20 25
10 15
10 10
10 15
10 10
10 10
20a
30a 30
20a 20
10 10
156
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TABIE III-9 (continued)
Product
8-66 to 6-9/67 3/68 to 4/69 to 4/70 to Additional
5-8/67 to 2/68 3/69 3/70 3/71 ad hoc
subsidies
23. Bicycle parts 20 25 30a 30a 30
24. Electric fans and
parts 10 15 15 (20)b 20a 20
25. Builders' hardware
including locks
Ferrous 20 20 20 20 20
Nonferrous 10 10 10 10 10
26. Tires and tubes
Bicycle 10 10 10 10 10
Other than bicycle
Butyl tubes 10 10 10 10 20
Nylon tires 10 10 10 20 20
Other 10 10 10 25 25
Notes:
n.a.: not available.
a: Includes additional subsidy conditional on increase in exports by indi-
vidual firms. In these cases the total exports of the product increased
by the required percentage, and it can be assumed that most of the
exports received the additional subsidy.
b: Figure in parentheses includes additional subsidy conditional on increase
in exports by individual firms. In these cases the total exports of the
product did not increase by the required percentage, and it is likely
that most of the exports did not receive the additional subsidy.
c: According to the report of the Steering Group on Iron and Steel,
the cash subsidies paid on exports of iron and steel amount to 44 per cent
of f.o.b. value in 1965-66, 24 per cent in 1966-67, and 13 per cent in
1967-68. The report states that the following rates of cash subsidy
were claimed by the Steel Exporters Association in 1968-69: pig iron, 43
per cent; billets, 34 per cent; structurals, 21 per cent; bars and rods,
31 per cent; and rails, 9 per cent. (GOI, MSHI, 1969, p. 36.) This
report could not be verified.
d: The rate was between 10 and 20 per cent, but the exact rate or range
of rates could not be determined. (GOI, MF, ES 1967-68, p. 32.)
e: It could not be determined whether all or only some of the rates were 20
to 25 per cent. (FE, 10 January, 1968, p. 8.)
f: The subsidy on iron and steel except rails was eliminated in October 1969.
q: Between January 1968 and June 1969 there was a special subsidy for steel
pipes and tubes equivalent to 16 per cent of f.o.b. value.
h: The subsidy was to be reduced by 5 per cent if the f.o.b. value of exports
was not at least 133 per cent of the value of imported and indigenous
steel used as raw material.
i: Subsidy was given only on orders against cash payment and worth $240,000
or more. It applied to most exports.
_ ~ ___ _~b~_~ ~ _ _ ~_ ~ ~
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Notes to Table 11I-9 (continued)
j: There was a nominal cash subsidy of 10 per cent of f.o.b. value for
data processing machines, but it was not given to firms receiving
licenses under the special scheme described in part III.C.2.b.
Sources: 1966-67 and 1967-68: GOI, EEPC, 1967a.
1968-69 and 1969-70: GOI, EEPC, 1968a; GOI, Ministry of Foreign
Trade, Letter to EEPC, Ref. No. 12(2)/69, EAC, dated 21 March,
1969; GOI, EEPC, Circular No. EPC/REG/1/69-70, dated 3 April,
1969.
1970-71: Worksheets on "Import Replenishment Rate and Cash
Subsidy", compiled from Ministry of Foreign Trade publications
by J.N. Bhagwati.
Ad hoc subsidies: Table III-10.
II1
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those in 1968-69 by 5 percent or those in 1967-68 by 12.5 percent.
The dominant share of exports in nine of these eleven industries in
1968-69, and in all of them in 1969-70, was by firms which increased
their exports enough to quality for the additional subsidy. In 1969-70
two more industries were included in the scheme with the rate of sub-
sidy to be increased by 5 to 10 percent of f.o.b. value if exports in
1969-70 exceeded those in 1968-69 by 25 percent.1 Few if any of the
important exporters in one of the industries increased their exports
enough to quality, but exporters in the other industry qualified.
There were also a number of ad hoc variants of this scheme which
made a higher average rate of subsidy contingent on a specified level
of exports. The government announced that the "rate of cash assistance
on steel forgings will be increased from 15 percent to 20 percent sub-
ject to the condition that the total exports of steel forgings from
1.9.67 to 31.3.69 reach a f.o.b. value of Rs. 1 crore ($1.33 million).,"2
This was repeated in 1969-70 with a target of $1.0 million per year.
Unlike the schemes discussed above, which related the rate of subsidy
to export performance for the individual firm, this scheme related the
rate to the export performance of the entire industry. In 1970 the
government announced that the subsidy on motor cycles would be increased
by 10 percent of f.o.b. value for firms which exported over $67,000 per
year.
IFE, 4 December 1969.
2
-GOI, EEPC, 1968a, p. 20.
3FE, 4 June 1970, p. 8.
_ __ _ __ __. _~___~~~_
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Third, on one product which was subject to price controls in
the domestic market, steel pipes and tubes, the government gave an
ad hoc cash subsidy on exports between January 1968 and June 1969 by
allowing producers to increase prices in the home market to create a
pool from which they drew funds on the basis of exports, at the equiv-
alent of 16 percent of f.o.b. value. Government approval of the
scheme depended on the assurance of the manufacturers that they would
export at least one-third of their production, which they did. A
similar scheme operated for bicycles and parts in 1959-1965, with a
subsidy of 20 percent of the domestic wholesale value of exports. 2
Fourth, at least as early as 1967 the government operated an
ad hoc scheme according to which:
Government consider extending additional (cash) assistance
needed for exporters to bid for and secure contracts for
export, for high value, not less than Rs 50 lakhs ($0.67
million). Each case is considered on merits.1
While the government has not made available a list of cases where such
subsidies were given, interviews revealed four cases involving exports
of $31 million in which additional subsidies of 2.5 to 5 percent of
f.o.b. value were given. (See Table III-10.) In the case of the rail-
way wagons, the additional subsidy was given to offset the freight dis-
advantage compared to Japan. For the transmission line towers it was
1GOI, EEPC, 1969b, p. 110. This is mentioned in IIFT, 1967b,
p. 44, was announced by the Deputy Minister of Commerce in the Lok
Sabha on 17 December 1968, and was repeated by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade's letter No. 15/52/69-EP(Engg) dated 30 December 1969,
cited in FE, 16 January 1971, p. 10.
'This was before the direct cash subsidy in Table 111-8 was
initiated.
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TABLE III-10
Ad Hoe Cash Subsidies Given oh Large
1967-1969
Export Orders,
Product Value of Order
($ million)
6. PILC power cables 3.5
9, Transmission line towers 1.3
11. Railway wagons
12. Cotton textile machinery 16.0
Additional Subsidy
(per cent f.o.b.)
5
some
5
2.5
Source: 6-11: Interviews with exporters and EEPC.
12: FE, 22 November 1969, p. 8..
Date
1967
1968-1969
1967
1968
C_ _~_ _ __
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given to overcome the high freight costs on the finished product as
well as on the imported steel used in production. In the case of
PILC power cables, the government also raised the regular rate in
1967 from zero to 10 percent of f.o.b. value for orders worth over
$240,000, but not for smaller orders.
Toward the end of 1969-70 and again toward the end of 1970-71,
the Ministry of Foreign Trade announced a crash program which may
have involved additional ad hoc subsidies to achieve the year's
export targets. At the end of December 1970, it was announced that
there would be
a major effort to retrieve the lost ground and push up over-
seas sales as much as possible. The program envisages spe-
cial and additional assistance (the government's official
term for cash subsidies) to selected products and markets.2
Table III-9 shows that between devaluation and 1970 exports of
iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires received cash subsidies
of zero to 30 (and in one case 46) percent of f.o.b. value. Examina-
tion of these schemes reveals the following points of significance
for an evaluation of the scheme:
(1) With the exception of three products which did not receive cash
subsidies--bare copper conductors, aluminum ingots, and data proces-
sing machines--the cash subsidy was a high enough percentage of f.o.b.
value to have had an important effect on the profitability of export
compared to production costs or to the profitability of domestic
ISee also the discussion of subsidies of ocean freight costs
in Chapter VII.B.4.
2FE, 29 December 1970, p. 5.
I .
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sales.
(2) The cash subsidy was increased by 5 to 10 percent of f.o.b. value
on a large share of exports between 1966-67 and 1969-70, implying a
de facto devaluation.
(3) The rate of cash subsidy varied substantially among engineering
goods. Since this was also true of the rate of cash subsidy on net
earnings of foreign exchange and since this was not offset by other
schemes, there were incentives for inefficient allocation among indus-
tries of resources devoted to export.
(4) Increases in rates of subsidy were selective and ad hoc, not
uniform.
(5) Where the average rate of subsidy depended on an increase in the
level of exports, the marginal rate of subsidy was sometimes much
higher than the average. For example, the increase of 10 percent in
the cash subsidy of 15 percent for transformers contingent on a 5 per-
cent increase in the value of exports over the previous year implied
a subsidy of 225 percent of f.o.b. value on a five percent increase
in exports, assuming that the previous level of exports would other-
wise have been maintained. Assuming that in the absence of the in-
crease in subsidy the level of exports would have been 20 percent
below the level of the previous year, the subsidy on the difference
between this and a 5 percent increase was 57 percent. A major ex-
porter reported in an interview that it cut its export prices in
certain markets in 1968-69 specifically to achieve a 10 percent
- ---
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increase in exports in order to qualify for the higher rate of sub-
sidy.
(6) Rates of cash subsidy appear to have been set at different levels
and subsequently adjusted for a number of reasons, but efficiency was
not among them. The rate of cash subsidy on f.o.b. value was not in-
versely related to import content, much less set in a way that equal-
ized the implicit exchange rate on net foreign exchange earned by
different engineering goods. However, the structure of multiple ex-
change rates was not random. Discussions with government officials
and examination of the structure of and changes in rates suggest that
several considerations, sometimes conflicting in their requirements,
affected-the pattern of subsidy:
(a) The government explicitly accepted the principle that rates should
be fixed at the levels necessary to offset, at least in part, higher
costs and prices in India. Government publications commonly include
statements like the following:
It was decided by the government to introduce a restricted
export assistance scheme on engineering goods. The main
features...are...the grant of cash assistance...with a view
to offsetting the disabilities of exporters of engineering
goods, arising out of non-refund of state and municipal
levies, higher indigenous cost of raw materials, and lack
of economies of scale in manufacture. 1
In its 1970 export policy resolution the goverment stated that
To increase competitive ability of Indian industry....the
government will...endeavour to compensate exports for the
1GOI, DGTD, AR 1966-67, pp. 79-80. See also GOI, MC, 1967a,
p. 4, and GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 74.
im
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temporary handicaps that stem from transitional difficulties
inherent in a developing economy and to alleviate the dis-
advantages arising from...tariff barriers in importing coun-
tries.1
In interviews government officials explained the purpose of the
cash subsidy not in terms of offsetting overvaluation but as a scheme
for overcoming the specific factors which raised the costs of produc-
ing and exporting engineering goods. This suggests that the cash sub-
sidy tended to be set at a higher rate where the ratio of the cost of
production or the domestic price to the f.o.b. export price was higher,
or at least where exporters were able to convince the government that
this was the case.
The examples in Table III-10 indicate that this was the basis
on which ad hoc subsidies were given on large export orders. A 1968
government report states that
Due to the comparatively high price of indigenous bearings
it has been found difficult to build up any sizable export
market...To encourage the manufacturers to enter into the
export market, the government is considering sanction of
special incentives to offset the disadvantage resulting
from the high cost....Caustic soda is also under consider-
ation of the Ministry of Commerce for granting adequate
assistance for promoting its exports.2
In September 1969 the government increased the cash subsidy on
exports of tires by 10 to 15 percent of f.o.b. value after the industry
argued that exports could not be maintained because the realization
from exports did not cover costs let alone match the profits available
1FE 31 July 1970, p. 8.
2 GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, pp. 17, 77.
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in the domestic market. The government first increased the cash
subsidy on exports of steel in mid-1967 to offset an increase in
control prices for domestic sales and then eliminated the subsidy
in October 1969 after f.o.b. export prices rose above control prices
for domestic sales. The rates of cash subsidy were reduced in the
case of sales under tied Indian aid to Ceylon (e.g. by 5 percent of
f.o.b. value for machine tools) because it was assumed that export-
ers would be able to charge higher prices on such sales. When the
government increased the cash subsidy on vehicles by 10 percent of
f.o.b. value in 1969, it specified that in the event of an increase
in f.o.b. realization per vehicle the additional subsidy might be
reduced or abolished.
Little if any attention was given to the fact that to the
extent subsidies were set in relation to Indian cost disadvantages
or profitability, incentives to export were equalized regardless of
the cost of foreign exchange earned, and thus comparative advantage
or efficiency was ruled out as a basis for export. Also, the attempt
of the bureaucracy to base subsidies on the exporters' own reports
concerning losses on exports without the power to verify their claims
probably led to "unnecessary" subsidies in some cases.
(b) Since export demand was not perfectly elastic with respect to
price, the criterion of offsetting losses was incomplete without an
export target for each industry. Government officials had two gen-
eral targets in mind: firms should export 10 percent of output and
-r --~-~---~_ IT.~_ _
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should earn their own requirements of foreign exchange, in both
cases without concern for costs. It is not clear whether these
targets affected the structure of cash subsidies, although they were
the basis for some other export promotion schemes discussed below.
The EEPC and the government also set export targets over a
5-year period for engineering industries which were already impor-
tant exporters. These targets were set without reference to the
cost of foreign exchange and, where they had any basis at all, seem
to have been projections of past exports and orders received or under
negotiation, or to have been based on the level of production and
excess capacity in the industry. Again, it is not clear whether
these targets affected the structure of cash subsidies, but the
heavy emphasis on ad hoc measures to achieve physical targets which
characterized other planning efforts suggests that such targets may
have played a role.
(c) An attempt was made to minimize the budgetary rather than the
domestic resource cost of foreign exchange. This was the basis for
the schemes which made a higher average rate of subsidy contingent
on an increase in the value of exports.
(d) The government discriminated in favor of large orders in giving
ad hoc subsidies and in favor of industries whose total exports were
over $1 million. This is evident from the fact that of the hundreds
of separate products listed in the schedule of cash subsidies in
1966-67, the rate was increased on only a few other than those listed
--1- -- ---~~~~-
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in Table II-9 by any of the schemes considered above. Such discrim-
ination was an inefficient but perhaps natural result of ad hoc incen-
tives and rewards given to industries with the greatest visibility and
bargaining power in the relevant ministries.
c. Losses of the State Trading Corporation
An important and increasing share of Indian imports and exports
was handled through state agencies, particularly the State Trading Cor-
poration (STC), the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation (IMTC),
1
and HSL.
At the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which is
responsible for the STC, the STC used profits earned on imports to
subsidize exports. Bhagwati and Desai report that in the early 1960s
2
it exported a number of non-engineering commodities at a loss. It
was reported that in 1967
Export of this item (cement) has been channelised through
the STC and adequate cash assistance and other provisions
to make good the losses have been granted.3
In 1970 the STC exported sugar, jute manufactures, and art-silk
fabtics at a loss, which amounted to 117 percent of the f.o.b. value
of exports in the case of sugar. For 1970-71 it reported losses
For a list of commodities imported and exported by state
trading agencies, see Capital, 12 March 1970, p. 442, and 9 April 1970,
p. 621.
2Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 403-04.
3GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 77.
4FE, 9 May 1970, 23 May 1970, p. 1.
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on exports of $7.3 million or 8 percent of the total value of its
1
exports.
The Ministry of Foreign Trade allocated enough import licenses
for items carrying high premia in the domestic market to the STC to
compensate for such losses:
This Corporation has to export certain commodities even at a
loss with a view to earning the much needed foreign exchange
... The government have from time to time entrusted the import
and distribution of...commodities to the Corporation with
directions to mop up a portion of the high profits. 2
When the Ministry of Foreign Trade announced a crash program
to increase exports in the first three months of 1971, it was reported
that:
The STC has drawn up an 'instant drive' for exporting an
additional Rs. 15 crores to 20 crores ($20-27 million)
worth of jute goods...STC will be permitted to offset the
possible losses they may incur... through the import of
certain sensitive items, up to a value of 20 to 25 per-
cent of the value of the proposed exports. 3
Assuming the licenses were for import of stainless steel, the announced
measure could have involved a subsidy as high as 25 percent of f.o.b.
value of exports of jute manufactures. To cover its loss on sugar
exports in 1970-71, the STC was allocated licenses to import polyster
filament yarn and stainless steel sheets for sale at a profit.4
IFE, 1 April 1971, p. 3.
2GOI, STC, 1966, p. 20.
FE, 12 February 1971, p. 1.
FE, 28 February 1971, p. 1.
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,None of the cases in which the STC is known to have exported
at a loss involved iron and steel, engineering goods, or tires. How-
ever, the STC exported $12 million of such goods in 1970-71, and the
chairman of the STC stated that "the STC would subsidize exports in
the case of items having long-term export possibilities."
Unlike cash subsidies and preferences in industrial licensing,
which depended on the cooperation of ministries which did not have a
direct interest in exports, export subsidies through the STC could be
implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Trade alone. It is not sur-
prising that the latter ministry resorted to such subsidies, particu-
larly toward the end of the fiscal year when export targets had not
been met.
In addition to the above losses on exports, in 1962 the STC
began a scheme under which it subsidized exports from small firms.
Between 1962 and March 1968 about $2 million worth of exports were
made under this scheme.
d. Subsidy of Specific Costs
Apart from adjusting export incentives under other schemes to
offset noncompetitive Indain costs, the government explicitly subsi-
dized five costs involved in export:
(1) Marketing
The government subsidized participation in foreign exhibitions,
advertising in foreign publications, and foreign market sales-cum-study
1Engineering Times, 26 February 1970, p. 1.
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tours throughout the. 1960s. As of 1967 it paid the entire round-trip
transport costs for goods exhibited abroad, one-third of the cost of
foreign advertising, and half the cost of foreign travel and market
studies. In 1968 it announced a program of subsidies of 50 to 75 per-
cent of many of the expenses connected with export marketing, e.g.
exhibitions, advertising, overseas showrooms, and delegations of
foreign distributors to India and of Indian manufacturers abroad.
Subsidies were to be given on an ad hoc basis and to depend on the
value of a firm's past exports.
There were many complaints that the government seldom gave such
subidies. However, in 1969 the government paid half the costs of a
tour of Indian factories by five foreign distributors who were handling
Indian machine tools and were interested in finding other companies to
represent. In 1970 it paid a subsidy of $87,000 covering half the
costs of exhibiting machine tools of eleven manufacturers in West
Germany. In addition, in 1968 USAID financed an export market survey
for Indian machine tools at a cost of $40,000 and in 1970 it financed
a tour of the U.S. for Indian machine tool manufacturers interested in
export. The total value of these subsidies from the Indian and US
governments amounted to about 10 percent of the f.o.b. value of machine
tool exports in 1969-70 to the markets covered by the subsidized
expenditures.
In 1968 the government began a tax concession scheme under
which firms could deduct from taxable income 33 percent more than
their actual expenditures abroad on export marketing, including market
~___ I I
172
research, advertising, distribution, overseas offices, business trips
abroad, etc. Except for firms without taxable income, this was equiv-
alent to a subsidy of 33 percent of such expenditures.
(2) Rail Freight
Although even regular rail freight rates probably involved sub-
sidization, beginning in 1958 the Ministry of Railways gave conces-
sions of 25 to 50 percent on the cost of rail transport for exports
from factory to port and in some cases for materials used in export
production. In the late 1960s the concessional rates applied to all
important engineering goods on trips over 200 miles.
In 1965 the rebate on the cost of rail freight for cast iron
pipes manufactured in the Punjab, 1120 miles from the Calcutta port,
amounted to 13 percent of f.o.b. value.1 In 1969 rail freight to the
port was 4 to 5 percent of f.o.b. value for a machine tool company in
Bangalore and 7 to 8 percent for a machine tool company in Batala,
implying freight subsidies of 2 to 4 percent of f.o.b. value for
machine tools. However, machine tool producers often sent machines
to ports by road because the latter was faster.
(3) Ocean Freight
Ad hoc subsidies of ocean freight costs are discussed in Chap-
ter VII.B.4.
(4) Materials
Subsidized prices and priority allocations of iron, steel,
tinplate, aluminum, and PVC resin used in export production are
IIIFT, 1966b, pp. vii-2 and 55.
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discussed in Chapter IV.M.
(5) Credit
Subsidized credit for exporters on the basis of working capital
requirements of export production and credit extended to foreign buyers
is discussed in Chapter VI.C.
e. Refund of Indirect Taxes on Inputs
In 1954-1956 the government began to refund import duties and
central excise taxes on inputs used in export production by certain
engineering industries. This scheme was progressively extended to
additional products and covered all engineering goods and tires after
1960. The refund rates in 1969 are listed in Table 111-7 for products
for which data are available.
Indirect taxes which applied to inputs used in production for
the domestic market but not export were important in reducing the gap
between effective exchange rates for production for the domestic
market and export. Because of high import duties and excise taxes on
steel and aluminum, the refund was substantial (e.g. 10 to 30 percent
of f.o.b. value) for products with a high ratio of direct imports or
materials to f.o.b. value. Moreover, since the average level of
import duties was positively related to the extent of overvaluation
of the rupee during the 1960s, increasing refund rates partially off-
set the disincentive effect on exports of domestic inflation until
1966 and a reduction in refund rates partially offset the devaluation.
In some cases the scheme involved a net subsidy beyond refund
--L ---l ---- -- V-
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of tax s actually paid. For a few nonhomogenous product groups (e.g.
automobile parts, diesel engine parts) the refund was set on an equal
ad valorem basis for all products in the group. For some of these
products the refund was greater than the indirect taxes paid, and
hence involved a net subsidy (up to about 5 percent of f.o.b. value),
while products on which taxes were higher than the group rate were
given full refunds on the basis of special application. In the case
of steel wire ropes, the refund rate of 19-20 percent of f.o.b. value,
which was based on the tariff on imported high carbon steel wire rods,
involved a net subsidy of 14 percent of f.o.b. value when indigenous
high carbon steel wire rods were used.1
f. Price Controls and Excise Taxes on Domestic Sales
Production for the domestic market was protected by the licens-
ing system. The resulting level of protection and discrimination
against exports were significantly reduced for a number of industries
by price controls and excise taxes imposed on sales in the domestic
market but not on exports.
Among important exports, there were controls on the domestic
prices of iron and steel, aluminum, commercial vehicles, batteries,
bicycles, and tires. In the case of iron and steel, ex-works control
prices for domestic sales were below f.o.b. prices on exports in
1969-70 and 1970-71, and the same was true of aluminum ingots in
1969. Calculations in part III.D. indicate that after December 1969
1ET, 18 April 1971, p. 4. The refund rate was cut to 5-6 per-
cent of f.o.b. value in 1971 to eliminate this additional subsidy.
. . .
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the realization including subsidies on export of commercial vehicles,
at least to rupee payment countries, was equal to or greater than on
domestic sales at control prices.
Apart from such price controls, there was a general directive
that in industries where public sector firms had monopoly power they
should limit domestic prices to the landed prices of imports. Also,
although discussions of Indian industrial structure emphasize the
monopoly power of producers, in a number of engineering industries
the government was the sole or major buyer while there were many
producers and, after 1966, there was substantial excess capacity
because of inadequate demand. Government purchase rules emphasized
price, and procurement was under "rate contracts" which sometimes
involved discounts below (list) prices for sales to non-government
buyers. Thus:
(Cast iron) spun pipes are mostly consumed by government
and semi-government departments and, therefore, bulk of
the production is sold on rate contracts. Therefore, in
spite of the short supply, prices have largely remained
highly competitive. 1
In addition, by 1957 exports of engineering goods and metals
were exempt from all central and state indirect taxes on the final
(export) transaction.
1GOI, MIS, 1967, p. 24. See also FE, 30 January 1970.
---1~-- _
176
2. Foreign Exchange Retention
a. Import Entitlement and Replenishment Licenses
In the 1950s the government began issuing licenses for import
of inputs based on the value of exports. The first significant
scheme was initiated in 1957, but it was after Manubhai Shah became
the minister in charge of exports in 1962 that the import entitlement
scheme became the government's major export subsidization program,
allowing exporters to expand production for the domestic market or
providing them with licenses which could be sold at a premium.1
Through progressive liberalization of the scheme and the increasing
scarcity value of imported materials, the subsidy value of the scheme
increased steadily between 1962 and 1966. Between 1964 and 1966,
exporters of all engineering goods except basic metals were given
licenses to import inputs worth 40 to 100 percent of the f.o.b.
2
value of exports. Within these limits, exporters received import
licenses for a minimum of twice the current import content of exports.
The rates of entitlement for 1964-1966 are listed in Table 111-7. The
scheme was ended at devaluation but was soon replaced by the replenish-
ment scheme described next.
l"Manubhai Shah became Commerce Minister in 1962. He strongly
believed in export subsidies; and he found that the only subsidies
that he could give without having to persuade the recalcitrant Finance
Ministry were those embodied in import entitlements. So he extended
import entitlements." (EPW, Special Number, July 1970, pp. 1275-76.)
2A few bicycle parts received entitlement licenses for only
20 percent of f.o.b. value, and the maximum rate was reduced to 75 per-
cent in 1965.
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'In August 1966 the government introduced the import replenish-
ment scheme under which exporters of engineering goods except basic
metals were given licenses to import current inputs worth 5 to 90 per-
cent of the f.o.b. value of exports. The rates in 1969-70, which were
virtually the same as those originally set in 1966, are shown in
Table 111-7.
It is important to add that the government sometimes increased
these rates on an ad hoc basis on individual orders or under other
special circumstances. The Ministry of Foreign Trade was authorized
to "allow an increase in import replenishment for exporters by five
percent of f.o.b. value in individual cases without further clearance
from the Finance Ministry."1  In an interview in 1968 a DGTD officer
stated that higher rates would be considered if an exporter would
guarantee a large increase in exports, and the DGTD reported that:
To arrest the fall of the export of plastics fabricated
articles...import replenishments...have been raised with
regard to PVC foam sheets and moulded and fabricated
goods.2
The import replenishment policy statement for 1968-69 stated that:
In cases where the quantum of replenishment..is inadequate
to accommodate some essential raw material or component
which needs to be imported on the ground that the indige-
nous substitute is not good enough in quality for maintain-
ing the competitive strength of the export products,
requests for exceeding the prescribed replenishment will
be considered on merits. 3
FE, 13 April 1969.
2GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 66.
3GOI, MC, 1968a, Vol. II, p. 5.
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Under this last provision, the replenishment rate was increased by
10 percent of f.o.b. value for sports light roadster bicycles and by
20 percent of f.o.b. value for nylon tires in 1969-70.
Import replenishment licenses subsidized exports for a number
of reasons:
(i) Import licenses for inputs were rationed, and sometimes either
there was no way for a firm to obtain additional imports or supplies
were available only at open market prices above the landed costs.
Because of liberalization of maintenance imports in mid-1966, firms
in industries with priority in import licensing--including basic
metals, most engineering products other than consumer goods, and
tires--had access to permissible imports on the basis of replacement
of inputs used, without fixed quotas based on capacity as was pre-
viously the case. Nevertheless, three categories of users were un-
able to secure as many regular licenses as they desired: (a) firms
in non-priority industries, including many consumer goods; (b) firms
which wanted to increase their production at a rapid rate, including
some producers of automobile parts and stationary diesel engines; and
(c) small firms with fixed investment below $100,000, which were dis-
criminated against by import licensing procedures. Consequently even
if their terms had been identical to those of regular licenses, import
replenishment licenses would have been valuable to these three groups
of firms. In fact, the terms of import replenishment licenses were
more favorable in a number of respects discussed below.
1 i ~_;_ _ __ __ _~i_ __~~L _ _
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(ii) Licenses granted against exports were general currency licenses
which could be used to import from the cheapest source of supply.
Regular licenses were often restricted to tied-aid or bilateral-pay-
ment sources, and it will be shown in Chapter IV.F that the price of
materials was commonly up to 40 percent higher from such sources.
(iii) Licenses issued against exports could be used to import mate-
rials and parts for which import was otherwise prohibited. In prin-
ciple there was a ceiling of 10 percent of the license or $1,333,
whichever was less, on such imports. However, judging from interviews
it seems doubtful that this ceiling was strictly applied, since a
number of companies attached importance to being able to procure
materials and parts which they would not otherwise have been allowed
to import. Import was allowed for certain items which were not pro-
duced in India, for which the quality of indigenous supplies was
inferior, or for which the government decided to supplement limited
Indian production by imports. It was reported in the press that:
A large quantum of banned chemicals is imported under several
export promotion schemes...Of the 22 items banned for import
this year on the recommendation of the (Indian Chemical
Manufacturers') Association, 10 were allowed under various
export promotion schemes.1
Some of these arrangements were standardized and published in
the import trade control policy; Table III-11 lists items allowed for
import only under replenishment licenses in 1968-69. In other cases
such imports were permitted on an ad hoc basis. According to the DGTD,
1Commerce, 27 Dcember 1969, p. 1239.
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TABLE III-11
Items Licensed for Imoort in 1968-69 only under Re-
plenishment Licenses Issued Against Exports
Bifurcated rivets
Trunk nails and washers
White metal
Antimony
Dry battery wax
steel balls of 1 mm and below
Abrasive coated copper foils
Superenamel copper wire
Solid tinned copper wire
Hook up wire
Haps and staples, clips and
brass round bars (extruded
quality)
Iridium alloy pen points
Gun metal
Needle bearings
Valve grinding pastes
Diesel engine parts:
Crankshaft unmachined,
Diesel injector tubing,
Valve springs,
Connecting rods,
Helli-coils,
Elements for fuel pumps,
Delivery valves,
Silicon '0' rings,
Seals,
Cylinder heads,
Silicon bushes,
Inlet and exhaust valves,
Nozzles and nozzle holders,
Valve seals,
Piston assembly 6" and below,
Camshaft,
Cylinder liners,
Power factor capacitors
Centrifugal switches for single
phase motors
Components for centrifugal switches
Armoured cables
Insulated cables
Calcined petroleum coke
Refractory material
Hardware, ironmongery, and tools
Components for record players
Sulphur powder
Natural dense soda ash
Suitcase locks and hinges
Spares for refrigeration machinery
and compressors
Industrial knives
Automatic electrical control switches
Polyvinyl chloride resin powders
PVC composition including moulding
powder
Urea-formaldehyde moulding powder
Dioctylphalate
Source: GOI, MC, i1968a, Volume 1, SeCtion II.
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which was in charge of ad hoc approvals, in 1967:
3600 applications from exporters-manufacturers for import of
specialised raw materials and components for export produc-
tion were processed and import allowed in deserving cases.
Approximately 75 applications for import of capital goods by
exporting units...were also scrutinized and recommendations
made. 1
Also, each exporter was allowed to import two electric type-
writers, two electric calculating machines, and (if exports were over
$133,000 per year) one photocopying machine. The licenses could also
be used to import tooling, testing instruments, and packing equipment
up to a limit fo 20 percent of the value of the license or $13,000,
whichever was less, and to import capital goods up to 50 percent of
the value of the license or $27,000, whichever was less and not more
than twice per year.
(iv) Regular import licenses specified in minute detail what could be
imported. Although there were some restrictions on what could be
imported under replenishment licenses, manufacturers did not have to
import inputs in the proportions they were used in the items exported
and were not even restricted to import only items used in their pro-
duction. According to the import policy for 1968-69:
A manufacturer-exporter...may...ask for any or all of the
items figuring in their latest, preferably valid, actual
user licence for raw materials, components and spares...
The items of import asked for as above on the strength of
an actual user licence will be generally allowed provided
they are permissible to actual users according to the
current import policy...The licensing authority will also
consider on merits requests for import of any other items
GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 75. In 1966, 200 applications for
materials and 16 for capital goods were processed. (GOI, DGTD, AR
1966-67, p. 81.)
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...permissible to actual users. 1
As a result, exporters were allowed to import inputs for their other
products, including ones with non-priority status under the regular
licensing policy. Most important, exporters could use the licenses
to import the materials for which the markups in the domestic market
over the landed prices of imports were highest or ones for which sup-
ply was constraining production while importing the actual import
content of the exported product under regular import licenses or buy-
ing it in the open market. Thus, it was reported that electric cable
exporters did not use licenses to import copper or high carbon steel
wire rods but rather materials with a higher markup.
(v) The licenses issued against exports, unlike other licenses, could
be sold, although sales were restricted to other companies in the same
"industry" or to companies producing components used in the exported
product. While there were complaints about these restrictions on
sales,2 the government took an increasingly flexible approach to
transfers in order to increase the subsidy value of the licenses.
The DGTD reported that in 1966-67:
Exporters were experiencing difficulties for transferring
import replenishment licenses due to the narrow range
available for such endorsement...In order to enable the
exporters to get more facilities for endorsement of their
import licenses, grouping of items which are generally
manufactured together was done (in 1967-68).3
GOI, MC, 1968a, Vol. II, pp. 6-7.
2FE, 9 November 1968, p. 7, and 20 December 1968, p. 8.
2GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 77.
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In 1969 and again in 1970 transfer was liberalized by substantial
reductions in the number of groups into which the engineering indus-
tries were compartmentalized for purpose of transfer.
When combined with provision (iv) according to which a firm
could use the licenses to import inputs for any of its products, this
allowed substantial flexibility in imports because there was consider-
able overlap of industries in multi-product firms; nevertheless, com-
partmentalization and other restrictions on licenses were sufficient
to create substantial differences in the premia at which licenses
issued against exports of different products could be sold in the
market.
In 1969 the market value of import replenishment licenses was
generally between 35 and 65 percent of the c.i.f. value of imports for
different export products, depending on what could be imported. Many
companies reported buying and selling licenses. The three examples of
the subsidy value of these licenses during 1969 presented in Table III-
12 illustrate the wide range of subsidization, in these cases 8 to
45 percent of f.o.b. value.
It seems likely that the major flow of import replenishment
licenses both within and between firms was from products with priority
status under the regular import licensing policy and a stable level of
production, i.e. products for which access to imports under the regu-
lar licensing procedure was liberal and adequate, to products without
priority status or a rapidly rising level of production. While direct
evidence on such flows is not available, a number of non-priority
__. /_I_ __ _~_____~ _
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TABLE 111-12
Subsidy Value of the Import Replenishment Scheme,
1969
Simple Machine
Tools
Low Tension
Switchgear
Insulated Cables
with Copper Con-
ductors
Import Replenishment
Rate (% f.o.b.)
Premium on Licenses
(% c.i.f. value of
licensed imports)
Subsidy Value of Licenses
i. % f.o.b.
ii. % foreign exchange
earned, net of
current import
content1
45
225
.Current import content was: simple machine tools, 10 per cent of f.o.b.
value; low tension switchgear, 20 per cent; insulated cables with copper
conductors, 80 per cent.
Source: Indian manufacturers of these products.
_ii;*pl9_rrs~e~ L~L1
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industries were able to increase production substantially in the post-
devaluation period. In a few of these--data processing machines,
electric fans, and bright steel bars--exports of the product involved
were sufficient to earn the import licenses necessary for production,
but for others this was not the case.
The pre-devaluation import entitlement scheme, which was "by
far the most important of the export incentive schemes in operation
during the Third Plan,"1 was widely cited at the time by firms in the
engineering industries as a major factor in their decisions to export
even at a loss before allowing for the value of import licenses. Many
firms would not have exported without the subsidy provided by the
scheme. The licenses were used to import materials and sometimes
capital goods not available in India in order to increase production
for the domestic market or were sold to other manufacturers. It was
reported in a later review of the scheme that "in some cases, exports
were undertaken at practically throw-away prices just because the
imports under the entitlements commanded very high premia."2
The following statements by Kirloskar Oil Engines and Jay
Engineering, the two largest exporters of engineering goods of the
period, are representative in the importance attached to the scheme
in explanations of exports between 1960 and 1966:
Export has not yet been a profitable proposition to engineer-
ing industry. Then why export? We need machinery and many
critical items, which are not available in the country,
1GOI, LSS, 1968, p. 181.
2EPW, 7 December 1968, p. 1862. See also MCIEC, July 1966,
p. xiii.
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without which we can neither maintain our present production
nor undertake any expansion. Import needs foreign exchange
and the government is not in a position to give us any foreign
exchange unless we earn foreign exchange by exports. Even the
production we made during the year would not have been possible
if we had not exported. Whether there is a profit or not,
under existing conditions, we have to export a portion of our
products to keep our factories working.
1
The loss suffered in exports was partly covered by the company
by selling part of its import entitlements.
2
The firms involved did not have excess capacity due to inadequate
domestic demand; production typically was constrained by supply condi-
tions for materials. In fact, Little et al. report that in the hand
tool industry a "firm had been exporting (to the extent of Rs 1.4 mil-
lion--$0.3 million--in 1965/6), in order to obtain entitlements for
its import requirements...The domestic market was unsatisfied, and
these tools were being imported." 3
Similarly, in 1967-1969 most exporters reported that the sub-
sidy given by the import replenishment scheme was an important factor
contributing to their exports. A number of firms which did not have
a shortage of domestic orders at prices covering average costs reported
that they exported because of the import licenses. HMT reported that
it exported wrist watches in spite of a waiting list in India to
iKirloskar Oil Engines, EW, 11 September 1965, p. 1427. Simi-
lar statements are common, for example: Ashok Leyland, EW, 24 June
1961, p. 956; National Rubber Manufacturers, Commerce, 3 July 1965,
p. 17; Philips India, AR 1965, p. 5, and 1966, p. 3; Sen Raleigh, EW,
22 April 1961, p. 654, Capital, 31 March 1966, p. 454.
2 Jay Engineering Works, EW, 30 November 1963, p. 1974. Philips
India, AR 1966, p. 3, reported buying licenses.
3 Little, et al., 1970, p. 174.
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obtain foreign exchange for expansion of capacity. Dunlop India
(tires) and Sen Raleigh (bicycles) had sufficient domestic orders
to operate at capacity but exported to earn import licenses for mate-
rials required for their own production.1 The same was true of light
electricals in general.2
b. Import Licensing for the Data Processing Machinery Industry
Exports of punched card data processing machines were nominally
covered by the.direct cash subsidy and import replenishment schemes;
in fact exports by the two firms in the industry--IBM and International
Computers Indian Manufacture--did not receive these subsidies. Accord-
ing to a government report:
An important feature in the development of these machines is
that the manufacturing units are to be self-sufficient in
their foreign exchange needs in as much as they are to earn
the necessary foreign exchange through export of their prod-
ucts.3
In effect, therefore, there was a 100 percent import entitlement and
replenishment rate for the data processing machinery industry, except
that these licenses were not transferable. This scheme was approved
in 1962-1964.
To support a current import content of about 50 percent of the
1HMT: Machine Tool Engineer, April-June 1967, p. 15. Exports
of wrist watches were minor, a few $1000 per year.
Dunlop India: Letter to author, and FE, 14 April 1970, p. 7.
Sen Raleigh: EPW, 22 March 1969, p. 562.
2ET, 21 December 1969.
3GOI, DGTD, AR 1967-68, p. 18.
^ ^ ~ ~ _ _ __
~
188
value of production, IBM exported $1.7 million or about half its out-
put in 1968-69. International Computers began production in 1964
using import licenses issued on condition that the foreign exchange
used be "repaid" by export. In 1966-67 its exports were $0.3 million
or 18 percent of output. 1
The level of export subsidy implicit in this scheme is indicated
by the fact that India was primarily a market for used and otherwise
obsolete machines. It was reported that:
I.B.M. has been licensed for building 68 computers (1401s)
during 1968-1970. I.B.M. will bring in used machines and
recondition and modernise them in India by using indigenous
and imported components. The Indian and foreign contents
of these 68 computers are expected to be Rs 134 lakhs
($1.8 million) and Rs 122 lakhs ($1.6 million). The re-
quired foreign exchange will be invested by their parent
company in the U.S.A. and this will be earned by the
exports of other machines (keypunches) manufactured by
them in India.2
1Similarly, in 1967 exports of office machines, mostly I.B.M.
statistical and data processing machines and their components, amounted
to $12.8 million for Argentina and $13.2 million for Brazil. (GATT,
1969, pp. 69-71.) In connection with I.B.M.'s Latin American exports,
it was reported that "exporting has several advantages to the firm.
It makes it an earner of foreign exchange, which, through a special
governmental agreement, it can then use to import additional, differ-
ent machines for other customers." (Business International, 1969,
p. 27. See also BI, BLA, 21 May 1970, pp. 163-64.)
2Industrial Times, 15 September 1969, p. 16. See also Commerce,
10 January 1970, p. 16.
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3. Preferential Import Licensing
a. Preferences for Firms Exporting a Specified Percent of Output
Shortly after devaluation in 1966 the government decided to give
....high priority to allotment of (imported) capital goods...
to the exporting units and exporting industries...'A special
allocation of foreign exchange will be made for this purpose.' 1
Capital goods, equipment, dies, jigs and tools required by
exporting units will be provided under a special allocation
of foreign exchange and an inter-Ministerial Committee will
consider applications from exporting units for such imports
of capital goods. 2
This scheme was evidently administered on an ad hoc basis without
explicit guidelines until 1968-69.
Beginning in 1968-69 the Ministry of Foreign Trade announced
that if a firm exported 10 percent of its output it would receive pref-
erences in import licensing for capital goods and in regular mainte-
nance import licensing, in addition to receiving licenses under the
import replenishment scheme. Such firms were eligible for additional
licenses in the case of capital goods and for licenses to import from
the cheapest sources of supply rather than under tied aid or rupee
payment. Since maintenance import licenses were given by value rather
than physical quantity of imports, permission to import from the cheap-
est source not only reduced the unit cost of materials but increased
the quantity that could be imported. Manufacture exporting less than
10 percent of output were eligible for these benefits on condition
IGOI, LSS, 1968, p. 95.
2GOI, MC, 1967a, p. 5. This statement was repeated annually in
the import trade control policy through 1971.
_ _
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they would commit themselves to achieve the 10 percent target within
about three years. Firms in industries not given priority status
under the liberalized import policy announced in 1966 were to be given
priority status if they exported 10 percent of output and would there-
fore receive larger import quotas for materials in addition to the
above benefits.
Although only a small proportion of firms qualified for these
preferences by exporting 10 percent of output, these firms accounted
for a substantial share of exports of iron and steel and engineering
goods (virtually all iron and steel and perhaps half of engineering
goods). The percentage of output that was exported is listed by firm
and industry in Tables II-10, II-12, and 111-7. Firms in at least
two non-priority industries, bright steel bars and electric fans,
qualified for priority status by exporting 10 percent of output.
In 1969 the government allowed firms which had exported at
least 10 percent of output in 1968 to import part of their materials
from the cheapest sources and to import additional capital goods. In
August 1968 the government stated that it had issued licenses for
import of $2.7 million of machinery by 46 exporters, approximately
$1.2 million of which was under free foreign exchange. In 1970 the
import licensing authority announced that each textile producer which
exported more than 10 percent of output in 1969 would be eligible for
import licenses for capital goods worth up to $27,000. Chase Bright
Steel, which was in a non-priority industry, was put on the priority
~C~L
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list for maintenance import licensing on the basis of its exports
(60 percent of output) in 1969-70.
In 1970 the Ministry of Foreign Trade further announced that
firms which exported 25 percent of output would get free foreign ex-
change for at least one-third of their regular maintenance import
licenses up to a maximum of $133,000 per year. In fact, shortly
afterward the government announced that during 1970-71 firms which
had exported over 25 percent of output in the previous year would
receive licenses to import all maintenance imports with untied funds,
firms which exported 10 to 25 percent would be allowed to import
two-thirds with untied funds, and firms in priority industries which
exported less than 10 percent would be allowed to import only half
with untied funds. 1
Thus, the preferences announced in 1968-1970 with respect to
import licensing were implemented. For a firm which exported 25 per-
cent of its output of steel wire ropes and thus qualified to receive
half of its regular imports of materials against free foreign exchange
rather than tied aid, the subsidy value of these preferences was 25 per-
cent of the f.o.b. value of exports. This reveals that introduction
of such preferences implied a substantial increase in export subsidies
in 1968-69 and thereafter. However, the rate of subsidy varied con-
siderably among products. There was a large subsidy for products with
a high direct current import content but no subsidy where there was no
FE, 30 May 1970, p. 1.
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import content. The rates of subsidy also differed among products
depending on the differences in prices for import from tied and the
cheapest sources. Moreover, since preferences depended on whether
a firm exported 10 or 25 percent of output while no additional pref-
erences were received by a firm exporting over 25 percent of output,
for each firm the implicit exchange on exports was a complicated
function of the export-production ratio.
b. Discrimination against Firms Exporting under Five Percent of Output
In 1968-69 the government announced that firms in certain indus-
tries, except units which had been in production less than five years
or with a fixed investment under $100,000, which did not export 5 per-
cent of output would be liable to cuts in regular maintenance import
licenses for import against free foreign exchange. The following engi-
neering industries were covered by this policy (See also Table 111-7):
II.
:I~r~_e_ Eol
. .~__~
Announced 1968-69
5. Steel wire ropes
7. Hand, small, and
cutting tools1
16. Dry and storage
batteries
20. Stationary diesel
engines
20-22. Stationary diesel
engine, auto-
mobile, and vehi u-
lar engine parts
23. Bicycle parts 3
Coated and bonded
abrasives
Added 1969-70
20-22. Stationary diesel
engine, automobile,
and vehicular engine
parts4
23. Bicycle parts 5
Winding wires
Added 1970-71
Steel pipes and tubes
Transmission line
towers
Weighing machines
1Hand tools (spanners, pliers, wrenches), steel files, twist drills, hacksaw blades,
diamond tools. These accounted for the majority of exports of hand, small, and cutting
tools.
2
The following automobile and engine parts: pistons, piston rings, gudgeon pins,
crankshafts, connecting rods, radiators, car wheels, gaskets, electrical equipment, brake
and clutch lining, shock absorbers, leaf springs. These items accounted for $47 million
in production in 1968, or 41 percent of the total of automobile ancillaries.
3Free wheels, hubs, chains.
4Engine valves, fuel injection equipment, filters.
5 All bicycle parts.
Ed Y
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In early 1969 the Ministry of Foreign Trade stated that import
licenses of firms in these industries which did not export 5 percent
of output in 1968 would be cut in 1969-70. According to press reports,
licenses were cut by 5 percent in 1969-70 for 250 firms in engineering
and non-engineering industries and licenses were to be reduced by
20 percent in 1970-71.1 Another press report stated that licenses
were cut by 20 percent in the drug industry in 1970-71.2 However,
Krueger reports that in late 1969-70:
Government officials with whom I talked stated that, to date,
no sanctions of this nature have been applied. Among firms
(in the automobile ancillary industry) interviewed, none
reported being subject to either sanction, although most were
meeting their obligation and seemed to believe that they had
no alternative. Many executives did mention discussions
with government officials about their export performance at
the time of import license application ... .Because all firms
feel obliged to export, they sell their products interna-
tionally at whatever price these products will bring. In
some instances, the firm's proceeds--even including cash
subsidy and duty drawback--do not cover the firm's direct
material cost per unit of output ... Only three firms (out of
55) reported that, including cash subsidy, import entitlement,
and duty drawback they could earn as much in exporting as
they could in the domestic 0.E. (original equipment) market.
Of the remainder, half covered materials and other direct
costs, once the export incentives were taken into account.
Even of this group of firms, most exported only enough to
meet their obligation, because they were pressed to meet
their domestic orders. 3
From these reports one can conclude that this policy increased the
incentive to export beginning in 1968-69.
IFE, 1 April 1970, p. 5.
2Commerce, 24 October 1970, p. 901.
3Krueger, 1970, pp. 22n, 106, 88. Parentheses added.
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4. Ad Hoc Licensing
After 1959 the government used licensing in a number of ways
to subsidize exports on an ad hoc basis without any statement of the
basis on which such licenses were issued.
a. Licenses for Import of Scarce Items for Sale in the Indian Market
Between 1959 and 1965 the government gave licenses to exporters
on an ad hoc basis for imports of scarce commodities carrying high
premia in the Indian market over their landed costs. The licenses were
given for the entire f.o.b. value of exports, and the imported goods
were not inputs for production of the exported items but were sold in
the domestic market at a profit.
The most important of these schemes involved "link" deals,
which were administered through the STC although transactions were
carried out and the profits were earned by private firms. According
to the STC:
The link deals provided a supplementary instrument of great
significance among the various measures for promotion of
exports...Under these arrangements, the imports of essen-
tial items...are linked with the exports of a packet of
equivalent value consisting of traditional and non-tradi-
tional items. 1
The value of exports under these arrangements between 1960-61 and
1964-65 was $357 million or 5 percent of total exports. Exports were
principally ores, sugar, and jute manufactures while imports included
included finished steel and a large number of other items. The STC
IGOI, STC, 1966, pp. 10-11.
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reported that "these arrangements have resulted in introducing...
sewing machines in France and West Germany." Exports of sewing
machines and parts to these two countries in 1960-61 to 1965-66 were
$0.54 million.I  In addition, $0.08 million of textile machinery was
exported under the arrangements in 1961-62, but evidently no other
exports of iron and steel, engineering goods, or tires were made under
this scheme. 2
In 1960-61 and 1961-62 exporters of semi-finished steel were
allowed to use the entire proceeds of their exports to import finished
steel. Exports under this arrangement amounted to $5 to $10 million.
An interesting feature of this scheme was that the government allowed
exporters to import the finished steel before they exported the semi-
finished steel, and the firms involved defaulted on half the export
commitments.
A third scheme of ad hoc licensing is reported by Bhagwati and
Desai for the period around 1964-65:
The operation of supplementary entitlements, where the formal
entitlements were inadequate as export incentives, was also
practised. Several interviewees admitted the existence...of
a clandestine, unlisted scheme...which consisted of entitle-
ments for high-premium dry-fruit given to exporters...on an
ad hoc basis. 4
IIt could not be determined whether all of these exports were
under these arrangements.
2For details of the deals, see GOI, LSS, 1966, pp. 196-230.
3GOI, LSS, 1966, pp. 51-106, and GOI, MSMM, 1968.
Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 412. See also GOI, MC, 1966,
Pt. II, p. 29.
II
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This scheme was applied to exports of some engineering goods.
Evidently no schemes of comparable scale operated after devalu-
ation, but the government accepted the principle of giving such subsi-
dies. In 1971 the government announced that imported polyster fila-
ment yarn would be allocated to exporters of art silk and rayon and
synthetic textiles, even though such yarn was not used as an input in
export production and would obviously be sold in the domestic market.
This implied a subsidy of 42 to 59 percent of the f.o.b. value of
1
exports.
In two related cases the government permitted similar imports
for the firm's own use. A textile machinery manufacturer reported in
1969 that the government allowed it to exchange certain components with
its foreign collaborator on a barter basis.2 In 1970 it was reported
that NOCIL was exporting under an import licensing obligation:
NOCIL expects to undertake bulk exports of chemicals worth
nearly Rs. 70 lakhs ($0.9 million) during the current year
in addition to packed export of PVC resins to repay product
loan obligations.
3
1 FE, 28 February 1971. p. 1. At that time the premium on
"licenses for import of this (polyester) fibre available against export
of woollen goods are said to fetch fancy premium of about 300 to 400
per cent." FE, 12 January 1971, p. 8.
2See also ABP, 27 April 1969.
3 FE, 28 March 1970, p. 5.
I II
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b. Capital Goods Import Licenses
Beginning in 1961, on an ad hoc basis the government allowed
import of capital goods for a firm's own use against commitments to
export. Both before and after devaluation export regulations con-
tained the following statement:
In certain cases, import of capital goods is permitted with
export guarantees. The Chief Controller of Imports and
Exports issues such import licences subject to certain con-
ditions, including conditions regarding bond, bank guarantee
and quantum of exports...The licensing authority can enforce
the bond and cut further import entitlement, etc., as soon
as the time schedule for export has expired without export
material is ing. I
While some of these commitments involved exports equal to the value of
imports, an item in the press in 1965 indicates that in some cases the
government set "the export obligation at twice the value of machinery
imported."2
Table 111-13 presents data on the value of capital goods imports
falling under the Capital Goods Committee's jurisdiction between 1961-
1962 and 1965-66 and details of those which were permitted against
export commitments and under the STC export-import link deals discussed
above. These data indicate that firms in the basic metals and engineer-
ing industries made commitments to export about $0.5 million per year
in the first half of the 1960s in order to secure import licenses for
capital goods, exclusive of licensing under the STC link scheme. A few
1GOI, MC, 1965a, p. 31, and 1967d, p. 33.
2Commerce, 30 January 1965, p. 170.
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TABLE III-13
Canital Goods Committee Releases for Import of Capital Goods Against Exports, 1961-1966
4/61 - 3/66 4/61 - 9/64
Approved Licensed Approved Licensed
$ mil. % $ mil. % $ mil. % $ mil. %
Total Releases 1445.0 100"
Releases financed by:
Export earnings 7.7 0
STC link deals 7.6 0
Sub-total 15.3 1
Breakdown of sub-
total by user
industry:
Iron and steel
Electricals
Automobiles
Bicycles
Other metals
Other engineering
Source: GOI, PC(Hazari), 1967b, p. 55.
.0
.5
.5
.1
831.2 100.0 1175.3 100.0 678.4 100.0
2.9
5.8
8.7
0.4
0.7
1.1, 14.1 1.2 8.7 1.3
2.2
0.9
0.6
0.1
2.4
2.6
8.8
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TABLE 111-14
Capital Goods Import Licenses Issued Against Export Commitments,
1963-1970
Date
Authorized
Value of
Imports($ mil.)
Value of
Exports
($ mil.)
Export Product
Napco Bevel Gear
India Pistons2
1963
1964
Kirloskar Oil Engines mid-1960s
Atlas Cycle 1970
2.3
1.3
0.3
0.2
3.6 Industrial
gears
1.3 Automobile
parts
0.35 Stationary diesel
engines
n.a. Motorized cycles
1
Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, Vol. 2, 1969, p. 57. "Napco
Industries Inc. USA agreed to purchase ... the products of the company
to a minimum guaranteed amount of U.S. $100,000 per month non-accumulative
for a period of three years." EEPC data do not record any exports by
Napco Bevel Gears in the period from 1965-66.
2
GOI, TC, 1968, pp. 12, 44. Exports were to be executed over a period of
seven years by shipment of piston castings to the U.K. collaborator.
Company
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specific cases are listed in Table III-14; these cases suggest a
higher level of commitments than do the data in Table 111-13.
c. Industrial Licenses
Kust reports that
As the pressure on foreign exchange resources by the maintenance
imports reached crisis proportions in the second year of the
third plan (1962-63), the (industrial) licensing policy had to
be tightened. License applications for projects dependent
on imports and raw materials were either rejected or conditioned
on exports by the new enterprise that would offset imports. The
latter involved a serious undertaking by the foreign collaborator
to assist with such exports and/or reasonable satisfaction by
the Ministry of Industry that the new enterprise could success-
fully export to the required extent....During the April to Sep-
tember, 1962, licensing period, twelve of sixteen applications
involving heavy recurring foreign exchange expenditures on
imports of components and raw materials were rejected while the
other four received letters of intent stipulating the licensees
will have to earn the foreign exchange for the required imports
...A project for the manufacture of...rilsan polymide fiber...
was conditioned as follows: (1) the cost of plant and machinery
should be financed through foreign investment and guaranteed
exports; (2) the annual requirement of imported raw materials
should be financed through exports; and (3) the repayment of
borrowed funds, if any, together with interest thereon would be
only permitted to the extent of foreign exchange earned prior
thereto by exports...This letter of intent even conditioned
repatriation of capital investment upon export earnings...It
should not be concluded that all projects are being conditioned
on export earnings, but it is becoming more the order of the
day with new industrial undertakings with low or lower priority
under the plan.1
Hazari states that in industrial licensing during the third plan
There has been a tendency to rely upon various ad hoc criteria.
One of these has been the policy of licensing projects, the
foreign exchange costs of which on capital and/or maintenance
account are covered by available credits and/or foreign (equity)
IKust, 1964, pp. 136-37. See also GOI, 1CI, 1962a, p. 24, and
EW, 29 June 1963, p. 1023.
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collaboration and/or export obligations.1
Kidron reports that "the government...has shown great latitude in allow-
ing investments in low priority spheres, or even banned ones, on receipt
of promises to export a proportion of the product."2  In its critical
report on licensing policy, the Dutt Committee stated:
A practice has developed under which licenses are issued subject
to various conditions...No attempt is made, however, to ensure
that Government has either the machinery or even the legal author-
ity to enforce such conditions. One of the major objections to
many proposals is regarding the possible heavy drain on foreign
exchange especially if the item is considered to be of low prior-
ity. One method of meeting this objection that seems to be quite
common is to attach an export condition to the licenses, i.e., a
condition to the effect that a certain specified proportion of
the product would be exported. Such conditions have been attached
to the licenses granted, among others,...for aluminium, twist
drills, particle boards, transformers, beer, automobile batteries,
thermoplastics, closures and A.C. (asbestos cement) pressure
pipes...There is no specific agency to look after the fulfilment
of these export conditions. Initially, it was proposed that bank
guarantees to the extent of the export value should be obtained
from the licensees. As this was found to be costly, it was whit-
tled down to a point where the the forfeiture of the bond does
not impose much of a strain on the licensee. Thus, the inclusion
of export conditions in licenses has in practice proved merely a
way of getting round objections to the grant of licences.
When Hindustan Aluminium...was given an expansion license in 1963,
a...condition was that import of alumina if not procured indige-
nously should be arranged through export of products. This...did
not happen.
Philips...applied in May, 1960, for substantial expansion from
12,000 to 48,000 radio sets per annum. Radio manufacture was
on the banned list (for further licensing), but the application
was recommended by the Licensing Comittee subject to the expan-
sion of capacity being linked with an undertaking of export.
1GOI, PC (Hazari), 1967b, p. 19.
2Kidron, 1965, p. 303.
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However, on an informal undertaking that the company would
make every effort to promote exports, a licence was issued
without imposing any export condition.
Indian Tool Manufacturers...was granted a substantial expan-
sion licence in 1962 subject to an export condition and it
was also laid down that the company should execute a bond for
the purpose with a bank guarantee. But this last part was
overlooked when issuing the license and the company pointed
this out when reminded about it in July, 1964. The matter
was therefore dropped.
Pure Drinks Private Limited...was granted a substantial expan-
sion licence in 1961 with an export condition relating to
fruit juices. As the production of these juices was found to
be inadequate and the company expressed its helplessness to
increase it, the matter was dropped.1
Industrial licenses or capital goods import licenses for all
investments in the aluminum industry in the latter 1960s were condi-
tional on commitments to export 10 percent of the output made possible
by the investment, and beginning in 1969 the same condition was
imposed on all licenses in the tire industry. An export obligation
was imposed on two producers of PVC resin and one producer of gamma
globulin and albumen. In 1968 Dunlop India was licensed to produce
tennis balls, a non-priority product for which no foreign exchange
would normally have been released, on the condition that "expenditure
incurred for import of raw materials should match with export."2
According to the EEPC, in 1969 to secure government approval for
expansion in some engineering industries a firm had to agree to export
GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, pp. 72-73. Hindustan Alumin-
ium imported alumina in 1964-1967.
2FE, 14 November 1968.
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20 to 25 percent of the production made possible by the expansion, and
the Ministry of Foreign Trade stated that "when we grant facilities to
produce for export, the entrepreneurs give an undertaking to export
30 percent of production." I
In 1970 it was reported that
A major factor responsible for...new-found enthusiasm (of radio
producers) for exports is the competition for licenses for manu-
facture of television sets. Every one of the big radio-makers
is anxious to establish its bona fides with government and run
up impressive figures of export earnings so as to strengthen its
case for TV manufacture and for expansion of radio capacity.2
In 1970 the government announced that firms with investments
below $6.7 million which belonged to large industrial houses or were
foreign subsidiaries, for which expansion licenses were severely
restricted because of concern over concentration of economic power,
would be given expansion licenses only if they agreed to export 60 per-
cent of the production made possible by the expansion or if expansion
was necessary to achieve economies of scale. Similarly, the large
industrial houses and foreign subsidiaries would be allowed to set up
new units with investments below $6.7 million only if they agreed to
export 75 percent of output.3
1Times of India, 9 June 1969.
2EW, 29 August 1970, p. 1440.
3Export Policy Resolution, 1970, reproduced in FE, 31 July 1970,
p. 1. For the industrial licensing policy, see Commerce, 28 February
1970, p. 410.
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d. Foreign Investment and Collaboration
Kust reports that in the early 1960s restrictions on the share
of foreign ownership of Indian companies were sometimes relaxed if the
foreign collaborator agreed to export. He states that only if
...the foreign collaborator agrees or offers to export a sub-
stantial part of the production of the new enterprise...can
there be any hope of obtaining 100 per cent, or near full
ownership...The government...was convinced IBM intended to
make its Indian factory the production center for its markets
in the surrounding Asian area...American Flange and Manufac-
turing...was licensed in 1960 to manufacture...with a wholly-
owned Indian subsidiary...The main reason for the favorable
approval was an agreement by the American company to export
half the product which would earn about $200,000 per year.1
However, as in the case of industrial licensing, the government did not
take export commitments seriously at the time. Kust writes:
How binding must the export commitment be? To date the
government...has not insisted on a firm agreement by the
foreign collaborator to take a fixed percentage of the
production for export.2
Foreign investment and technical collaboration were banned in a
number of low-priority and technically simple industries in the late
1960s, but it was reported that
The government has recently decided to allow foreign col-
laboration in low-priority and non-essential fields of
industry where foreign collaborators agree to underwrite
a substantial part of the production for export. 3
According to the Ministry of Industrial Development, to be eligible
for such preferences a firm had to agree to export 75 percent of
iKust, 1964, pp. 144-45, 149.
2Ibid., p. 145.
3Engineering Times, 1 May 1969. See also ABP, 6 June 1969.
See, for example, FE, 22 December 1968, 13 April, 1969.
~___^__I~
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output. 3 There is virtually no evidence that this policy was imple-
mented in the late 1960s, perhaps simply because firms were not in-
terested in exporting 75 percent of output. Coca-Cola reportedly was
permitted to enter the Indian market after accepting an export commit-
1
ment.
e. Government Finance for Investments
It was reported in 1966 that the government Industrial Finance
Corporation had revised its loan policy to give high priority to indus-
trial projects which would make a significant contribution to exports.
In 1970 the government announced that firms exporting over 10 percent
of output would be given preferences in access to finance. No informa-
tion is available on the implementation of these policies.
f. Enforcement of Commitments
As the report by the Dutt Committee makes clear, for several
years the government did not enforce export commitments in licenses.
In 1963 it was reported that "export...quotas have remained conspicu-
ously unfulfilled...without exposing the units concerned to any penal-
ties." 2
1EPW, 24 May 1969, p. 864.
2EW, 18 May 1963, p. 821.
3 Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, Vol. 1, 1968,
Section 1, p. 76.
4 11C, 1966, pp. 11-12.
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Such defaults were common under several schemes during the
period because the only penalty was forfeiture of a bond which was
sometimes less than the loss on exports, and often there was no penalty
at all. In the case of export commitments made to secure import
entitlement licenses, prior to export,
The amounts of bank guarantee were fixed on the basis of
approximately 30 percent of the total value of exports.
The Secretary, Ministry of Commerce conceded that in some
cases the holder of a license might prefer to pay the 1
guarantee amount rather than fulfil the export obligation.
Only 70 to 80 percent of the export commitments made to secure import
licenses prior to export in 1957 to 1965 were fulfilled and on the
average the firms forfeited only 5 to 10 percent of the value of unful-
filled export obligations.2
However in 1968 the government announced that commitments made
in the past would be enforced. In 1969 three of the concerned firms
in the machine tool, diesel engine, and cast iron spun pipe industries
reported in interviews that the government was enforcing commitments
made in 1961 to 1963 by reducing regular maintenance import licenses
and denying foreign exchange to expand capacity. All three reported
that this was a powerful incentive to export, and all increased their
exports. In 1970 it was reported that
IGOI, LSS, 1966, p. 199.
2 bid., pp. 131, 133.
3FE, 6 October 1968, 29 September 1970, p. 3.
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So far as the (steel) tube industry was concerned...certain
parties (like Amin Chand Pyarelal) were facing court cases
for failure to honour their export commitments.
In 1970 the government announced that an
Export Obligation Cell had...been set up to watch...the fol-
low-up action...of all concerns to which (industrial) licenses
...or approvals to foreign collaboration agreements or capital
goods licenses were issued against an undertaking to export. 2
However, in the case of the aluminum industry, the government
indicated in 1970 that it would not enforce export commitments because
of the shortage of aluminum in the domestic market.
All the ad hoc licenses considered in this section were poten-
tially very large subsidies for export of the amount necessary to
secure the licenses. The policies discussed under (b) - (d) made ex-
ploitation of the domestic market contingent on export and hence created
an implicit subsidy on exports, within the quota specified by the
license, which could have been several times that on import substitution.
However, failure to enforce the commitments or even to make them enforce-
able eliminated most of the export incentive. In practice, except for
the schemes described under (a), these schemes do not seem to have had
much importance until 1969; they were mainly a method of justifying
approval of projects which had low priority or high foreign exchange
inputs.
1FE, 9 December 1970, p. 8.
2FE, 14 December 1970.
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5. Investment Abroad by Indian Firms
The government encouraged exports of engineering goods by link-
ing investment abroad to exports of capital goods after 1959.1 Indians
could not legally buy foreign exchange for purchase of foreign assets.
However, Indian firms could acquire equity shares in manufacturing firms
abroad in exchange for Indian capital goods, including building mate-
rials and steel structurals, and technical know-how for the foreign
plant's own use. This allowed Indian firms to use the entire f.o.b.
value of such exports for purchase of foreign assets.
The fact that the benefits of foreign investment were contingent
on export of capital goods created a subsidy for export to the extent
the present value of benefits to the Indian investor exceeded the world
market value of the exports or investment. Several considerations sug-
gest that such subsidies may have been large:
(i) Investments in the protected markets of certain developing coun-
tries presumably had a high profit rate, particularly allowing for
investment incentives.
(ii) Indian companies had management control of most of their overseas
investments,and some of these operations may have enabled them to
earn unrecorded foreign exchange. In any event, they made it possible
to accumulate capital outside India, since profits could be reinvested
in the foreign firm although dividends had to be repatriated to India.
(iii) In addition to certain subsidies on the capital goods exported,
1See ET, 11 August 1964, for an early statement of the policy.
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in 1967 the government granted an income tax exemption for 60 percent
of dividend income, royalties, and fees received for technical know-
how and services from foreign companies. In 1968 the exemption was
increased to 100 percent.
Furthermore, the situation in India encouraged firms to invest
abroad. Licensing limited expansion in India of large industrial
houses, and these, particularly the Birla group which accounted for
one-fifth by number and one-third by value of the approved foreign
investments, were responsible for the major investments abroad. The
recession also encouraged firms to invest abroad.
Between 1959 and 1963 the government approved only five cases
of foreign investment. However, by 1968 the government declared a
policy of promoting foreign investment, primarily to increase exports.
By the end of 1970 the government had approved 105 foreign manufactur-
ing projects with a total Indian investment of $20.7 million. It was
reported that 27 had been abandoned and 22 had gone into production.1
(See Table VI-11.) Actual investment abroad by export of capital
goods appears to have been about $1.5 to $2.0 million per year. For
1968-69 the Ministry of Finance fixed a ceiling of $4 million on the
total value of exports that would be allowed against equity shares for
all companies.
In addition to this scheme, on two occasions the government
IE, 13 January 1971, p. 1.
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allowed Kirloskar Oil Engines to use export earnings from other types
of engineering goods to buy foreign equity shares. In 1966 the company
was permitted to use $0.46 million earned by export of stationary
diesel engines and parts to purchase 75 percent of the equity of an
established West German company. In 1970 it was permitted to use
$0.10 million earned by export of diesel pumpsets to purchase equity
shares in a company to be set up in the Philippines. 1
6. Direct Government Pressure
The Ministry of Foreign Trade used direct pressure on important
firms to get them to export., This went beyond general exhortation and
involved direct communications to individual firms. Because firms
depended on the government for a vast number of decisions affecting
profits, they were sometimes willing to cooperate. The fact that
other ministries seldom shared the Ministry of Foreign Trade's prior-
ities limited the range of pressures that were brought to bear, how-
ever.
TISCO was reported to have begun exporting steel at a loss
compared to sales in the domestic market, where there was an order
backlog, only because of government pressure, and to have exported
as little as possible. At the same time, TISCO issued public state-
ments arguing that it was a mistake for India to export steel. Under
government pressure TELCO began exporting commercial vehicles in the
IE, 5 May 1970, p. 1.
2Islam, 1968, p. 589, reports a similar situation with respect
to exports in Pakistan.
-- ~----I--
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early 1960s with the reluctant assistance of Daimler Benz, which had
included a clause in the original collaboration agreement restrict-
ing exports to Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Nepal and would have
preferred not to export from India. In 1966 Tomlinson reported that:
Recently, in its search for foreign exchange, the Indian
government has insisted that Goodyear should export 10 percent
of its Indian production. This has meant that markets had
to be found for these exports in some cases at the expense
of other subsidiaries...in spite of the high cost of indige-
nous Indian materials. 1
It was reported in 1967 that
Siemens India has entered the export market under pressure
from government and the no less pressing exigencies of re-
cession.2
7. Government Ownership
Chapter II.D notes that the government owned a substantial
share of capacity in the steel and engineering industries. Public
sector firms were sensitive to bureaucratic and political interven-
tion in the interest of goals other than profit maximization, and
the government could have issued and enforced a directive to public
sector firms requiring a certain level of exports.
There was no lack of export targets for public sector firms.
In 1965,
Prime Minister Shastri asked them to sell a portion of their
production abroad in order to earn at least the foreign ex-
change required for their own maintenance and development
needs. H.S.L. will have to make more vigorous efforts if
1Tomlinson, 1966, p. 187.
2 EPW, 18 November 1967, p. 2033.
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it is to achieve Mr. Shastri's target by selling at least
10 percent of its output abroad.1
In April 1966 the government Board of Trade set annual export targets
of $63 million for Hindustan Steel and $105 million for public sec-
tor firms in engineering industries other than steel to be achieved
by 1971-72. Similarly, when the Ministry of Foreign Trade announced
a crash export drive for the first three months of 1970, representa-
tives of a dozen public sector engineering companies were called to
a meeting and asked to pledge exports of $6.7 million for the drive.2
The managing director of a public sector firm, which was sub-
jected to other direct pressures by the Ministry of Foreign Trade to
increase its exports even though it was already one of the leading
public sector exporters, stated that while private companies had to
be induced to export by profit considerations, "being public sector
I will be forced to export."
The Ministry of Foreign Trade did not find public sector firms
responsive to its targets or pressures. The Minister is reported to
have
...bluntly told the meeting (mentioned above) that the pub-
lic sector undertakings, barring a very few, had not made
any significant export effort despite the recent decision
by the government that they should export at least 10 per-
cent of their production.3
Capital, 21 July 1966, p. 113.
2FE, 9 January 1970.
3Ibid.
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While Hindustan Steel exported $41-60 million of iron and
steel, amounting to over 10 percent of output, in each year between
1967-68 and 1969-70, exports from public sector firms in engineering
industries were negligible compared to their output or investment or
to exports of firms in the private sector. (See Table 11-12.) The
exports of public sector firms in engineering industries totalled
approximately $4 million in 1968-69, or 4 percent of total exports of
engineering goods excluding steel, in spite of a public sector invest-
ment of over $1000 million and vast excess capacity. No public sector
firm except Hindustan Steel and the Integral Coach Factory exported
10 percent of output. Only two more, HMT and Indian Telephone Indus-
tries, exported over I percent of output. No others exported $0.1
million in 1968-69, and by 1970-71 annual exports exceeded $0.1 million
in the case of only two other public sector companies, Hindustan Tele-
printers and the Surgical Instrument Factory of Indian Drugs and Pharma-
ceuticals, which exported about $0.3 million each. Bharat Heavy
Electricals was the first public sector firm in the heavy capital
goods industries to recieve a significant export order. It was to
export power-station boilers worth $3 million in 1971-72.
It is clear that exports of engineering goods other than steel
were almost entirely from private firms and that directives to public
sector firms to increase exports had little if any effect. There is
no evidence that public sector firms exported more than they would
have had they been private companies. The explanation is partly that
~I_
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outside the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which had no special powers
over public sector firms, the public sector export targets were not
of much interest to the bureaucracy or politicians.
8. Government Purchases
The government was the largest buyer of basic metals and engi-
neering goods, and for a number of products it was the only domestic
buyer. In 1969-70 government purchases of basic metals and engineer-
ing goods from indigenous sources totalled (at least) $495 million;
"the actual volume of purchases was probably still higher since the
above figures do not include complete information on purchases made
directly by Central/State governments, public sector undertakings,
quasi-public bodies, etc.'A The DGS&D, the government procurement
agency, purchased 146 items only from small firms to encourage develop-
ment of the latter. There were some suggestions that the government
might give preferences in purchasing to exporters, but this was not
done by 1970.
It was mentioned in 1967 that as an incentive to export the
government might allocate part of its railway wagon orders to firms
that had secured export orders, and the Minister of Foreign Trade sug-
gested that small units which benefitted from preferences in govern-
ment purchasing should export 10 percent of production. In 1969 it
was reported that
1 IEA, HS 1969-70, p. 138.
_ 
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Export oriented industries (sic: firms) submitting quota-
tions against government tenders through DGS&D are likely
to be given preferential treatment henceforth in placement
of orders. The DGS&D, which handles all government orders
beyond Rs 10,000 ($1,333) mooted the proposal to boost
export promotion efforts. The same scheme may also be
adopted by all the ministries.1
9. Bilateral and Barter Trade and Tied Aid
Bilateral and barter trade arrangements and tied aid involving
export subsidization were important in government export promotion
measures in the 1960s. These are discussed in Chapter VI.B.2-3 and
VI.C.4.
10. Export Licensing
Government restrictions on export of iron and steel and aluminum
are discussed in Chapter IV.
There was a rule that products with a hard currency import con-
tent greater than 30 percent of f.o.b. value could not be exported to
rupee payment areas. However, this was not applied consistently, e.g.
copper winding wires were exported under rupee payment arrangements.
11. Limitations on Export Subsidization
Several factors offset part of the subsidy value of the export
promotion schemes discussed above.
a. Administration of Export Promotion Schemes
All exporters complained about the procedures involved in the
export promotion schemes, including the direct cash subsidies,
IEngineering Times, 1 August 1969, p. 13.
_ _ ___ 
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subsidies on iron and steel, refunds of indirect taxes, and import
replenishment licenses.
One complaint concerned the substantial amount of paperwork
required to apply for each subsidy. In addition to initial applica-
tions, exporters were frequently required to submit further details
and verification and forced to make personal visits to the authorities
to keep papers moving. The efforts required were multiplied by the
fact that applications for different subsidies and different products
had to be made to different government offices through different spon-
soring agencies.
A related complaint concerned delays, which were commonly a
year and sometimes longer between export and receipt of subsidies. 1
These delays alone often reduced the discounted value of total subsi-
dies by 1 to 5 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports.
Complaints like the following were routine in interviews and
the press:
At present not even a single exporter is able to obtain
cash assistance without a lapse of six months and that
too after the exporter concerned has met the officials
of the department concerned a number of times.2
Such complaints were common even in the case of the scheme for refund
of indirect taxes, which had been in operation for over a decade, in
ISee, for example, the statement by R. L. Kirloskar in FE,
10 January 1971, p. 9.
2Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of Textile Stores
and Machinery, Commerce, 5 December 1970, p. v.
-INNWKWNUVW
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spite of numerous announcements by the government that procedures
were being streamlined to eliminate delays. A 1967 IIFT study of
exports by small units reported:
Generally exporting units do not take into account customs
drawback and excise rebate, as these are not claimed by the
units owing to procedural difficulties and delays. I
A representative of Perfect Machine Tools noted that "this
incidentally also becomes the breeding ground for bribery and cor-
rupt ion." 2
b. Uncertainty Concerning Value of Subsidies
The government relied heavily on ad hoc measures and never
guaranteed continuation of export promotion schemes. Consequently,
especially in the case of industries with rates of subsidy above the
average, firms were uncertain about the future profitability of export.
Apart from changes in schemes, rates of subsidy were uncertain at the
time orders were booked in four cases: (i) Firms were often uncertain
whether their exports in a given year would exceed those in the pre-
vious year by enough to qualify for a higher rate of cash subsidy
given on this basis. (ii) For many non-standardized products the
rate of refund of indirect taxes was set after exports were shipped.
(iii) The market value of import replenishment licenses fluctuated.
(iv) The steel subsidy was given on the basis of prices prevailing on
the date of export.
IIFT, 1967c, p. 33.
2Commerce, 6 February 1971, p. vi.
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c. Reduced Rates of Cash Subsidy and Import Replenishment
The major export subsidies discussed above applied simultane-
ously in most cases, but there were a number of circumstances under
which rates of cash subsidy or import replenishment were reduced to
limit the total subsidy.
The direct cash subsidy was reduced or eliminated in the fol-
lowing cases: (i) The rate was reduced on exports under (subsidized)
tied aid to Ceylon, e.g. by 5 percent of f.o.b. value in the case of
machine tools. (ii) The subsidy of 10 percent of f.o.b. value on PILC
power cables was eliminated on exports on (subsidized) credit.
(iii) Initially the cash subsidy was not given on exports of capital
goods made to acquire foreign equity shares, but in 1969 the subsidy
was given at the rate of 10 percent of f.o.b. value and in 1971 the
subsidy was increased to the regular rate. (iv) Exporters of data
processing machines that were allowed to use their entire export earn-
ings to import inputs did not receive the cash subsidy. (v) There was
a provision that if the import replenishment rate on railway wagons
was increased above the normal 20 percent to provide for a higher
import content, the rate of cash subsidy would be reduced.
Import replenishment licenses were reduced or eliminated in the
following cases: (i) Exporters of data processing machines that were
allowed to use their entire export earnings to import inputs did not
receive import replenishment licenses. (ii) When a capital goods
import license was given against an export commitment, the exports
-r -------- ---
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made in fulfillment of the obligation did not receive import replen-
ishment licenses, at least in cases where the obligation was enforced.
(iii) In return for supplies of PVC resin at international prices,
exporters of electric cables transferred part of their import replen-
ishment licenses to the suppliers of PVC resin. (iv) When indigenous
aluminum was allocated to exporters of electric cables on a priority
basis, the rate of import replenishment licenses was reduced.
D. Export Promotion Schemes and the Incentive to Export
1. The Extent of Nominal Devaluation for Export
This section considers the extent of nominal devaluation of the
implicit exchange rate for exports of engineering goods between 1964-
1965 and 1969 resulting from the change in the official parity value
of the rupee in 1966 and the income tax concession, direct cash sub-
sidy, and import entitlement and replenishment schemes. The next
section considers changes in domestic sales prices in India and dollar
export prices and draws conclusions about the extent to which the gap
between implicit exchange rates for production for the domestic market
and export was reduced.
The important changes during this period which are considered
here were: (i) In June 1966 the rupee was devalued from Rs. 4.76 to
Rs. 7.50 to a dollar, implying a 58 percent increase in the rupee
equivalent of a dollar. (ii) At the same time, the import entitlement,
income tax concession, and limited pre-devaluation cash subsidy schemes
__ ____~__
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were replaced by the import replenishment and general post-devaluation
cash subsidy schemes. (iii) There was a sharp rise in premia on
import entitlement licenses in the year immediately preceding devalu-
ation, and there was an increase in cash subsidies and in premia on
import replenishment licenses between late 1966 and 1969.
Table 111-15 was constructed using data for electric fans, which
are representative of engineering goods with a low current import con-
tent (10 percent of f.o.b. value). The realization from export was
calculated for four dates: 1964-1965, 1966 before devaluation, 1966
after devaluation and initiation of the new schemes, and 1969.
The data in Table 111-15 indicate that there was a nominal
devaluation of 56 percent in the implicit exchange rate for exports
of electric fans between 1964-1965 and 1969. Between 1959, when there
was little subsidization of exports at the official exchange rate, and
1969 there was a nominal devaluation of about 100 percent in the
implicit exchange rate for exports of engineering goods. In addition,
several changes in export promotion schemes not included in Table III-
15 substantially increased the extent of subsidization of exports of
engineering goods in 1968-1969. Subsidization of export credit and
tied aid was considerably increased, exporters were given preferences
in maintenance import licensing, and enforcement of export obligations
became more strict.
The data in Table 111-15, which indicate subsidization of
exports equal to 68 percent of f.o.b. value in 1966 prior to devalu-
ation, are consistent with observations made in other sources
II
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TABLE III-15
Realization on Exports of Electric Fans, 1964-65 to 1969
(per cent of rupee f.o.b. price at pre-devaluation exchange rate)
1964-65 1966 before 1966 after 1969
Devaluation. Devaluation
F.o.b. export price 100 100 158 158
Income tax concession 3 3 0 0
Cash subsidy 0 0 16 32
Market value of import
entitlement/replenish-
ment licenses 30 65 6 19
Realization on exports 133 168 180 208
Change in realization
from previous period 35 12 28
Notes:
The following premia on import entitlement/replenishment licenses were used in the calculations:
1964-65: 75 per cent, based on a report by Bhagwati and Desai that the average premium on licenses
issued against exports of engineering goods was 70-80 per cent. (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970,
pp. 418, 421.)
1966 before devaluation: 162.5 per cent, based on a report that the premium on licenses issued against
exports of electric fans was 150 to 175 per cent (IIFT, 1967a, p. 78).
1966 after devaluation: 20 per cent, based on a report by da Costa that in 1966 there was a "fall in
market values of import entitlements (issued against exports of engineering goods) from nearly
300 per cent to about 20 per cent after the liberalization of imports to priority industries."
At another point da Costa uses a premium of 200 per cent in calculating the value of export
rQ
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Notes to Table 111-15 (continued)
subsidies in 1966 before devaluation. (da Costa, 1968, p. 28.)
Bhagwati and Desai report that after devaluation import
replenishment licenses were "hardly a matter of significance
... in view of import liberalization which gave almost
total access to imports to the fifty-nine priority industries."
(Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 490.)
1969: 60 per cent, based on a report by an exporter of electric fans
during an interview.
The rate of import licenses given was 40 per cent of the f.o.b. value
of exports until devaluation and 20 per cent after devaluation.
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concerning the extent of de facto devaluation that existed immedi-
ately prior to the change in parity and the net effect of the changes
in 1966. According to the Ministry of Finance, immediately prior to
devaluation:
The premium on import entitlements...implied an effective rate
of exchange varying from Rs 6.5 to a dollar to about Rs 8 to a
dollar depending on the rate of entitlement and the extent of
the premium.1
This estimate, which is not limited to engineering goods, implies de
facto devaluation of the implicit exchange rate on exports of 40 to
71 percent allowing for the 3 percent income tax concession. Since
subsidization from the entitlement scheme was generally higher for
non-traditional manufactures than for traditional exports, this indi-
cates a subsidy of about 70 percent for engineering goods. Similarly,
Bhagwati and Desai estimate that immediately prior to devaluation:
The average degree of such de facto lowering of the exchange
rate...could be put at around 80-100 percent subsidization on
many new manufactures (e.g. chemicals, engineering products...)2
Finally, it was reported that "before devaluation...some exports were
subsidised to the extent of 90 per cent and more."3
It is important to note that only a very small share of the
devaluation in the implicit exchange rate occurred when the official
parity value of the rupee was changed in 1966 because the change in
ISupplement to the Economic Survey, July 1966, cited by GOI,
LSS, 1968, p. 82.
2Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 474.
EPW, 16 September 1967, p. 1679.
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parity was almost entirely offset by changes in export promotion schemes.
Nominal devaluation of the implicit exchange rate in Table 111-15 for
exports of electric fans between June and August 1966 was only 7 percent.
For a number of engineering goods there was a decline in the
implicit exchange rate on exports at the time of the official devalu-
ation. Assuming the same premia used in Table 111-15, the realization
on products with an import entitlement rate of 60-75 percent would have
declined at the time of devaluation even if they received the maximum
rate of cash subsidy. Consequently, the de facto exchange rate very
likely declined on hand tools, transistor radios, commercial vehicles,
vehicular engines, and automobile parts. The implicit exchange rate on
exports also declined for a few products like bicycles and parts which
received large cash subsidies prior to devaluation (See Table 111-8).
This conclusion is supported by a report that while the changes
in 1966
Helped that section of the industry which was receiving incen-
tives (entitlements) of 50 per cent or less, it adversely
affected the interest of the units which were receiving incen-
tives of more than 50 per cent. 1
It is also supported by a number of complaints found in annual reports
and other company statements.2 Although the calculations above indi-
cate that there was a small increase in the exchange rate for electric
fans at the time of devaluation, the major exporter of electric fans
1 EPW, 4 July 1970, p. 1053.
2See also Krueger, 1970, p. 21n, for support in the case of
automobile parts.
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reported that
The devaluation and changes in the export promotion scheme
have further tilted the balance against Indian manufacturers
in regard to (profitability of) export of fans. 1
On the other hand, since the import entitlement scheme did not
apply to iron and steel or aluminum ingots, the changes in 1966 appear
to have lead to a substantial increase in the implicit exchange rate on
their exports.2
2. Reduction in Discrimination between Production for the Domestic
Market and Export
The preceding section dealt with nominal devaluation of the
implicit exchange rate for exports, i.e. the increase in the rupee
realization per dollar of exports. This section considers changes
in domestic sales prices in India, dollar export prices, and the
prices of Indian inputs and draws conclusions about the reduction
in the gap between implicit exchange rates for production for the
domestic market and export during the 1960s.
It is clear from the data in Table 111-15 and the domestic
price indices for engineering goods in Table 111-16 that even if
dollar export prices had remained constant, there would have
been a substantial increase in the ratio of the rupee realiza-
tion on exports to the realization on domestic sales between
either 1961-62 or 1964-1965 and 1969. For example, while the
1Jay Engineering, Industrial Times, 15 September 1968, p. 43.
Parenthesis added.
2However, see note (c) to Table 111-9.
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realization on exports of electric fans increased by 56 percent
between 1964-1965 and 1969 even before allowing for schemes not
included in Table III-15, the domestic price index for electric
machinery (including electric fans) increased by only 16 percent.
In addition, there was an increase in nominal international
prices of engineering goods during the 1960s, and hence at a given
quantity of exports the rupee realization on exports would have
increased even more compared to that on domestic sales.
The prices of Indian industrial inputs generally rose more
than the domestic prices of finished engineering goods between
1964-1965 and 1969. Apart from the data presented here, this was a
universal complaint in the annual reports of Indian companies. It
was true of wages which were linked to the consumer price index
(See Table 111-17) through dearness allowances,l the control prices
of domestic materials including iron and steel (See Table 111-18),
the landed prices of imported materials, and the prices of materials
like alloy steel and steel forgings for which import substitution
took place in this period. It was not true of open market prices of
some materials like steel in 1966-1968 but was true of these as well
for the period through 1969-70 (See Table 111-19). Consequently, the
increase in the realization on export compared to the cost of produc-
tion was less than that compared to the realization on domestic sales.
1The increase in wages could have been partly offset by an in-
crease in productivity, but this probably did not occur since there
was an increase in labor problems in the late 1960s.
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TABLE III-16
Domestic Price Indices (Base: 1961-62 = 100)
Item 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 Oct.1970
Machinery and transport equipment 104 107 111 116 124 131 132 135 149
Non-electric machinery 105 107 111 116 122 129 132 136 156
Electric machinery 103 107 113 119 130 136 135 134 149
Tranport equipment 102 107 111 113 122 130 130 133 137
Vehicles 102 107 111 114 124 131 132 135 n.a.
Tools and implements 103 106 106 117 126 131 131 140 n.a.
Cutlery and hardware 110 118 125 130 138 141 142 147 n.a.
Lamps and lanterns 101 107 106 112 118 131 134 141 n.a.
Clocks and watches 101 104 105 106 122 133 131 130 n.a.
Aluminum products 105 109 106 118 130 134 134 134 n.a.
Rubber tires and tubes 100 105 115 122 148 151 152 161 n.a.
Metal products 106 108 112 119 126 135 142 149 166
Iron and steel manufactures 105 107 111 118 125 134 142 149 n.a.
Metals 103 110 120 142 157 167 170 180 n.a.
Pig iron 104 104 119 125 149 155 165 175 n.a.
Aluminum 104 101 101 114 121 123 119 123 n.a.
Copper 106 113 135 209 250 270 285 336 n.a.
Brass 103 109 137 196 252 294 286 294 n.a.
Zinc 90 91 114 168 165 135 113 130 n.a.
Tin 141 215 205 213 258 303 247 258 n.a.
Lead 106 146 219 377 392 264 229 250 n.a.
n.a: not available
In these indices the term "machinery" applies to consumer goods as well as capital goods.
Source: EE, R & S, February 1970, pp. 118-20, and GOI, RBI, Bulletin, November 1970, p. 1883. For details
see IEA, HS, 1969-70, pp. 223-25.
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TABLE III-17
Cost of Living Index (Base: 1960 = 100)
Consumer Price Index
Industrial Workers
Urban Non-manual Employees
Industrial Workers in Calcutta
1961 1962 1963 1964
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
101 107 112 121
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 July 1970
139 157 175 174 177 189
132 146 159 161 167 n.a.
128 144 159 171 171 184
n.a.: not available
Base of index was 1949 until 1968 and was then changed to 1960. Index for period to 1968 is simply scaled
to 1960-base index for 1967-1968.
Source: EE, 6 November 1970, p. 834, and IEA, HS, 1969-70, p. 226.
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Control Prices of Steel
Category
Billets
Bars
Structurals
Plates
Hot rolled sheets
Galvanized sheets
Charges included
in control prices
Freight, surcharge,
cess
6/59
n.a.
600
610
685
630
n.a.
4/63
n.a.
626(70)
645(70)
742(92)
813(97)
925
TABLE 111-18
for the Domestic Market
3/64
505
630
660
767
832
940
4/65
535
663
693
777
872
1130
(Rs. per ton)
4/66 5/67
550 630
685(125) 760
715(125) 790
797(135) 890
902(175) 985
1160 1545
n.a.
Average excise duty n.a. n.a. 75+ n.a. n.a. n.a.
n.a.: not available
Prices are base prices for untested quality and include all levies on domestic sales,
including excise tax and freight equalization levy. Numbers in parenthesis
are excise taxes included in the prices.
Sources: EW, 8 August 1964, p. 1366; GOI, MSHI, 1963, pp. 9, 102; GOI, MSM, 1966, p. 6;
IEA, HS 1967, p. 66, 1968-69, p. 162, and 1969-70, p. 174.
7/68
649
780(125)
849(125)
979(135)
1059(175)
1784(325)
n.a.
146
1/70
711
847
896
1082
1162
1846
n.a.
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TABLE III-19
Open Market Prices of Steel, 1963-1970. (Rs. per ton)
Category 3-8/1963
Wire and wire rods
Wire rods
H.B. wire
Galvanized wire
Rounds
Rounds (3/4")
Bars and rods
Structurals
Angles
Channels
Joists
Plates
Sheets
Hot rolled
10-14 guage
16 and over
Cold rolled
16 and over
Galvanized
16-20
22-26
Stainless
steel
4/64-2/65
860-880
1100-1500
1600-2500
950-1050
1150-1310
600-810
640-750
670-700
850-1000
980-1400
9/1969
1200
950-1000
950-1000
1600-2500
6/1970
1306-1640
1175-1640
1238-1800
1400-2000
3000-3475
1888-2350
1500-2700
2250-2600
1550-2200
17800-22600 38500-41000
1800-2700
48000-52000
Sources: See Table IV-5.
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3. Profitability of Export and the Role of Excess Capacity and
Export Subsidies
This section compares the realization from export with the cost
of production and the realization in the domestic market in 1969. The
section does not consider the entire realization from export but rather
the f.o.b. price plus the cash subsidy, the refund of indirect taxes on
inputs, the steel subsidy, and the market value of import replenishment
licenses. No allowance is made for the value of preferences in licens-
ing or ad hoc subsidies.
It was typical for firms to report in interviews that after
allowing for the four export subsidies considered here the realization
from export covered short-run marginal cost but not average total cost
even if the latter was defined to exclude all return on equity.1
Detailed data supplied by two major machine tool producers and export-
ers indicated that the realization from export, after allowing 10 per-
cent of the f.o.b. value for costs of export marketing, was 90 percent
of average total cost excluding all return on equity. The latter fig-
ure was confirmed by the firms in subsequent communication and by a
iPublished statements claiming that exports involved losses
were very conmon. In 1967 Dunlop India reported that "our export
business in unprofitable even after taking into account duty drawback
and the current cash subsidy of 10 per cent," and in 1969 it reported
that "due to the high cost of raw materials, this level of exports
could only be achieved at a substantial loss." (EPW, 6 May 1967,
p. 859, and EE, 25 April 1969, p. 902.) Jessop reported that "our
cost of production did not leave a margin of profit despite financial
assistance afforded by government...We took on the orders to fill a
part of our idle capacity." (Jessop, AR 1967-68, pp. 5-6.) Philips
India reported that "whatever exports were effected had to be under-
taken at a loss." (Philips India, AR 1966.)
II1
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third major machine tool producer. One would expect that for many
non-exporters profitability of export was even lower and that this
was why many firms did not export in spite of excess capacity or did
not use all excess capacity for export production. In the case of
firms in the automobile parts industry, which were required to export
5 percent of output or suffer adverse discrimination in import licens-
ing, Krueger reports that in late 1969-70:
Because all firms feel obliged to export, they sell their
products internationally at whatever price these products will
bring. In some instances, the firm's proceeds--even including
cash subsidy and duty drawback--do not cover the firm's direct
material cost per unit of output. In other cases, the export
price does not cover material cost but the cash subsidy and
the duty drawback make up the difference. In a few cases, the
firm's total recovery (f.o.b. price plus cash subsidy and duty
drawback) is equal to, or almost equal to, the O.9. (original
equipment) price received from domestic sale.1
On the other hand, a few companies reported that realizations
from export covered long-run average costs and allowed some return
on equity, e.g. one producer of cast iron spun pipes and one producer
of hand tools, and an UNCTAD-GATT study states that "the confidential
data examined in connexion with this survey suggest that some segments
of the (automobile parts) industry engaged in the forging and machin-
ing of parts do very well on exports." 2
One can conclude that while some firms covered long-run average
costs on exports and earned a return on equity, a large share of Indian
iKrueger, 1970, p. 106.
2UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. C, p. 47.
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exports of engineering goods in the late 1960s were made at realiza-
tions, allowing for the four export subsidies listed above, which did
not cover long-run average cost. This confirms the conclusion reached
in part III.B.2.b that excess capacity was probably critical for
export by a number of industries, given the implicit exchange rate on
export. It also indicates the importance of the schemes for prefer-
ential import licensing for exporters, particularly discrimination
against firms in certain industries like automobile parts which ex-
ported under five percent of production.
Interviews indicated that the f.o.b. price received on exports
of a number of engineering goods excluding metals in 1969 was between
50 and 75 percent of the price for domestic sales (ex-works exclusive of
taxes on the final sale). This is consistent with the replies to a
1967 ESRF questionnaire: 21 companies in the basic metals and engi-
neering industries reported that export prices were 40 to 90 percent
of domestic prices and two companies in the rubber products industries
reported that export prices were 50 percent of domestic prices.1
With f.o.b. export prices 50 to 75 percent of domestic prices
and the four export subsidies considered in this section totalling
25 to 50 percent of the f.o.b. export price, realizations from export
were concentrated between 65 and 100 percent of the realization in
the domestic market after allowing for the additional costs involved
1 ESRF, 1967, p. 17.
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in exporting.I There were probably many engineering goods on which
the realization on export would have been even less than 65 percent
of that in the domestic market, since non-exporters were under-repre-
sented in the interviews. A few exporters, on the other hand, reported
higher realizations on exports to certain markets than in the domestic
market, e.g. one producer of automobile parts for exports to East
Europe under bilateral trade agreements. Such reports may also have
been under-represented since exporters would have been reluctant to
invite reductions in their export subsidies.
For three products, iron and steel, aluminum ingots, and com-
mercial vehicles, the realization from export in 1969-70 was higher
than on domestic sales. In each case this was in part because of
domestic price controls.
For iron and steel the f.o.b. price of exports rose above the
ex-works control price for domestic sales during 1969, and this situa-
tion continued in 1970. One of the major exporters of steel reported
that in late 1969 the f.o.b. export price on categories like bars and
structurals, which accounted for the bulk of exports, averaged 12 per-
cent more than the control prices for domestic sales.
In the case of aluminum ingots, a press report on the 1968
annual meeting of Hindustan Aluminium, which had exported 12,000 tons
of aluminum, stated that "there is no loss on export."2  It was also
iKrueger, 1970, pp. 127-28, states that in the automobile parts
industry, "it is highly unprofitable to enter the export market rela-
tive to domestic market profitability even given the subsidies avail-
able."
2EE, 13 December 1968, p. 1119.
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reported in May 1969 that "prices (for aluminum ingots) in the inter-
national market are rising. The supply position has become somewhat
tight. There has been a rise in the international price from 24 to
26 cents a pound. This is higher than the prevailing price in India."l
In the case of both iron and steel and aluminum ingots, inter-
national prices fluctuate substantially, and the above situation was
temporary. By late 1970 the international price of aluminum ingots
had fallen to 22 cents per pound, which was below the Indian ex-works
control price for domestic sales.
Krueger presents data for five producers of motor vehicles
which reveal that the f.o.b. prices of exports were 85, 80, 73, 72,
and 51 percent of the ex-factory control prices for domestic sales
in 1968-1969.2 With a total subsidy of 35 to 40 percent of f.o.b.
value, the realization on export was equal to or greater than on
domestic sales for the first four producers during 1968-1969. Krueger
indicates that in the second case, and perhaps in some of the others,
the f.o.b. price is that for sales against non-convertible currency.3
Assuming all prices applied to exports for non-convertible currency
and that sales for hard currency were made at 10 percent less, only
the first two would have had a realization on exports for hard cur-
rency equal to that in the domestic market.
1Capital, 8/May 1969, p. 909.
2Krueger, 1970, p. 106.
3Table 111-7 shows that 93 percent of exports of commercial
vehicles and jeeps in 1969-70 were to soft currency areas.
II
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4. The Response of Exports to Subsidies
a. 1959-60 to 1969-70
Export subsidization programs were an important factor in the
expansion of exports of engineering goods between 1959-60 and 1969-70.
No attempt has been made to verify this statistically on the basis of
differences in implicit exchange rates among products or changes over
time. The data for a reasonable model to explain the level of exports
on a disaggregated basis are not available, and on an aggregate basis
there is little but trend. However, the conclusion is supported by
the following considerations:
(i) Parts III.D.1 and III.D.2 show that the export subsidization
schemes considered in part III.C progressively increased the implicit
exchange rate on exports and reduced the gap between the implicit
exchange rates on import substitution and export. Simultaneously,
there was a large increase in exports and in the ratio of exports to
domestic sales.
(ii) Until 1965-66 engineering goods were exported primarily by firms
whose production was constrained by the supply conditions for mate-
rials, not by firms with excess capacity due to insufficient domestic
demand. Most of these exports clearly would not have been made with-
out the subsidy provided by the import entitlement scheme since
marginal revenue in the protected domestic market was higher than on
exports before allowing for export subsidies in cases where production
was constrained by supply factors. Similarly, in the late 1960s,
while engineering goods were exported primarily by firms with excess
II
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capacity due to insufficient domestic demand, some firms without
excess capacity also exported, evidently because of the subsidy pro-
vided by import licensing preferences for exporters as well as other
schemes.
(iii) Only a small amount of the excess capacity in the engineering
industries where production was limited by inadequate domestic demand
after 1966 was employed in production for export, even where collabor-
ation agreements did not impose restrictions on export. It can there-
fore be concluded that marginal cost considerations alone did not
make exports universally profitable; this was confirmed by producers.
This suggests that export subsidies were not redundant and influenced
the volume of exports by such firms.
(iv) There are a number of cases where exports of specific products or
to particular destinations were clearly influenced by export subsidies,
e.g. data processing machines, which were exported to secure import
licenses but not for cash; exports under tied aid to Ceylon and rupee
payment to the UAR; and exports of capital goods exactly equal in value
to Indian investments abroad.
(v) Apart from such inferences, in interviews and annual reports engi-
neering firms attributed considerable importance to export subsidies
as influences on their decisions to export, their export targets, and
their export pricing. For example, it was common in 1969 for firms to
report that they had set export targets of 5 or 10 percent of output
because of penalties in licensing for firms exporting under 5 percent
and preferences for firms exporting 10 percent, but few engineering
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firms without excess capacity due to insufficient domestic demand
planned to export over 10 percent of output.
b. Impact of Devaluation in 1966
It is popularly believed that the devaluation in 1966 failed
to stimulate exports. The data in Table 11-15 show that exports of
engineering goods increased only slightly in 1966-67, moderately in
1967-68, and then very rapidly in 1968-69 and 1969-70. Exports of
iron and steel increased rapidly immediately following devaluation.
The preceding discussion of the limited extent of devaluation
of the implicit exchange rate on exports during 1966 helps to explain
why there was little increase in exports of engineering goods in
1966-67 in spite of a substantial change in the official parity value
of the rupee. A number of other factors also explain the limited
short-run response of exports:
(i) Export promotion schemes were temporarily suspended. There was
a two-month delay between devaluation and termination of the income
tax concession and import entitlement schemes and announcement of the
new cash subsidy and import replenishment schemes. The scheme for
supply of iron and steel at concessional prices for export production
was suspended between June 1966 and May 1967, and the provision for
allocation of one-third more iron and steel than was actually required
for production of exports was eliminated. Also, since devaluation
was accompanied by a reduction in import duties, the scheme for refund
of indirect taxes on inputs was disrupted and refund rates were
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reduced. Moreover, the official devaluation did not apply directly to
exports under non-convertible currency arrangements because contracts
were in rupees, and exports and new contracts under these arrangements
were disrupted for a few months until the prices on existing contracts
could be renegotiated. The DGTD reported that:
The immediate impact of devaluation on exports in this sector
(engineering goods) was the dislocation, for a few months, of
the even flow of export contracting and negotiations consequent
on the uncertainties created by the event and the withdrawal of the
erstwhile export promotion scheme, price concessions on indige-
nous iron and steel for export fabrication and import entitle-
ments (between June and August, when the new schemes were
announced).1
(ii) There was probably a reduction in overinvoicing.2
(iii) Time was required to establish marketing facilities.
5. Export Targets
Given the level of export subsidies, the profit calculations
made in the preceding sections depend on domestic market conditions
and reflect the effect of the recession on input and domestic output
prices. The revival of domestic demand in 1969-71 probably reduced
IGOI, DGTD, AR 1966-67, p. 78. Before announcement of the cash
subsidy, it was reported that "abolition of the special export promo-
tion measures will undoubtedly hit hard the engineering industry as
the extent of the benefits, in most cases, was higher than the present
rupee devaluation of 57.5 per cent." 1.IEC, July 1966, p. xiii.
2For evidence of overinvoicing before devaluation, see Bhagwati
and Desai, 1970, pp. 454-55, 488. They found that between 1961-62 and
devaluation there was an incentive to overinvoice exports of certain
engineering goods and their interviews revealed that such overinvoic-
ing took place. They estimate overinvoicing at an average of 10-20
percent of the value of exports covered by the import entitlement
scheme. Overinvoicing in the case of stainless steel products is re-
reported in GOI, LSS, 1966, pp. 23, 165, 167, and for textiles in
GOI, 2C, 1966, Pt. II, p. 153.
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the ratio of the realization on export to costs and to the realization
on domestic sales for some products.
Furthermore, the long-run outlook for profitability of export
of engineering goods was at no time in the 1960s high enough to induce
investment for export production, although the question of investing
for export production was not relevant for many industries because of
excess capacity. Rather than investing specifically for export, it
was typical in 1969 for firms to report an export target of 5 to 10
percent of production set on the basis of government licensing prefer-
ences for exporters.
These observations raise doubts about the official projections
for exports of engineering goods cited in Chapter II.F. It seems
unlikely that the long-run targets will be achieved unless there is a
further increase in the ratio of the realization on exports to that
on domestic sales.
E. Demand Factors Affecting Exports
Although changes in supply factors appear to have played the
primary role in the expansion of Indian exports of engineering goods
and metals in the 1960s, the following changes in export demand seem
to have played a role:
(i) The closing of the Suez canal reduced competition in west Asia and
east Africa, although it also increased freight costs and shipping
times from India to West and East Europe and to the east coast of
North America.
II
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(ii) There was a sharp rise in the international price of steel and
products like steel pipes and tubes in 1969 and 1970.
(iii) Although bilateral trade agreements have been listed in part
III.C as export promotion measures because exports appear to have
been subsidized by higher prices for imports, these agreements led to
an increase in export demand and prices.
(iv) The economic development of surrounding countries increased the
demand for capital goods, but import substitution abroad was probably
a factor in the stagnation of Indian exports of simple metal products.
(v) Exports to Pakistan ceased in 1965 and exports to South Vietnam
under US aid ceased when procurement was tied to the US in the mid-
1960s. Both countries were major markets in the first half of the
1960s.
I -- I-' - _ _
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CHAPTER IV
TRADABLE INPUTS AND NEGATIVE PROTECTION
This chapter considers the influence of government policies on
supply conditions for tradable inputs used in production of engineer-
ing goods and tires. The purpose is to determine the extent to which
negative protection of value added for export and related difficulties
resulted from restrictions on imports, controls on domestically pro-
duced materials, and similar policies. The chapter considers not only
higher unit prices of materials but other aspects of supply conditions
which affected the cost of value added, quality, design, or output of
engineering goods.
The chapter first discusses the conditions under which tradable
inputs were available for production for the domestic market and then
considers the special provisions which were made for supply of mate-
rials for export production.
A. Government Policies Affecting the Supply of Tradable Inputs
Among government policies which directly influenced supply con-
ditions for tradable inputs were (1) import licensing, (2) price and
distribution controls on domestically produced materials, (3) export
licensing, and (4) indirect taxation.
.. . T WWW_ "
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1. Import Licensing 1
The following features of import licensing affected the supply
conditions for tradable inputs throughout the 1960s:
(a) All inputs required licenses, which were allocated bureaucratically
rather than by a price mechanism in the presence of excess demand at
landed prices.
(b) A large majority of licenses for inputs were allocated directly to
manufacturing firms which used the inputs in their own production.
During the 1960s the share of licenses for inputs issued to independent
private import houses declined and the share issued to state trading
agencies increased.
(c) Except for import licenses issued against exports, the quantity of
maintenance import licenses allocated to a firm depended on (i) the
total availability of foreign exchange for maintenance imports, (ii) the
priority status of the industry under the import policy, and (iii) the
firm's capacity, recent production, and/or recent use of import licenses.
(d) For each assembled product, the government imposed a schedule for
increasing domestic content and progressively reduced the ratio of
licenses for components to output so that after 5 to 10 years firms
typically were required to produce or procure 75 to 95 percent (by value)
of parts in India.
(e) The validity of licenses was restricted in mnute detail so that the
importer often had little discretion in their use: (i) Items and
ISee Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, Chapters 15 and 16, for a detailed
discussion of import licensing in 1956-1966.
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amounts of each were specified. (ii) Licenses were often valid for
import only from a specific country under tied aid or rupee payment.
(iii) Licenses were valid for only a limited period, e.g. six months
or a year including the time required for delivery of goods, and poli-
cies making issuance of licenses contingent on use of past licenses
further discouraged delay in import.
(f) In the case of licenses issued to manufacturers, with the excep-
tion of licenses issued against exports, neither the licenses nor
the imported inputs were legally transferable to other firms.
(g) Import of many tradable inputs was banned. The basic rule was that
import was prohibited if an item was manufactured in India, regardless
of the Indian price, except in certain cases when the government
decided that domestic production was insufficient (e.g. when supply
constrained production in a user industry). Import of some other
items was banned because the end-product was considered non-essential
or to force use of domestically available substitutes.
(h) Licensing policy changed frequently, both between semi-annual licens-
ing periods and on an ad hoc basis. The ratio of licenses to capacity,
the banned list, the extent of imports permitted to supplement domestic
production, source-tying, etc., all changed, often with little warning.
(i) The minimum formal requirements of licensing entailed considerable
paperwork and included a cumbersome procedure for proving that the
desired imports could not be procured in India. Before they could
obtain import licenses for capital goods, castings and forgings, and
mild, alloy, and special steels, firms were required to advertise their
__ __ 
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requirements or notify domestic producers and obtain "non-availability"
certificates from all producers stating that they could not supply the
requirement. For alloy steels this involved securing certificates from
as many as seven producers stating that they could not supply the mate-
rial within six months. This requirement for clearance led to numerous
problems:
There have been instances when indigenous manufacturers had been
hesitant to supply such certificates even though they were not
in a position to make supplies. 1
Soon after the introduction of this new procedure, several evils
have cropped up. There are reports that some manufacturers of
machinery have started demanding illegal consideration for issu-
ing letters of regret. Besides there are reports that some
companies, which have already entered certain industry, are try-
ing to delay the projects of others coming into the same field
with the help of this procedure.2
Even without such deliberate efforts, this procedure and others led to
delays.
Apart from such formal requirements, manufacturers devoted a
large amount of resources even at the top management level to securing
licenses to import materials and capital goods. This cost of licens-
ing is considered in part IV.K.
2. Price and Distribution Controls
The prices of domestically produced iron and steel and distribu-
tion among users were controlled by the government throughout the 1960s.
Other materials and ancillary items under controls during part or all
1 FE, 5 October 1968.
2 FE, 29 January 1969.
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of this time were ferrous scrap, aluminum, coal, caustic soda, synthetic
rubber, and tires and tubes. The price of natural rubber was supported
to subsidize production.
3. Export Licensing
At certain times the government restricted exports in the case
of iron and steel, ferrous scrap, and aluminum in order to hold domestic
ex-works prices below f.o.b. export prices.
4. Indirect Taxation
Tariffs on imports and central excise taxes on a number of
domestically produced materials and components were a significant factor
in the structure of effective protection. Tariffs on imports in 1969
were 15 to 27.5 percent ad valorem for basic metals and raw rubber,
27.5 percent for spare parts and machine tools, 27.5 to 50 percent for
a wide range of components (and higher in some cases), and 60 percent
for synthetic resins and plastic materials. There were additional
countervailing duties on imports where there were domestic excise taxes.
The central exise tax was 10 percent on pig iron, 17 to 33 percent on
steel, 27 percent on aluminum, and 5 percent on caustic soda, and it
applied to certain components, including electric motors (5 to 15 per-
cent), storage batteries (15 percent), and motor vehicle tires (40 per-
cent).
Since tariffs and central excise taxes on current inputs used
directly by the final manufacturer were refunded on exports (see
Chapter III.C.2.e), these are omitted from calculations in the present
_ _I~_~_ ~_~il _____
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chapter.
However, other indirect taxes were not refunded and hence con-
tributed to negative protection for export. There was no refund of the
same tariffs and central excise taxes on machinery or on indirect in-
puts, of state and local sales taxes (e.g. a 2 percent sales tax in
West Bengal) or other levies (e.g. a 1 percent octroi tax in Bombay)
on inputs, or of the 3 percent central sales tax on interstate move-
ments of certain inputs including steel. The effect of these non-
refunded indirect taxes is included in the calculations in this chapter,
but it was not possible to separate their effect from other factors
responsible for negative protection.
B. Dependence on Imports
For perspective in the following discussion a few generalizations
about the relative roles of import and domestic production in supply of
tradable inputs to the engineering industries are useful.
1. Materials
Virtually all pig iron and the large majority of mild steel and
aluminum used at the end of the 1960s were produced domestically, and
their production in turn used Indian materials with the'exception of
part of the cryolite and aluminum fluoride for aluminum and some minor
items. Imports accounted for 15 percent of mild steel flat products,
25 percent of tool, alloy, and special steels, a great majority of non-
ferrous metals other than aluminum, and a large number of non-metallic
materials.
F - - - -- -----=--
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2. Components
In the case of assembled goods, although production sometimes
began with import of all components in completely-knocked-down (c.k.d.)
condition, imports rarely accounted for more than 25 to 40 percent (by
value) of the c.k.d. pack five years after production began. Direct
imports accounted for less than 10 percent of the components (by value)
in most of the assembled products exported at the end of the 1960s, e.g.
cotton textile machinery, machine tools, commercial vehicles and jeeps,
stationary diesel engines, and electric fans. The range from 2 to 16
percent for commercial vehicles, jeeps, and passenger cars listed in
Table IV-1 was representative for such products. 1
Table IV-2 provides data on currentimport content including
materials and components for a number of the industries examined in
detail in this study.
3. Machinery
At the end of the 1960s, one-quarter to three-quarters (by value)
of the machinery and equipment for new investments in the engineering
industries was imported, with the higher fraction applying to industries
requiring special purpose, automated, high precision, and large machines.
Sixty percent of the total supply of machine tools by value and 20 per-
cent by number were imported.
1These figures do not include imported materials used in produc-
tion of components in India.
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TABLE IV-1
Domestic Production and Procurement Of Automobile Components,
1959-60 and 1967-68
IndiQenous Content (per cent)
Vehicle 1959-60
Ashok Leyland truck
Hindustan Bedford truck
Premier Dodge truck
TELCO Mercedes-Benz truck
Mahindra and Mahindra Jeep
Hindustan Oxford Morris car
Premier Fiat car
Standard Herald car
38.5
46.0
68.0
64.0
65.0
70.5
47.0
32.5
1967-68
89.0
84.0
98.0
95.0
96.5
97.5
98.3
89.8
Indigenous content = 100 minus import content; import content = foreign
ex-factory price of components still imported (excluding raw materials)
as per cent of foreign ex-factory price of complete vehicle.
Sources: 1959-60: GOI, MCI, 1960, p. 11.
1967-68: GOI, MIDCA, 1969, pp. 61-62.
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TABLE IV-2
Production and Direct Import Content of Engineering Goods, 1960 and 1967.
1960 1967
Product Production Direct Import Production Direct Import
Content Content
($ mil.) (per cent) ($ mil.) (per cent)
2. Steel pipes and tubes 30 10 54 9
3. Bright steel bars 2 20 8 13
4. Iron and steel castings
Cast iron/alloy * * 35 *
Malleable iron 1 6 6 2
Steel 11 6 21 2
5. Steel wire ropes 2 50 5 40
6. Electric wires and
cables
Aluminum conductors 18 65 57 45
Power cables 4 75 27 49
Rubber and plastic
insulated cables 16 - 65 25 40
8. Aluminum ingots, sheets,
and foils
Ingots 12 7 51 3
Foils 5 39 7 4
11. Railway wagons 77 20 61 la
14. Electric machinery
Transformers 9 59 44 30
Electric motors 14 35 35 12
Switchgear 8 50 43 20
15. Comrercial vehicles,
jeeps, passenger cars,
and motor cycles 316 22 262 15
16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry 16 30 16 20
Storage 11 40 14 20
18. Data processing machines
and calculating machines 1 b 27 4 22
19.& 23. Bicycles and parts 39 20 51 12
20. Stationary diesel engines 11 40 31 5
21. Automobile parts 25 27 87 25
24. Electric fans 33 19 27 10
26. Tires and tubes
Automobile . 82 26 144 9
Bicycle 15 26 22 6
1139 16
_II_ _ __
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Notes to Table IV-2
*: less than 0.5.
a: this is so low that there is clearly an error
b: only calculating machines were produced in 1960
Value of production is converted at the official exchange rate.
Direct import content is derived by comparing the value of production
converted at the official exchange rate with the value of imports.
Because of overvaluation of the rupee, the direct import content would
be higher if production were valued at international prices. Because
the degree of overvaluation can not be assumed equal in 1960 and 1967,
it is difficult to compare production or direct import content in the
two years.
Source: EE, 26 December 1969, pp. 1356-57.
II
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C. Prices of Domestically Produced Tradable Inputs
The prices of domestically produced tradable inputs for the engi-
neering industries were generally higher than the c.i.f. prices of
imports from the cheapest sources, even after the 1966 devaluation.
This was generally a reflection of overvaluation; there were also spe-
cific cases of comparative disadvantage, inefficient production, and
monopoly pricing.
In certain cases however (particularly iron, steel, ferrous scrap,
and aluminum), Indian prices were sometimes lower than not only c.i.f.
prices of imports but (with the exception of aluminum) even f.o.b. prices
of exports, largely as a result of government controls over prices and
exports. Hence, for users of these metals during certain periods there
was subsidization of value added for export as well as for the domestic
market.1
In addition to the excess of domestic over c.i.f. import prices
for tradable inputs purchased in India, an important source of negative
protection was the excess of in-plant production costs over c.i.f. import
prices for tradable inputs produced by vertically integrated firms.
These inputs are not considered in this section but are discussed below
in part IV.I.
1The question whether India had a comparative advantage in produc-
tion of pig iron, mild steel, and aluminum for the domestic market is not
examined here. Other studies have suggested that Indian production costs
for these metals were lower than the c.i.f. prices of imports or would
have been lower if certain conditions had been fulfilled. See Liedholm,
1965, on steel and Manne, 1967, on aluminum.
__ ____ _ ___
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1. Materials
Comparison of Indian and c.i.f. import prices for materials used
by the engineering industry is complicated by the fact that world prices
of metals fluctuate substantially. During 1969 when most of the data
presented here were collected, international prices of metals were rising
sharply. In the case of mild steel and aluminum, data are presented for
before and after the rise in international prices.
a. Iron and Mild Steel
(1) Control Prices
Prices of pig iron and mild steel produced in India by the inte-
grated steel mills were controlled by the government. The extent of
government control over production schedules and distribution to users
varied during the 1960s and differed among categories of steel; but
generally it included at least ranking of users by priority for distri-
bution and reservation of quotas for certain uses, and in some cases it
involved much more detailed control.
Johnson reports that in spite of an overvalued exchange rate:
In 1962 the weighted average import price for steel, c.i.f.,
...was roughly 10 percent greater than the weighted average
selling price for comparable combinations of (domestic) st el
output. This difference was far greater a decade earlier.
Johnson further reports that
Perhaps the most serious defect of steel price control was
the distortion of both retention and selling prices relative
to the prices of other commodities and the real costs of
producing steel in India. Although operating or out-of-
pocket costs were as a rule fully covered by retention
1Johnson, 1966, p. 97, and for details, p. 98.
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prices, overheads were not.1
Until 1964 the government subsidized imports of steel when import prices
exceeded domestic control prices. 2 Moreover, because the same domestic
freight "equalization levy" was imposed on all sales, the control price
throughout the 1960s was the same everywhere in India on a delivered
basis regardless of the true freight cost.
In support of demands for an increase in control prices, TISCO
claimed that in 1968-1969 Indian ex-works control prices exclusive of
excise taxes and the freight equalization levy were lower than ex-works
prices in most advanced countries. TISCO supported this claim with the
data in Table IV-3 on the average ex-works prices of what it said was a
representative bundle of structurals, bars, plates, and black sheets.
While this claim may generally have been correct, it was not
correct compared to Japan in 1968 or to the EEC in 1967 4 or for certain
flat products.3  In any case, the comparison relevant to negative pro-
tection is between the price paid for steel by Indian users and the low-
est c.i.f. price at which it could have been imported or the f.o.b. price
1Ibid., p. 91. The retention price was the ex-works price re-
ceived by the manufacturer. Excise taxes and levies were imposed on
this to reach the selling price paid by the customer.
2GOI, MSM, 1966, p. 5.
3See Table IV-2. Also, the Indian price excluding excise taxes
for steel sheets for passenger cars was about 1.3 times the U.K. price.
(Standard Motor Products of India, ABP, 30 April 1969, p. 875. See
also Hindustan Motors, FE, 25 July 1969, p. 10.)
4 FE, 7 January 1968, p. 4.
_ __I ~yl~_ _ __
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TABLE IV-3
Comparison of Average Ex-Works Prices of Steel in India and
Advanced Countries, 1968-69
Foreign Country
U.K.
EEC
Australia
Ratio of Indian to Foreign Price,
Ex-Works
1968
0.78
0.85
0.77
1.01Japan
1969
0.78
0.82
0.83
0.83
Source: TISCO, EE, 2 August, 1968, p. 303, and Indian Express, 28 July
1969, p. 11. See also ET, 31 December 1969, p. 1.
~-Y --
- --- -- ,-------;
257
of Indian exports. Table IV-4 shows the ratio of Indian control prices
excluding excise taxes to the London Metal Exchange (LME) f.o.b. price
in January-March 1969 and July-September 1969, before and during the
sharp rise in international steel prices which occurred in that year.
These data show that the ratio ranged between 1.01 and 1.30 in early
1969 but fell to 0.74 - 1.15 (1.01 excluding galvanized sheets) later
in the year.2
These ratios should be reduced to allow for the difference be-
tween the f.o.b. and c.i.f. (or even f.o.r. railhead station) prices
of imports. However, it seems likely that imports could have been
obtained from Japan below the LME f.o.b. prices which would require
an increase in the ratios.1
Subject to these qualifications, it appears that the Indian
control prices for steel excluding excise taxes were equal to or
greater than the c.i.f. prices of imports early in 1969 but were below
the c.i.f. prices of imports later in 1969 because of the temporary
rise in international prices.3
The same conclusion holds for control prices relative to the
f.o.b. prices of Indian exports. Until the latter part of 1969, exports
GOI, EEPC, 1969a, p. 7.
2Indian import data are not sufficiently detailed to permit
direct comparisons of c.i.f. import and domestic prices of steel.
3Complaints that the duty-paid prices of imports were higher
than domestic control prices were common in the latter part of 1969-70.
See TELCO's annual statement, EPW, Special Number July 1970, p. 1310.
/_L _~ __ _I___~
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TABLE IV-4
Comparison of Indian and London Metal Exchange Prices of Steel, 1969
Category Ratio of Indian Price Excluding
of Steel Excise Tax to London Metal Ex-
change Price
1-3/1969 7-9/1969
Bars 102.9 75.0
Structurals 114.2 81.6
Wire rods 100.8 74.2
Plates 101.8 73.5
Hot rolled sheets 114.7 90.0
Cold rolled sheets 121.3 100.9
Galvanized sheets 130.0 114.7
Skelp 114.5 84.6
Source: GOI, JPC; EEPC.
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of steel were given a 10 to 25 percent cash subsidy on f.o.b. value to
offset the difference between domestic and export prices, but in the
second half of 1969 f.o.b. export prices rose above domestic control
prices excluding excise taxes, by 12 percent in the case of TISCO's
exports of bars and structurals, and export subsidies were abolished.
2
The export promotion program notwithstanding, beginning in the
first half of 1969-70 the government imposed quantitative restrictions
on export of basic grade pig iron and mild steel billets and wire rods.
Export of certain categories of steel was banned and by the end of 1970
the government announced export ceilings on all categories of iron and
steel. HSL reported that
In the international market...prices now are much higher than
the domestic market...We have completely stopped booking fresh
orders for the export of billets, wire rods, INP joists, pipes,
round bars, etc....In March (1970) the world market for pig
iron was at its highest and we had firm offers for purchasing
a very large tonnage at very attractive prices. HSL did not
book this order to help the indigenous and export-oriented in-
dustries and thereby making a big sacrifice of losing the
extra realization of about Rs 125 per tonne (about 30 percent
of the f.o.b. export prices, of which 10 percent was a cash
subsidy). 1
It follows from this that while control prices for steel, partic-
ularly flat products, probably led to negative protection of value added
in steel-using industries until mid-1969, at least temporarily after mid-
1969 they led to subsidization of value added except in the case of
certain flat products.
IFE, 4 March 1971, p. 4. Parentheses added.
Even government price floors for exports were above domestic
control prices excluding excise taxes in December 1969.
__ 
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The data in Tables IV-3 and IV-4 are for base prices. Size and
quality extras, which often amounted to 5 to 15 percent of the base
prices, were higher in India. Users claimed that:
The high section extras on 5.5 and six mm. wire rods (20 per-
cent of the base price) put the steel wire industry to a dis-
advantage not only in the home market but also in export.
1
It was reported that
The price of mild steel core wire used in the manufacture of
arc welding electrodes continues to be high in comparison with
prices prevailing in other countries because of the substantial
quality and size extras in India.2
One explanation for high extras in India was that the small scale of
demand for many sections made rolling inefficient.
3
Excise taxes raised Indian prices of steel for production for
the domestic market. IISCO reported that in 1967-68 excise taxes on
steel averaged 24 percent of the ex-works price.
4 However, the excise
tax was refunded on steel used in export production.
(2) Open Market Prices
The most important qualification to the above description is
that the open market prices of steel were substantially higher than
control prices. Table IV-5 provides comparisons for 1962 to 1970.
Although a large proportion of iron and steel was supplied directly
IFE, 14 December 1970, p. 8.
2Capital, Supplement, 10 July 1969, p. 47.
GOI, MSM, 1968.
EE, 9 August 1968, p. 338.
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TABLE IV-5
Comparison of Open Market and Control Prices of Steel, 1962 - 1970
Category
Wire and wire rods
Wire rods
H.B. wire
Galvanized wire
Bars and rods
Structurals
Angles
Channels
Joists
Plates
Sheets
Hot rolled
Cold rolled
Galvanized
Unspecified
1962-8/1963
1.14 - 1.26
1.20 - 1.38
0.96 - 1.29
0.99 - 1.16
1.04 - 1.09
1.15 - 1.35
1.00 - 1.72
1.17
1.66 - 2.38
1.42
Ratio of Open Market
4/1964-2/1965
1.25 - 1.28
1.13 - 1.46
1.47 - 2.17
to Control Price
9/1969
1.53
1.22 - 1.28
1.12 - 1.18
1.63 - 2.55
1.25 - 2.16
1.53 - 1.73
1.40 - 2.16
6/1970
1.53 - 1.92
1.39 - 1.93
1.38 - 2.01
1.45 - 2.07
2.77 - 3.21
1.62 - 2.02
1.57 - 1.81
0.98 - 1.46
Notes:
Control prices are base prices for commercial IS-1977 ST-42/ST-32 or untested grade, f.o.r. railhead
station, and include excise duty.
Sources: 1962 - 1963: Ford Foundation, 1963, p. 37, and GOI, MSHI, 1963, p. 102.
1964 - 1965: GOI, MISa, 1966, p. 12.
1969: Letter from Joint Plant Committee, Ref. No. ES-6/Y7113, dated September 10, 1969;
FE, 21 May 1969, 31 December 1969; EPW, 6 December 1969; ET, 30 December 1969; inter-
views; IEA, HS, 1968-69, p. 162.
1970: IEA, HS, 1969-70, pp. 174-75.
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to users at controlled prices, there was a considerable amount of
open market activity, much but not all of it illegal. HSL stated
that
In a shortage situation criticism is rightly levelled against
open market activity and the speculative prices demanded by
those who are engaged in resale of steel. The magnitude of
this is no higher than above five percent of the production
...Complaints are made that this is due to steel being given
to traders and not to the actual consumers...The trade re-
ceived only...eight percent and seven percent of Hindustan
Steel's sales (in 1968-69 and 1969-70), respectively. On
the other hand, traders have claimed that the actual consum-
ers do re-sell part of their quota in the open market.1
One source of supply to the black market was fake small units
not engaged in production which were set up to secure supplies at
control prices by fraudulent orders. According to a 1963 Ford Founda-
tion study dealing with allocations to small firms in one state:
Firms not in operation but getting allocations plague every
area. In this state 26 percent of all allocations went to
non-operating or "bogus" firms obviously for resale in the
black market.2
Another source of supply to the open market for bars, rods,
and light structurals was re-rollers. It was reported that:
Mr. Sidhu (the Iron and Steel Controller) said that bars and
rods produced indigenously were now available from :two main
sources, the main producers who sell their products at a
fixed price and the re-rollers who were free to choose their
buyers and sell products at open market prices...Mr. Sidhu
said that end-products from billet re-rollers were selling
at a price ranging between Rs. 1600 and Rs. 1700 a tonne
(compared to a control price of Rs. 847 for supplies from
main producers.)3
IFE, 7 August 1970, p. 9.
2Ford Foundation, 1963, p. 38. See also FE, 7 August 1970,
p. 9.
3ET, 17 April 1971, p. 1.
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Billet re-rollers accounted for 11 percent of the output of finished
steel by tonnage in 1969-70.
Yet another source of supply to the open market was "rejects,
which are presently distributed by the main producers according to
their convenience."1 During 1967, 6 percent of total production of
finished steel was classified as defective. 3 In the case of HSL-
Rourkela's production of steel sheets for stampings used in elec-
trical equipment, a spokesman of the Indian Electrical Manufacturers'
Association reported that:
Only about 40 percent of the production of this unit is being
supplied for electric motor and fan manufacturers and the re-
maining part of the production, which is termed as 'rejects,'
sold to dealers. This material is now being sold in the
market at very high prices. 2
There were three important situations where firms were forced
to rely on the open market for supplies of steel because of limited
availability of steel at control prices:
(i) Supplies of steel were subject to long delays, sometimes a year,
and were very uncertain even for users with priority under the
government distribution policy. According to HSL:
Our production cycle is such that a consumer may not get
steel always at the anticipated time and therefore he is
forced to obtain his urgent requirement from the open
IE, 1 October 1968, p. 10.
2R. L. Kirloskar, "Chairman's Address," IEMA, Bombay, 23 Janu-
ary 1970, pp. 5-6. See also FE, 10 January 1971. According to
another report, most of the domestic production of soda ash was sup-
plied to the open market where it was sold at 2.5 times the manufac-
turers' fixed price. FE, 15 January 1971.
3GOI, MSMM, ISCNB, May 1968, p. 425.
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market.1
(ii) Some users had low priority in allocation of steel under the dis-
tribution system and were forced to rely on the open market.
(iii) Small firms, particularly those with fixed investment under
$100,000, were discriminated against by the official system of distri-
bution at control prices and were forced to rely heavily on the open
market. The Ford Foundation study cited above reported the following:
Small factories...are presently seriously handicapped in com-
parison with larger units by an inequitable allocation system
for scarce raw materials and imported components...Allocations
to small units are generally lower in relation to total capac-
ity than allocations to larger firms producing the same pro-
duct...As a consequence, small units have to buy a larger share
of their requirements at high prices on the black market than
do larger units...Our studies indicate that 90 percent of the
modern-type small factories analyzed in the industrial state
purchased some materials or components in the black market.
Approximately 46 percent of their total material and compo-
nent purchases were at premium prices. If the firms had not
had to buy materials and components in the black market their
profit rates on investment would have ranged from 30 to 50
percent higher...Inequities in the distribution of raw mate-
rials and imports are so severe that they tend to override
all other types of assistance offered to small firms by the
government.
The situation in 1969-70 appeared to be similar.3
In addition to discrimination for other reasons, the size of
their orders often made it impossible for small firms to secure sup-
plies at control prices:
IFE, 7 August 1970, p. 9. Examples of firms that were forced
to purchase steel in the open market for export production are given
in part IV.M.2.
2Ford Foundation, 1963, pp. 2, 39, 40.
3 See, for example, Engineering Times, 12 March 1970, p. 12, and
Commerce, 20 February 1971, p. 325.
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According to rules for placing indents for indigenous iron
and steel materials, the minimum quantity that can be in-
dented is 24 tonnes, that is, one wagon load...Most of the
units of textile engineering industry belong to the small
scale sector...(and) are not in a position to get indige-
nous material at the price fixed by the producers...They
have been getting their material from the open market at
exorbitant prices.1
It can be concluded on the basis of the data in Table IV-5
that as far as supply conditions for steel were concerned, there was
substantial negative protection of value added for small firms and
at the margin beyond allocations at control prices for other firms
as well.
b. Steel Scrap
Steel scrap was an important input in production of steel by
re-rollers and of steel castings. In early 1970, the domestic price
of steel scrap was 45 percent of the f.o.b. price on Indian exports
2
because of government restriction of exports to "quantities (which)
are surplus to the requirements of the country."3
The government set ceiling prices for steel scrap, and at
least as early as 1967 it restricted export of scrap to hold prices
to domestic users below the f.o.b. prices of exports. To get export
licenses "exporters were required to secure certificates from the
1Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of Textile Stores
and Machinery, Commerce, 5 December 1970, p. v.
2ET, 6 January 1970, p. 4
3
GOI, MSMM, ISCMB, May 1968, p. 389.
4Commerce, Annual Number 1968, p. 88.
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domestic furnace owners" to the effect the latter did not want to buy
scrap. In 1970 export of a number of categories of scrap was banned:
...to regulate equitable distribution between users and
exporters. The indigenous demand for scrap by the furnace
industry will get preference over export. The (Metal Scrap
Trading) Corporation will allow only surplus scrap to be
exported.2
Grades of scrap that could be utilized as a raw material
for indigenous production of iron and steel cannot be
exported.3
As a result of these restrictions, value added in industries
using steel scrap was subsidized. Since the government also banned
export of rolled steel made from scrap, steel castings were the only
products where value added for export was subsidized. Steel castings
accounted for a large share of the value of railway wagon exports. 4
c. Aluminum
Table IV-6 shows the range of the ratio of the Indian ex-works
price excluding excise tax to the c.i.f. import price of aluminum in-
gots during 1966-1967 and 1969-1970. Excluding the period of high
international prices in fiscal 1969-70, the ratio was generally about
1.0 to 1.1 after August 1966. During fiscal 1969-70, the ratio was
1FE, 20 June 1967, p. 6.
2ET, 22 April 1970, p. 1.
3FE, 24 July 1970.
Cast steel bogies and couplers produced by Mukand Iron and
Steel accounted for $4 million, or 44 percent, of the railway wagon
order from South Korea executed in 1968-69. (Mukand Iron and Steel,
AR 1967-68, p. 14.)
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TABLE IV-6
Comparison of Indian and International Prices of Aluminum Ingots
Ratio of Indian Ex-
works Price excluding
Excise Tax to c.i.f.
Import Price
1966* - 1967
1969-1970
Low (July 1966)
High (post-April 1967)
Low (April 1970)
High (December 1970)
0.92 - 1.01
1.09 - 1.19
0.77 - 0.85
0.99 - 1.09
* Post-devaluation
At each date, the lower ratio applied to Indian Aluminium Company
and the higher ratio to Hindustan Aluminium Company.
Sources: EPW, 25 November 1967, p. 2042; FE, 20 November 1970, p. 1,
and 20 December 1970, p. 5; Commerce, 12 December 1970,
p. 1233.
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less than 1.0; in mid-1969 it was about 0.90 - 0.95. Thus, the price
of aluminum was at most a minor source of negative protection after
devaluation.
In early 1970 the government banned export of aluminum ingots
in 1970-71, except against previous commitments. Nevertheless, since
domestic prices evidently were above not only f.o.b. export prices
but c.i.f. import prices in 1970-71, except briefly at the beginning
of the year, this did not lead to subsidization of value added in
aluminum-using industries.1
d. Alloy and Special Steels
Table IV-7 provides comparisons of Indian producer and open
market prices and c.i.f. import prices for alloy and special steels.
These indicate that in 1969 Indian producer prices for such steels
were typically 1.3 to 2.3 times the c.i.f. prices of imports. There
was thus substantial negative protection of value added in user indus-
tries.
However, imports of such steels were allowed for certain users,
subject to the other usual restrictions, if domestic producers were
unable to supply them within six months. Because of this provision,
25 percent of total supplies of tool, alloy, and special steels by
weight were imported in 1968-69; imports accounted for 50 percent of
IThe measure was intended to subsidize use of aluminum in India;
it was only because of a decline in international prices that this was
not significant.
I _ __
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TABLE IV-7
Prices of Alloy and Special Steels in India Compared to Import Prices, 1969
Ratio of Indian Price* to c.i.f. Price of Imports
*Price from
Indian Producers
*Indian Open Market Price
of Imports
High carbon steel wire
rods, wires, tapes,
Chrome steel wire,
cold drawn, annealed
Medium carbon steel
alloy, Cl
Carbon steel alloy,
C2
Alloy steel, EN 16,
24, 34
High speed steel,
18% tungsten
4% molybdenum
cables, wire
ropes, tires
bearings
machine tools
machine tools
machine tools
small tools
1.3 - 1.5
1.8
1.8
2.3
2.3 - 2.5
1.9
Tinplate
Stainless steel sheets
Notes:
containers,
processed food
textile mach-
inery
1.2 - 2.0 a
3.0 - 3.3 4.7 - 5 .4b
a: Comparison is to the price of tinplate in the U.K. Ratio was 1.2 in 1968 and 2.0 in 1965-1967. In 1970
it was reported that the Indian price of tinplate was "nearly 200 per cent higher" than the international
Material User
~1
_ - -- -- 1.-.~ ~------. .~.*r ---------------- ----- -- . ---- i- --- ---
270
Notes to Table IV-7 (continued)
price. (FE, 15 April 1970, p. 4). In 1965 part of the difference was
excise: "In Bombay local tinplate costs precisely twice as much as it
costs ... in England. Of this a quarter is due entirely to excise."
(EW, 3 July 1965, p. 1077.)
b: Comparison is to the price f.o.b. Japan.
Sources: Interviews in 1969 except:
Tinplate: Metal Box, EW, 3 July 1965, p. 1077,
Capital, 30 June 1966, p. 917, EE, 5 July 1968;
Poysha Industries, EPW, 7 October 1967, p. 1834.
Stainless Steel Sheets: FE, 30 January 1969; Textile Machinery
Manufacturers' Association, FE, 16 January 1971, p.10;
FE, 22 August 1969; Capital, 18 September 1969, p. 511.
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high carbon steel wire rods for steel wire ropes and 40 percent of
tinplate. On the other hand, import was banned in certain cases,
e.g. wire rods for cables and stainless steel sheets thinner than
1.25 mm for all users.1
2. Components
This section examines the prices of components and parts in
India. Apart from comparing Indian and import or foreign prices, it
considers two hypotheses which are relevant to negative protection
and the cost of foreign exchange and which seem to be supported by
the available evidence:
(i) The ratio of Indian to c.i.f. import or foreignpprices yaries sub-
stantially among components. This hypothesis suggests neglect of
comparative advantage in policies relating to investment and also
lack of competition for many items. It suggests the inefficiency of
import restrictions and domestic content requirements to the extent
that Indian prices are related to social costs.
(ii) The price or cost of production, deflated for general prices
increases, declines over time after production is established. This
hypothesis is based on considerations of learning and achievement of
economies of scale.
The available evidence supports these hypotheses, subject to
the serious reservations stated in the Appendix about all such com-
parisons. The ratios of Indian to c.i.f. import or foreign prices
1GOI, MSMM, ISCMB, May 1968, Schedules B and C.
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appear to differ widely for the components of assembled products.
Typically, the range of ratios is from less than 1.0 to over 2.0.1
a. Automobile Components
Virtually without exception, the comparisons of automobile com-
ponent prices in public statements by Indian companies indicate that
Indian prices averaged about twice those abroad. Table IV-8 presents
the relative prices in India and the UK in 1969 for 12 components.
The price ratios varied from 1.6 to 3.0.2
1A study by Krueger of the domestic resource cost (with a shadow
rate of return on capital) of value added at international prices in
the automobile ancillary industry supports the first hypothesis but not
the second. For 28 ancillary items, she found a range from Rs. 8.7 per
dollar to negative value added at international prices and an inter-
quartile range from Rs. 14.6 to Rs. 33.8 per dollar. Krueger's test
of the second hypothesis is based on cross sectional data. (Krueger,
1970.)
2Also, according to Hindustan Motors, before the 1966 devalua-
tion "components and parts bought indigenously cost the automobile
manufacturers 50 to 200 percent more than what is paid by manufacturers
in foreign markets. Car wheels are sold to manufacturers abroad at
less than 40 per cent of the price which the Indian manufacturers have
to pay." (Iron and Steel Review, June 1967, pp. 41-45.) Other early
sources that state that the prices of Indian ancillary items were
higher than the c.i.f. duty-paid prices of imported ones are Premier
Automobiles, EW, 11 January 1964, p. 66, and TELCO, EW, Special Number
July 1964, 1321. According to an Indian government report, "our study
gives us reason to believe that in general the cost of production of
components of passenger cars in Indian factories is at least twice as
high as the price at which they can be purchased abroad. In the case
of commercial vehicles, the ratio is less unfavourabie and Indian
costs appear to be something like 40 per cent above the overseas
prices...Very often the price of the components purchased from the
ancillary industry costs a great deal more than the landed cost of
the imported product." (GOI, 1EI, 1960, pp. 22, 30. Based mainly on
deletion allowances.)
Table IV-8 should be compared to the similar list presented by
Baranson for Argentina and the US in 1965. For 17 parts costing $585
at US purchase prices, the total Argentine purchase price at the
'~
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TABLE IV-8
Relative Prices of Automobile Components in India and the U.K.
1969
Component Ratio of Price in India
to Price in the U.K.
Tires and tubes 1.64 a
Battery 1.67 a
Distributor 1.68
Clutch assembly 1.72
Propeller shaft 1.75
Radiator assembly 1.80
Engine block casting 1.83
Starter 2.18
Dynamo 2.20
Backlight glass 2.35
Brakes 2.39
Steering wheel 3.03
TOTAL OF ABOVE 2.11
Prices are for original equipment.
a
Excise taxes of 40 percent on tires and tubes and 15 percent on
batteries have been excluded from Indian prices.
Source: Standard Motor Products of India, ABP, 30 April 1969,
and Hindustan Motors, FE, 25 July 1969, p. 10.
I'll'
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The sample is probably biased upward, since price controls gave
an incentive to manufacturers to emphasize their cost disadvantages. 1
Even the individual comparisons may not be accurate; the claim that
the Indian price for engine block castings is 1.8 times the UK price
is not consistent with other evidence collected on the relative prices
official exchange rate was 2.02 times that in the US, while for the
individual items the ratio varied from 1.28 to 4.44. (Baranson, 1969,
p. 99.)
In his study of procurement of automobile parts in Mexico,
Edelberg found that "whenever a Mexican supplier manufactured a part,
his proposed sales price was usually higher than the omission allow-
ance the Mexican automobile firm got if the importation of the United
States counterpart was discontinued." He states that "executives at
the international division of Mexmotor's parent corporation applied a
rule-of-thumb estimation according to which any purchase of a compon-
ent in Mexico cost 1.5 - 2 times as much as the related omission allow-
ance for the equivalent imported component." Edelberg presents data
which show that procurement costs from Mexican suppliers ranged from
0.1 to 5.6 times the omission allowance f.o.b. US. Edelberg warns that
the relation of the omission allowance to US production or procurement
costs is unclear. (Edelberg, 1963, pp. 96-97, 155-57. Edelberg's
findings are misinterpreted by Baranson, 1966, p. 262.)
Baranson presents unusually complete data supplied by one U.S.
manufacturer on costs of production of passenger cars and light trucks
at its factory in the U.S. and its subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico. These show Latin American ex-factory costs in 1967, at
an annual production rate of 20,000-30,000 units, or 5 to 10 percent
of US volume, for local content were 1.72 times US costs for Brazil
at 99 percent local content; 1.92, Mexico, 63 percent; and 2.72,
Argentina, 83 percent. For individual operations and components,
however, comparisons were 1.30 to 2.70 for Brazil, 1.06 (1.80 omitting
assembly) to 2.50 for Mexico, and 1.15 (1.90) to 4.30 for Argentina.
The higher costs in Argentina were evidently explained at least in
part by the extent of overvaluation; shortly after the comparison,
Argentina devalued. (Baranson, 1969, p. 36.)
1However, Krueger presents 12 ratios for Indian to UK ex-factory
prices ranging from 1.7 to 2.9, with no indication that the sample was
biased. (Krueger, 1970.)
II1
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of ferrous castings, although this might be explained by the fact
that engine block castings were produced by automated foundries in
the UK.
b. Diesel Engine Components
Table IV-9 compares the f.o.b. prices of components for a diesel
engine imported from West Europe during 1961-62, when the Indian com-
pany concerned began production of the model in question, with the in-
itial prices at which the components were purchased in India in 1961-64
and the prices in India in 1969. The data support the two hypotheses
above:
(i) The ratios of the 1969 Indian prices to the 1961-62 import prices
vary considerably among items. The ratio is less than 1.0 for iron
and aluminum castings unique to the model but 2.0 to 2.5 for pistons
and fuel pumps.
(ii) In the case of all but one of the components listed, the initial
Indian price was higher than the f.o.b. price of imports. According
to the company in 1969, the prices at which components initially were
purchased in India were almost invariably higher than the import
prices during the 1960s. The company attributed this to the fact that
initially batch sizes were small, rejection rates were high, and tool-
ing costs were amortized at an accelerated rate. However, when scale
was increased, rejection rates were reduced with experience, and tool-
ing had been amortized, component prices in India were often reduced
significantly. This was true of eight of the thirteen components in
II
TABLE IV-9
Comparison of Prices of Indian and Imported Components for Diesel Engines
Ratio of Price of Indian Component* to Price
*Initial Indian Price, 1961-64
Pre-devaluation Exchange Rate
Components
Unique to Model
of Imported Component, f.o.b.i 1961-62
*1969 Indian Price
Pre-devaluation
Exchange Rate
Post-devaluation
Exchange Rate
Crankcase, iron casting
Gear case, " "
Liner, " "
Cylinder head, aluminum casting
Fan body, " "
Crankshaft, steel forging
Connecting rod, " "
Camshaft, " "
Not Unique to Model
(Proprietary)
0.9
1.3
1.4
2.5
1.6
1.4
1.6
1.2
0.8
1.1
0.9
0.9
1.2
1.4
1.7
1.2
0.5
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.1
0.8
Piston 2.5 2.5 1.6
Fuel pump 2.0 1.8 1.1
Nozzle 1.7 1.5 1.0
Air filter 1.4 n.a. n.a.
Gear ring 2.9 2.0 1.3
*Note: Scale of Production in India in 1969 was 600 engines per month. In 1969 expenditure on these com-
ponents accounted for about 20-25 percent of the Indian sales price for the engine.
Source: An Indian manufacturer.
------ -
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Table IV-9. Moreover, the reason the prices of three other compon-
ents (steel forgings) did not fall was that the price of special
steel increased. At unchanged material prices, the prices of these
components would have declined. The fact that component prices
actually fell or remained unchanged during the period 1964-1969 is
striking, since at the same time there was a decline in the real value
of the rupeel and the unit rupee costs of both domestic and imported
inputs increased.
c. Office Machine Components
A firm which had manufactured an office machine for three years
and produced or procured about 60 percent of the components (by value)
in India in 1969 reported that its experience supported both hypotheses
(i) and (ii), and data provided by the company supported the hypothesis
that the comparative cost of production or procurement between India
and advanced countries differed among components. Production and pro-
curement of components in India began with those with the most favor-
able cost ratio and progressed to those with increasingly unfavorable
ratios. For the first 20 percent of the components, the ratio of
Indian to foreign costs averaged 0.89; for the next 15 percent, 1.05;
and for the next 25 percent, 1.30. For individual components the
ratios differed even more: 0.5 for a manually assembled item but
2.5 for fractional horsepower electric motors.
ISee Table III-16.
----~- - ---..
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d. Machine Tool Components
A major machine tool producer with its own foundry provided the
comparisons in Table IV-10 for components used at the end of 1968.
These comparisons indicate that iron castings were slightly cheaper in
India than abroad and significantly cheaper than the c.i.f. prices of
imports while Indian electricals cost about 1.5 to 1.9 and fasteners
2.0 to 3.0 times the c.i.f. price of imports.
e. Electric Fan Components
Jay Engineering reported that the prices of many materials and
components for electric fans with existing designs were about twice the
prices in advanced countries. (See Table IV-11). The ratio was more
unfavorable for materials like plastics and gadgets that would have
been required for models like those exported by Japan.
3. Capital Goods
Government import licensing and tariffs restricted access to
capital goods as well as current inputs and raised the prices of capi-
tal goods used in production of engineering goods above the c.i.f.
prices of imports.
Table IV-12 presents comparisons between Indian and interna-
tional prices for standard, general-purpose machine tools manufactured
under foreign collaboration in India by nine companies which provide
a fairly representative sample of the Indian industry. In all cases,
except the last two HMT machines, the machines compared are identical
or virtually identical in design. Interviews with users in India
II
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TABLE IV-10
Ratio of Indian to International Prices of Components for Machine Tools,
1968
Component
Fasteners, clips, etc.
Electro-magnetic clutch
Electric motor
Grey iron castings
Ratio of Price from Indian
Source to c.i.f. Price of Imports
2.0 - 3.0
1.9
1.5 - 1.8
0.8 - 1.0 a
aComparison is to the price in West Germany.
Source: An Indian manufacturer of machine tools
--
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TABLE IV-11
Ratio of Indian to International Prices for Material Inputs for Electric
Fans, 1968
Input Ratio of Indian
Ball bearings
Condensers
Insulating material
Zamac
Super-enamelled copper wire
to International Price
1.5
Source: Jay Engineering, Industrial Times, 15 September 1968, p. 43.
The ratio for ferrous metals was reported to be 1.1.
-- ~--~- I
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TABLE IV-12
Comparison of Indian and International Prices of
Machine Tools, 1969
Machine
Type
tool and cutter
grinder
surface grinder
guillotine shear
plate-bending
roll
hydraulic press
brake
capstan/turret
lathes
automatic
lathe
Indian
Model
Praga 310
Praga 540
Scottish
Indian 3200
x 12 hydr.
Scottish
Indian
2000x10
2500x12
3200x10
Scottish
Indian
120 ton
25H20
120 ton
32H25
150 ton
25H20
150 ton
32H25
Mysore
Kirloskar
Herbert
No. 1
No. 2D
No. 4
No. 7B
No. 9C-3C
Mysore
Kirloskar
Herbort
3A-1
Foreign Model
Jones & Shipman
310 (U.K.)
Jones & Shipman
540 (U.K.)
Scottish (U.K.)
same
Scottish (U.K.)
same
same
same
Scottish (U.K.)
same
same
same
same
Herbert (U.K.)
same
same
same
same
same
Herbert (U.K.)
Design
Comparison
identical
identical
identical
identical
identical
Ratio of
Indian to
International
Price
1.0a
0.9
b
1.4a
1.3b
0.9
c
1.2c
1.3 c
1.3 c
1, 3c
identical
d1.0
o.0d
0.8d
0.8d
0.9d
identical
same
_ ____ - 2~
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TABLE IV-12 (continued)
Indian
Model
Foreign
Model
HIarig India Harig (U.S.)
H1Mi530 Super 612 Hand
HA1530 Super 612 Hydr
11M1545 Super 618 Hand
HA1545 Super 618 Hydr
milling mach.Ex-Cell-0
ram turret India
602
. Ex-Cell-0
(Canada)
602
Design Ratio of
Comparison Indian to
International
Price
virtually
identical 0 .9e
(Indian 1.0e
machine 0.8e
heavier and 0 .9e
lower r.p.m.)
virtually
identical 1.7
capstan
lathe
center lathe
Gedee Weiler
RDU 260
Beco Graziano
SAG 180
turret lathe Texmaco-Ward
electrically
controlled
milling
machine
HMT Fritz
Werner FV2D
FV2D
Weiler (W.Ger.)
RDU 260
Graziano (Italy)
SAG 14
Ward (U.K.)
3CA
Fritz Werner
(W.Germany)
FV2D
identical 1.f
identical 0.9f
U.K.machine 1.0f
is modified
version; same
specifications
and very close
identical 0.8f
radial
drilling
machine
HMT Kolb
RM61/62
cylindrical HMT Olivetti
grinding G13-5000
machine
Morey-Hercules-Sass
(Italy)TRL1000/1300
Morey-Hercules
F2B600
similar machines 0.9f
but not the same
design
similar specifi- 0.7f
cations but com-
parability not
verified
Machine
Type
surface
grinder
r II ____ ___
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Notes to Table IV-12
Indian Price
a. Ex-works for domestic sale,
exclusive of distributor
commission
b. Same as (a).
c. Same as (a).
d. Indian customer selling price, less
10 percent for distributor commissic
e. Same as (d).
International Price
Ex-works for domestic sale,
exclusive of distributor commission,
plus 10 percent for transport
cost to India.
U.S. customer selling price, less
40 percent for distributor
commission and tariff.
f.o.b. export price of foreign
producer, plus 10 percent for
transport cost to India.
Same as (c)
)n
U.S. customer selling price, less
30 percent for distributor
commission.
f. Same as (d). Same as (b).
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confirmed that the quality of the Indian machines was comparable to
foreign machines, apart from details of finish which did not affect
performance. The major problem faced in making the comparisons was
to secure comparable prices for Indian and imported machines, e.g.
converting the US customer selling price of a UK machine to the c.i.f.
Indian price and the Indian customer selling price to the ex-works
price. This required adjustments to allow for distributors' margins,
tariffs, and freight.
Table IV-12 indicates that, on a comparable basis, Indian
prices for this range of machines were 0.8 to 1.3 times the c.i.f.
prices of imports. This supports HMT's long-standing claim that the
prices of its machines were less than the landed (27.5 percent duty-
paid) prices of importsl and indicates that negative protection due
to higher Indian prices of domestically produced general-purpose
machine tools was moderate, on the average less than the 27.5 percent
duty on imported machines.
However, the foreign prices used probably are not the lowest
c.i.f. prices at which imports were available. For this range of
machines, the lowest prices in the US market were on machines from
Japan, Italy, Spain, and Czechoslovakia, not the US, UK, West Germany,
and Canada.
1HMT reported that its "ex-works selling prices...were uni-
formly 15 per cent below the landed cost of European machines through-
out the year 1963-64. These European prices are for machines of the
same type and quality manufactured by our collaborators." (HMT,
AR 1963-64, p. 12.)
II
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While price comparisons have not been made for other machines
used by the engineering industry, Indian prices were relatively
higher for specialized machinery and electrical equipment than for
general-purpose machine tools, or so it was alleged by some users in
India. It was not unusual to hear claims that Indian prices were
twice the c.i.f. prices of imports, but such cases have not been
verified.
D. Effect of Higher Domestic Material Prices on Cost
This section examines the extent of negative protection of
value added which resulted from higher prices of current tradable
inputs in several Indian industries. The effect of higher domestic
output prices and export subsidies is not considered in these calcu-
lations.
Although only a few industries are considered, the analysis
suggests a wide range of rates of negative protection and very high
rates in certain industries, indicating that such price differentials
for inputs were an important factor in the structure of effective ex-
change rates on value added.
1. Tires
The data in Table IV-13 indicate that the cost of production of
tires in India would have been 24 to 28 percent lower if the three
major materials, each of which was produced in India, had been avail-
able at the c.i.f. import price. Since domestic supplies of natural
rubber were sometimes supplemented with imports, this probably should
-
TABLE IV-13
Effect of Higher Material Prices on Cost of Production of Tires, 1967 and 1969.
Ratio of Expenditure Ratio of Indian to
on Material to Total International Price*
1967 Production Cost
at Indian Prices
1967 1969 *World Price *c.i.f.
1967 Import Price
1969
Reduction in Production Cost if
Materials were Available at Inter-
national Price, as Ratio of Total
1967 Production Cost
1967 1969
Rayon tire cord1
Natural rubber 2
Synthetic rubber
.36
.17
.08
.33 1.88
.23 1.35
.10 1.51
2.00
1.50
2.06
TOTAL .61 .66
Notes:
1
Indian price omits excise of 12.5 percent.
2
Indian price omits cess of 7.1 percent.
.167
.044
.027
.24
.167
.076
.032
.28
The situation was generally similar for c.i.f. import prices in 1965. See Commerce, January 30 1965, p. 169,
19 June 1965, p. 1088, and 3 July 1965, p. 16. These reports indicate that domestic prices of carbon black,
antioxidants, and accelerators used in production of tires were also substantially above c.i.f. import prices.
Sources: Dunlop India, EPW, 6 May 1967, p. 859, EE, 25 April 1969, p. 902.
Material
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be reduced by 2 to 4 percent.
The government set a floor price on natural rubber above the
c.i.f. price of imports to subsidize domestic production, but at the
time these calculations were made the Indian prie~%exceeded the floor
price.
Raw materials were reported to have a6coui~ted for 78 percent
of the production cost, and negative protectioa of value added at
international prices would probably have been jonthe order of 100 per-
cent. Goodyear India reported that
The cost of most of the indigenous rawsittdt4l s are far in
excess of international prices with the result that our
prices are not competitive in internationaf itkets. 1
Madras Rubber Factory made the following inteieincf g statement indi-
cating how negative protection resulting frdom iiloriz substitution
could adversely affect exports of a competitive pftedict:
If all raw materials are made available at international
prices, Indian tyre manufacturers will definitely have an
edge over their foreign competitors owing to the compara-
tively cheaper labour available locally. On the subject
of raw material, I wish to focus the attention of the
Government to a problem I foresee. Nylon cord is at pre-
sent permitted to be imported as there is no indigenous
production. Nylon tyres now form the bulk oe Iidia's
exports, as tyres made with imported nylon naturally work
out to be more competitive in export market. Experimental
indigenous production of nylon has now commenced and the
quality of the Indian product is yet to be approved. While
this is a welcome development, the price quoted:at present
for the indigenous nylon is about 168% more than the inter-
national delivery price. This could lead t~ a very serious
problem (for exports) unless sufficient planning is done in
advance to make this item available at international price.2
IFE, 8 May 1969.
2Madras Rubber Factory, Chairman's Annual Address for 1968-69.
I ' - - _
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2. Aluminum Ingots
The data in Table IV-14 indicate that in 1968-69 there was
negative protection for export of aluminum ingot equal to 11 percent
of the f.o.b. value because of higher prices of the six tradable
inputs listed. Refundable excise taxes have been eliminated from
input prices, and aluminum ingot in 1968-69 did not receive either
cash subsidies or import replenishment licenses as export incentives.
Thus, effective protection for export was negative.
These figures overstate negative protection because they assume
that the materials listed were procured entirely in India. Part of
the cryolite and perhaps part of the aluminum fluoride were still
imported.1 Nevertheless, the calculations suggest the level negative
protection will reach when import substitution in aluminum fluoride
and cryolite are completed, unless domestic prices of these materials
decline.
3. Ship Ancillary Equipment
It was reported that the difference in material prices in India
and abroad raised Indian production costs for ship ancillary equipment
by 10 to 12 percent:
Basic materials...are 80 to 100 per cent more expensive than
in other countries. Indigenous rubber items are more than
100 per cent higher. Copper, brass, bronze, tin, zinc, nickel,
stainless steel, EN steel...are either not available or are
available at high prices... Due to higher cost of materials
finished goods tend to be 10 to 12 per cent more expensive.i
1Import of aluminum fluoride was on the banned list in 1968-69,
however. GOI, MC, 1968a, Vol. 1, p. 262.
2FE, 29 July 1969.
II
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TABLE IV-14
Effect of Higher Material Prices on Cost of Production of Aluminum Ingots, 1968-69
Ratio of Indian
Price to c.i.f.
Import Price
Increase in Cost of Aluminum Resulting from Excess of
Indian Price over c.i.f. Import Price of Material
US $ per metric ton
of aluminum ingot
Percent of Indian export
price of aluminum#
Aluminum fluoride
Cryolite
Caustic soda
Fuel oil
Anthracite coal
Calcined petroleum coke
TOTAL
Notes: #c.i.f. import price assumdo to be 120
#: Export price of $500 per metric ton
p cei of the price abroad.
w&" at~pra for 1968-69.
Sources: Hindustan Aluminium, Industrial Times, 15 March 1969; Indian Aluminium, Commerce,
Annual Number 1968, p. 82; ABP, 19 June 1969.
Material
2.79
2.75
1.92*
1.58*
2.02*
1.03
16.8
16.9
15.2
3.0
1.5
3.36
3.38
3.04
0.60
0.30
0.8 ) 0.16
10.84
I-lr
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4. Transistor Radios
According to a press report on the cost of producing transistor
radios in India:
It is estimated that the costs of production of Indian compo-
nents are higher than their counterparts in Japan or Europe by
about 150 per cent for coils, 300 per cent in the case of re-
sistors, 400 per cent in the case of transistors and 100 per
cent in the case of circuit components and switches and plastic
parts. All these result in an increase in the cost of produc-
tion of complete radios to the extent of 220 per cent as com-
pared to Japan.1
5. Motor Vehicles and Ancillaries
Krueger presents data which indicate that for four producers of
motor vehicles, negative protection of value added for export on account
of higher prices for current inputs was about 60 to 100 percent.2 This
includes the effect of import tariffs and excise taxes which were re-
funded on export but was due mainly to the excess cost of domestic
inputs.
E. Negative Protection as an Explanation of Uncompetitive Costs
In the discussion of material prices it was noted that under
certain circumstances the Indian prices of iron, mild steel, ferrous
scrap, and aluminum were lower than the c.i.f. prices of imports. In
IFE, 19 May 1970, p. 4.
2Based on data for assemblers 1, 2, 3, and 6 in Krueger's
Table IV-1, assuming value added by assemblers was 40 percent of the
export price. For assembler 4 the rate would be over 100 percent on
the same assumption. (Krueger, 1970, pp. 110, 127-28.)
I'll.
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addition, there were certain parts and discrete operations which manu-
facturers frequently reported cost less in India than the c.i.f. prices
of imports, at least provided output was not limited below the minimum
long-run average cost level of existing plants with Indian supply con-
ditions for management and labor and non-tradable inputs. Most impor-
tant were: (i) rough ferrous and aluminum castings, provided foundry-
grade pig-iron was available; (ii) patterns and tooling unique to in-
dividual models, provided tool steels were ava~iabie at c.i.f. import
prices; (iii) machining and forging of parts usique~teiAndividual
models (e.g. machining of castings for batch-produced machinery), pro-
vided materials were available at c.i.f. importpriees; and (iv) assem-
bly of components and complete products, provided- pwrts were available
at c.i.f. import prices.
Even in these cases there were undoubtedly many eceptions where
there was automation abroad (e.g. mass production of castings for pass-
enger cars), where supplier problems led the Indian company to estab-
lish captive facilities which were underutilized because of limited
requirements (e.g. heavy equipment and tooling shops), where management
was deficient, or where there were labor disputes. In most cases these
parts or operations were made or carried out by the main producer in
India rather than purchased or sub-contracted.
It was not uncommon for manufacturers to state that because of
the above advantages, the private cost of value added in production of
an engineering good was competitive with value added at c.i.f. import
prices but to report that the total cost of production was uncompeti-
tive because of the higher prices of some materials and purchased
292
components. In interviews a number of senior managers in machinery
industries claimed that provided (i) production was not constrained
below installed capacity by shortage of materials and (ii) materials
and purchased components were available at the c.i.f. import prices,
costs of production with a significant percentage of indigenous value
added would have been equal to or even below the c.i.f. prices of
imports. Such claims were made in companies producing non-electric
machinery like machine tools, diesel engines, pumps, cotton textile
machines, and commercial vehicles, and some items df electric machinery,
including switchgear and transformers.
It was possible to check these reports against data only for
machine tools, where the reports appeared accurate for the established
products of the largest companies. In spite oflthe lack of data, the
other reports should not be dismissed altogether. The firms involved
usually stated that there was a significant range in their competitive-
ness and that they were not competitive for other products, and typ-
ically some plausible basis was suggested for the differences in cost
ratios, e.g. scale, experience, etc.
These reports should be qualified because they refer to private
rather than social costs and presumably involve substantial under-
estimation of real capital costs. In any case, since the comparisons
were made at the official exchange rate, the scaling is arbitrary.
The most important inference from the reports is not that the Indian
costs of value added were competitive at the official exchange rate
but that there was a substantial difference in the ratio between
~IIL -
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Indian costs and c.i.f. import prices of a significant share of the
value added by the main producers (roughly 40 to 50 percent of the
value of output at international prices) and the ratio for the rest
of the materials and components. This indicates how import restric-
tions and domestic content requirements deterred exports of assembly-
type products and increased the average cost of foreign exchange earned.
This conclusion concerning negative protection for assembly-
type products is supported by Krueger's calculations of the domestic
resource cost of value added at international prices for motor vehicles
and ancillaries. In the case of private costs, Krueger found that
there was negative protection of value added in production for the
domestic market for three of six vehicles; yet*at least TELCO, Ashok
Leyland, and Mahindra and Mahindra earned a profit when they operated
near capacity.1 Assuming operation at capacity and a shadow rate of
return on capital of 20 percent per annum, she found that the domestic
resource cost of value added by four vehicle producers, covering about
40 percent of the value of output at international prices, was Rs. 7.20
to Rs. 8.85 per dollar while for ancillary producers the domestic re-
source cost ranged from Rs. 4.51 per dollar to negative value added at
international prices, with only two of 28 below Rs. 8.85 per dollar and
a median of Rs. 17 per dollar.
1These companies claimed the return on equity was inadequate,
but all wanted to expand. However, private profits reflected in part
subsidized loan capital, low depreciation costs because of accelerated
write-offs in earlier years, etc.
2Krueger, 1970.
U.
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Because of the wide range of comparative costs for individual
parts and operations, the marginal rupee cost of value added increased
significantly with the percentage of indigenous content. According to
Mahindra and Mahindra, which produces Jeeps:
Development of indigenous manufacture means significantly
higher costs than imported costs. It is our experience
that as the vehicles pass beyond the 60 per cent indige-
nous state, costs of further components for indigenous
manufacture increase relatively in greater proportion than
in the pre-60 per cent phases. The reason is the low vol-
ume.1
Other examples illustrate the problem faced by industries forced
to use domestically produced tradable inputs at prices above their c.i.f.
1Mahindra and Mahindra, AR 1959-60, p. 10. As an illustration of
the problem of low volume, in the case of tractors: "To increase local
content beyond about 40 per cent requires large expenditures in tooling
...The high unit overheads arising from such capital expenditures in
low-volume projects (in developing countries)...make it inevitable that
the production of tractors...requires protection." (Neufeld, 1969,
p. 331.) While Ford and Massey-Ferguson each had integrated component
manufacturing for over 100,000 tractors annually in advanced countries
and Massey-Ferguson's subsidiary Perkins had a capacity of 400,000 diesel
engines annually in the U.K., total production of tractors in India in
1968-69 was 15,500 fragmented among five independent plants, and by 1970
the government had divided licensed capacity for 98,000 tractors per
year among 12 firms with capacities ranging from 2,000 to 13,000 trac-
tors per year. (IEA, HS 1969-70, p. 178.) Perkins engines were pro-
duced in India on a scale of less than 10,000 per year. Nevertheless,
India applied the usual indigenous content requirements. HMT planned
to reach 90-100 per cent domestic content after six years with an out-
put of 12,000 tractors per year. (Commerce, 30 January 1971, p. 199.)
Cilingiroglu reports that for heavy electrical equipment in
developing countries "competitiveness will depend very much upon the
size of the domestic content (beyond 50 per cent, for instance, prices
for generators are likely to rise rapidly.)" (Cilingiroglu, 1969,
p. 49.) De Vries similarly reports that in production of capital goods
in developing countries "material cost will go up as domestic producers
switch to domestic supplies. In some industries the cost differential
rises sharply as the domestic content begins to include the more com-
plex components." (de Vries, 1968, p. 232.)
See also Krueger, 1970, pp. 95-96.
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import prices and, more important, for which the ratio of domestic cost
to import price was greater than for a significant share of value added
by the main producer, so that the average cost of domestic value added
increased.
De Vries and Cilingiroglu provide data indicating that in 1965-
1966 there was negative effective protection of value added in production
for the domestic market for transformers in Brazil and Mexico, genera-
tors in Brazil, and small trucks in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, "sug-
gesting that the industry can be competitive on export markets," given
access to tradable inputs at international prices. The domestic value
added to which this finding applied accounted for about 50 percent of
the international price of final output. However, in six of the seven
cases where production occurred with negative protection of value added
there was positive protection of domestic content as a whole, i.e., the
excess cost of certain domestic tradable inputs more than offset what-
ever cost advantage the main producer may have had.1
For Mexico, King reports that:
An electronics firm, for example, would be much more profitable
if it were able to import materials and parts at world prices,
even if its own output received no protection (i.e., there was
negative effective protection of value added). There is every
indication that this firm could export very profitably in these
circumstances, and electronics manufacturers certainly believe
that the industry has considerable export potential if the
government pursued a more liberal policy towards component
imports. Similar conclusions apply to a proposed machine-
tool plant.2
Ide Vries, 1968, and Cilingiroglu, 1969, pp. 67-71.
2King, 1970, p. 149.
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On the proposed machine tool plant, Little et al. report:
A machine tool project in Mexico promised a social return of
36 per cent...This project promised a market rate of return
of 18 per cent (for the domestic market), the difference
being due to quite heavy protection of its inputs and no pro-
tection of the output.... (Negative effective protection) must
almost certainly have retarded the development of what appears
to be an excellent industry for the country.1
Little et al. also report finding a company in an unidentified labor-
intensive industry and semi-industrial country which
...had a market yield (for domestic sales) of around 10 per
cent, but a social yield of 57 per cent. This was a case
of heavy negative protection; and, without the protection
afforded to its inputs, the company reckoned it could have
exported very successfully.2
F. Import Licensing and Higher Costs of Imports
The c.i.f. prices at which tradable inputs were imported were
sometimes above the minimum prices at which they were available, and
imports were not always available to producers at their c.i.f. prices
(even assuming refund of tariffs).
1. Tied Licensing
A large share of imports of certain materials and of capital
goods was against tied aid or rupee payment, sometimes from countries
whose prices were not competitive or from suppliers that discriminated
in pricing against orders financed by tied aid or soft currency. Prices
of imports under tied licenses were up to 40 percent above those under
free foreign exchange licenses. Table IV-15 lists examples from
1Little et al., 1970, p. 194.
2 Ibid., pp. 193, 196. This may be the same case reported by
King above.
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TABLE IV-15
Examples of Higher Prices for Materials Imported under Tied Aid and Rupee Payment, 1960-1970
Tied source Price Premium
Steel
Steel
Steel
Special Steel
Tinplate
automobiles
unspecified
containers
Electrical steel electrical
sheets equipment
Silicon steel
sheets
CRGO electrical
steel sheets
U.S.
Rupee payment
U.S., U.S.S.R.
U.S.
electric fans U.S.
electrical equip- U.S., U.K.
ment
High carbon steel Steel wire
wire rods ropes
U.S. and rupee
payment
67 percent
higher
c.1965 Hindustan Motors,
Iron and Steel Review,
June 1967, p. 42.
"price 40 percent
higher than in Bel-
gium or England"
U.S. prices higher than
Japan or U.K., and U.S.S.R.
prices higher than U.S.
"comparatively expensive"
"very much higher price"
U.S. price $1200 and U.K.
price $1300 compared to
Japanese price of $1000 per
ton. U.K. charged as much
as $1450 for purchases on
tied aid
"costlier" than from Europe
or Japan
1965 Capital, 16 June 1966,
p. 841.
1961- Metal Box, EW,
62 1962, p. 1019.
1960- I.E.M.A., AR 1960-61,
61 p.20.
1962- Jay Engineering, EW,
63 6 October 1962, p.1589.
1969 I.E.M.A., Interview;
I.E.M.A., AR, 1968-69,
p.49.
1965- J.K. Steel, AR, 1965-66.
1966
Material User Date Reference
30 June
|l l _~__ _ Fl__ ~ _
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TABLE IV-15 (continued)
Material
High carbon steel
wire rods
High carbon steel
wire rods
High carbon and
special steel wire
rods
Non-Ferrous Metals
Lead
Unspecified
User Tied source
cables U.S.
steel wire ropes
steel wire
storage
batteries
unspecified
Price Premium
"cost approximately 46
percent more than from'
West Germany or Japan"
U.S.. 40 percent higher than
U.S.S.R. West Europe
Rupee pay-
ment, U.S.,
U.K.
Rupee pay-
ment
Rupee pay-
ment
"high prices and long
deliveries" compared to
West Germany and Japan
"15 to 20 percent above.
the world price"
higher price
Non-Metallic Materials
Transformer oil transformers
Chemicals unspecified
Chemicals and drugs unspecified
Rumania c.i.f. price 35 percent
above that from Western
countries
U.S. often 30-50 percent higher
in price, including higher
dollar costs of freight, than
West or East Europe
U.S., U.K. "quotations under credits are
at least five to ten percent
Date Reference
1966- I.E.M.A., AR, 1966-
67 67, p.53 .
1969 J.K. Steel, inter-
view
1970 Steel Wire Manu-
facturers' Assoc.,
FE, 15 December,
1970, p.3.
1960- ABMEL, AR 1960-61,
61 p. 37.
GOI, Ministry of
Foreign Trade, FE,
22 January 1970, p.i.
1969 . IEMA, interview
1965 EW, 21 August 1965,
p.1 2 91.
1966
higher than previous quotations
for import from free foreign
exchange
EW, 10 September 1966,
p. 156.
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TABLE IV-15 (continued)
Material
Unspecified
Staple fibre
User
rubber products
tires
bicycles
PILC power
cables
electrical
equipment
cryolite and
aluminum
fluoride
textiles
Tied source
U.S.
tied sources
U.S., rupee
payment
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Price Premium
higher prices
higher prices
higher prices than
West Europe
average 30 percent
above West Europe
or Japan
"abnormally high"
higher price
30 percent higher
Date Reference
1962 Dunlop India, EW,
28 Aptil 1962,
p.714.
1965 Inchek Tyres, Com-
merce, 18 December
1965, p. 1108.
1961- Sen Raleigh, EW, 31
62 March 1962, p. 560.
-1969 Indian Cable Company,
interview
1962- IEMA, AR, 1962-63,
63 p.1 8 .
1969 Indian Aluminium,
ABP, 19 June 1969.
1971 FE, 12 January
1971, p. 1.
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throughout the 1960s.1
Even after excluding food, 40 percent of total imports during
the third plan (1961-62 to 1965-66) were financed by aid, most of which
was tied.2 Between October 1961 and March 1965 only 26 percent of
IAccording to Kidron, who bases his account on 1961 data, "esti-
mates vary, but suggest that India might normally be paying anything
between 6 and 15 percent, sometimes as much as 20-30 per cent, above
ruling prices for aid-supported imports." (Kidron, 1965, p. 123.)
According to Lal, the prices of chemicals imported by India under U.S.
aid and rupee payment loans were 15 and 24 per cent respectively above
world prices. (Lal, 1968.) Bhagwati and Desai report that in India
"Soviet bloc licences to import dyes and chemicals have been sold at
a discount, in relation to convertible-currencymarea licences, indi-
cating a margin of loss around 30-40 per cent." (Bhagwati and Desai,
1970, p. 204.) Cilingiroglu reports that tied aid played a role in
raising prices of imported materials to developing countries in 1966:
Pakistan, copper wire bars, 1.50 times the price th advanced countries;
Pakistan, transformer-grade grain-oriented steel sheets, 1.14; Brazil,
transformer-grade grain-oriented steel sheets froth U.S., 1.31.
(Cilingiroglu, 1969, pp. 59-61.) Haq reports: Pakistan, 10 categories
of mild steel from the U.S., 1.30 to 1.87 (and 2.57 in one case). For
equipment under tied project loans, Haq estimates the average excess
cost for Pakistan to have been 51 per cent. (Haq, 1967,) On 92 con-
tracts financed by IBRD and IDA funds in 1960-1966, Bhagwati reports
that the average ratio of the difference between the highest bids and
successful bids to successful bids was 49 per cent. Bhagwati suggests
that this is indicative of the potential excess cost of imports under
tied aid. (Bhagwati, 1967, p. 33.) Narain reports that "according to
...the opinion in knowledgeable business circles (in India)...the prices
of machinery supplied by the socialist countries are generally higher,
in some cases up to 25 per cent higher than international prices."
(Narain, 1968, pp. 18-19). However, Narain reports that for metals,
chemicals, petroleum, and paper items accounting for 19 to 47 percent
of India's imports of industrial materials from East Europe, the weighted
average of unit values of Indian imports was 7 to 11 per cent lower in
1961-1965 and 1 per cent higher in 1965-66 for imports from East Europe
than from other countries. (Narain, 1968.) The last finding is com-
plicated by the fact that some of the imports from other countries were
also under tied licenses.
2OI, MF, S 1967-68, p. 29.GOI, MF, ES 1967-68, p. 29.
1 -- ----= _
Indian steel imports were against free foreign exchange.1 During the
third plan,
Due to foreign exchange difficulties it has been possible to
allow import of capital goods only (a) to the extent assist-
ance (aid) is available from friendly countries and (b) where
the import of capital equipment is covered by foreign equity
capital or long-term loans. Release of foreign exchange from
'cash' resources for import of capital eqpipl met was only
marginal.2
In the case of tied aid, some excess in prices paid was beyond
the control of the Indian government, since major donors were not the
cheapest suppliers of industrial materials. However, import licensing
procedures did not minimize this excess. First, it appears that allo-
cation of rupee payment, tied aid, or free exchange licenses was based
on such things as availability of the items from a particular source
and perhaps priority of the end user but not relative prices from dif-
ferent sources. In 1969 importers reported that if a machine could be
secured from a rupee payment country, only a rupee payment license was
given. Otherwise, a tied hard currency license was given.
Second, prohibitions on transfer or exchange of licenses among
importers and specification of items to be imported under each license
as well as tying of source left importers no discretion in procurement
1GOI, MIS, 1966a, pp. 23-24.
2GOI, PCO 1963b, p. 94. See also the stateent by Hazari in
Chapter III.C.4.c. During the third plan, of the capital goods import
licenses issued by the Capital Goods Committee, at least 34 per cent
were restricted to imports from a single country or rupee payment
areas under official credits or trade agreements; 27 per cent were
against foreign equity shares or supplier credits; only 1 per cent
was against Indian free foreign exchange reserves. (GOI, PC(Hazari),
1967b, p. 55.)
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based on price and enabled suppliers to discriminate in export pricing
against sales on tied licenses. As an example of such price discrimin-
ation, two Indian import houses reported that at official exchange rates
the prices of machinery sold by East European countries under rupee pay-
ment to India were 20 percent above the prices at which these machines
were exported against hard currency. Two other examples are given in
Table IV-15.
Furthermore, the higher prices of imports under bilateral trade
agreements were a result of the Indian government policy of trading bi-
laterally to promote exports.
Tying of licenses led to other procurement problems in addition
to higher prices. Users commonly complained that, with some exceptions
like 'TOS" machine tools from Czechoslovakia, machinery imported from
East European countries was inferior in design or quality and that after-
sales service and availability of spare parts were very poor. Imports
of defective tractors from East Germany led to organized protests by
farmers in 1970, and it was reported that a third of the East European
tractors in the Punjab were idle because of lack of spare parts.
There were also complaints that licenses were issued for import
from countries where the delivery period was long, which could not supply
materials or machines with the desired specifications, or even which had
not authorized import of the item in question under tied licenses.
According to the Indian Electrical Manufacturers' Association:
~_____~
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During 1960 the consumers of electrical steel sheets were
granted licenses for import of material from rupee payment
agreement countries. Electrical steel sheets were not
available in these countries. 1
A former president of the Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of
Textile Stores and Machinery stated that:
Proper assessment of availability of raw materials from the
countries from which imports were permitted should be made
before licenses were finally issued. Often the licenses
issued were of no use to the holders as the items specified
were not available in the country.2
As a result, firms were forced to use materials with different and/or
non-optimal specifications. They were also forced to use machinery from
different countries with different specifications so that tooling and
spare parts inventory costs were increased.3 Although licenses were re-
validated for import from other countries in some cases when imports
were not available, this required efforts by the license holder and in-
volved delays.
A related complaint was that the government changed the countries
from which imports were permitted when the foreign exchange situation
changed, and consequently firms were forced to procure from unknown sup-
pliers. This led to problems concerning information on sources of supply,
reliability of delivery dates, quality control, etc. Sen Raleigh re-
ported that production was adversely affected bddised:
IEMA, AR 1960-61.
E, 9 December 1969. Similarly, see ns neerLan Times, 26 Novem-
ber 1970, p. 4, for a complaint by Permanent kndls, and FE, 2 November
1968, for a complaint by the plastics industry.
3Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 204, and Krueger, 1970, p. 84.
II.'
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In many cases as a result of changing import policies (includ-
ing tying of licenses), materials had to be obtained from un-
known and untested suppliers both within the country or
abroad.1
Yet another complaint was that tied licenses forced manufacturers
to import materials from as many as four different countries. 2
2. Restrictions on Timing of Procurement
A number of important metals are old'ljierhifionally both under
long-term contracts at producer prices and on the London Metal Exchange
or other open markets for spot and future trakikiofi. Producer prices
are substantially more stable than LME pridd,' hih commaonly fluctuate
by 50 percent, and at the end of the 1960s ,ire a'i'lover.
Licensing prevented Indian importers #Sr etiiing long-term or
speculative contracts for materials and from stockpiling materials on a
speculative basis. Although firms were sometimes' ,ble to build up in-
ventories of imported materials, because of restrictions on licenses and
incentives to use them as soon as they were issued, imports were made at
the LME price prevailing for spot transactions heeivir licenses were
issued.
According to an Indian government report:
In the case of items like steel, the manufacturers overseas have
long-term arrangements with domestic producers of steel which
ensure them a steady supply at specially favourable price while
Indian producers have to pay such prices as are in force for
spot transactions. 3
1EW, 31 March 1962, p. 560. See also Krueger, 1970, p. 14.
FE, 2 November 1968.
GOI, MCI, 1960, p. 22.
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Hindustan Motors reported a similar situation for special steels,l but
the main complaints concerned non-ferrous metals, particularly copper
used in production of electrical equipment, nickel, and lead. It was
reported that:
Practically the entire requirement of copper is imported from
London Metal Exchange sources, the price of which is 1.5 to
2 times that of direct purchase from the mines. The mines re-
quire a long-term contract such as for three years...Due to
this,the country loses about 30 to 50 per cent of copper for
the foreign exchange spent.2
Cilingiroglu reports that because of the difference between LME and pro-
ducer prices, in 1965 Argentine and Brazilian imports of copper cost
68 percent and 39 to 46 percent more than the producer price. Their
collaborators and competitors in advanced countries purchased copper
at producer prices.3
Delays in issuing licenses also increased the costs of imports.
According to Dunlop India:
Considerable problems were raised by the delay in the issue of
import licenses. When licenses are not issued promptly, it
leaves us little time to negotiate prices and we are often com-
pelled to pay higher prices in order to obtain prompt shipment.
This is the case where natural rubber is concerned.4
1Iron and Steel Review, June 1967, p. 42.
2 FE, 10 January 1971, p. 11.
3Cilingiroglu, 1969, pp. 60, 69, 71.
4 EW, 1 May 1965, p. 763.
I~P
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3. Premia on imported Materials
Because the rupee was overvalued at the import exchange rate in-
cluding tariffs and because the supply of imported materials was often
the binding constraint on production for the protected domestic market,
open market prices of imported materials were above landed prices during
the 1960s. Since the large majority of import licenses were issued
directly to users, firms (other than small ones which were discriminated
against by licensing) secured the bulk of their imports at the landed
prices. However, firms paid more than the landed prices in a number of
circumstances which can be traced to government policies.
In order to qualify for larger allocations of maintenance import
licenses issued on the basis of capacity, there was an incentive for
firms to expand even though this involved creation of excess capacity.
Investment behavior in the first half of the 1960s suggests that this
may have been a factor in the creation of excess capacity. From the
point of view of the firm, such investments were a cost of licenses.
Also, import licenses were issued to exporters under STC "link" arrange-
ments and the import replenishment scheme, which are discussed in
Chapter III.C. It was often necessary to export at a loss to secure
such licenses, and this loss was a cost of licenses. 1
While these cases involved use of real resources, in several
others the excess cost of imported materials to the users were transfer
payments:
ISee for example NCAER, 1967a, p. 36, and Philips India, AR 1966,
p. 3.
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(i) A limited and declining share of imports was licensed to independent
import houses which sold the imports at prices above landed cost. By
the late 1960s this channel accounted for only a very small share of
imports of inputs.
(ii) An increasing share of imports, amounting to over $400 million in
1970-71, was channelled through state agencies. The STC earned a profit,
after operating expenses but before losses on exports and taxes, of
8.2 percent of its imports in 1970-71.1 This supports the frequent com-
plaint that the STC sold imported materials at prices above landed cost.
It was reported that in 1970-1971 the STC and MMTC sold imported mate-
rials at the following markups over landed costs: aluminum, 14 to 20 per-
cent; titanium dioxide, 18 percent; hydrosulphite of soda, 75 percent;
2
and stainless steel, 150 percent. There were a number of revealing
statements by the STC itself:
Mr. P. J. Fernandes, Acting Chairman of STC,..added... the Corpor-
ation charged five to 5.5 per cent over the landed cost of imported
materials to its consumers. Prices of imported items were fixed
slightly lower than the ex-factory prices of domestic manufacture
...with a view to protecting the interests of the local industry.3
Earlier the STC reported that
The Corporation's margin (on sale of imported items) is, barring a
few exceptions of special character, within 10 per cent...In the
case of a small number of commodities...there is a wide differ-
ence between the domestic and international prices because of
SEE, 2 April 1971, p. 626.
2 FE, 22 April 1970, p. 5; 22 July 1970, p. 8; 5 January 1971,
p. 1; 19 February 1971, p. 4; 17 March 1971, p. 8.
3 FE, 7 December 1970, p. 8.
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restricted imports...and the high indigenous cost of produc-
tion or because the product is not available at all...The
government have from time to time entrusted the import and
distribution of such commodities to the Corporation with
directions to mop up a portion of the high profits.1
(iii) There were black market sales of imported materials. Table IV-16
shows the ratio of Indian open market prices to LME f.o.b. prices in
December 1969 for several non-ferrous metals for which India was prima-
rily dependent on imports purchased at the LME prices. Markets in
these metals were active. According to a representative of small firms:
For want of raw materials in time we have to close our indus-
try or to procure the imported raw materials at the Bombay
market at exorbitant black market prices. 2
In addition, there were legal open market sales of imports made under
the STC "link" arrangements and of licenses issued under the import
replenishment scheme.
G. Supply Bottlenecks and Lack of Domestic Substitutes
If the government restricted imports only when a perfect substi-
tute was available domestically with the same delivery period as imports,
negative protection would have been limited to higher prices of tradable
inputs. However, in a number of situations there were quantitative
restrictions or prohibitions on imports even though a close substitute
was not available domestically or delivery periods were long and unre-
liable. As a result, government policies affected a number of aspects
IGOI, STC, 1966, pp. 19-20.
2FE, 22 April 1971, p. iv.
____
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TABLE IV-16
Indian Open Market Prices for Imported Non-Ferrous Metals, December 1969
Metal Ratio of Indian Open Market Price
to L.M.E. price (f.o.b.)
Zinc 2.4 - 2.6
Tin 2.3
Lead 1.9
Copper 1.2 - 1.6
Nickel 1.1 - 1.3a
Ratio is for August 1969 when the LME price was unusually high
because of a strike at the two major Canadian producers.
1=---- -----------~3i--- - - -- ------- ---
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of input supply, including quantity, delivery period, specification,
and quality.
This led to a number of problems: interruptions in production
and lower average utilization of capacity, use of machines and current
inputs which led to higher overhead and operating costs and lower
quality products, higher inventories, and allocation of resources to
procurement of licenses and inputs. The excess costs resulting from
such problems were sometimes high compared to the values of the specific
items involved, since inadequate supplies or inferior quality of one
critical input sometimes stopped production even though the input
accounted for a small share of costs, and the effects were passed on
to firms using those products as inputs.
1. Shortages which Constrained Production
A large share of foreign exchange available for maintenance
imports and of domestically produced iron and steel was allocated
bureaucratically to individual firms at the official exchange rate and
control prices. Often the amount allocated to a firm was less than was
desired, there were delays in licensing imports, delivery periods for
domestic inputs were long and unreliable or supplies were irregular,
and the inflexibility of bureaucratic allocations made it difficult
to respond to unforeseen events. Only a limited amount of reallocation
among firms was possible in the open market, and supplies were avail-
able there only at high premia if at all.
_ __
~ 
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As a result, production of engineering goods was often con-
strained or interrupted by shortage of materials, and delivery dates
were uncertain. This was especially common until 1966 and, in the
case of steel supplies, again in 1969-1971.
a. 1960 to 1966
Chapter III.B referred to the fact that in the first half of the
1960s there was substantial excess capacity in many engineering indus-
tries. The binding constraint on production where there was excess
capacity was almost always the supply of materials, components, and
spares. According to a study made in that period:
Shortage of raw materials is at present seriously holding up
production and preventing anything like the full use of the
nation's industrial capacity...The shortage is both of imported
and indigenous raw materials...The position in regard to some
basic raw materials like iron and steel, copper, aluminium,
zinc and lead, is particularly bad. In spite of the develop-
ment of iron and steel industry, the country has not been able
to meet the demand for various special types of steels. Thus
there is an acute shortage of alloy and tool steels, spring
steels, stainless steel and specially shaped steels, particu-
larly of the imported nature...The engineering industry and
the foundry industry appear to be affected most by the per-
sistent shortage of pig iron and coke. Since the import of
pig iron has been totally stopped and indigenous production
has failed to come up to the expectations there does not seem
to be an early end to this difficulty in sight...There are
quite a number of important industries which are not utiliz-
ing their full capacity due to non-availability of non-ferrous
metals.1
1 NCAER, 1966 a, pp. 45-49. This study applies mainly to 1962-
1965. The shortage of foundry pig iron occurred primarily in 1962-63
and 1963-64. In 1960-61 and 1961-62 pig iron was exported because of
excess capacity. In late 1964-65, 150,000 tons was imported from the
USSR. See GOI, MIS, 1967a, pp. 50, 62.
_ ___PI_ _I~~
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This study further reports that of 46 engineering firms which replied
to a questionnaire concerning operations in 1962, 38 stated that dif-
ficulties in procurement of materials were one of the major bottlenecks
in production, with a breakdown as follows: 1
Number of Firms
Import restrictions: 31
Problems with procurement of indigenous
materials:
Items not available 4
Inadequate supply 16
Uncertain delivery 25
Poor quality 10
Variation in quality 12
High cost 16
The following report was made by the Indian Engineering Association on
the problems of the structural fabrication industries:
In December 1962 it was found that shortage of matching
steel was one of the main causes of idle capacity:
four member firms alone had lost production during 1962
of at least Rs 6-1/2 crores ($13.7 million) worth of
railway wagons for lack of matching sections. Early in
1963 the position became still more acute. Certain
major fabricators in the country were working at only
50 per cent capacity on a single shift.2
According to a Ford Foundation report in 1963 on the operations of small
firms:
1NCAER, 1966a, p. 93.
2GOI, MSM, 1968, p. 47. This is confirmed in annual reports for
Jessop and Braithwaite.
_ __ j_
313
Nearly 60 per cent of the firms analyzed provided evidence
that critical shortages of materials and components that
could only be purchased at higher black market prices made
it unprofitable for them to expand their production to
fuller utilization of capacity. Another 18 per cent of the
firms stated that they could not get additional supplies at
any price. 1
b. 1969-71
During 1966-1968 imports were liberalized and all categories
of domestically produced mild steel except flat products were readily
available near or, in the case of rolled products like bars and wire
rods, even below control prices. However, beginning in early 1969 a
growing number of engineering industries reported that production was
constrained below capacity by the supply of imported materials, foundry-
grade pig iron, and mild steel billets, sheets, plates, and skelp.
In 1969-71 shortage of steel and high open market prices were the major
complaint of a number of engineering industries dependent on these
categories .2
IFord Foundation, 1963, p. 39. For other reports, see: GOI,
MCI, 1962 a, pp. 9-10, 27; GOI, PC, 1963a, pp. 4, 9, 43, 120; GOI, PC,
1967a, pp. 97, 109; GOI, DGTD, AR 1965-66; GOI, DGTD, 1965, pp. 30-31;
GOI, MIS, 1967, pp. 10, 62; GOI, MIS, 1966a; IIFT, 1966b, p. 29.
2The large exports of iron and steel in this period were mainly
categories which were easily available, namely basic pig iron and mild
steel bars, structurals, and rails, or were against past commitments.
~~
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2. Banning of Imports on Grounds of gdigenous Availability
Indian firms frequently reported that the government banned
imports of tradable inputs on the grounds that they were produced in
India when the items actually were not av4~aible. This occurred for
a number of reasons. First, the government banned import when domestic
production was scheduled to begin, but coi"inly tthe local producer did
not meet its schedule or its initial products vre inferior in quality
to imports. Local production of alloy steels led to such problems in
the late 1960s. According to the Indian Electr'ica Manufacturers'
Association: p &r i :I
At times sudden changes are brought about ,ri the import licens-
ing policy. As soon as indigenous productioan laimed to have
started, the import is banned without ascertainig the quantum
and quality of indigenous production. A gl4ri 0rexample in this
regard is the production of dynamo grade stee' sheets by...
Hindustran Steel Ltd. The targeted production during the year
was 22,500 tonnes. As soon as the production commenced, the
imports were banned; meanwhile there were teething troubles in
the plant and the total production including off-grade quality
was limited to about 9,500 tonnes per annum of which the prime
quality was only 5,000 tonnes or so. Such over-zealous steps
were responsible for cutting down the production of electric
motors, fans and other rotating machinery.1
The same was true during 1969-70 in the case of high carbon steel wire
rods required for steel wire ropes.3 The Textibtchilery ft Manufac-
turers' Association reported that in 1969:
The ban on import of needle roller bearitgfto a0~&tual users...
caused a lot of anxiety to manufacturers of Ecxthe machinery
since the only licensed manufacturer had not ie into produc-
tion.
'E, 10 January 1971. 2FE 22 November 1969, p. 9.
3Commerce, 6 February 1971.
~j~
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Second, the government used prohibitions on imports to force
manufacturers to develop domestic sources. For example, it was re-
ported that:
DGTD has,..been asked not to clear import applications for
such items as can be made available from indigenous sources
with a little extra effort. 1
Third, it was common for the government to ban import even though
domestic production covered only a limited range of specifications,
leaving firms less choice of inputs than would have been available by
import. Often the items produced domestically did not have the speci-
fications which were necessary or optimal for particular users. In these
cases, costs were increased in a number of ways.
The government banned import of machine tools when there was a
machine available locally which could do the job, based on workpiece
size, without much concern for power, tolerances, and other character-
istics which influenced productivity. Equipment selection was con-
strained so that both initial and operating costs were increased, e.g.
machines used were not optimal for the length of production runs and
tolerances required. For example, Krueger found:
Domestically available machinery very frequently was of the
wrong capacity for the firm's purpose. That is, domestically-
produced machinery is available in a smaller range of capaci-
ties than imported machinery. In some cases, firms were per-
suaded to accept several smaller capacity machines in lieu of
a single, larger, imported machine. It was alleged, in several
instances, that higher domestic prices and inappropriate sizes
resulted not only in increasing the initial machinery cost
threefold but also led to higher operating costs than would
have been obtained with appropriate machine size. In two
IFE, 8 November 1970.
III.
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cases, the author was shown a machine, domestically pro-
duced, whose capacity was ten times or more that required
by the firm's operations. In both cases, an imported
machine of the appropriate capacity would have cost the
firm less than 7 per cent the price paid for the domestic
machine.1
Manufacturers of electric fans and twist drills reported that they
were not permitted to import automatic machines which would have
led to a reduction in costs. The designs of some machines produced
in India were outdated and inefficient under any conditions.2
In the case of materials, when firms could not get the metal
sections they wanted because the sections were not manufactured or
delivery periods were long, they used heavier or more expensive
ones or machined larger ones to the size required, wasting mate-
rials and machining time. Kamani Engineering reported that:
In the field of export, the company has suffered from
several handicaps. Only a limited range of steel sec-
tions is rolled in India as compared to a much larger
range produced in other countries. As the Indian tower
designer has to limit his designs to the available sec-
tions, he is compelled to make use of heavier sections,
unnecessarily adding to the weight of the towers. Any
undue increase in weight will inflate the cost of Indian-
made structures.3
The availability of only a limited range of steel sections
within the country and the difficulty in getting matching
sections f steel have considerably impeded our efforts in
(export).
1 Xrueger, 1970, pp. 83-84
2See Chapter V.B.
3 EW, 3 April 1965, p. 612.
4Capital, 31 March 1966, p. 445.
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Basu et al. report that for a company manufacturing tea machinery:
High speed steel of 7/64" dia. is generally required but
the available section is 1/4", and considerable wastage
and increased unit cost result from the use of available
section. 1
It was reported that in 1970 galvanized sheets were used in place of
2
non-galvanized sheets because of shortage of the latter.
Designs and material specificiations were adapted to use what
was available although this adversely affected the performance of the
products. Import restrictions on CRGO steel sheets forced manufac-
turers of distribution transformers to rely onhot rolled sheets in
many cases. A government report on the industry stated that "the
resultant energy losses must be considerable."3 According to Cilingi-
roglu, the use of CRGO sheets rather than hot rolled sheets would
result in a 10 percent reduction in energy losses and a 10 to 25 per-
cent saving in steel and copper, or a 5 to 10 percent reduction in
material costs. The IEMA stated that:
It was reported that at times, transformers supplied by some
manufacturers exceed the losses guaranteed by them by an
amount beyond the permissible tolerance lmits 4 given in
the Indian Standards Institution specificatons.
Use of hot rolled sheets may have been a contr qfin factor.
Baranson reports that a tire manufacturer "had to revert to
1Basu et al., 1965, p. 147.
2FE, 22 February 1971, p. 6.
3GOI, MIDCA, 1969, p. 49.
Cilingiroglu, 1969, pp. 33-34.
5SEMA, AR 1968-69, p. 46.
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cotton cord construction due to a shortage of rayon and nylon" cord in
India.3
Much of what passed for R & D in India was actually adaptation
of specifications to substitute locally available inputs for those spe-
cified by the foreign collaborator but unavailable because of import
restrictions.
Jessop reported that restrictions on import of automatic welding
equipment delayed conversion of railway wagons from riveted to welded
construction, which would have allowed a reduction in both steel and
labor costs as well as better performance. The electric fan industry
was reported to have been unable to import machinery required to manu-
facture fans like those produced in Japan:
The industry has been making intensive efforts to modernise
its machinery...The manufacturers expressed that the machinery
is required by the fans industry urgently as they want to
switch over to new processes and materials to catch up with
the latest trends abroad in the design and manufacture of
electric fans...For instance, the industry is trying to in-
troduce aluminium die-cast rotors and replace aluminium
canopies by plastic ones. These processes will result in
improved performance of fans and also add to their style
and streamlined appearance. The industry has nat been able
to secure adequate licences for the import of machinery.
In order to effect the improvements mentioned above, the
industry requires die-casting machines, optical profile
grinders, plastic injection moulding machines, and auto-
matic coil winding machines.2
Jessop and Company, AR 1963-64, 1964-65, 1966-67.
2 IIFT, 1967a, pp. 9, 54. In 1969 the Indian Electrical Manufac-
turers' Association reported that the government allowed manufacturers
exporting electric fans to import machinery required for modernization.
(IEMA, AR 1968-69, p. 82.)
Baranson, 1971, p. 60.
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Restrictions on import of electrolytic tinplate when only hot-
dipped tinplate was produced in India prevented use of automatic
machines in manufacture of tinplate products, because the thickness
of hot-dipped tinplate was too variable for use of automatic machines.
3. Non-Availability of Items Banned for Import
Import of some materials was banned even though they were not
available in India or domestic supplies were very limited because the
end-products were considered non-essential (e.g. import of components
for certain consumer goods was banned) or to force reliance on domesti-
cally available substitutes (e.g. import of copper and stainless steel
was banned in certain cases where aluminum could be used.) In a number
of cases such import restrictions made it impossible for Indian firms
to produce goods to the specifications used in foreign markets. While
only rayon tire cord and one type of synthetic rubber were produced in
India, import of nylon tire cord and other synthetics was not allowed.1
Import of gadgets for production of electric table fans of the type
exported by Japan was not allowed even though the gadgets were not
available in India. 2
H. Quality Problems and Ancillary Development
One of the basic difficulties of producing complicated engi-
neering goods in a semi-industrial country is the limited network of
ancillary suppliers and subcontracting shops. Although the situation
IGoodyear India, FE, 8 May 1969.
2Jay Engineering, Industrial Times, 15 March 1969, p. 28.
~_~ _
320
in India improved during the 1960s, firms frequently found that spe-
cialized suppliers did not exist, that there were problems with the
quality of what could be procured, and that supplies were irregular.
This was a common experience of international companies with subsidi-
aries in developing countries which limited import of inputs.1
Import restrictions encouraged or forced manufacturers in India
to rely heavily on domestic sources for tradable inputs in spite of
the limited capacity of ancillary suppliers. The banned list required
firms to procure locally any tradable input man4aCtured in India.
Beyond this, the prospect that import might be banned before a satis-
factory substitute was available locally, domestic content require-
ments, limited allocations of licenses and the dapger of a cut in the
event of a foreign exchange crisis, the burden of procedures and delays
involved in licensing, and the excess cost of imports because of
licensing restrictions and tariffs created a strong incentive for
firms to develop local sources, especially for current inputs, even
at supply conditions not competitive with free imports.
The effect of this on prices of purchased inputs has already
been considered. The following sections consider the role of the
import control regime in forcing manufactures to use inputs of lower
or more variable quality than those that could have been imported, to
establish their own facilities for production of ancillary items, and
to devote resources to procurement and to development of ancillary
IBaranson, 1967; Edelberg, 1963; Kleu, 1967; Neufeld, 1969,
pp. 330ff, esp. p. 336.
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suppliers.
1. Quality Problems
Ancillary suppliers producing items suitable for large manufac-
turers were most developed for industries with a large demand for parts
for production of new equipment and for replacement, especially where
these requirements had existed for some time. Thus, ancillaries were
most extensively developed for railway rolling stock, motor vehicles,
and cotton textile machinery.
The fact that the last two industries camolauned about quality
of ancillary supplies at the end of the 1960s indicates that low and
variable quality of purchased components remained an obstacle to
production of complicated engineering goods to international quality
standards. A working group of the Planning Commission for the textile
machinery industry reported:
Some of the components available from indigenous sources may
be suitable for domestic consumption, but when the machinery
is to be exported it may not be possible to depend on such
components, especially when they are of intricate nature.
The Group recommends that for the purpose of maintaining the
competitive strength of the export products, import of banned
items may be considered liberally for export orders...With
such relaxation the prospects of improving export would
brighten. 1
According to TELCO, which produced Mercedes-Benz trucks:
Despite intensive development assistance and liberal financial
support we have given to the various component suppliers, we
are still unable to secure regular supplies of consistently
1GOI, MIDCA (Textile Machinery), 1968b, p. 18.
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high quality automotive components, castings, and forgings.
This is a clear indication that our country's industrial
base is still somewhat immature and uneven in its develop-
ment.1
Table IV-17 lists a number of complaints about the quality of
domestic materials and parts which firms were forced to use because of
import restrictions. Baranson reports in the case of diesel engines
produced by Kirloskar Cummins:
Absolute restrictions on the import of enigi* parts that are
currently manufactured in India adversely affect the qual-
ity...A license to import oil filters was rused on the
ground that "oil filters" were produced "i U ia, even though
Cummins had tested the Indian product azlr fdnd it well below
its standards.2
Quality problems were especailly great when fzmdi'ere forced to pur-
3
chase inputs on the open market.
Although one can infer from such complits that there was some-
times negative protection related to the quality of inputs, there were
no complaints about the quality of many other parts.- for example,
most of the complaints by vehicle assemblers recorde4 by the Pande
Committee during its investigation of the quality of psssener cars
concerned incidental items produced by small firms. There were no
complaints about the quality of most proprietary items like pistons,
TELCO, ABP. 25 July 1969. See also EE, 22 November 1968,
p. 987, and Krueger, 1970, p. 80.
2Baranson, 1967, p. 76. See also pp. 71-73 for additional
examples of quality problems faced in procurement of materials and
parts.
3
_E, 19 September 1970, p. 4.
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TABLE IV-17
Complaints Concerning Quality of Indian Materials
Material User
alloy steel
alloy steel
alloy steel
motor
vehicles
steel
forgings
steel
forgings
Quality Problem
poor quality
poor quality
poor quality
Consequence of Lower Quality
high percentage of rejections of
forgings
"the quality of available domestic
steels did not meet specifications,
and their use resulted in a poor
finished product and in a high degree
of wear and tear on the capital equip-
ment"
Source
TELCO, EPW, 27
July 1968, p.1190.
FE, 26 June 1969
UNIDO, 1970a, p. 50.
special steels
cold rolled
steel sheets
steel wire
piston
assemblies
switchgear
welding
electrodes
quality problems Indian manufacturer
"indifferent" FE, 21 July 1969, p.8.
quality
variable quality "a high percentage of rejections...
Considerable quantities of the steel
supply and, on occasion, even the
finished product had to be scrapped."
UNIDO, 1970b, p.66.
containers "quality is probably
the poorest in the.
world"
steel strips cycle rims poor quality 8-20 percent reduction in production
due to defective material
Metal Box, EW, 3 July
1965, p. 1077.
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47.
tinplate
---- 
-- -- - -------- 
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TABLE IV-17 (continued)
Material User
steel
mild steel
wire, tin
steel sections
pig iron
pig iron
pig iron
pig iron
pig iron
containers
machinery
hurricane
lanterns
fabricated
structurals
it ot
iron castings
for power-
driven pumps
iron castings
for pumps
iron castings
for machinery
and cast iron
pipes
piston
assemblies
Quality Problem
overguage, offsize,
holes
poor quality
poor quality
Consequence of Lower Quality
1 percent reduction in production
due to defective material
5-75 percent reduction in production
due to defective material
2-4 percent reduction in production
due to defective material
twisted and bent)
) 25 percent reduction in production
) due to defective material
poor quality )
poor quality
incorrect grade
off-grade, mixed
grade
incorrect metal-
lurgical composition,
mixed grade
20 percent reduction in production
due to defective material
Source
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47.
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47.
NCAER,
46-47.
NCAER,
46-47.
1966a, pp.
1966a, pp.
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47.
FE, 26
p.8.
higher rejection rate for castings,
lost machining time
March 1970,
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47; IIFT, 1966b,
p.33; and Indian
manufacturers
Indian manufacturer
I~ _ ~X _ _
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TABLE IV-17 (continued)
Material
iron castings
iron castings
mild steel
plates
alloy steels,
laminations,
steel pressings,
bearings
bearings
bearings
fasteners
User Quality Problem
machine blow-holes, dimensional
tools inaccuracy, hardness not
to specifications of
order and variable,
castings sometimes too
hard to be machined or
so hard cutting tools
break
machine tools,blow-holes
flour mills
metal-forming low tensile strength
machine tools
electrical
equipment
electric
fans
variable quality
variable quality
machine tools variable quality
machine tools variable quality
enamelled copper electrical
wires equipment
components radios
improper enamelling
low quality
Consequence of Lower Quality
30-9Q percent rejection rates
for castings, wasted machining
hours, longer machining time
25 percent reduction in pro-
duction due to defective
material
increase input of steel to
compensate for lower strength
higher rejection rate
higher rejection rate, noisier
fans
increase in assembly and testing
time
high percentage of wires
rejected
5-10 percent reduction in pro-
duction due to defective material
Source
Three Indian manu-
facturers of machine
tools without
captive foundries
NCAER, 1966a, pp.
46-47.
Indian manufacturer
Indian manufacturer
Indian manufacturer
Indian manufacturer
Indian manufacturer
Indian Express,
13 December 1969.
NCAER, 1966a,
pp. 46-47.
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TABLE IV-17 (continuedl
Material
aluminum and
plastic foils,
insulating
cloth, ceramic
tubes, steel
sheets, brass
and aluminum
sheets and rods
and wires
graphite
electrodes
rayon cord
User
electronic
products
steel
castings
tires
machine tools,
vehicles,
bicycles
electric fans
Quality Problem
low quality
low quality
"poor quality"
poor quality
poor quality
Consequence of Lower Quality Source
National Pro-
ductivity
Council, 1965,
p.38.
Capital, Supple-
ment, 10 July
1969, p.103.
EPW, 15 July
1967, p.1243.
affects appearange of products; Indian manu-
discoloration, cracking, chipping; facturers
poor finish
"fans, even with the best type of Jay Engineering,
paints available in India, do not Industrial Times,
get such smooth and clear surfaces 15 March 1969,
as the fans from Japan or other p.25..
foreign countries. This difference
in finish places Indian fans, parti-
cularly table fans, at a considerable
disadvantage in foreign countries."
Krueger, 1970,
p.51; FE, 3 June
1970, p. 9.
paint
paint
glass vehicles inferior
quality
- -- ---y-a~- -;--------- -
TABLE IV-17 (continued)
Material
paper, wood,
packing and
packaging
materials,
rust pre-
ventives
User
machine tools-,
etc.
Quality Problem
poor quality, wrong
specifications
Consequence of Lower Quality
affects appearance; damage to
transit; heavier wood increases
freight costs.
Source
Indian manufacturers
and Metal Box, EW,
3 July 1965, p.1077.
electrical p
ancillaries
including
instruments,
switches, wiring,
horns, wipers;
rubber parts
including seals,
hoses, weather
strips, wiper
blades; window and
door regulators,
handles, buttons,
locks, clips;
plastic parts;
leaf springs
,assenger cars -low quality GOI, MIDCA, 1968a,
p.4 5; Assoc. of
Automobile Manu-
facturers, ET,
13 Sept. 1969,
p.9 .
small grinding
wheels
bearings
spindle inserts, cotton textile
drafting materials machines
quality problems Indian manufacturer
Commerce, 23 Jan-
uary 1971, p. 150.
low quality
I _
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fuel injection equipment, engine valves, spark plugs, radiators,
brakes, wheels, tire and tubes, and batteries, all of which were pro-
duced by large firms with foreign collaboration.1
Often the complaint was not that inputs comparable in quality
to imports could not be obtained but that to achieve such standards
firms were forced to reject a large percentage of purchased supplies
or take steps to improve their quality. This involved expenditures
on inspection, an increase in processing costs when parts were re-
jected after being machined, and costs of rectification. Quality
problems also interrupted production and forced firms to hold larger
inventories.
According to an NCAER study of capacity utilization in manu-
facturing in 1962, among 46 engineering firms which answered a
questionnaire, 10 and 12 reported that poor quality of materials and
variation in quality of materials, respectively, reduced their rate
of production. The complaints for which details are available are
reproduced in Table IV-17. The study states:
The non-standard quality of materials gives poor results...
The end-products also suffer...defects or the cost of produc-
tion is increased. The non-standard quality of material
requires additional operations involved in rectifying or sal-
vaging the quality of materials to achieve acceptable quality
end-products and these additional processings result in an
increase of cost of production as well as in reduction in
production. 2
GOI, MIDCA, 1968a.
NCAER, 1966a, pp. 45, 93.
329
Rejection rates were often very high and consequently were an
important factor in costs. For example, when it began production IBM
had an average rejection rate of 70 percent for locally procured parts.
After three years this was reduced to an average of 32 percent, with
a rate of 15 percent for supplies from large manufacturers and 40 per-
cent for small firms. Even the 15 percent rate was considerably
higher than the average at IBM's Japanese plant.1 Cummins Engine's
experience in India was similar.2 Machine tool producers commonly
reported rejection rates of 30-60 percent on purchased castings even
after they had been in production for several years, with a large
share of rejections occurring after some machining.
Because import of certain types of high precision bearings was
banned even though they were not available in India, some machine tool
producers were forced to make repeated trial assemblies of machines
with bearings of ordinary tolerances until they found bearings which
gave the required accuracy to alignment of the spindle. Considerable
labor was wasted in this trial and error process.
Under these circumstances, particularly where material supplies
were the binding constraint on production, manufacturars sometimes
1IBM World Trade Corp., "Development Activities Report," New
Delhi, 6 November 1969; C. G. Ravi (Manager, IBM India), "Scarcity of
Professional Grade Components," Commerce, 1 August 1970, pp. xviii, xx;
P.K, Biswas (Export Manager, IBM India), "Prospects and Problems of
Manufacturing Computers in India," ET, 11 December 1969, p. 6.
2Baranson, 1967, pp. 71-72.
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reduced their acceptance standards below the quality that could have
been procured by imports, e.g. castings for machine tools and bearings
for fans. In production for export, firms in the machine tool indus-
try reported following stricter quality standards than for production
for the domestic market, typically by using the best items in a batch
of inputs like castings for export production. However, the very high
rejection rates required to meet export quality standards were a deter-
rent to production of special export models, since rijected inputs
unique to the models could not have been salvaged for production for
the domestic market.
2. Investment in Development of Suppliers
Where they could not buy items of satisfactory quality, Indian
manufacturers, at least large companies with the necessary know-how,
commonly invested technical and managerial resources helping suppliers
to produce the materials and components they required and to achieve
the desired quality. Engineers spent a substantial amount of time at
suppliers' factories giving technical assistance in production of
items, e.g. castings, alloy steels.
Given the number of items that had to be secured in the case
of complex assembly-type engineering goods, the resources devoted to
developing suppliers and the time required were sometimes considerable.
However, surveys of ancillary suppliers in India have indicated that
vertical integration was a more common feature of domestic procurement
-- --_I -~--~L.3eb_42L-- --I , - -- - ~ -1--~
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than was assistance to independent ancillaries. Consequently, the
following examples should not be regarded as typical. Nevertheless,
most large firms reported undertaking such activities, and whether or
not firms offered technical assistance to suppliers they did devote
resources to procurement.
Because of difficulties purchasing items of acceptable quality,
plus the government policy of encouraging small industry, at the begin-
ning of the 1960s HMT constructed an industrial estate for 50 small
units producing simple components, sheet-metal work, and accessories.
HMT provided drawings, tested prototypes, and tooling, trained workers,
provided technical assistance in production and quality control, and
assisted in financing and procurement of materials. In order to build
this group of ancillaries, HMT reported that it purchased from them at
prices higher than those charged by other suppliers and that it con-
tinued to buy from them when it had excess capacity and could have pro-
duced the items itself.
A different approach was followed by IBM. Rather than setting
up its own industrial estate, IBM tried to secure parts from existing
independent suppliers who also did work for other manufacturers. It
experienced difficulties because large manufacturers of electronic
components were not interested in IBM's small orders, and rejection
rates from small firms were high. It tried to solve these problems
iBasu et al., 1965, p. 93, and Rosen, 1958, p. 115.
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by giving technical assistance to the suppliers. 1
I. Vertical Integration
Often Indian producers make a substantial number of items them-
selves while producers in the same industry in advanced countries buy
them from specialized firms which supply many manufacturers. A number
of studies of manufacturing subsidiaries of international corporations
in semi-industrial countries which restricted imports of inputs have
noted a high degree of vertical integration, even self-sufficiency,
when compared to the operations of the parent company in the advanced
country, in spite of smaller scale and costs above the prices of
imports.2 Table IV-18 provides a list of examples which illustrate
this structure. The main explanation given by Indian firms in inter-
views was the limited ancillary supplier network and the problem of
assuring satisfactory quality and regular supplies of parts from the
ancillaries that did exist, combined with import restrictions.
However, vertical integration was not explained simply by under-
development and import restrictions. Contrary to the stated objective
of encouraging small firms, including ancillaries, government policy
created a strong bias toward vertical integration in two ways. First,
allocation of maintenance import licenses and domestic materials which
were subject to distribution controls discriminated heavily against
1IBM World Trade Corp., "Development Activities Report," New
Delhi, 6 November 1969.
2See the first footnote in section IV.H and Rosen, 1958, p. 148.
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TABLE IV-18
Outside Procurement by Engineering Industries in Semi-Industrial and Advanced Countries
Product
(Manufacturer)
1. Diesel engine
(Cummins)
2. Automobiles
(Kaiser-Willys)
Semi-industrial
Country
India
Argentina,
Brazil, India
Outside
Procurement
40% of parts
by value
36-40%
Advanced
Country
U.S.
U.S.
Outside
Procurement
60% of parts
by value
60-63%
3. Automobiles
(Ford)
4. Heavy electrical
equipment
5. Air-conditioners
6. Bicycles (T.I.)
7. Sewing machines
(Jay Engineering)
8. Cotton textile
machines
Brazil
Pakistan and
others
India
India
India
India
9. Storage batteries India
(ABMEL)
10. Unspecified India
far less than
in advanced
country
less than in
advanced
countries
20%
5-10%
a) only needles
b)very little
few parts
far less than
advanced
countries
W.Ger.,
France,
U.S.
U.K.
U.K.
Japan
unspec.
1964 in Brazil com-
pared to initial
years of production
in advanced countries
40%
15-20%
almost
everything
many parts
in U.S.,
Europe
Japan
2% U.K. 40%
1968
1959
1961
a)1953
b)1967-1969
1953
1962
c.1960
Date
1962-1965
1965-1968
I,
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Notes to Table IV-18
For data on Japanese subcontracting, see Boon, 1964, p. 47.
Sources:
1. Baranson, 1967, pp. 35, 59, 91. This was the basis on which the factory
was set up, not what was achieved in 1962-65.
2. Baranson, 1969, p. 26, and GOI, MIDCA, 1968. Outside procurement was
39 percent for Hindustan Motors passenger cars and 45 percent for TELCO
trucks, ET, 22 January 1970, p. 11.
3. Wilkins and Hill, 1964, p. 416; Mahindra and Mahindra, AR 1964-65; and
interviews. The percentage of bought-out parts for GM and Ford in
the U.S. and Fiat in Italy is low, but the percent is high for others
in West Europe, especially where scale is low. See Economist, 23
October 1965, p. vii.
4. Cilingiroglu, 1969, p. 9.
5. Kidron, 1965, p. 250.
6. Kidron, 1965, pp. 249-50.
7. GOI, PC, 1953, p. 75; Jay Engineering interview; and Bank of Japan,
1967, p. 72. See also Garratt, 1967, Part 7, p. 797, for similar
comments on Jay Engineering's self-contained electric fan factory.
8. GOI, PC, 1953, p. 65.
9. ABMEL, AR 1961-62, p. 38. The Indian company reported "our factory
is a battery, rubber., plastics and metal recovery factory all on one
site."
10. Kidron, 1965, pp. 249-50,
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small firms.1 The control system enabled vertically integrated firms
to procure the materials required to produce ancillary items at lower
prices and in larger quantities than small, independent firms could
procure them.
Second, under Indian conditions there was excess demand for in-
dustrial licenses because those able to secure licenses were able to
earn monopoly returns. Vertical integration was therefore partly a
result of licensing which allowed assemblers to manufacture their own
inputs rather than real economies in production and reflected the gen-
eral bias in industrial licensing toward concentration reported by
Hazari and the Dutt Committee.
Such biases toward vertical integration limited the interest
of some firms in developing independent ancillaries, which they could
have facilitated by accepting standardized component specifications.
In some cases main assemblers continued to produce items after ancil-
lary units producing satisfactory components were established. This
was true of pistons at Hindustan Motors and radiators at Premier
Automobile.
Basu et al. reported that in the machine tool industry
iSee Ford Foundation, 1963, and GOI, MIS, 1966a.
2GOI, PC(Hazari), 1967b, and GOI, MIDITCA, 1969a. However, the
government reserved certain automobile components for ancillary sup-
pliers,instructed public sector companies to rely on small firms for
parts, and announced in 1970 that as a condition for granting indus-
trial licenses it would require large firms to procure a certain per-
centage of parts from ancillary suppliers. (Engineering Times,
8 October 1970, p. 8)
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All the operations starting from manufacturing to assembly
of machine tool components are done at one place....Units
engaged in machine-tool manufacturing are in most cases
their own ancillaries.1
Although HMT did a substantial amount to develop ancillary suppliers,
it bought only 10 percent of the parts, components, and services for
one of its standard machine tools, or one fourth of what its collabo-
rator purchased in West Europe. Apart from supplies from its own in-
dustrial estate, HMT bought only items like bearings, fasteners, non-
ferrous castings, and electricals in India. In advanced countries
machine tool producers also bought iron castings and tooling and relied
more on sub-contractors for machining of parts and for subassemblies.
All Indian machine tool producers interviewed reported diffi-
culty in buying ferrous castings, accessories like chucks and collets,
and tooling of satisfactory quality. A number of producers concluded
that they had to have their own foundries to control quality because
of the low quality and high machining rejection rates on purchased
castings. HMT originally planned to buy castings but set up its own
foundry in 1961 because of difficulties with quality of purchases.
The four leading machine tool producers all had their own foundries,
as did many smaller firms. Similarly, automobile manufacturers pro-
duced many of their own castings and forgings.
Complaints about the quality of accessories, including those
produced by Praga Tools, were common. One machine tool manufacturer
IBasu et al., 1965, p. 15.
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was considering producing chucks to secure ones satisfactory for use
on its lathes for export.
While manufacturers of machinery in advanced countries buy much
of their tooling from tool and die shops, Indian manufacturers were
often forced to produce their own. This was particularly true in the
automobile and diesel engine industries.I
It was common for engineering companies in India to undertake
extensive modifications or complete building of machine tools for
their own use because of inability to buy custom-made special-purpose
machines as a result of import restrictions, e.g. in the automobile
ancillary and sewing machine industries. Most companies produced some
spare parts themselves because it was difficult and time consuming to
secure licenses to import spares for foreign machines. At times prior
to the recession manufacturers even produced their own cutting tools
because of long and uncertain delivery periods from local suppliers.
J. Inventory Investment
Inventory costs were a prominent item in capital costs. The
import control regime and controls over distribution of domestically
produced steel were an important cause of the high average inventory-
sales ratios which were characteristic of Indian manufacturing.
1See Tandon, 1965, pp. 27-31; Baranson, 1967, pp. 59, 62; and
ABP, 1 November 1969, p. i.
2Garratt, 1967, Part 6, pp. 684-91, reports examples for Jay
Engineering.
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Because production was often constrained or interrupted by
shortage of imported inputs, the import control regime created an
incentive to hoard import licenses to guarantee continued produc-
tion; restrictions on the period of validity of the licenses trans-
formed this into an incentive to hold inventories of imported inputs,
including materials, components, and spare parts for imported equip-
ment. Many of the features of the licensing system, including spe-
cification of items to be imported, source-tying, and prohibitions
on sale of licenses or materials in India probably increased inven-
tory holdings by reducing flexibility in procurement. Controls over
distribution of domestic iron and steel and import prohibitions which
forced reliance on domestic suppliers with unreliable quality and
delivery dates were similar in effect. The high profit on domestic
sales, the speculative effect of overvaluation until 1966, the price
differential between imported and domestic supplies when the latter
became available, and the subsidized rate of interest, all results of
government policy, increased the private benefit-cost ratio of holding
inventories given the licensing restrictions.
It should be added that there are other hypotheses to explain
high inventories: supply problems due to factors other than govern-
ment import restrictions, e.g. distance from foreign suppliers, and
poor management.
-4
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Inquiries into the operation of Indian companies, particularly
in the public sector, report high inventory-sales ratios. According
to government surveys in 1965, the ratio of inventories to annual sales
for private sector basic metals and engineering companies was 0.37 and
34 public sector companies was 0.49 (0.33 for purchased inputs only),
compared to 0.20 which the surveys report for advanced countries. For
10 of the public sector companies, the ratio was over 1.0, for five
over 2.0. 1  In 1969-70 the inventory-sales ratio for the eight major
Indian private motor vehicle manufacturers with $308 million in sales
was 0.44 in spite of excess demand for the output of several.2 Krueger
reports that for automobile ancillaries ex-ante or "desired inventory
levels are typically six to nine months' needs for imports and three
to four months for domestically-produced goods." 3
Islam reports a similar 1966 World Bank finding on Pakistan:
A disability that affects most industries relying heavily on
imports for critical inputs is the need to hold large inven-
tories because of the uncertainty of such things as foreign
exchange availability and administrative delays in obtaining
permits. This raises current costs. In the electrical-
equipment industry, the ratio of inventories to total sales
is 100 per cent to 120 per cent -- compared to 10 per cent
in West Germany.4
1GOI, RBI data reported in Commerce, Annual Number 1968, p. 286,
and GOI, ARC, 1967, pp. 176-178, 183. GOI, LSS, 1969, p. 3, reports
that in 1965 the value of average inventories at 21 public sector firms
was equal to that of 12 to 15 months' production and criticizes inven-
tory management techniques. See also Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp.
165n, 167, and Boon, 1964, p. 33.
2ET, 7 February 1971, p. 6.
3Krueger, 1970, p. 93.
4Islam, 1969, p. 84.
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K. Resources Devoted to Procurement
Indian firms devoted substantial resources to overcoming prob-
lems of procurement and to government liaison activities which would
not have arisen under a liberal economic regime in which import of in-
puts was not restricted and tradable inputs were allocated by the price
mechanism. Activities oriented to procurement overshadowed the prob-
lems which concern management in advanced countries, since the former
were the key variables under management control which influenced profits
under Indian conditions.
One side of this was the resources devoted to domestic procure-
ment as a result of restrictions on imports. The other was the re-
sources devoted to dealing with the government. Corresponding to the
minute detail in which government controls were often exercised, firms
were required to make detailed and repeated applications. The routine
paperwork by successful applicants was only one aspect of this. Because
of the scarcity value of resources allocated by government decisions,
there was substantial excess demand. The number of applications for
every scarce resource was increased, and in order to secure faster and
more favorable decisions firms devoted considerable resources beyond
the requirements of routine compliance, e.g. firms maintained govern-
ment liaison staffs in New Delhi and managers frequently went to New
Delhi to meet with officials. Such liaison was also one of the major
activities of trade associations. I Government inquiries have suggested
See, for example, the report of the Textile Machinery Manufac-
turers' Association, FE, 22 November 1969, p. 9.
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that firms were successful in influencing industrial licensing and
thus have indicated the importance of such liaison activities in the
profitability of Indian business.1
This involved an increase in costs of procurement and a waste
of resources, particularly entrepreneurship. It also created a bias
in resource allocation toward large firms and industrial houses. Com-
plaints by smaller firms, like the following for automobile ancillaries,
were common:
Another major difficulty facing the small-scale industry is the
procurement of raw materials, both imported and indigenous.
The big industries having resources to maintain special staff
for liaison with the various government agencies are able to
use their influence to expedite their applications and obtain
raw materials on priority. In this respect, though small-
scale industries get some government help, the small-medium
scale industries with no special staff to liaise with the
government agencies are left with inadequate supplies and
often they have to resort to open market purchases at very
high prices.2
All of the problems concerning supply conditions for tradable inputs
were more serious for small firms, since it was less efficient for them
to devote resources to securing favorable bureaucratic action.
L. Import Liberalization after Devaluation
Devaluation in 1966 was followed by an announcement that main-
tenance imports would be liberalized for firms producing basic metals,
most engineering goods with the exception of a number of consumer
GOI, PC(Hazari), 1967b, and GOI, MIDITCA, 1969.
2 FE, 19 March 1971, p. 8. See also Krueger, 1970.
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products, and tires. For a short period procedures and criteria for
screening imports appear to have been liberalized, and licenses were
given for a variety of inputs which competed with products of domestic
firms. However, this liberalization was quite limited compared to the
number of items on the banned list, and by 1968 whatever liberalization
had occurred in restrictions based on indigenous availability and in
domestic content requirements had been withdrawn. There was thus no
important change in the import control regime underlying the discus-
sion in the preceding sections. In fact, because of continued import
substitution, the number of inputs on the banned list and domestic
content requirements increased.
In any case, the main liberalization was not in these regulations
but simply in the quantity of imports allowed for items not on the ban-
ned list. Even in this respect, by 1969 there were many complaints
about shortages of maintenance imports by firms in industries with
priority under import policies, especially ones which were trying to
expand production.
M. Special Provisions for Supply of Tradable Inputs for Export
Production
The discussion in this chapter indicates that in the absence of
special provisions for exporters or offsetting subsidies, there would
have been substantial negative protection of value added for export in
many Indian engineering industries because of supply conditions for
tradable inputs. Apart from providing general export subsidies, which
were discussed in Chapter III.C, the government took a number of
I
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measures to reduce the cost or increase the availability of tradable
inputs for export production. These subsidies and their shortcomings
from the point of view of eliminating or offsetting negative protec-
tion are discussed here. Criticisms of the measures from the point
of view of efficiency are considered in Chapter VIII.A.
1. Concessional Prices of Domestic Materials for Export Production
Because of government action, several indigenously produced ma-
terials were supplied at concessional or even international prices for
export production. There were schemes for pig iron and mild steel,
aluminum, and PVC resin.
a. Iron and Steel
Pig iron, mild steel, and tinplate produced in India were sup-
plied at concessional prices for export production from December 1958
to devaluation, That scheme was suspended at devaluation.
Beginning in May 1967 exporters of engineering goods (excluding
primary iron and steel) received a subsidy equal to the difference in
cost at Indian and international prices of pig iron, mild steel, and
tinplate manufactured in India by the integrated steel producers and
used in export production. Indian prices were taken as the control
prices and extras. The international price of pig iron was taken as
the f.o.b. price of Indian exports and that of mild steel was taken
as the London Metal Bulletin price minus 2.5 percent, minus an addi-
tional $4 per ton for untested quality, with Benelux extras.
Until the relevant international prices rose above Indian
I i
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control prices in October 1969, eliminating the subsidy except on cold
rolled and galvanized sheets, this export subsidy was important for
products for which mild steel was a major input. The data in Table IV-
19 indicate that subsidies were 8 to 35 percent of the international
prices (6 to 22 percent of the Indian control prices) for different
categories of steel in mid-1969. For engineering goods excluding
iron and steel, the subsidy averaged about 3 percent of the f.o.b.
value of exports. For certain products with relatively low value
added, the subsidy was 8 to 14 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports.
(See Table 111-7.)
This scheme did not enable exporters to get the entire iron and
mild steel content of their exports at international prices, and con-
sequently did not eliminate negative protection. First, the subsidy
was paid only if the exporter could prove that the iron and steel was
manufactured by the main steel mills. Exporters generally could not
collect in the case of steel which they purchased in the open market
or from re-rollers (other than ones approved under the scheme) when
they could not wait for supplies from the main producers or because
the main producers did not manufacture the item, e.g. wire. Even
when they could collect for open market purchases, they were not re-
imbursed for the difference between open market and control prices.
Because of problems in proving its origin, generally they could not
collect for steel used by suppliers of components.
Second, the subsidy covered the difference between Indian con-
trol and LMB prices, but according to the EEPC:
345
TABLE IV-19
Subsidy of Domestic Steel Price for Exporters of Engineering Goods,
April - September 1969
Category of steel Subsidy as Percent of London
Metal Bulletin Price
Wire rods 7.9
Bars and rods 10.0
Structurals 21.4
Plates 8.0
Sheets
Hot rolled 20.6
Cold rolled 26.0
Galvanized 35.2
Skelp 21.5
Source: Data from GOI, JPC.
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LMB quotations are not representative of world prices of
steel as Japan is reported to be selling steel in the inter-
national market at much lower rates than LMB (London Metal
Bulletin) price. 1
Third, interviews revealed that because of the paperwork and
liaison involved in applying for this subsidy, often producers of
items with a low iron and steel content or a low export volume did not
bother to apply. Finally, the subsidy was paid only after exports
were made and often was delayed several months.
In spite of these reservations, the subsidy reduced the nega-
tive protection of value added for export resulting from higher
Indian prices of iron and steel to a relatively minor level in 1967-
1969. Particularly in 1969-1970, the major difficulty related to
supply conditions for steel was not price but availability, except
to the extent firms were able to resort to the open market for limited
additional supplies. In fact, the scheme tended to reduce the effec-
tive price of steel below the c.i.f. import price. The government
intended the scheme as a means of providing steel to Indian exporters
at the prices at which their competitors abroad could buy it, and
hence the international price used was f.o.b. Europe rather than c.i.f.
India.
After October 1969 the above scheme was no longer important
because international prices rose above Indian control prices. How-
ever, in 1970 it was reported that $8 million of imported steel would
1 GOI, EEPC, 1969a, p. 7.
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be supplied to exporters of engineering goods "at JPC (control) prices
irrespective of the landed cost, which is generally higher than home
prices at present."l
Thus, in 1970 both Indian and imported mild steel were supplied
to exporters of engineering goods at subsidized prices below the rele-
vant international f.o.b. or c.i.f. prices. As noted below, however,
exporters often faced considerable difficulties and delays in securing
supplies.
b. Aluminum
In 1969 there were discussions between the government and pro-
ducers to arrange for supply of aluminum at international prices for
production of electric cables for export. Apparently this was put
into operation on a limited scale late in 1969. During 1969 Madras
Aluminium supplied $0.4 million of aluminum rods at concessional
prices for production of ACSR conductors for export.
c. PVC Resin
In 1967 the Ministry of Commerce announced that indigenously
produced PVC resin, PVC sheets, and polyethylene moulding powder would
be supplied to exporters at international prices. In 1969 manufacturers
of insulated cables reported that they were able to obtain PVC resin
under this scheme, and NOCIL reported supplying $70,000 worth of PVC
resin on these terms.
FE, 10 May 1970, p. 8.
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d. Winding Wires
In 1967 manufacturers of winding wires agreed to give a price
concession to manufacturers of electric equipment like fans, motors,
and transformers for export. However, in 1969 a number of winding
wire manufacturers were not giving the concession.
2. Priority Access to Rationed Ddmestic Materials for Export Production
Distribution of a number of domestically produced materials was
subject to government controls, and the government set priorities and
minimum quotas for allocation of such materials at control prices for
export production. Because of excess demand for materials at control
prices and high open market prices, to the extent that they were imple-
mented these schemes were important export subsidies.
Prior to devaluation the government allocated 133 percent of
the actual input of iron, mild steel, and tinplate for export pro-
duction on a priority basis. In March 1966 the government announced
that the following materials were to be supplied on a priority basis
for export production: iron and steel, aluminum, cycle tires, tubes,
and rims, natural and synthetic rubber, rayon tire cord, PVC and PVC
resins, and polyethylene and polyethylene moulding powder. After
devaluation in 1966 the government specified that iron and steel would
be allocated for export production with priority second only to mili-
tary requirements. It also specified minimum quotas of certain cate-
gories of steel that would be reserved exclusively for export produc-
tion. The additional 33 percent allocation was eliminated at
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devaluation, however.
HSL reported that it supplied the following quantities of iron
and steel against export priorities:
Year Pig Iron Steel ('000 tons)
1967-68 2.4 20.3
1968-69 5.6 62.4
1969-70 27.7 93.9
1970-71 (9 mo.) 15.6 118.0
The figures for 1970-71 include imported steel allocated, evidently at
Indian control prices and not requiring replenishment licenses, through
HSL.
Comparison of the figures for 1969-70 to the EEPC's estimate
that 75,000 tons of pig iron and 310,000 tons of mild steel were re-
quired for production of engineering goods for export in 1969-702 indi-
cates that as much as one-third of the iron and steel used was obtained
under the priority scheme from HSL, or perhaps half allowing for supplies
3
from TISCO and IISCO. Important exporters of cast iron spun pipes and
steel tubes reported in 1969 that because of the scheme they secured
larger allocations, faster deliveries, and in the case of pig iron,
higher quality materials than were available for production for the
domestic market.
IFE, 4 March 1971, p. 4.
GOI, EEPC, 1969 a, p. 1.
3This may be an overestimate, since the tonnage figures for HSL
may include billets supplied to re-rollers for production of steel
bars and rods for export. The latter exports are not included in the
EEPC figures.
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In 1967 the government allocated tires, tubes, and rims to
bicycle exporters. In 1970 it reserved 11,000 tons of aluminum,
about 7 percent of total output, for production of electric cables
for export.
Given material supply constraints on production and high open
market premia above control prices (see Table IV-5), such discrimina-
tion in favor of exports was an important export subsidy. It was prob-
ably a significant factor in shifting the allocation of resources from
production of engineering goods for the domestic market to production
for export, at least beginning in 1969-70.
However, while this priority scheme relamed steel supply con-
straints for export production, iron and steel were not always avail-
able at control prices for export production. The EEPC and a number
of producers reported that frequently iron and mild steel were not
supplied on the basis of requirements for export production and that
exporters were forced to buy steel in the open market and to reject
orders, particularly between early 1969 and late 1970.
In 1968 a government report found that:
The scheme for the allotment of indigenous raw materials
and intermediates to export units on a priority basis has
not been working satisfactorily. Many exporting units
are stated to have complained that they were not getting
timely supply of indigenous raw materials to execute
export orders on schedule. 1
One limit on the priority allocations of iron and steel was that they
GOI, LSS, 1968, p. 194. See also Iron and Steel Review,
August 1967, p. 7, for a similar report.
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applied only to so-called "scarce" categories, mainly flat products,
and not to "non-scarce" categories, while in fact there were short-
ages of the latter as well. In addition, according to the EEPC, in
the case of scarce categories:
Although export orders are enjoying priority, the present
system of allocating is defective. Orders are to be re-
ported (to the Steel Priority Committee, which assigns
priorities) at least two and a half months before the start
of the half-yearly period for which priority is accorded.
After getting priority, supplies are supposed to be avail-
able within six months. However, supplies have never been
made in full during (the) six months for which the priority
is given (i.e. 8 1/2 to 14 1/2 months after the original
order)...There is always a heavy backlog before the supplies
against new priority are taken up. There is no machinery to
take care of urgent orders...Furthermore...while priority
is given in...allotment, there is no priority...to...produc-
tion...with the result that even the common categories are
not available for export fabrication in time.1
In 1969 a manufacturer of transformers reported that although
it received some supplies of steel plates at cpntrol prices, these
were not supplied on the basis of exports and were not adequate to
cover requirements for export. Consequently, it was forced to pur-
chase steel in the open market for export production. Similarly, it
was reported that:
Although, in theory, there are provisions for the supply to
wagon manufacturers of steel for execution of overseas
orders, in many cases in practice punctual supplies are not
ICapital, 15 January 1970, p. 86. Parentheses added. See also
GOI, EEPC, HE, 1 May 1969, pp. 123-24. In 1970 the government announced
some changes in the priority allocation system which may have improved
supply conditions. The distinction between scarce and non-scarce cate-
gories was abolished and priority was to be assigned to all, priority
was to be assigned every 3 instead of every 6 months, and priority was
to apply to production as well as distribution. GOI, JPC, Bulletin,
May-June 1970.
352
made, thus making it necessary for the manufacturers to pur-
chase steel at a high price.'
According to the EEPC, exports of engineering goods would have
been greater in 1969-70 and 1970-71 if steel had been readily avail-
able to exporters at the control prices or if imports had been allowed
freely for export production. The EEPC stated that because of the
delays in supply of steel and uncertainty about the future supply,
execution of existing contracts was delayed and acceptance of new
contracts was deterred. In fact, the EEPC argued that shortage of
steel after early 1969 was the major explapation of the slow-down in
the growth of exports of engineering goods in 1969-70.2
It was reported that:
Shipments against the Burma orders of Rs. 80 lakhs ($1.07 mil-
lion) should have started in June (1969). These orders were
not executed in June because of the non-availability of fish-
plate-quality billets. The Kuwait government's huge orders
for transmission line towers remain unimplemented because of
the steel famine. Some export contract holders cannot supply
railway track materials owing to the critical shortage of
billets. The execution of many other orders has been delayed
for the same reason.
Similarly, it was reported in April 1969 that "an engineering unit in
Poona with a captive foundry has had to defer its exports owing to non-
4
receipt of pig iron since December (1968)," and it was reported that
1Engineering Times, 18 June 1970, p. 5.
2FE, 8 January 1971, p. 8.
ABP, 10 July 1969, p. 1.
4FE, 16 April 1969.
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in 1969-70 execution of TE~XACO's $7.7 million contract for supply of
railway wagons to Hungary was delayed by non-availability of steel.'
It was reported that the cement machinery industry "is not able to
export aggressively, despite some success in winning export orders,
because of government's tardiness in making imports of, for example,
boiler-quality plates available." 2
Bharat Steel Tubes stated in 1970 that:
Forty per cent of our capacity is lying idle...A good deal of
this could go abroad...Selling in overseas markets has never
been a major problem for us...It may sound odd that while we
can sell more abroad we are not able to do so. Reason?
Shortage of raw materials, (mild steel) strip and skelp.3
In the government distribution policy for hot rolled strips and skelp
for 1970-71, 50,000 tons was allocated for production of tubes for
export (compared to 100,000 tons used for export production in 1969-
1970), to be "distributed to all exporters on the basis of their best
average monthly exports over a continuous period of 12 months during
the calendar years 1968 and 1969." There was no way to get additional
domestic supplies of strips and skelp for export production, since the
rest was allocated by end-use with prohibitions on redistribution, e.g.
supplies allocated for production of tubes for the domestic market
could not be shifted to production for export even by the same firm. 4
1Engineering Times, 8 October 1970, p. 5.
2 EPW, 6 March 1971, p. 557. See also Commerce, 13 March 1971.
3FE, 5 April 1970, p. 7. See also ABP, 1 May 1969, and FE,
19 May 1970, p. 1, and 13 September 1970.
GOI, JPC, Bulletin, May-June 1970, p. 9.
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In spite of the shortage of domestically produced steel,
import restrictions were not liberalized and no special provisions
were made to allow import of mild steel for export production until
1970-71. Import of some categories of mild steel sheets and strips
was allowed using import replenishment licenses, but for products
for which supplies of steel were an important constraint on produc-
tion, the replenishment rates were much lower than the actual steel
requirement at c.i.f. prices, e.g. the replenishment rate was 5 per-
cent of f.o.b. value on non-galvanized steel pipes, for which the
c.i.f. import price of steel content was about two-thirds of the
f.o.b. price of exports. In other cases import of the material was
not even allowed under the replenishment licenses which were issued,
e.g. pig iron in the case of exports of iron castings.
During 1970, $8 million of mild steel flat products was
imported through HSL for production of engineering goods for export
and in an important step in September 1970 the government announced
that exporters could import the entire requirement of mild steel for
production against confirmed export orders or half the mild steel
requirements of exports made in 1969-70, whichever was greater.
Evidently these imports were allowed without use of import replenish-
ment licenses. If the EEPC's analysis of the role of steel shortages
in 1969-70 was correct, this measure should have led to an expansion
of engineering exports in 1971; at the time of writing, export data
were not available. Imports were also liberalized for production
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for the domestic market, but to a lesser extent.
3. Import Replenishment Licenses
Licenses for maintenance imports were issued against exports of
engineering goods under the import replenishment scheme, which was dis-
cussed in Chapter III.C.2. These licenses gave preferential access to
tradable inputs for export production and hence reduced or eliminated
several aspects of negative protection for export.
a. Free Foreign Exchange
Replenishment licenses allowed import of the direct current
import content of exports in addition to imports allowed under other
licenses, and these additional imports were allowed against free for-
eign exchange. This eliminated the supply constraint on direct current
imported inputs and their excess cost under source-tied licenses.
b. Higher Import of Non-Banned Items
When an input was produced in India but import was not yet
banned because of the limited domestic supply, the import replenish-
ment scheme sometimes allowed import of the entire input requirement
for export production while local procurement of some or all of the
input was required for production for the domestic market.
This provision was most important for alloy and special steels.
For example, while manufacturers of steel wire ropes were required to
procure locally half the high carbon steel wire rods used for produc-
tion for the domestic market, they could import the entire requirement
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for export production under the replenishment scheme. The situation
was similar for bright steel bars and shaftings, steel-reinforced
aluminum conductors, and hand, small, and cutting tools.
c. Permission to Import Banned Items
Exporters were permitted to import items which were banned for
production for the domestic market in four situations. First, the
Ministry of Foreign Trade announced that:
A component, which might be produced indigenously but was of
substandard quality would be allowed to be imported if it
went into the manufacture of a finished product meant for
export.2
A manufacturer of bearings reported that under the replenishment scheme
it was permitted to import small grinding wheels, which were ordinarily
banned in spite of low quality of local supplies.
Second, import was allowed for export production when import
was otherwise banned in spite of lack of domestic production in order
to encourage use of a substitute available domestically or because the
end-use was considered non-essential. Tire manufacturers were per-
mitted to import nylon tire cord for export production while they were
forced to use locally produced rayon tire cord for the domestic market,
cable manufacturers were permitted to import copper and lead for use
in place of indigenous aluminum and PVC, electric fan manufacturers
1For announcements to this effect, see ABP, 24 December 1968;
and GOI, EEPC, HB, 23 January 1969, p. 979, and 10 April 1969, p. 31.
2FE 22 December 1968.
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were permitted to import gadgets like time/speed switches not allowed
for the domestic market, and a machinery manufacturer was permitted
to import a particular type of temperature control because the foreign
buyer insisted on it.
Third, without explaining the basis for doing so, the govern-
ment permitted import of a number of inputs only under replenishment
licenses issued against exports. (See Table III-10.)
Fourth, the government permitted import of machines in certain
cases when they were necessary to produce goods to the specifications
required in export markets. This was true of machinery for manufac-
ture of certain parts for electric fans.
d. Residual Negative Protection
The import replenishment scheme reduced or eliminated certain
important aspects of negative protection for export. It gave some
industries virtually free access to imports of current tradable inputs
for export production. However, for several reasons the schemes did
not allow exporters to obtain all tradable inputs at the supply con-
ditions in international markets.
First, the criterion of indigenous availability applied to
clearances of imports for export production. Imports were permitted
only when an item was not produced locally, when the quantity of local
production was inadquate to meet the requirements of export production
as well as production for the domestic market, or when local supplies
were inferior in quality. Price differences were not a basis for
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permitting imports. Furthermore, export products were not exempted from
domestic content requirements or other regulations which encouraged or
forced firms to develop local sources or their own captive facilities
for virtually all components. As a result, apart from being allowed to
import at most a relatively small number of parts for which local sup-
plies were of low quality, exporters of assembled products were still
required to make or procure components in India, regardless of price
differentials. The percentage of items on the banned list whose import
was allowed for export production was miniscule.
Second, imports of some important materials, including iron and
steel, were restricted in spite of domestic shortages, and no special
provisions were made to allow imports for export production (until 1970-
71 in the case of steel) even though production and export evidently
were constrained by their supply conditions.
Third, quality problems were not eliminated. Imports were not
allowed in the case of some inputs for which complaints about quality
were universal, e.g. foundry pig iron and grey iron castings. Although
machine tool producers complained that the accessories made in India
for their machines were low in quality and reported that "complaints
have been received from our agents and customers abroad that the
quality of accessories is not up to the quality of machines,"'2
1For the first time, the import trade control policy for 1971-72
explicitly contemplated licensing of imports when "the price (of the
indigenous substitute) is too high to maintain the competitive strength
of the export product." FE, 1 May 1971, p. i.
2HMT, "Comments," August 1969, p. 5.
359
accessories were on the banned list during 1969 even for export pro-
duction on the grounds of indigenous availability. Similarly, ex-
porters of machine tools and bicycles received complaints from for-
eign customers about discoloration, cracking, and chipping of paint,
which was also on the banned list. Steelsworth complained that import
of vital stainless steel parts for tea-processing machines was banned
in 1969-70 even for export production, although deliveries from the
only local manufacturer were irregular and supplies were of undepend-
able quality. Manufacturers of fans had similar complaints concern-
ing bearings.
Fourth, the import replenishment licenses were generally given
only after exports were shipped, and sometimes only after additional
delays. There was a provision for issuing import licenses before
production was undertaken in the case of firm export orders, but ex-
porters reported difficulty in securing such advance licenses. Because
of these problems of timing, imported materials had to be purchased
at a premium in the open market, sales in the domestic market had to
be deferred to produce for export, and firms declined export orders.
According to a press report, Zenith Steel Pipes
....is entitled to import zinc from preferential sources
(i.e. from whatever source it prefers, against replenish-
ment licenses) but the import licenses for zinc and spare
parts have been unduly delayed with the result that the
company has had to make purchases from indigenous sources
at a very high cost. 1
'Capital, 24 July 1969, p. 149. Parenthesis added. See also
Capital, 31 March 1966, p. 445.
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The Textile Machinery Manufacturers' Association reported that
after they booked an order from the UAR in 1969 for $6.3 million of
textile machinery, its members applied for but did not receive licenses
to import materials and components prior to export. To meet the con-
tractual delivery date,
...the members used up their actual user licenses to meet
export orders...Due to this, the home market was being
starved as the necessary raw materials and components to
meet the local demand were utilized for exports.1
Moreover, it reported that some members "had to refuse export orders
due to uncertainty with regard to import of raw materials and compo-
nentsto meet contractual delivery periods. '2 Because materials could
not be ordered at the time export contracts were made, exporters were
forced to bear unnecessary risks with regard to their costs because
of fluctuations in material prices in the world market. When interna-
tional prices of materials were rising, as they were in 1969-70, mate-
rials could be replaced only at much higher prices than if licenses
had been given at the time of production.
Fifth, permission to import banned items for export production
was granted only after delays and liaison efforts by manufacturers.
Sixth, there were many individual cases where a restriction in
licensing made it impossible to use replenishment licenses to secure
a particular tradable input at the c.i.f. import price even though
1 FE, 16 January 1971, p. 10.
2Ibid., p. 8
.
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import was not banned. The tire industry complained that replenish-
ment licenses for materials whose import was monopolized by the STC
were valid only for purchase from the STC at prices above the minimum
import price. An exporter reported that when there was excess supply
of indigenous zinc import was temporarily restricted even under the
replenishment scheme for exporters to force firms to buy indigenous
zinc at a price above that of imports. Manufacturers reported that,
although stainless steel was not on the banned list and there was a
domestic shortage:
The present import policy...does not permit import of stain-
less steel against export of textile machinery, parts of
which are manufactured out of stainless steel.
Finally, there were no general provisions for supply of capital
goods for export production at the terms at which imports would have
been available or for discrimination in supply conditiions for capital
goods between export production and production for the domestic market.
There was no relaxation in indigenous non-availability requirements, no
refund of the 27.5 percent import tariff, and no relaxation of source-
tying of licenses. Import licenses for capital goods were sometimes
used as ad hoc export incentives, and a limited share of replenishment
licenses could be used to import capital goods, including ones required
to produce parts to specifications for export. However, these special
'E, 6 October 1970, p. 8.
2Association of Merchants and Manufacturers of Textile Stores and
Machinery, Commerce, 5 December 1970, p. vii. See also FE, 17 January
1971.
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provisions for exporters were limited and ad hoc and bore no rational
or consistent relation to the capital goods requirements of export
production.
4. Effective Protection of Value Added for Export
The rate of effective protection of value added for export
depends on the extent of negative protection discussed in the present
chapter and the extent of subsidization discussed in Chapter III.C.
The usual formula for the rate of effective protection has limited use-
fulness since the only aspect of material supply conditions which
enters the calculation is the difference between costs at which trad-
able inputs are procured or produced indigenously and their c.i.f.
import prices. In fact, indirect effects of material supply problems
on costs, especially because of lower utilization of capacity and
higher inventories, may be greater than the direct effect of higher
prices of materials. Moreover, while calculations of effective pro-
tection emphasize current inputs, many of the problems faced by Indian
firms relate to capital goods. If the purpose of the calculations is
to determine the effect of government policies influencing supply con-
ditions for tradable inputs on the allocation of resources and on the
real cost of foreign exchange earned by export, such problems are as
relevant as higher prices of current inputs.
A further difficulty arises because it has not been possible to
quantify the subsidy value of all the preferences given to exporters.
Preferences given to firms exporting a small share of output could
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have a greater subsidy value than cash subsidies and import replenish-
ment licenses. However, since all preferences given were available to
firms exporting 10-25 percent of output, it is possible to avoid this
problem by confining the discussion to the rate of effective protec-
tion which would apply at the margin for firms exporting over 25 per-
cent of output.
In order to calculate the higher cost of tradable inputs in
India, inputs can be divided into three groups: imported inputs, indig-
enously produced inputs purchased in India, and value added in India
by vertically integrated firms producing their own tradable inputs.
Considering only current inputs used directly by the firm, imported
inputs and certain indigenously produced purchased materials including
iron and mild steel were available to exporters at international prices,
with the reservations noted above. As a result, it can be concluded
that after allowing for cash subsidies and the "net" subsidy value of
the import replenishment scheme (e.g. the value of licenses permitting
imports beyond the actual import content of exports) there was positive
effective protection of value added for export in the first eleven
industries listed in Table II-1 with the exception of aluminum ingots.
The calculation for these industries is simple because they were able
to secure their main inputs either by import or in India at interna-
tional prices and because they do not depend on ancillary suppliers
for parts.
The situation is much more complex for the remaining items,
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which include a number of assembled products. Many of these relied
on parts purchased in India or produced the parts themselves at costs
above the c.i.f. price of imports. The motor vehicle industry pro-
vides a useful example because of its heavy dependence on ancillary
suppliers and also on many alloy steels which were not supplied to
exporters at international prices. Krueger presents data on the
ratio between the domestic ex-factory price and Indian f.o.b. export
price and on the rate of effective protection for the domestic market
for five motor vehicle producers.1 Assuming that at international
prices value added was half of the f.o.b. value of exports, from this
data it can be inferred that the excess of procurement costs over the
c.i.f. import prices for current tradable inputs for five producers
was 25., 28, 38, 40, and 60 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports
respectively.
In the period 1968-1969 to which these data apply, exporters of
motor vehicles received a cash subsidy of 17.5 percent of the f.o.b.
value of exports, an import replenishment license with a cash value
of about 10 percent of f.o.b. value, and a subsidy of steel costs and
refund of indirect taxes which together were probably about 10 percent
of f.o.b. value. The value of export subsidies therefore was between
35 and 40 percent of f.o.b. value.
It can be concluded that for the first four producers the rate
of effective protection of value added for export was between zero and
LKrueger, 1970, p. 110.
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10 percent of f.o.b. value or roughly zero to 20 percent of value
added. For the last producer, the rate of effective protection was
negative.
These calculations do not allow for cases where the producers
of motor vehicles manufactured tradable inputs themselves at a cost
greater than the c.i.f. price of imports as a result of the govern-
ment's import licensing policy. Moreover, none of these calculations
allow for factors other than higher prices of current inputs, e.g.
quality problems, underutilized capacity because of material shortages,
high inventory requirements, or problems associated with the supply of
capital goods, or for problems collecting export subsidies. It seems
quite likely that if effective protection is defined to include all
these, the rate of effective protection of value added for export was
negative for motor vehicles and a significant number of other indus-
tries in the case of exports beyond 10-25 percent of output if not
for the first 10-25 percent as well.
__
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CHAPTER V
DESIGN PROBLEMS
This chapter examines the following questions concerning the
designs of engineering goods produced in India in the 1960s:
(i) whether the designs were the most efficient ones available for
the industries concerned from the point of view of minimizing the
domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned by export;
(ii) whether the designs were more efficient for export to develop-
ing countries than those of products manufactured by competitors in
developed countries; (iii) whether the designs were modified to
increase the profitability of export; and (iv) whether government
policies reduced the incentive or ability of firms to secure the
best available foreign designs, to adopt subsequent design improve-
ments made abroad, to adapt designs to local conditions and under-
take other indigenous designing activities, or to modify designs for
export. The chapter begins with a review of the sources of Indian
designs.
Since problems of design do not arise for commodity-like
products, the chapter is restricted to machinery, including capital
and consumer goods. Special emphasis is given to machine tools. The
industries considered in detail were almost all among India's major
exporters of engineering goods at the end of the 1960s (see Table II-
17), and the firms were among the largest producers and exporters in
~
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these industries (see Table II-18).
A. Sources of Designs
This section reviews the roles of indigenous designing and for-
eign technical collaboration as sources of designs. Background data
on foreign investment and technical collaboration were presented in
Chapter II.D.
1. Indigenous Designing
A 1967 government-sponsored report states:
The twin aspects of research and developent and of design and
engineering underscore an important deficiency in our indus-
trial development plans. We have till now placed emphasis on
the physical appurtenances of the productive apparatus such as
factory building, civil works, plant and machinery, operating
personnel, raw materials, components, etc. But we have not
paid adequate attention to the 'back room' personnel--in the
laboratories and in the drawing and design offices. 1
Although Indian companies produced a wide range of machinery
with little direct import of components, their involvement with not
only basic research but applied designing was very limited. Moreover,
while there were two government institutes concerned with research in
mechanical engineering, they were allocated few resources and their
impact on commercial production was very small.
1GOI, MIDCA, 1967, pp. 12-13.
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a. Designing Activity of Manufacturing Firms
Kidron reports that:
While there are some firms which find it necessary to adapt
their products or methods to local needs, and so undertake
a modicum of development research, this is usually done on
a modest scale if at all and for strictly limited ends.
Fundamental research and major developments in the private
sector are, with perhaps the sole exception of Tata, a
foreign responsibility.1
With few exceptions, at the end of the 1960s Indian companies
producing mechanical, electrical, and transport equipment did virtu-
ally no original designing, and even imitative designing was limited
in scope. Apart from simple products, they depended almost entirely
on foreign collaboration for initial designs and subsequent improve-
ments. There was not only little effort to develop indigenous designs
rather than rely on foreign collaboration but little adaptation and
improvement of the foreign designs which were used. This was true
even for large firms with more than a decade of production experience
and in major industries such as stationary diesel engines and cotton
textile machinery.2 Many large firms had what they called a develop-
ment department, but their activities were typically limited to the
following: 3
'Kidron, 1965, p. 287. At the end of the 1960s, TELCO, which
was the largest producer of engineering goods, probably had the largest
program for research and development.
2See, for example, GOI, MIDCA, 1969, p. 21 (cement machinery)
and p. 64; GOI, MIDCA, 1968b, Textile Machinery, p. 19; Metallurgical
Equipment, p. 38; Electric Power Equipment, p. 27; Agricultural Machin-
ery, Diesel Engines, p. 5.
3See also the discussion of Baranson's 1970 survey of design
modifications in part V.C.
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(i) Because of the import restrictions discussed in Chapter IV, they
did what was necessary to increase the indigenous content of products
manufactured under foreign collaboration. The departments concentrated
on finding, and if necessary developing, local suppliers of materials
and components to replace imports, testing local supplies, and investi-
gating the use of indigenous substitutes for imported materials with
different specifications. These activities were aimed not at design
improvement but at procurement problems created by government import
restrictions, although changes in designs or material specifications
were sometimes required to overcome these procurement problems.
(ii) They designed fittings and other secondary items required for
specific applications of products manufactured to designs secured
under foreign collaboration, largely as a matter of customer service.
(iii) In industries which manufactured products against individual
orders, including structural engineering and heavy equipment and spe-
cial-purpose machine tools, there was local designing and engineering,
although foreign engineering consulting firms were often used.
Both (ii) and (iii) were necessary to sell machinery involving
unique individual applications.1 For general-purpose equipment there
was no comparable designing activity.
Nevertheless, a significant minority of Indian output of machin-
ery was manufactured without foreign collaboration. Although there
1For a related account of project engineering in Brazil which
notes that "imported and domestic know-how have been complementary
rather than competitive," see Leff, 1968, pp. 91-92.
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were exceptions, one can make the following generalizations about these
"indigenously designed" products:
(a) They were generally close if not identical copies of products which
were previously imported. Designing involved imitation, not innovation
or adaptation to local conditions.
(b) They were relatively simple products which did not require advanced
manufacturing techniques. They were used mainly by consumers, farmers,
workshops and small producers, or technical schools and seldom included
items like production machinery used by large firms, motor vehicles and
ancillary items used as original equipment, or electronics. They were
limited to items like sewing machines and fans, small stationary diesel
engines, small machine tools like lathes and drilling machines, and
items simpler than these.
(c) Because of (a) and (b), there were few engineering products manu-
factured in India without foreign collaboration which were not produced
in advanced countries a decade or two earlier. With regard to the
machine tools produced in the early 1950s, a chief engineer of HMT
reported that "among machine tool builders, none had any design office
worth the name in the post-Independence period. Most of them had pre-
war designs of machines, mostly of English origin." It was reported
by the Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute that prior to
its own work, most efforts to produce cable-making machinery without
foreign collaboration "have been in the way of copying existing
1 Machine Tool Engineer, April-June 1968, p. 20.
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machines. These local efforts have suffered from the fact that only
simpler and older types of machines have been manufactured."
'  There
were a large number of small workshops, particularly in the Punjab,
which manufactured engineering goods of the type described without
foreign collaboration and with a total annual turnover of $100,000 or
considerably less. According to the chairman of the Indian Machine
Tools Development Council:
Whilst the larger machine tool units in the industry can
afford to buy sophisticated designs and technical know-
how from foreign countries, the small units, with their
limited resources, have restricted their production activ-
ity to copying of imported machines. Some of th se are
old in design, and...their productivity is poor.
In the organized sector, production without foreign licenses
was most common in firms which began production of engineering goods
prior to the first plan without foreign equity participation. It was
common for large firms manufacturing such products to manufacture other
more complicated goods with foreign collaboration.
There was little evidence that development of production was
accompanied by an increase in designing. Much of the imitative design
activity occurred in the early phase of import substitution before the
second plan. As import substitution moved to more complicated products
in the second plan, firms no longer copied imported goods on their own.
Indigenous designing played a negligible role in the diversification of
1 India in Industries, March 1967, pp. 29-30.
2Central Machine Tool Institute, 1966, p. 7.
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Indian engineering industries after the mid-1950's, even at firms which
started by imitating foreign products.1 Furthermore, foreign collabora-
tion agreements seldom included provisions for assistance in estab-
lishing design facilities at Indian firms. Typically when foreign col-
laboration agreements expired, firms applied for renewal or for collab-
oration with another firm on the grounds that they wanted to extent
their product range, and such applications were generally approved.
Even at firms which engaged in designing, products manufactured
without foreign collaboration accounted for a relatively small share of
output. In 1968-69, less than 10 percent of output at HMT and 6 percent
of output at Bharat Electronics was accounted for by indigenously
designed products.2
Not all Indian companies engaged in even the limited design
activity described above; many did no designing. In the machine tool
industry, this seems to have been particularly true of firms set up
during the third plan to manufacture a limited range of products with
substantial foreign equity participation and production capacity under
$1.5 million per year.
The available data confirm that expenditures on research and
development, including a number of activities besides designing, by
Indian manufacturing firms were very low. A 1964 study reported that
about 50 percent of the chemical and metalworking firms in India spent
1Compare the situation in Brazil described in Leff, 1968,
pp. 19, 90-91, 97-99.
2EE, 16 January 1970, p. 117. The situation at HMT is discussed
below.
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nothing on research, about 25 percent spent less than 0.1 percent of
turnover, and the remaining 25 percent spent an average of 0.25 per-
cent of turnover. The study concluded that the average R & D expendi-
ture of Indian industry did not exceed 0.1 percent of turnover. 1
According to a 1970 report by the Committee on Science and Technology,
"the private contribution to R & D is small and is estimated at about
0.2 percent of the turnover of industry."2 In the case of firms with
foreign licenses, Kapoor reports the findings of a 1965 survey:
There is hardly any R & D activity by Indian licensees. Less
than 5 per cent of the respondents (licensees) claimed to be
engaged in any development activity while not even 2 per cent
were engaged in research ....The 5 per cent of the respondents
engaged in some form of R & D activity are the large companies
with an industrial background...Though 5 per cent of the re-
spondents are engaged in some sort of R & D, even these licen-
sees became nearly completely dependent on the licensors'
R & D in the licensed area.3
D. Designing Activity at HMT
HMt was one of the relatively few Indian manufacturers of engi-
neering goods, and the only machine tool company, which had a signifi-
cant design program for general-purpose equipment. In 1968, HMT re-
ported that about 250 engineers and draughtsmen were engaged in
IESRF, 1964.
2Reported in Commerce, 19 December 1970, p. 1272, which states
that the amount spent by industry on R & D was $17 million excluding
capital expenditures in 1969-70. According to the head of the Council
of Scientific and Industrial Research, R & D expenditures by industry
in 1967 were $3.3 million. (FE, 16 December 1970, p. 7.) Apparently
these reports cover all manufacturing.
3Kapoor, 1968, pp. 30-31, based on results of a Council of
Scientific and Industrial Research survey of Indian industrial estab-
lishments reported in ET, 30 June 1965, p. 10, and 1 August 1965.
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designing new machines, improving existing ones, and converting and
following up license designs. About 100 of these were working on spe-
cial-purpose machines and related problems at the Hyderabad unit while
105 were at the Bangalore design center for general-purpose machines.
HBM reported an annual budget for current expenditures on development
activities of about $135,000, or somewhat less than 1 percent of its
turnover.
Initially in the 1950s HMT's design activities were limited to
follow-up work connected with machines produced under collaboration.
After establishing production of three machine families (H22 lathes,
M milling machines, and RM radial drills) under foreign collaboration
in 1956-58, a simpler lathe with many components in common with the
122 lathe was designed at HMT. Another simplified lathe was designed
at HEM by an engineer sent by a foreign collaborator. However, instead
of using these designs, HMT entered a new foreign collaboration for LB
lathes, which were produced in 1959.
In 1959-60 an engineer from a foreign collaborator designed a
pre-selection turret lathe (L22TP). The first product designed at HNT
which was put into commercial production, it was initially marketed in
1962-63, subsequently withdrawn because of defects, redesigned, and
finally marketed successfully.
The technical staff in design and development increased from 20
in 1960 to 100 in 1962, and HMT organized a training program for
designers and sent a number of engineers abroad to collaborators'
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factories for training in designing. During 1961-65, HMT designed
standardized drives for its machine tools and designed 13 machines.1
However, a number of these designs (the last six) were dropped
before prototypes were built, and HMT later entered a foreign collab-
oration for horizontal boring machines. Progress from the design stage
to commercial production on the others was slow. It was only in 1965-
1966 that HMl set up a separate workshop for manufacture of prototypes.
By 1968, only three (E2, Z35, and FB) had been produced commercially.
By 1969, two more (a redesigned GT20 and Z14) were marketed. As of
1969, the two others (R78 and VTM) were still in the prototype stage.
In addition to these early designs, after 1965 HM designed a
heavy-duty lathe (L45), a small cylindrical grinding machine (G9), and
a ram-turret milling machine (MlTR), all of which were scheduled to go
into commercial production in 1969-70.
Apart from developing its own designs, HMT expanded on the range
of machines produced under collaboration, including the H26 lathe in
1968 (a larger version of the H22) and the M2P and M2EP milling machines
in 1968 (simplified versions of the M2). HMT also redesigned a few of
its older machines, the M, G, and L22 series, to improve their export
potential. Finally, HMT was developing a horizontal boring machine
(AZ9) jointly with Pegard of Belgium.
1The machines designed were: carbide tool grinding and lapping
machine (GT20), fine boring machine (FB), short-piece turning machine
(Z14), heavy duty radial drill (R78), multi-spindle drilling machine
(Z35), electrically controlled knee-type milling machine (E2), vertical
copying machine (VTM), bed-type milling machine, duplex milling machine,
plano-milling machine, facing and centering machine, horizontal boring
machine (Z41), and center lathe.
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In spite of its designing efforts, at the end of the 1960s
production to its own designs (excluding the improved M and G machines
originally produced under foreign collaboration) accounted for less
than 10 percent of HMT's output, which was heavily concentrated in the
products licensed in the 1950s. Between 1957 and 1968, HMT made 19
foreign collaboration agreements for machine tools. (See Table VII-5.)
In most cases, the machine tools designed at HMT belonged to categories
already produced by it under collaboration. While a number of the
machines designed at HMT were not simple compared to the machine tools
produced by other Indian firms, they were all relatively simple by
international standards and did not exceed in complexity the machines
already produced at HMT under collaboration. Moreover, they involved
no innovations or design features not found on machines produced in
advanced countries.
Thus, in 1966 HT noted that "notwithstanding our efforts to
develop indigenous designs, there is still a vast area in which we
have to depend on foreign know-how," and at the end of 1968 HMT re-
ported that it did not have the know-how to develop its own designs
for machine tools of types it had not produced, at least within a
reasonable period of time. It almost invariably secured designs of
different categories and more sophisticated machine tools by collabora-
tion, e.g. presses, automatic lathes, and broaching machines, and it
relied exclusively on collaboration to diversify into production of
11MT, AR 1965-66, p. 12.
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wrist watches, tractors, printing presses, and die-casting machines.
C. Government-Sponsored Designing Activity
Little scientific research was done at Indian universities,
and very little of this was applied or technological.1 Rather than
support university research, the Indian government supported a very
limited program of industrial research and development by a system
of national laboratories. There was a great deal of criticism of
this research on the grounds that there was little contact between
the laboratories and industrial firms, that the laboratories did
little applied research, that there were almost no government facili-
ties for proceding from laboratory research to commercial production,
and that the results of research in the laboratories were seldom put
into commercial production.
An ESRF study estimated that the total value of industrial
production in 1963-64 based on know-how and designs provided by the
national laboratories in over a decade was about $11 million, or about
0.1-0.2 percent of the total.2  In 1968-69, 47 products with a total
value of slightly under $1 million were manufactured on the basis of
know-how from the National Chemical Laboratory, the oldest of the
laboratories.
According to the director of 0CHRI, the national laboratory
concerned with mechanical engineering, government expenditure for
1 See Shils, 1970, pp. 186-92.
2ESRF, 1964.
3ET,22 December 1969, p. 4.
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research on mechanical engineering during the third plan totalled
less than $6 million.I He stated:
Far too little research and development expenditure is allo-
cated in India's planned economy, the result is our near
total dependence on foreign technical know-how and collabora-
tions....The Planning Commission has pointed out that
Rs 250 crores were actually spent on research during the
Third Plan period...Then why no measurable contribution to
the Indian economy?...Out of a total spending of Rs 250
crores on research during the Third Plan, the mechanical
engineering research and developments received a mere
1.6 per cent allocation...We can, therefore, readily see
why Indian process know-how and scientific innovations are
not utilised by Indian industry.2
(1) Central Machine Tool Institute
The CMTI was set up by the government in 1962 with financial
and technical assistance from Czechoslovakia and moved into its own
buildings in 1965. It was set up with a $1 million grant from Czecho-
slovakia, and the Indian government allocated $3 million to expand it
in the fourth plan.
The CMTI designed a number of relatively simple machine tools,
attachments, and components, built and tested prototypes, and licensed
their commercial production at manufacturing firms. Except for two
items licensed to HMT, none of these were licensed to the top half
dozen Indian machine tool manufacturers, and at the end of the 1960s
the value of output produced under license from CMTI was a negligible
fraction (certainly less than 1 percent) of the output of the indus-
try.
1Apparently this figure refers to the budget of CMERI.
India in Industries, March 1967, pp. 26-27.
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The CMTI tested existing machines and prototypes of new ones
for a few firms and suggested modifications, and it redesigned the
drive of a planing machine and the rocker arm of a shaping machine.
It developed the prototype of a simple tape-input, 3-axis program-
control unit which could be fitted to milling machines, and it was
developing a simple digital readout system to permit accurate meas-
urement of machine movements.
In 1969 the CMTI's design and testing facilities were utilized
to only 30 percent of capacity by the machine tool industry. Many
firms in each size group did not use the facilities, even though they
did not have comparable facilities of their own and even though
charges were nominal. The payments made for licenses of CMTI designs
covered only 30 percent of the costs of developing the designs and
building a prototype. CMTI thus had little success in associating
manufacturers with its designing activities or getting them to use
its designs. By late 1969 CMTI had decided that to prove the feasi-
bility of using its designs it would undertake small-scale commercial
production of the items it designed in the hope that regular manufac-
turers would eventually decide to license production, and that the
CMTI would produce some of the difficult parts until the manufacturer
could produce them itself.
(2) Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute
The CIERI was established in 1958 as the main national labora-
tory concerned with research in mechanical engineering other than
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machine tools, and its first laboratory buildings were completed in
1963. With a staff of 600 in 1966-67 and a budget on the order of
$1 million per year, it was a good deal larger than the CMTI, but it
had a number of the same problems.
It successfully collaborated with a few Indian machinery manu-
facturers for development of machines. Its major project was design
of several cable-making machines in collaboration with machinery manu-
facturers and Hindustan Cables, a public sector cable manufacturer
which agreed to buy the first machines. However, only one cable pro-
ducer collaborated on this project, and in general the CMERI did not
find firms interested in its design activities even though it did not
charge the entire development costs on its projects. In 1969 HMT
rejected CMBRI's design and prototype for a 20 h.p. tractor in favor
of Czech collaboration. The major interest which firms had in CMERI
was not in designing but in solving the problems of local procurement
involved in reducing import content of machines produced under foreign
collaboration.
2. Foreign Collaboration
The preceding review of indigenous design activity showed that,
from the second plan, indigenous designing played a negligible role
in the diversification of production of engineering goods, which was
heavily dependent on foreign technical collaboration. This is sup-
ported by the data in Table II-13 on the number of foreign collabora-
tion agreements approved by the government. This situation reflected,
_ _I_ _
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on the supply side, a permissive government attitude toward foreign
technical collaboration until the late 1960s. According to the
report of the Dutt Committee, during the period 1956-1965:
In many cases collaborations have been permitted without
adequate Justification. Because of the advantage that the
foreign brand names provide...many firms have been inter-
ested in obtaining collaborations even in areas of produc-
tion where no great advantage by way of obtaining technical
know-how was to be gained...These include loud-speakers,
toys, sports goods, spectacle hinges, snap fasterners, ball
point pens, vacuum flasks, crockery, lipsticks and other
cosmetics, toothpaste and ready-made garments...Even repeti-
tive collaborations are allowed...They are also permitted to
be renewed.
To give a few examples about repetitive cctlaborations in terms
of numbers, we find that 56 collaborations were afproved in
the field of textile finishing, printing and dyeing, 23 for
cranes, 18 for electric motors and capacitors, 17 for trans-
formers and house service meters, 16 for foundries and 15
each for transistors and cement mill machinery....The ex-
amples given by us are adequate to indicate the prevalence
of repetitive collaborations in a number of products, some
of them entered into at different points of time and even
years after the industry was first established in the coun-
try....We are not certain that the differences in the tech-
nologies imported are so important as to justify the high
cost involved in repetitive collaborations.
A list of approximately similar products in which production
seems to be carried on both by firms who have foreign collab-
orations and by those who have not suggests that foreign col-
laborations are permitted in areas where it is not always
necessary for developing the particular line of production.
(The report lists 73 such items produced in 1966 including
bicycles, electric fans, electric motors, radios, domestic
refrigerators, steel furniture, razor blades, vacuum flasks,
umbrella ribs, zip fasteners, etc.)l
1GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, pp. 125, 130-32.
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3. Origin of Machine Tool Designs
Table V-I shows the sources of designs of machine tools pro-
duced in India in 1969 broken down by company and machine type. All
companies which had foreign technical collaboration or output of
$0.25 million per year are listed separately while the rest are grouped
together as "miscellaneous small companies without collaboration."
The latter accounted for on the order of 15 percent of the output of
the industry.1
4. Preferences for Foreign Collaboration
Firms reported several reasons that they found it profitable
to rely on foreign collaboration rather than indigenous designing:
(i) Time: Foreign collaboration eliminated the lead-time for design-
ing and testing and made it possible to start production using imported
components before domestic suppliers were established. In machinery
industries the lead-time required for domestic designing often would
have been at least three years.
(ii) Risk: Indigenous designing expenditures might not have led to
a commercially acceptable product, but the foreign designs had been
commercially tested abroad and in India through imports.
(iii) Marketing: Because foreign designs and brand names were known
in India and there was allegedly a general customer preference for
1In 1969 an industry spokesman estimated that output of small
machine tool units was $4 to $5 million per year. See IEA, HS 1969-
1970, p. 64.
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TABLE V -1
Sources of Designs of Machine Tools Produced in 1968
Company scale
Row Z
I. Metalcutting
A. Lathes
engine
.capstan, turret
automatic
B.
single-spindle
multi-spindle
copying
roll-turning
Column Miscellaneous Batala
E small companies . Engineering
without collabo- (cl .Bajajg
ration n.a.
small medium
IF I IF
IF
IF
IF
F
F
-
Batliboi
n-.a ..
n.a.
medium
IF
.1 F(1961,It)
.Drillin"
Bench, pillar I F I
column I F
radial I F I. F(Cz)
multi-spindle F.
tapping I I
Grinding
double-ended,
tool-cutter IF I
surface IP I
cylindrical I F I
crankshaft F
lapping F
polishing I
Milling
ram-turret I F
knee (mech) IF I I
knee (elect) I F F(Cz)
simplex, duplex F
Reciprocating
shaping I F I
slotting IF I
planing .. I F I ... F(1961,It ..............
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling P
f in e b o r in g I. .....F.. .. ... ....................................................
other
hacksaw I I
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
rF
---~--- 
~--~~-~~
--
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TABLE V -1 (continued)
Company scal
.Row Z
I. Metalcutting
A. Lathes
engine
capstan, turret
automatic
single-spindle
multi-spindle
copying
roll-turninq
B. Drillina
Bharat
Fritz Werner
-(c).. Birla .......
45% W.Ger n.a.
.e large
F
.... .. . ~ • . . . . ................
B.S.Mach- Cooper
ine Tools Engg.
n.a. (c) Walchand
n.a. 1935
medium large**
F IF
bench,pillar
column
radial
multi-spindlb F
tapping
Grinding
double-ended, tool-cutter F(1959,US)
surface F(1960,US)
cylindrical
crankshaft
lapping F(1960,US)
polishing
Milling
ram-turret F(1960,US)
knee (mech) .F(1961,WG) P(Dk)
knee (elect)
simplex ,duplex F
Reciprocating
shaping (1966)
slotting F(1959,Cz)
planing F(1958,UK)
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling F(1959,US)
fine boring.
Other
hacksaw
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
F(1961,WGj
F (1966,WG)
Ex-Cell-0 .
India
(b)80% US
1958
medium
F
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TABLE V'-I (continued)
Gedee
Weiler-
some W.Ger.
n.a.
Company scale small
Row E .F
I. Metalcutting ....... ........
A. Lathes
engine
capstan, turret.
automatic
single-spindle
multi-spindle
copying .
roll-turning
Harig
Malik
some US
n.La.
small
F
F* (WG)
F(WG)
Heavy Engg.Hindustan Machine
Corp. Tools
(a) Govt. (a) Government..
1966 1956
very large very large
F IF
F(Cz)
F*(Cz)
I F(1957,Sz;1959,Fr)
I F*(1966,WG)
F*(1964,Fr;1966,Fr)
F*(1966,WG)
F (1966,Fr)
Drilling
bench,pillar
column
radial F(C) I* F(1958,WG)
multi-spindle X
tapping
Grinding
double-ended, tool-cutter
surface F (US) F* (1961 ,EG)
cylindrical I F(1959,It)
crankshaft
lapping
polishing
Milling
ram-turret I
knee (mech) * (WG) I F(1957,WG)
knee (elect) I F(1963,WG)
simplex,duplex
Reciprocating
shaping
slotting
planing r (Cz)
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling F* (Cz) F* (1967,Belg)
fine boring . .... . X .. ..... .......
Other
hacksaw
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
F(1963,UK;1964,WG)
F* (1967,WGI
B.
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TABLE V' -1 (continued)
Company scale
Row E
I. Metalcutting
A. Lathes
engine
capstan,turret
automatic
single-spindle
multi-spindle
copying
roll-turning
B. Drilling
bench,pillar
column
radial
multi-spindle
tapping
i i4.dA
Industrial Kerry Jost Kirloskar
Plants Tools Brothers
n. a. 30% .UK (c)Kirloskar
1962 1962 1935
medium-large small medium*
F F IF
Machine. Tool
Corporation
(a) -Govt.-
1970
very large
F
F (1962,J)
F(1962,UK) I
F (1962,UK)
. as L 
-double-ended,tool-cutter F*(1969,Cz)
surface F*(1969,Cz)
cylindrical
crankshaft F*(1969,Cz)
lapping
polishing
Milling
ram-turret
knee (mech)
knee (elect)
simplex,duplex
Reciprocating
shaping F(1963,UK)
slotting
planing F(1963,UK)
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling
fine boring.... ....................... ...................
Other
hacksaw F (UK)
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
F(1959,USI
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TABLE V -1 (continued)
Company scale
Row Z
Machine Tools
Prototype
Factory (a) Govt
1952
medium-large
I
Madras Mach.
Tool Manuf.
n.a.
1957
small
X
Mapa Mysore Kirloskar
n.a. (c)Kirloskar
n.a. 1935/1940
small very large
F IF
I. Metalcutting .......... ...............
A. Lathes
engine I(1952) X(1957-61) I
capstan,turret 1(1952) F(1955-60,UK)
automatic
single-spindle I F(1960-63,UK)
.multi-spindle
copying F(U3)
roll-turning
B. Drilling
bench,pillar
column
radial
multi-spindle
tapping
C. Grinding
double-ended, tool-cutter I(1952)
surface 1(1952)
cylindrical F
crankshaft
lapping
polishing
D. Milling
ram-turret
knee (mech)
knee (elect)
simplex,duplex
E. Reciprocating
shaping
slotting
planing
F. Boring
horizontal
boring/milling
fine bor ing ............................... ... .......
G. Other
hacksaw
threading F*
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
--
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TABLE V -1 (continued)
Company scale
Row E
I. Metalcutting
A.
Naokhali N.SIC Indo-Ger. New Stand.
Mach.Tools Prototype Prod.& Engg.
n.a. Training Centre n.a.
n.a. (a) Govt. 1963 n.a.
small. small medium**
F F I F
Oriental
Elect.
n.a.
n.a.
small
F
Lathes
engine F(1960) F(WG)
capstan,turret
automatic
single-spindle
multi-spindle
copying
roll-turning
Drilling
bench,pillar I(1957)
column
radial F(1961,UK)
multi-spindle
tapping
Grinding
double-ended tool-cutter F (WG)
surface
cylindrical
crankshaft
lapping
polishing
Milling
ram-turret
knee (mech) F(WG)
knee (elect)
simplex,duplex
Reciprocating
shaping
slotting
planing
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling
fine boring
Other
hacksaw
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
I J1959)
F (1962 ,UK)
i
TABLE V -1 (continued)
Praga Tools P.S.G.Ind.
Institute
(a) Govt n.a.
1942 n.a.
Company scale medium-large small
w ' I F X
I. Metalcutting'
A. Lathes'
Sant Engg. TELCO
Works
n.a.. (c)Tata
n.a. 1940s
small medium**
F I
engine I(1952) X(1956)
capstan, turet
automatic
single-spindle
copyfi "
roDt-zrning
benchillar-- . - I(1952)
column F (UK) 1(1968)
raiial X(1956)
multi-spindle
tapping
Grinding
double-ended tooee-outterF(1962,UK)
surface F(UK)
cylindrical
crankshaft
lapping
polishing
Milling
ram-turret
knee (ech)
knee (elect) F
simplex,duplex
Reciprocating
shaping
slotting
planing F
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling
fine 6ori4
Other
hacksaw
threading
vertical turret 1athe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
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B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
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TABLE V -1 (continued)
TEXMACO
SCompany scale
Row E
I. Metalcutting
A. Lathes
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
(c) Birla
n.a.
medium* *
F
Traub India
(b) 60% WGer'
1960/64
medium-large
F
engine
capstan,turret F(1959,UK)
automatic
single-spindle F (1960,WG)
multi-spindle
copyingq
roll-turning
Drilling
bench,pillar i
column
radial
multi-spindle
tapping
Grinding
double-ended tool-cutter.
surface
cylindrical
crankshaft
lapping
polishing
Milling
ram-turret
knee (mech)
knee (elect)
simplex,duplex
Reciprocating
shaping
slotting
planing
Boring
horizontal
boring/milling
fine boring
Other
hacksaw
threading
vertical turret lathe
gear-cutting
broaching
facing and centering
II ~ _ __
Company scale
Row E
II. Metalforming
power presses I F
press brakes I F
bending and straighten-
ing rolls I F
guillotine shearing I F
nibbling I
punching,splitting,
shearing F
plate-edge planing F
forging hanmmer I F
TABLE V -1 (continued)
Column Miscell. Ameteep Godrej Heavy Hindustan KCP New Bemco
E small cos. & Boyce Eng.Corp. Madh.Tools
without n.a. (d) Ind. (c)Govt. (a) rGovt n.a. n.a.
collab. n.a. n.a. 1966 1956 1960 n.a.
4 medium medium** very large very large s** small
I F I F . F F
I F(J) I (1956)
I F (EG) I (1956)
I
I F(EG) I1(1956/61)
I
F(1967,US) F
F(1967,US). F
F
F*(1967,US) F
F(Cz)
New Standard
Engineering
n.a.
n.a.
medium**
I F
F (1960,WG)
I(1958)
I
F (1959-60,UK)
III. Special-purpose,
custom-made
lathes
fine boring
presses
multi-operation
transfer line
F(1961,Fr)
F(1961,Fr)
-- ---- -i..:.....~--..~- -- .I--I'----- -.--- '---- ;-- - i--. - - -. - r -. -- - I--I-
Company scale
Row E
II. Metalforming
power presses
press brakes
bending and straighten-
ing rolls
guillotine shearing
nibbling
punching,splitting,
shearing
plate-edge planing
forging hammer
III.Special-purpose, custom-
made
lathes
fine boring
presses
multi-operation
transfer line
Scottish
Indian Mach.
Tool
(c) Tata/40%UK
1964
medium
F
TABLE V -1 (continued)
Tak Ex-Cell-0
Machinery India
(Indian) (b) 80% US
n.a. 1958
small medium
F F
Mysore
Kirloskar
(c) Kirlos-
skar
1958
very large
I
F(1964,UK) F(1963)
SF(1964,UK)
F(1964,UK) F (1963)
P(1964,UK) F(1963)
F(US)
F(US)
TELCO
(c) Tata
1940s
medium **
F
F*(WG)
I -- --- I . -. --------------------------
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Notes to Table V-I
Matrix Elements:
I: machine produced without foreign collaboration
F: machine produced with foreign collaboration
X: source of design could not be determined
*: licensed or at prototype stage but not in commercial production
(year, country): year is date of industrial license or
cdllaboration agreement for machine; country is that of
the foreign collaborator, if any.
abbreviations for countries:
Belg: Belgium
Cz: Czecioslovakia
Dk: Denmark
EG: East Germany
Fr: Frande
It: Italy
J : Japan,
Sz: Switierland "
WG: West Germany
Column Headings: name of company; affiliation; date of initial production
of machine tools; company scale
Affiliation of company: (for details see Chapter II.D.3)
(a) : gdVernment
(b): foreign majority
(c): large industrial house
(d): independent
Company scale (annual production of machine tools):
small: less than $0.25 million
medium: $0.25 tb $0.5 million
medium-large: $0.5 to $1.0 million
large: $1.0 to $2.0 million
very large: $5.0 million or more
**: total production of company, including products other than
machine tools, exceeded $5.0 million
n.a.: hot available
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imports and products made under collaboration, foreign collaboration
had marketing advantages.
(iv) Complementary services: Collaborators frequently provided other
things desired by the Indian company:
(a). patents;
(b). design and engineering of the plant, selection of equip-
ment, supply of tooling, erection and commissioning;
(c). product engineering and manufacturing know-how, includ-
ing process sheets;
(d). technical and managerial personnel to operate the plant
and train Indian replacements, training of Indian per-
sonnel in their factories abroad;
(e). equity capital, foreign exchange, loans, access to sub-
sidized credit (e.g. loans from PL480 funds).
(v) Cost: While firms often indicated that they did not have the per-
sonnel and facilities to undertake indigenous designing, this supply
constraint could have been relaxed by investment. It was also argued
that collaboration was a cheaper way to secure designs; unfortunately,
the available evidence does not permit comparisons of costs. I Given
high fixed costs of R & D relative to the real costs of transferring
the results between companies, it would presumably have been more
efficient from a global point of view for India to borrow technology
than undertake independent development in the cases where technology
already existed. On the other hand, markets for technology are not
1Apart from royalties and fees, foreign collaborators earned
considerable profits on the sale of components and hence it is impos-
sible to make an estimate of the cost of collaboration from published
data.
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perfectly' copetitive, and Indian companies had little bargaining
power. Kust reports that "the foremost reality, perhaps, in the
(collaboration) negotiations is that the Indian entrepreneur is in
a weak bargaining position. He finds himself the wooer. In most
cases the foreigh collaborator is not anxious to go to India." 1
The' Dutt Comnittee reported that:
The competition for collaborations that sometimes arises
among Indian parties because of Government's readiness to
accept foreign collaboration results in different Indian
firms wooing the same foreign firm, even at the same time,
and therefore getting the worse of the bargain. 2
The dvailabl'evidence, which is very imptessionistic, suggests that
payments t6 Tbreign collaborators involved monopoly returns.
While the above list of factors may explain the preference of
individual iirns f' o'fr foreign designs, they ignore the potential advan-
tage of indigenous designing in terms of arriving at products more
suitable'to local conditions.
Moreover, there were several respects in which government
licensing policies increased the incentive to rely on foreign collab-
oration:
Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, 1968, Vol. 1i,
Section 3, p. 52.
2
GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, p. 125.
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(i) Capital Goods Imports:
Kust states that:
After 1958, Indian entrepreneurs were given provisional (in-
dustrial) licenses that required them to secure part or all
of the foreign exchange (for import of capital goods) by way
of foreign investment. Hence, Indian entrepreneus had to
negotiate more broadly for foreign collaboration.
In the third plan, the government made industrial and capital goods
import licenses contingent on foreign investment or foreign long-term
credit to finance all imports of capital goods. Apart from the direct
role of foreign, investment, Kidron states that foreign equity gave
"access to special loan funds set up or supported by (foreign collab-
orators') home governments to encourage exports." Kidron reports
that:
These and other factors have so affected official thinking
that it -s-now virtually impossible for an Indian firm to
start up or expand without presenting a scheme for foreign
c(l?4borstop,. As one journal put it, 'it has become dif-
ficult to get a manufacturing license without prior arrange-
ments for foreign technical collaboration...whether (an in-
dustry) really needs technical know-how and foreign capital
or,not'3 -.
(ii) Time: -Government licensing contributed to the incentive to rely
on foreign collaboration to save time. There was a substantial risk
that firm woul4 not be licensed to manufacture products even if they
developed designs, and hence there was little incentive to develop
designs in advance.
yuqt, 1964, p. 66.
. K4on, -1965, p. 231.
Ibid., p. 262. See also GOI, MIDITCA, 1969a, Main Report,
p. 303, and GOI, RBI, 1967, p. 5.
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(iii) Brand Names: The passages from the report of the Dutt Committee
quoted in part V.A.2 make clear that the government approved foreign
collaboration, including foreign investment, in a number of industries
where technology was relatively simple. This may have increased the
incentive of local competitors to make foreign collaboration agree-
ments; Kidron reports:
On two occasions...important well-entrenched Indian firms were
forced into unwanted, technologically-superfluous foreign col-
laborations in order to secure the use of foreign brand-names.
Without them they would almost certainly have lost out in com-
petition with new entrants to the industry who had that foreign
distinction.1
However, since government industrial and import licensing and controls
over allocation of domestic materials severely limited competition
among firms, it is clear that Kidron exaggerated this argument. The
argument probably was not important for the period to 1966.
(iv) Rupee Finance: Firms with US equity collaboration were eligible
to borrow rupee PL 480 funds from USAID on favorable terms, subject
to approval of the Indian government. Based largely on Rosen's study,
Kidron reports that:
Foreign firms are also privileged, by and large, in gaining
access to cheap (rupee) finance. They naturally benefit
from the bias shown by almost all Indian lending institu-
tions (the most important of which had government support)
toward big, established borrowers.2
Kidron, 1967, p. 266.
2Kidron, 1965, p. 231. There is no evidence that foreign firms
had more access to rupee finance from Indian institutions than did
large Indian firms, however; the argument would apply mainly to cases
where the Indian partner did not belong to a large industrial house.
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'Kidron has emphasized that foreign companies with equity parti-
cipation in Indian firms are strongly motivated by the desire to exer-
cise control, even where they have a minority of the equity. He argues
that as a result foreign collaborators did not want an independent
R & D capacity at their Indian subsidiaries because the continued tech-
nological dependence of the subsidiary facilitated control by the col-
laborator. He states:
Beyond the cost advantage of concentrating fundamental research
and development at home lies a further, real advantage in the
continued dependence of local affiliates on their parent firms
over the long term...While cost is certainly a factor...there
is little doubt that such reservation is often resorted to in-
tentionally in order to limit the operational independence of
local affiliates.1
Similarly,; Deriks reports
...a remark, a single remark and undoubtedly very much exag-
gerated made by a firm which has a collaboration. According
to it, all foreign collaborators try to kill the initiative
for research in order to keep the Indians dependent and to be
able to sell more knowledge and technical know-how.2
B. Inefficient Designs
This section reviews the design problems of engineering goods
produced in India in the 1960s. The main problem was that even for
developing countries designs of many Indian products were obsolete
or inferior to those of products sold by competitors from advanced
countries and therefore were inefficient from the point of view of
Kidron, 1967, p. 160.
Dericks, 1969, p. 56.
399
minimizing the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned by
export. Moreover, where designs were not obsolete, the models pro-
duced in India sometimes accounted for a small and declining volume
of sales abroad, even in developing countries, while the models which
accounted for an increasing share of sales abroad were not produced
in India. Because of economies of scale in export marketing and the
gestation period required for development of markets, it is often in-
effic lent to export a narrow range of models which will not have long
term markets.
It is important to emphasize that the problem discussed here
is not that Indian companies did not produce the most '"modern" machin-
ery available in advanced countries, e.g. automated, capital-using
machinery efficient only for use in high volume production or where
there is a high labor-capital factor price ratio.
1. Problems of Individual Industries
a. Cotton Textile Machinery (12)1
Throughout the 1960s there were criticis that Indian manufac-
turers of cotton textile machinery did not keep up with technical
developments in machine designs abroad, even when the developments
were suitable for Indian conditions. According to a report of the
Tariff Commission in 1960:
Number in parenthesis is rank of industry in Table II-1.
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Representatives of the cotton textile industry have empha-
sized...that the Indian mills being obliged to use indige-
nous machinery should not be deprived of the benefits of
technical developments that are rapidly taking place among
their competitors abroad. The Indian Mills' Federation has
stated that the developments in textile machinery have been
taking place at a much faster rate in the last 6 or 7 years
than during the last 50 years; more automation, streamlin-
ing of processes and higher speeds mark the new machines;
and the Indian textile machinery manufacturers should adopt
these modernised concepts.l
The Economic Weekly was critical of failure to produce modern machines:
The textile machinery industry has failed to keep pace with
- technological developments in other countries so that
modernisation carried out with indigenous machinery is often
,very soon outdated.2
Textile machinery remains extremely unsatisfactory. The
mills complain of obsolete models....The machinery manu-
facturers are tied down to obsolete models under their
collaboration agreements.3
According to the report of the Tariff Commission's 1966 enquiry into
the textile machinery industry, the Textile Comeissioner stated that
14
"modern machines are being manufactured in the country." However,
the report further states:
According to the (Indian Cotton Mills') Federation, as com-
pared to the indigenous products, some of the imported
machines maintain quality even at higher speeds, thus re-
sulting in substantial saving in cost of manufacture, e.g.,
English and Continental ring frames have incorporated
several. technical improvements like positive helical gear,
ia prved-type ballon control devices, etc. These permit
GOI, TC, 1961a, p. 21.
2EW, 17 August 1963, p. 1389.
3EW, 7 August 1965, p. 1218.
GOI, TC, 1967a, p. 28.
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the ring frames to be run at speeds up to 16,000 r.p.m. with-
out mechanical trouble. On the other hand, it is considered
inadvisable to operate indigenous ring frames in excess of
12,000 r.p.m.--in fact, even at lower speeds the yarn break-
ages are sometimes heavy with consequent deterioration in the
quality and-evenness of yarn. Imported looms can weave cloth
of greater width at higher speed resulting in substantial
savings in the manufacturing cost. The Ahmedabad Millowners'
Association has stated that there has been improvement in
quality.of indigenous cotton textile machinery after 1963,
but that-the domestic products still lack proper designing,
casting, standardisation and finishing....In the opinion of
the Bengal Millowners' Association...the techniques also lag
far behind the international standard. 1
A study,of the cotton textile machinery industry in India by the NCAER
reports:
-The complaint of the consumers of indigenous textile machinery
that it lacks the latest innovations available in imported
machinery is valid....Modernisation in the textile industry
involves more and more automation in all the processes of
manufacture, thus, making conventional machinery obsolete
at an alarming rate.....In India, conditions are not condu-
cive to such rapid technological changes, because of the
lack of know-how about the latest inventions (since this has
to be obtained mostly from abroad) and the lack of finance
to effect changes rapidly.2
b. Machine Tools (13)
The report on a 1959 exhibition of Indian engineering goods in
Singapore stated:
The 'gneral.reaction about our machine tools (including a
shaping machine and a lathe) was that they are 20 years old
in design and construction and they can not stand competi-
tion against the latest designs of U.K. and Germany. If
export market for lathes is to be developed, it would be
1GOI, TC, 1967a, p. 29.
NCAER, 1967c, pp. 24, 31, 4. See also NCAER, 1967a, pp. 35,
83, and FE, 30 January 1971, p. 4.
402
necessary to catch up with the latest designs such as that of
'Colchester' England and introduce new features annually.1
Similarly, at an exhibition in West Germany in 1963:
The Indian machine tools, a lathe by Kirloskar, drilling
machines of HMT, and so on were examined by German machine
expetts...They stated that these machines could not easily
be sold here as they were 10 to 15 years back in technical
design-and outfit. There is only a limited market in the
small workshops which use such machines. At present these
Shops use old (second-hand) machine tools from the bigger
engineering concerns.2
Virtually identical comments on the designs of Indian machine tools
were made in 1966 by the joint director of the CMTI ("need redesign-
ing"), in 1967 by the IIFT, in 1968 by a working group of the Planning
Commnission ("out-moded"), in 1969 by an Italian trade delegation which
visited an industrial exhibition in India ("discarded by Italy ten
years ago"), and in a 1970 NCAER report on the market for Indian ma-
chine tools in the Indian Ocean basin ("obsolete")'. Similar comments
were also made by North American machine tool distributors in inter-
views for the present study.
Even for the Indian market it was stated that:
The demand for increased productivity in industry has neces-
sitated a close look into machine tools...with a view to
ascertain whether their quality and performance can be raised
to higher levels....Several types of machine tools are being
produc~ Ain India for quite some time, and in the early stages,
many of. them were copied from imported machines. The produc-
ton of. such machine tools has continued, even enlarged...
The designs might have been excellent at the time of their
GOI, EEPC, HB, 15 June 1959, p. 30.
2GOI, EEPC, B, I December 1963, p. 6.
Central Machine Tool Institute, 1966, p. 13; LIFT, 1967b,
p. 10; GO, MIDCA, 1968b (Machine Tools), p. 21; GOI, EEPC, HB,
17 July 1969, p. 53; and NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 89.
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introduction, but today they are at least 10-15 years old,
and require to be redesigned in the light of advances in
technology. The needs of industry have greatly changed
since their introduction... .Machine tools need to be re-
designed so that they may be capable of exploiting new
tools and new materials to the fullest extent; they should
be robust and rigid enough to withstand high cutting forces
and should incorporate features which will lead to lower
idle time. Redesigning should also take into account the
requirements of maintenance, the working convenience and
safety of ope ators, and the appearance of the finished
machine tool.
In 1969, R. G. Gardner, HMT's agent for Canada and the eastern
U.S., stated that the "products of HMT, though A-I under international
quality standards, found it difficult to compete in America because
of poor finish."2
Design problems of machine tools are discussed further below
in connection with design changes for the North American market.
c. Electric Motors (14)
In a report on the electric motor industry, the Tariff Comnis-
sion criticized "the long and extensive time lag between the estab-
lished use of improved design and materials in overseas countries
and their acceptance in India."3 Later it argued that:
The high price of raw materials in India is not the only
factor responsible for the inability of the Indian manu-
facturers to compete in the overseas markets. Techno-
logical improvements and better designs should help con-
siderably in the establishment of competitive capacity.4
ISathe, 1966, p. 21.
2 BP, 16 April 1969.
3GOI, TC, 1963a, cited by Cilingiroglu, 1969, p. 34.
GOI, TC, 1966a, p. 25.
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The latter report noted that changes in design and materials
had reduced both the weight-to-power ratio and the cost of motors
produced abroad. It stated that Indian motors were larger and much
heavier than motors of the same horsepower manufactured abroad, and
that the excess weight was considered undesirable by users. It also
estimated that adoption of the foreign specifications would result in
a reduction of 20 to 33 percent in raw material costs. The following
differences in design and material specifications abroad were noted:
(i) foreign motors used aluminum die-cast rotors instead of rotors
with copper strips; (ii) foreign motors used aluminum die-cast bodies
instead of cast iron bodies, which resulted in a reduction of weight;
(iii) foreign motors had class 'E' insulation, which resulted in lower
inputs of copper and electrical steel stampings than were required
with class 'A' insulation. In addition, class 'E' insulation was
almost universally used abroad because it enabled motors to withstand
higher temperatures.
In the second half of the 1960s a number of Indian manufacturers
adopted these design changes for part of their production. Neverthe-
less, a trade association report in 1968 refers to the
... mbdernisation required to export electric motors. Our
products can become competitive only if modern techniques
are used for improving castings operations, design styling,
etc.2
1 Ibid., p. 24.
IEMA, 1968, p. 15.
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In 1970 the trade association reported that of 32 manufacturers in the
organized sector and 170 in the small scale sector, 12 produced motors
with class 'E' insulation.
In the case of electric motors used in electric fans, it was
reported:
The industry is at present using the conventional hot rolled
dynamo-grade steel sheets for the rotor and stator cores of
fan motors. The dynamo-grade electrical silicon sheets now
produced in India are becoming obsolete in rotating machine
applications. The steel industries in the West have been
changing over to low carbon, cold reduced electrical steels
..,.The uniformity of thickness, magnetic and electrical
properties and surface finish are accurately controlled by
continuous cold rolling process. The magnetic permeability
and punching properties of cold rolled steel being better,
the quality of the assembled stator core of this teel is
superior to that produced by hot rolling process.
Related problems in the case of transformers are discussed in Chap-
ter IV.G.2.
d. Motor Vehicles and Vehicular Diesel Engines (15 and 22)
It was reported in 1970 in connection with the Lambretta and
Vespa motor scooters produced in India that:
The government felt that the models being manufactured were
already obsolete abroad.3
The scooters now made in India are about 15-year-old models.
In the case of cars, the models are older still.4
IIEMA, FE, 13 July 1970, p. 7.
2IIFT, 1967a, pp. 7, 45.
31, 18 August 1970, p. 1.
4]t 26 August 1970, p. 1.
M M m
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Already in 1960 a government report stated that in the case
of its passenger cars, Hindustan Motors "has not always introduced
the changes from time to time in the Morris Oxford. We cannot keep
modifying vehicles as often as in countries like the U.K."I In 1969
the chairman of Standard Motor Products of India stated:
In Western countries rapid changes and improvements have taken
place in the concept of the automobile, but we have not been
able to effect any improvement or modification2in our vehicles
since 1960 in view of the extra cost involved.
An official of one of the largest Indian producers and export-
ers of commercial vehicles stated in an interview that the truck pro-
duced by the company in 1969 was a 15-year-old model which was outdated
both in appearance and in mechanical design, even for Indian conditions,
and yet it was generally considered better than the other trucks pro-
duced in India.
The Premier-Dodge truck produced in India used a Perkins P6
diesel engine. According to Neufeld, the P6 engine was introduced
in the -UK before the second world war and the P6V was licensed for
production in India in 1953. However,
In the early 1950s the company (Perkins, U.K.) discovered
that vehicle manufacturers (in advanced countries)...were
do longer entirely content with the P6, and that competi-
tdrd-Vsre rapidly catching up, even in some instances over-
taking Perkins, in developing improved light-weight diesel
engines.a
1GOI, MCI, 1960, p. 18.
2EE, 25 April 1969, p. 873.
3Ncufeld, 1969, p. 325.
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In 1960 an Indian government report noted complaints that "the Perkins
engine does not have sufficient reserve of power to cope with Indian
conditions of road and habitual overloading,"1 and recently it was re-
ported that one reason for general customer preference for TELCO over
Premier trucks was that the latter had a Perkins engine, even though
after 1966 a newer P6/354V engine with more power and better torque
characteristics was produced under a 1962 license.
e. Bicycles (19)
Until 1967-1970 Indian manufacturers produced only standard
roadster bicycles designed for carrying heavy loads. As early as
1961 reports on the market for bicycles in other developing countries
like Iran noted a preference for sports light roadsters, and in 1966
a report stated that 85 percent of the bicycle market in developing
countries in southeast Asia was accounted for by sports light road-
sters.2 In 1967 TI Cycles introduced a 3-speed sports light roadster
for export and in 1970 Sen Raleigh did the same. Nevertheless, the
new Sen Raleigh was reported to be a bicycle produced by Raleigh in
the 1950s, and a 1970 IIFT study stated that:
In design...and colour, our bicycles have yet to rival those
of Jppan or UK. The old look of our bicycles is largely the
result of the absence of any sustained product development...
A heavy machine Sf solid steel parts is unlikely to appeal to
European buyers.
(O;I, MCI, 1960, p. 46.
2CGI, EEPC, 1961, p. 53, and GOI, EEPC, 1966a, pp. 8, 10, 14.
]Cited in FE, 25 August 1970, 26 August 1970.
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The report recommended production of lighter bicycles, including use of
plastic parts, and improvement of styling and finish.
Furthermore, Indian manufacturers did not produce models like
10-speed racing bicycles or high-rise bicycles with small wheels and
high handlebars. The latter, which were produced in the US in 1964,
accounted for 61 percent of the US new bicycle market in 1967.1
Finally, there were criticisms of the quality of finish, particu-
larly paint, on Indian bicycles. 2
f. Stationary Diesel Engines (20)
The main types of stationary diesel engines manufactured in
India, particularly low-speed, water-cooled, horizontal ones were being
replaced abroad by more efficient high-speed, air-cooled, vertical
engines, even in developing countries. This was not a new development.
The report on the 1959 exhibition in Singapore, cited above, stated:
There have not been many enquiries for the type of diesel
engines that were on display. The horizontal engines
attracted the least attention as the preference of the
dealers and importers is for high-speed vertical engines. 3
Cooper Engineering produced horizontal diesel engines ranging
from 5 to 40 h.p. They sold well in India but Cooper found that there
was no export market. It also produced 10 to 15 h.p. vertical engines
Ii -- -
IBicycle Manufacturers' Association of America, US Congress,
1970, Part 14, p. 3852.
2This was a complaint of an East African importer and is also
reposcfne4,L4 (CAR, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 33, 80.
... 1 EEPC HB, p. 30.
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to an old design, for which there was little demand in export markets
because suppliers from advanced countries like the U.K. were offering
newer, more efficient engines with a higher power-to-weight ratio.
Finally, in 1962 Cooper began production of a 5 h.p. vertical engine
to a modern design with a high power-to-weight ratio, and this was
doing reasonably well in export.
Kirloskar Oil Engines built its export market chiefly on lower
speed 5 and 10 h.p. horizontal and vertical engines, based on designs
of a UK firm which has since discontinued their production. In com-
menting on the stagnation of these exports in the latter 1960s,
Kirloskar Oil Engines noted that "the trend in export market demands
a change in product design and this is engaging our active attention."l
The industrial engines produced by Kirloskar Oil Engines were
made to old, inefficient designs. Industrial engines produced in
advanced countries operated at a higher speed (2 to 4 times the
r.p.m.) than all but one engine produced by Kirloskar and had a
higher power-to-weight ratio and lower noise level.
Ruston and Hornsby, a U.K. subsidiary which was the third major
producer and exporter of stationary diesel engines, began export in
1962 with horizontal engines for agricultural use. At the end of the
1960s it produced a variety of slow-speed horizontal engines, one
simple vertical engine for agriculture, and air-cooled diesels for
industrial and marine purposes. These had many of the same design
problems as the engines produced by Cooper and Kirloskar Oil Engines.
Kirloskar Oil Engines, ABP, 25 August 1969.
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In addition to the above problems of design, the export of
diesel engines was reported to have suffered because "in finish and
appearance they are poor."l
g. Electric Fans (24)
The report on the 1959 exhibition in Singapore, cited above,
stated:
Our (Indian) 'Usha' and 'Orient' table fans lacked the lustrous
finish which was eye-catching in the case of (Japanese and Hong
Kong) 'Hulda' and KDK fans. If the revolving device and the
finish of out table fans are improved, I see no reason why the
sales should not improve. In the export market, it is impera-
tive that we should catch up wijh the latest design and con-
struction of the Japanese fans.
A decade later Indian table fans were still out-dated and infe-
rior in design, styling, and finish to fans exported by Japan and Hong
Kong to developing countries. Japanese and Hong Kong fans had smoothly
finished and bright colored stands and plastic casings in modern shapes,
nickel-chromium-plated fittings and protective mesh, and gadgets like
time switches, variable oscillation-angle controls, and plastic piano-
style keys for different speeds. The exteriors of Indian table fans
were made of painted cast iron and steel, the fans were heavy, the
styling, surface finish, and colors were not attractive, and there were
no controls other than choice of speeds. Late in the 1960s, Jay Engi-
neering introduced one model with variable oscillation control and
NCAER, 1967b, p. 27.
2GO- EEPC, HB, 15 June 1959, p. 30. 'Usha' is the trademark
of Jay Engineering.
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piano-style keys but none of the other styling and features. Indian
fans were also noisier than Japanese ones.
Both manufacturers and foreign importers reported that for ceil-
ing fans there was no comparable problem because the basic designs of
competitors had not changed in decades, there were no special gadgets
or features, and changes in styling were limited to blade shapes and
color. The only styling problem apparent in 1969 was that some compet-
itors had changed from cast iron and aluminum to plastic for covers
and canopies. -According to the IIFT, Indian "ceiling fans...are at
par with the-latest models perfected abroad."2
An additional problem of design of electric fans concerned
motors, which were discussed above.
Design and styling were important in explaining why Indian
exports of table fans, which were produced in large volume in India,
were stagnant at a low percentage of output even though they were priced
(c.i.f.) at 25 to 45 percent below Japanese fans of the same size
while exports of ceiling fans by the same companies were a higher
.3
percentage of output and increased at a moderate rate.
1These observations, which are based on information gathered
in Africa and India in 1969, are similar to ones reported in IIFT,
1967a, pp. 68-70, and NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 89.
IIFT, 1967a, p. 29.
Exports of table fans peaked prior to the 1966 devaluation,
as did exports of sewing machines discussed in the next section.
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h. Sewing Machines
In the case of sewing machines, there were problems of styling
and lack of features similar to those of table fans. Although Jay
Engineering made limited changes in the styling of its straight-stitch
machine for export, a market report on the US stated:
The design of the Indian machines does not stand very well as
compared to the design of the Japanese machines. Some of the
points on design mentioned were: (a) The balance wheel in the
Indian machine was too large; (b) The light attachment in the
Indian machine is not very convenient; (c) Absence of 'Push-
button' controls which go with the present vogue; (d) Unattrac-
tive col6ur combination. The above points indicate only some
of the areas of complaint. It is considered that from the
long range point of view it would be necessary to come up with
a completely new and better design after a detailed study.1
Apart from the difficulties faced because of competition with
other straight-stitch sewing machines, Indian manufacturers did not
produce the types of sewing machines which were becoming more popular.
In 1969 Japan exported three times as many zig-zag sewing machines as
straight-stitch units.2 Indian manufacturers did not produce automatic
zig-zag machines and Jay Engineering's semi-automatic zig-zag machine,
which was first produced in India in 1962 under Italian collaboration,
was an old design.
i. Other Industries
RefArences to out-dated designs of engineering goods produced
in India were common in other industries as well. A number of addi-
tional examples are listed below:
GII, MC, 1967b, p. 9.
2Oriental Economist, April 1970, p. 36.
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(1) Radios (17):
So far as speakers are concerned we are still backward. The
indigenous radio manufacturer still uses the tyconal magnet
speakers whereas throughout the world the radio industry has
switched over to ferrite magnet speakers.1
(2) Tires and tubes (26):
The basic complaint against India (in export markets)...was...
that tubes were not light-weight...Japan supplies light tyres
compared to India. In addition, some countries have a pref-
erence for seamless tubes which India does not export. Japan
and Malaysia are the suppliers of seamless tubes...Tubes are
heavier for Iranian taste. 2
(3) efrigerition equipment: Indian industrial refrigeration equipment
used reciprocating compressors while centrifugal compressors, which
operate at much higher speeds, were reported to be more efficient. As
of 1970 two companies had been licensed to manufacture centrifugal re-
frigeration syttems.3
(4) Razor blades: Carbon steel (blue) blades accounted for over
90 percent of Indian production of safety razor blades, and at least
three of the six major producers manufactured only carbon steel blades,
even though developments in stainless steel blades abroad had made
carbon steel blades virtually obsolete.4
(5) Pulp and paper machinery:
1-
IT 10 ay 1971, p. 5.
2 NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 181-82.
3ET, 25 April 1970, p. 4.
Commerce, 12 September 1970, pp. 556i-ii.
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In the pulp and paper industry, the indigenous pulping
machinery offered in our country is for full-chemical
pulp in batch plants, and the paper machines are slow-
speed, small capacity units. As against this, the world
over semi-chemical pulping methods have been introduced
that give higher yields for the same weight of raw mate-
rials, and continuous pulping and high speed paper
machines are offered that reduce the cost of making
paper. 1
2. Inefficient Designs and Exports
One inference which can be made from the preceding discussion of
design problems is that there was often a considerable lag in the appli-
cation of technological changes made abroad and that machinery was often
produced to designs which were inefficient even for developing countries.
It has not been possible to quantify this conclusion in either of two
dimensions, however.
First, one would like to know what percentage of Indian output
of machinery was produced to inefficient designs. Unfortunately, it
is clear only that an important share of production was to inefficient
designs and that an important share was not. The conclusion that an
important share suffered from such problems is supported by the pre-
ceding descriptions. The conclusion that other products did not is
supported by the fact that many products manufactured in India were
still manufactured by the foreign collaborators and sold in advanced
and developing countries,2 by the fact that Indian firms continually
11E, 10 October 1968.
2 tor examples of such machines, see the list in Table IV-12.
415
made--new collaboration agreements in the process of diversification,
and by direct reports by Indian manufacturers.
Second, one would like to know how much the cost of foreign
exchange earned by export could have been reduced by production to
efficient designs. It proved impossible to make any useful estimates
of this, but the export managers of companies exporting commercial
vehicles, cotton textile machinery, and machine tools all confirmed
that if they produced the machines manufactured by their foreign com-
petitors rather than the ones they did, their exports would have been
more profitable (telative to the long-rmp.ayerage cost of the model).
Part V.D.l.g discusses the design modifications made by machine tool
producers to-increase the profitability of export.
Another conlusion is that many Indian companies exported even
though their designs were inefficient. Apart from direct evidence
that such exports took place, the fact tkat products can be exported
even though their designs are inefficient from the point of view of
minimizing the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange is supported
by the widespread use of old machinery in advanced countries and the
large market for used and rebuilt machinery. In 1968, 64 percent (by
number) of the machine tools installed in U.S. metalworking plants
were over80 years old and 23 percent were over 20 years old. The
market for used machine tools in the U.S. was well organized, and
according to the trade association of used machine tool dealers,
"approximate sales of used machinery (metalworking machine tools to
American Machinist, 1968, pp. 1-2.
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ultimate users) in the U.S. is in the range from $350 - $400 million"
per year, or about 20 percent (by value) of sales of new machine tools.
A significant amount of second-hand U.S. equipment was also exported to
Latin America.2 The fact that a machine tool was produced to an old
design therefore did not mean it was worthless, even in the U.S. It
is significant that some of the dealers handling Indian machine tools
specialized in used machinery and Indian machine tools competed directly
with used equipment. A delegation of Indian machine tool manufacturers
which visited the US in 1970 reported finding "competition from Europe,
Japan, Spain and Brazil and, more important, used machine tools worth a
few hundred million dollars placed in the market by the Defense Depart-
ment."3 It was also reported that:
The Bowers Division, Norris Industries, Inc., Los Angeles,
purchased an HMT radial drill. Bowers shopped around before
buying the HMT drill and... considered a used Cincinatti
machine. But it was 12 years old, and didn't have a war-
ranty...The old machine sold for $8,002 and the new Indian
drill for $8,300 with a tilting table.
In some cases, such exports of products with inefficient designs
were made for hard currency, presumably at "discount" prices. However,
a striking fact which is evident from the data in Table 111-7 is that
exports of some of the most important of these products were almost
'Machinery Dealers National Association, Letter to author, 1969;
see also Machinery Dealers National Association, 1967.
2Little et al., 1970, p. 59.
3p , 6 December 1970, p. 4.
4 Mtajworking News, 19 November 1968.
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exclusively to soft-currency areas under bilateral trade or tied aid,
especially to the UAR and Ceylon. This was true of 93 percent of com-
mercial vehicles and jeeps, 91 percent of cotton textile machinery,
and 75 percent of vehicular engines and engine parts.
The export manager of an Indian textile machinery manufacturing
company stated in an interview that with present designs, there was
little prospect of selling Indian cotton textile mills to countries
which could finance purchases from elsewhere, e.g. against hard cur-
rency. However, by providing 10-year credits at 3 percent annual inter-
est repayable in non-convertible currency, in 1969 Indian companies
sold $16 million of textile machinery for three complete mills to the
UAR, which had serious foreign exchange problems and therefore gave
considerable preference to supplies on credit and with payment in non-
convertible currency. There were similar reports for trucks and
vehicular engines. An exporter of machine tools wrote that:
Only because of the credit given by our government (to Ceylon)
and because of earmarking certain portion of it for purchase
of Indian machine tools, could our company :ucceed in selling
equipment worth about Rs. 15 lakhs ($0.2 million).1
These were not minor examples. Commercial vehicles and cotton
textile machinery ranked first and second by value of exports among
machinery industries in 1969-70. Chapter VI.B notes that half of
Indian exports of non-connmodity-like products for which design was a
potential problem were to soft currency areas in 1969-70.
Letter, 1968.
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3. Production: to Inefficient Designs
The discussion of design problems raises the question why
machines were produced in India using inefficient designs. In con-
sidering this question, emphasis is placed on government policies
which created a bias against use of the best designs available when
production was initially established and against subsequent improve-
ments in designs.
a. Lack of Competition
Government policies which restricted foreign and domestic
competition and tolerated losses by public sector firms made it pos-
sible for firms not only to earn a profit in spite of high costs or
low quality of output and to survive losses but to manufacture goods
with inefficient designs without being forced out of business. The
system permitted inefficiency.
b. Price Controls
The system also limited the rewards to efficiency. Government
price controls which allowed a predetermined rate of profit on invest-
ments reduced the incentive to improve designs and eliminated that incen-
tive altogether where turnover was constrained by supply factors beyond
the control of the company, e.g. in the case of passenger cars or motor
scooters.
c. Industrial Licensing: The Banned List
Industrial licensing often would have prevented existing firms
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from'expanding and new firms from entering even if they used superior
designs. At any given time, licensing of expansion and/or new units
in many industries was formally banned because there was excess capac-
ity at some units or installed or simply licensed capacity was suffi-
cient to meet plan targets. Among the industries considered above,
during at least part of the period between 1960 and 1966, electric fans,
sewing machines, and bicycles were all on the list of industries for
which further industrial licensing was banned. In addition, both expan-
sion and new investment licenses were systematically denied to certain
units: to private sector firms if items were reserved for the public
sector, to large industrial houses, to foreign-controlled units, to
units. vith fixed investment over $100,000, etc.
d. Industrial Licensing: Criteria
There was excess demand for licenses, and efficiency of the
design of the product was not one of the criteria used by the govern-
ment in giving licenses. According to a government-sponsored report:
No consideration is ordinarily given (by the government) to
whether the particular technology sought to be imported is
the most suitable to our requirements, having regard to the
scaleof .production, raw material availability, etc.l
Consequently, there was no assurance that the best design was licensed.
Moreover, the government gave preferential access to licenses to
units which did not require imported capital goods, imported materials,
or foreign collaboration, at least at the end of the 1960s. It was
reported4. that
1
GOI, MIDCA, 1967, p. 6.
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Mr. Dinesh Singh has told Parliament that in order to encour-
age the growth of indigenous talent and resources, the govern-
ment had decided to issue letters of intent to parties in the
private sector who are prepared to take up the manufacture
of cars based comyletely on indigenous designs requiring no
foreign exchange.
Two such licenses were given in 1970. A similar policy was followed
for television sets at the end of the 1960s. Such discrimination could
easily lead to production of goods to inefficient designs when effi-
cient designs were not available in India or required import inputs.
The same was true of provisions for exemption of certain units from
licensing as long as they did not use foreign exchange or foreign col-
laboration.
e. Import Restrittions
Chapter IV.G.2 notes that restrictions on import of current in-
puts and capital goods sometimes prevented Indian firms from producing
goods to the designs and specifications used abroad. Reference is
made there to problems faced in production of distribution transformers,
nylon tires, and Japanese-style table fans. Similarly, one of the
obstacles' to production of sports light roadster bicycles was their
higher import cobntent. Even after the government allowed import of
special inputs for production of these bicycles for export, they could
not be produced for the Indian market because of import licensing
restrictions. Metal Box reported:
The introduction of the latest developments in packaging is
subject to import limitations. For example, while we are
ready to introduce containers made from 2CR tinplate, we
ICommerce, 15 August 1970, p. 349.
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cannot consider their marketing until Hindustan Steel are
equipped to make such plate or, alternatively, Government
can assure continuing imports. In the development of new
products such as improved crown corks and other sophisti-
cated closures, beer cans, easy opening ends, tinplate
aerosol cans, aerosol valves, we have continuous access
to the 'iost advanced technology in the United States and
Europe through our technical associates. We can over a
reasonably Short period equip ourselves to manufacture
all these products, but we need to be certain that raw
material of the right quality and specifications will be
available to develop the market.1
f. Higher Prices of Tradable Inputs
Differences in relative costs of tradable inputs at Indian and
c.i.f. import prices because of quantitative import restrictions and
indirect taxatioit created a heavy bias against use of certain materials
in India,".g. plastics. In some cases the excess cost at Indian prices
of materials required for a model which was more efficient at interna-
tional prices, i.e. negative protection, was reported to be so great
that production of the model in India not only would have been less
profitable but would have involved losses. In the case of table fans,
a major Indian producer indicated that if it overcame the other obsta-
cles to producing Japanese-style fans, the cost would be so high that
it probably would not have been able to sell them at a profit if it had
to buy inputs like plastics, chromium, and gadgets at Indian prices.
g. Fragmentation and Vertical Integration of Production
Government licensing encouraged fragmentation of production and
loss of economies of scale. This was true of the policy of licensing
EPW, 11 July 1970, p. 1102.
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several small units in an industry, each with a fraction of the effi-
cient scale of production, and of licensing policies which allowed and
encouraged vertical integration and consequent loss of economies of
scale in production of components. The result of such fragmentation
of production was to increase or even multiply by several times the
average cost of designing and/or foreign collaboration and tooling in-
volved in introduction of a new model. Discrimination in implicit
exchange rates between production for the domestic market and export
which limited production to the scale of the domestic market had a
similar effect, Thus, a number of firms explained their failure to
modify designs on the basis of the very high average tooling costs
involved where the sale of production of not only the finished product
but all the components was very small. Firms producing table fans,
sewing machinea, and bicycles argued that foreign companies could afford
to change designs because parts were produced by specialized ancillaries
with a high volume of output while in India each final assembler produced
its own parts on a small scale and hence would have to incur very
high tooling costs if it changed designs.
h. Foreign Collaboration
Although there were restrictions on foreign equity investment,
until the late 1960s the Indian government was liberal in approval of
foreign technical collaboration. There is no evidence that restrictions
on the terms.of technical collaboration prior to 1967-68 were a signi-
ficant limit on access to efficient designs. However, certain policies
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made factors other than efficiency of design of primary importance in
choice of foreign collaboration in that period. Restrictions on import
of capital goods made the willingness of the foreign company to finance
capital goods imports by equity investment the first consideration in
selection of collaboration. Closely related to this was preference to
aid donors as sources of collaboration, e.g. in the case of East Euro-
pean collaboration for public sector firms.
In the latter 1960s the government changed its policy toward
foreign'collaboration and in 1968 it issued a series of guidelines on
terms of collaboration which would no longer be approved. These in-
dicated a significant restriction on acceptable terms compared to those
prevailing during the previous decade in matters including industries
in which technical and financial collaboration would be allowed, number
of times the same technology would be licensed to different firms, maxi-
mum duration and renewal, maximum royalty rates, clauses restricting
exports and re-sale of licensed technology, and recognition of foreign
patent rights. The basic changes were:
(i) The government announced it would no longer approve foreign collab-
oration in a list of industries which it considered had been adequately
developed in India, including many industries in which collaboration
had been approved in the previous decade. Included in the list of in-
dustries in which neither technical nor financial collaboration were
A bill passed by the Lok Sabha in 1970 reduced the life of a
drug, medicine, or food product patent. BI, BI, 4 September 1970,
p. 282.
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to be approved were electric fans, domestic sewing machines, bicycles
and parts, railway wagons, transmission line towers, grey iron and
steel castings, and "general purpose machine tools (simple types)."
There was also a large group of industries in which financial collab-
oration would not be approved but technical collaboration was still
permitted.
(ii) The government specified maximum rates of royalty for technical
collaboratipn, generally 3 to 5 percent of sales (subject to a 50 per-
cent tax) which were lower than rates approved earlier.
(iii) The ,oyprWment specified a maximum duration of collaboration
(i.e. royalty payments), generally five years, compared to the 10-year
duration,typcaly approved earlier. The Minister of Industrial
Development announced that he was "against allowing any extension of
foreign collaboration agreements beyond the normally permitted period
of five to seven years." 3
(iv) The government announced that it would no longer approve new col-
laboration agreements or renewal of existing ones which restricted
exports to areas other than the country of the foreign collaborator
or countries where the foreign collaborator had other investments.
IIC, 1968.
Ibid. Data on royalty rates and duration of agreements made
through 1964 is available in GOI, RBI, 1968.
ABP, 17 September 1969.
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(v) The government indicated that it might not approve foreign col-
laboration agreements with secrecy clauses which prevented Indian
firms from selling the know-how obtained and that it might require
that Indian firms be allowed to pass on know-how on the basis of sub-
stantially reduced royalties to the foreign collaborator. 1
According to businessmen and a leading Indian law firm which
took part in negotiation of collaboration agreements, in 1969 the
government was following the new guidelines, at least on points (i) -
(iv). However, some more radical statements of the Ministry of Indus-
trial Development concerning such things as centralization of import
of technology were not implemented. Moreover, in 1968-1970 the govern-
ment licensed several independent foreign collaborations for small
tractors, even though one of the government's own research institutes,
CMERI, had developed an indigenous design and prototype. By March
1970, 12 companies had been licensed to manufacture 14 to 75 h.p.
tractors, each with a different foreign collaborator. Thus, it
appears that even at the end of the 1960s the government was neither
implementing restrictions on repetitive import of technology nor ban-
ning import of technology when a domestic substitute was available.
Indian firms were overwhelmingly critical of the government's
i, 8 February 1969; Times of India, 30 May 1969.
2For critical comments on the government's approval of HMT's
application for Czech collaboration for production of small tractors,
see EPW, 13 September 1969, p. 1465, 20 September 1969, pp. 1500-01.
3For a list, see IEA, HS 1969-70, p. 178.
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restrictions on the terms of technical collaboration. They claimed the
guidelines limited their access to the most efficient foreign designs.1
There was also a conflict between the Ministry of Industrial Develop-
ment, which initiated the restrictions, and the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, which was concerned about their possible adverse effect on
exports.
According to the chairman of Mysore Kirloskar, India's largest
private machine tool firm:
If we are to enter the foreign markets, it is necessary for us
not only to manufacture conventional machine tools but also to
take up the manufacture of more sophisticated machine tools.
When reputed manufacturers are requested to come for the manu-
facture of sophisticated machine tools, generally they are not
willing to come to India on account of the various restrictions
imposed by the government in regard to collaboration agreements,
such as:
(1) Limiting the period of agreement to 5 years: The foreign
collaborators expect the collaboration agreements to run over
a period of at least 10 years and if we wish to derive maximum
benefits out of collaborations, the agreements should be for a
period of 15 years.
(2) Government's insistence on Indian manufacturers having a
right to sub-licence: The foreign collaborators do not desire
to allow the Indian parties to sub-licence the manufacturing
technique, as every collaborator feels that his product has
specialities, the know-how for which should not be passed on
to others, as they are afraid that the information may fall in
the hands of their competitors.
(3) Government's insistance on Indian manufacturers having a
wide export franchise: The reputed foreign collaborators have
licensing arrangements in a number of countries and they are
lFor a discussion of Brazilian restrictions on technical collab-
oration, see Leff, 1968, pp. 89, 100n. For evidence that these had an
adverse effect on transfer of new technology to Brazil, see BI, BLA,
17 September 1970, pp. 298-99.
A.P, 27 September 1968.
I~l-- ---------- ;;r~,~ -
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reluctant to allow export franchise for such countries. Apart
from this, they are generally against giving export franchise
because to that extent they lose their market. Collaborators
do not like to give export franchise unless the machine is out-
dated and is not presently being manufactured by them....
For some time to come, we should not enforce these conditions.
Our first objective should be to get the knowledge at a reason-
able cost without scaring them away by insisting on unaccept-
able terms.1
i. Approval of Restrictions in Collaboration Agreements
The government approved restrictions in foreign collaboration
agreements which prevented Indian companies from modifying the designs
of products manufactured under active collaboration agreements or pro-
ducing similar, a'd heince competitive, products under collaboration
with other companies.2 Such restrictions could have prevented com-
panies from making changes in designs to adapt them to local condi-
tions or to increase export potential and from producing special export
models.
Under the terms of a 12-year collaboration agreement for textile
machinery made in 1963 with Rieter of Switzerland, which had only a
12 percent share in its equity, Lakshmi Machine Works agreed:
To place at the disposal of Rieter all information relating to
its own inventions and improvements and obtain Rieter's prior
approval before adopting them. The company has agreed not to
manufacture any items of machinery other than those specified
herein without the consent of Rieter, for the first twelve
years or during the period the collaboration agreement is in
force,, that is up to 31-3-1975.3
N. W. Gurjar, Mysore Kirloskar, Letter, August 1969, pp. 5-6.
2See also Kidron, 1965, p. 282, and Behrman, 1969, pp. 74-75.
Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, Vol. 2, 1969,
p. 11-752.
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Until its expiration in 1969, TELCO's 15-year technical collab-
oration agreement with Daimler-Benz, which also had a very small minor-
ity equity share in the Indian company, prevented TELCO from adapting
the Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicle designs to make them more suitable
for India or other developing countries. Upon termination of these
restrictions, TELCO immediately stated that it would modify the designs.
In 1969 it was making changes in the steering assembly and the gear box,
including addition of synchromesh, and it changed the driver's seat.
J. Difficulties in Securing Information on Required Design Changes
Even if they wanted to redesign their products for export, many
companies would not have known what changes to make because they were
not familiar with demand in foreign markets or the designs of competi-
tors. This could have been overcome by market research, but govern-
ment policies presented two obstacles.
First, when an industry was developed in India, imports of the
product were banned, and it was easy for the Indian industry to lose
touch with further design developments abroad. It was even difficult
for manufacturers to get licenses to import samples of foreign products
in order to imitate them. According to Mysore Kirloskar:
It will be necessary to see that firms who cater for the export
markets are allowed to import samples of latest machines with-
out any difficulty as we find that it takes a long time for the
government to sanction purchases of latest models for development
from the foreign countries.1
imysore Kirloskar, "Foreign Tour Report of Shri N. W. Gurjar,"
1968, typed, p. 8.
1
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The electronics and textile machinery industry also complained about
difficulties in importing foreign machines for development purposes,l
and Krueger states that in the automobile ancillary industry:
One case was reported of a prototype being sent by a foreign
customer to the Indian firm; it was not allowed through
customs, since it was on the banned list. 2
Second, it is pointed out in Chapter VI.A.4.a that companies had
trouble getting foreign exchange for market research abroad, particu-
larly if they had not yet exported.
k. Government Restrictions on Demand for Efficient Machinery
To protect cottage industry in cotton spinning and weaving,
processing of oil seeds, and rice milling, the Indian government limited
expansion and modernization of the large scale sectors, e.g. by restric-
tions on expansion of the cotton textile mill sector and on installation
of automatic looms. These policies created a domestic market for other-
wise obsolete machinery and limited the market for up-to-date machinery.
According to a 1953 report:
The restrictions on future expansion of the textile industry,
particularly the weaving section, have contributed to the
difficulties of the (cotton textile machinery) industry by
reducing the level of demand.
3
Although relaxed, restrictions were still in force in 1969.
IIFT, 1967c, p. 34, and Comerce, 5 December 1970, p. iv.
2Krueger, 1970, p. 88.
3GOI, PC, 1953. See also Singh, M., 1964, pp. 91-92, 108-09.
4FE, 22 November 1969, p. 10.
__ I
430
Apart from cotton textile machinery, which was discussed above,
these restrictions probably delayed development of modern rice-milling
machinery, which was not produced in India until 1968:
Till recently, rice was milled through conventional rice-
milling machinery, and the total requirements of these
machines were met by indigenous manufacturers. It was,
however, found that with modern industrial type rice-
milling machines, wastage could be considerably reduced
and the yield increased. 1
Milling machinery manufactured in India was designed 30 to
50 years ago...Millers get an average estimated out-turn of
580 kg. of rice per tonne of marketable surplus paddy. In
addition, by-products are not usable for human consumption.
Modern milling equipment and procedures used on paddy that
has been properly produced and harvested and safely stored
may be expected to yield 670 to 720 kg. of rice per tonne
of marketable surplus paddy...These mills work at low oper-
ating costs also.
1. Supply of Inefficient Designs
On the supply side, a major source of inefficient designs was
the passing of time. However, there were important potential sources
of designs which may have been inefficient when production in India
began.
As products become obsolete in advanced countries, a large
amount of specialized tooling and similar assets become worthless
there. Although in some cases the product might be efficient for
developing countries, at least if the tooling and know-how were cheap
IEA, HS 1969-70, p. 45.
FE, 6 March 1971, p. 4.
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enough, even when this was not the case it might have been possible
for the foreign company to sell these assets to an Indian company or
exchange them for equity shares because of limited competition in
India, imperfections in international markets for technology and equity
capital, and irrational licensing. There were many complaints in India
about unsuitable capital goods and high prices of equipment supplied by
foreign collaborators, e.g. in the case of Napco Bevel Gear,1 but no
systematic confirmation of such practices was available.
Whatever the reason, some of the designs selected by Indian manu-
facturers probably were not the best available in advanced countries at
the time. A U.S. importer, who was the first distributor of Indian
machine tools, stated that the Oerlikon H22 lathe and the Fritz Werner
M milling machines produced by HMT were not a good choice. A govern-
ment report on the construction equipment industry suggests that there
were collaborations with relatively unknown firms for machines whose
designs were not internationally acceptable:
For some items, the makes covered (by collaboration agree-
ments) may not find favour with international markets until,
through continued development in the country, the product
is at par with other makes better known in the market...
Research and development has to make the machine a better
product or give it a modern shape. 2
1Napco Bevel Gears purchased the entire machinery and tooling
of Detroit Bevel Gears Division of Napco Industries (US) in 1963 for
$2.8 million.
2GOI, MIDCA, 1968b (Construction Equipment), pp. 35, 91.
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C. Exports Based on Monopoly of Design
A number of recent studies have emphasized the role of R & D,
innovations, and temporary monopolies based on technological superior-
ity in explaining manufactured exports and direct foreign investment
of advanced countries, particularly the US. It has been argued that
the US has a comparative advantage not only in R & D but, temporarily,
in production and export of new high-income or labor-saving products
because the large home market provides a base for innovation given the
importance of communication between manufacturers and customers during
product development. Similarly, one might think that India would have
an advantage in products based on indigenous developments in "inter-
mediate technology," for which there would presumably be a large home
market. This would give India monopoly power in exporting to develop-
ing countries and an entry to East European markets, which are more
accessible on the basis of technical monopolies than low price given
their autarchic bias.
One implication of the small amount of designing in India is
that there were only very limited areas in which Indian firms had
design advantages over competitors in advanced countries, even in
supplying products to developing countries where economic conditions
are similar to those in India. What design advantages there were
depended chiefly on manufacture of products which had been discontinued
in advanced countries rather than on ability to offer original designs,
designs adapted to conditions in developing countries, or other forms
of product differentiation.
__
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With relatively few exceptions, no important changes were made
in designs by either the foreign collaborator or the Indian licensee
when products were manufactured in India under collaboration or by
imitation of foreign designs, in spite of differences in conditions of
production and use. The main exceptions occurred when materials spe-
cified by the collaborator could not be procured in India. A 1967 IEA
survey of 12 Indian companies producing engineering goods reported:
Few deviations from the designs of the (foreign) principals
are envisaged if materials are available. Substitution (of
materials) is not dictated by economic considerations but by
non-availability of materials...Four of the firms indicated
that studies are not conducted or are conducted only in a
limited way on re-designing of components to make them more
economical to manufacture.
In his study of Kirloskar Cummnin, Baranson states:
Most of the...product innovations (by ~mtains Engine Co.) have
been made in response to changing demands in the American
market. Product applications to overseas markets, especially
for nonindustrialized areas, have been on a pragmatic basis.
In most cases, design features meticulously adjust d to...
the U.S. are poor fits for an underdeveloped area.
Similarly:
In transferring automotive production to developing countries,
international firms have kept adjus6tnts in product design...
to a minimum. This is because such adjustments are costly and
disrupt the industrial transplant process....The size of
,arkets is often too small to warrant the additional expendi-
ture to adapt product designs. 3
IEA, 1967, p. 9.
2Baranson, 1967, p. 27. Baranson lists the "minor changes" made
in the Cummins engine for India, pp. 63-66.
3Baranson, 1969, pp. 24, 14. Baranson reports that "Renault has
designed a completely new car for manufacture in Brazil and export
within and outside Latin America. It is adapted to the rough roads and
poorer servicing facilities that characterize hinterland areas." (p. 78)
w
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An automobile manufacturer in India sells cars made to foreign
designs which are now years old. There has been no attempt at
qualitative improvement of the models and design of components
on the basis of local conditions.1
In a survey of 100 international firms involved in manufacture of
automobile parts in developing countries (primarily India and Latin
America) in 1970, Baranson found that only "minor changes have been made
in product design." His tabulation of the responses of 50 companies,
some with affiliates in several developing countries, shows that 25 made
no design changes while 25 made minor changes of the following types:
10 modified designs because of non-availability of materials to specifi-
cations used in advanced countries and related material-supply problems
of the types discussed in Chapter IV; 8 modified designs to suit local
demand, including safety regulations, load requirements, road conditions,
and climate; 8 modified designs to suit measurement requirements of the
assembled product; 3 modified designs to reduce manufacturing costs re-
lated to scale economies and relative factor prices; one produced custom-
made items; and 3 modified designs for unspecified reasons.2
Tomlinson further indicates that adaptation to local conditions
is not one of the common features of transfer of technology to develop-
ing countries:
Many of the UK firms in the present study...had been interested
in extending the profitable life of patents, processes, and
equipment which were well-established or even semi-obsolescent
in developed countries...Countries of this type (India and
Pakistan) are markets for established formulations, processes,
equipment, and techniques. Many of these corporate assets are
constantly being forced into quasi-obsolescence by the pres-
sures of a rapid rate of competitive technological development
1EPW, 12 August 1967, pp. 1426-27.
2Baranson, 1971, pp. 54, 57-60. The examples of design changes
_ __~__
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in the industrially advanced nations themselves. Markets in
the less-developed countries provide a longer potentially
productive life for such assets. In many cases, it may be a
quieter and more profitable life as the foreign investment
sinks peacefully to rest behind a host nation's protective
tariff barrier.'
The ability to offer designs not available from advanced coun-
tries was a negligible factor in Indian exports. A possible exception
was railway wagons. It was reported in connection with the abortive
railway wagon deal which was being negotiated with the USSR in 1968-
1969:
The railway wagons are required in connection with industrial-
ization of the Siberian region. The Japanese have agreed to
take care of most of the requirements of sophisticated equip-
ment. Japan is vacating unsophisticated fields like wagon
building. This process will receive a setback if she under-
takes the manufacture of wagons 6n the scale needed by the
Soviet Union. At best Japan can meet only a small part of the
Soviet Union's requirement of wagons with the help of capacity
which has not yet been oriented to sophisticated production.
The only other source from which the Soviet Union can purchase
wagons are the Western countries, but in their case also the
problem of reverting to unsophisticated itmns will arise.
Unless the Russians themselves wish to build the wagons, which
seems improbable, India can hope to secure the contract eventu-
ally.2
There were, nevertheless, products manufactured in India which
were smaller in size and simpler in design than competing West European
products distributed in Africa. Local distributors in West Africa re-
ported that sinCe rural customers often did not know how to use or
total more than twenty-five because some firms made more than one type
of change.
.1
Tomlinson, 1970, pp. 41, 2.
2Conmerce, 10 May 1969, p. 909.
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maintain equipment, simplicity was an important advantage in agricul-
tural machinery. Kirloskar Oil Engines' products were reported to have
some advantages in this respect.
A small producer of Indian origin in Ghana bought an Indian
barbed-wire-making machine from Escorts International because the small-
est available European machines had output rates considerably greater
than his potential market and their automation was considered a handicap.
The Indian machine was simpler, could produce as much barbed wire as he
could profitably sell, and cost only 10 percent as much as the European
machines.
For similar reasons, the same producer bought several very simple
Indian machine tools produced by small firms for use in manufacture of
buckets and simple agricultural implements. The West German machines
that were available were technically more advanced, but the simpler
Indian machines were more suited to his needs and cost less than 25 per-
cent as much as a set of West German machines capable of the same (and
other) operations.1
In 1969, ASCU Hickson, a small Calcutta firm, received an order
from Ceylon for a small mobile plant for weather-preservation treatment
IThis apparent advantage on designs may simply reflect the limited
number of suppliers operating in Ghana. Because the market was very
small and suffered from foreign exchange problems, West European sup-
pliers were represented only by branches of a few large trading com-
panies and Japanese suppliers did not take a serious interest in the
market. As a result, the choice of products available in Ghana was
limited. ' b the other hand , as an Indian who visited India periodi-
cally, this customer was able to choose among all available Indian
machines.
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of wooden electricity-transmission poles. The manufacturer, which
designed the plant itself, claimed it was the only one in the world
designed for developing countries where it was difficult to take
timber to a central processing plant. Competing firms from the US
and West Europe reportedly did not produce comparable plants.
1
It has been argued that India is likely to be most competitive
in export of engineering goods for which there is a large market in
India but for which demand in advanced countries is low and shrinking.
The argument is based on scale economies in production rather than
design monopolies, however. It has been applied to conventional rail-
way wagons,2 hydroelectric power-generation equipment,3 steam locomo-
tives and spares,4 spare parts for older models of vehicles and other
machinery,5 ordinary manganese dioxide dry batteries,6 conventional
machine tools, and grey iron castings, and it was often used by Indian
manufacturers themselves in interviews. In the short-run, however,
India faced competition from suppliers in advanced countries exporting
on the basis of short-run marginal cost because of excess capacity,
e.g. in hydroelectric power equipment. There was also competition
from other semi-industrial countries.
1Engineering Times, 1 June 1969, p. 9.
2 Commerce, 10 May 1969, p. 909.
3Cilingiroglu, 1969, pp. 10, 30.
4 UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 34-35, 185, 241.
5 Kleu, 1967.
6Japan Economic Journal, 3 June 1969, p. 10.
438
D. Export Models
With the exception of large orders for commodity-like products
and structural fabrication, virtually all engineering goods exported
from India in the 1960s were produced to designs adopted when manufac-
turers were concerned with supplying only the Indian market. Few com-
panies producing general-purpose machinery, including consumer and
capital goods, or their parts made any significant design changes or
produced special models for export. This was true even in the case of
companies which exported products with inefficient designs.
In the case of commodity-like products (e.g. steel rails and
deformed and ribbed reinforcing bars) and structural fabrication (e.g.
transmission line towers and railway wagons) which were sold in indi-
vidual orders typically valued at $1 million or more, production was
commonly to foreign specifications differing from those used in India
and in some cases requiring different materials and manufacturing
techniques. Manufacturers of transmission line towers exported spe-
cially designed equipment for voltages higher than those used in India
in a $1.9 million order to Nigeria in 1966-68 and a $1.3 million order
to the US in 1969. In 1969-70 the Integral Coach Factory exported
$0.3 million of specially designed railway coach bogies to Taiwan.
1. Design Changes for Export
A few exceptions to the generalization about absence of design
modifications-on general-purpose machinery, most of which involved
only minor changes, are described below. Since one question of
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interest is whether exporting provided an inducement to improve
designs of products sold also in the domestic market, it is relevant
to point out that at least in the case of bicycles, tires, and tele-
printers the export models were not sold in India, because of govern-
ment restrictions in the case of sports light roadster bicycles and
nylon tires. However, in the case of machine tools the designs modi-
fied for export were also produced for the domestic market, and one
can conclude that considerations of export did contribute to design
improvements for the domestic market.
a. Electric Motors (14)
It was reported in 1965, when Indian electric motor manu-
facturers were using class 'A' insulation for the domestic market,
that "Kirloskar Electric has manufactured a few batches of motors with
class 'E' insulation particularly for export purposes."'  Since then,
class 'E' insulation has been used regularly by a number of manufac-
turers for motors produced for the domestic market as well.
b. Bicycles (19)
In 1967 TI Cycles began to export a 3-speed sports light roadster
bicycle designed to North American specifications, and in 1970 Sen
Raleigh did the same.
GI, TC, 1966a, p. 19.
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c. Tires (26)
Dunlop India announced that it was "exporting sizes of bicycle
tyres and tubes not used in India which are being made specifically
for the American market." Also, while manufacturers used rayon cord
for tires produced for the Indian market, they used nylon cord for
tires produced for export.
d. Sewing Machines
When Jay Engineering exported its standard sewing machine to the
US in 1958 the response to the design was unfavorable. In 1959 it re-
modelled its machines for export to the advanced countries. However,
these export models differed from the domestic ones only in minor ways
like the shape of the casting, which was streamlined for export, and
color. Even in 1969 the firm had not otherwise changed its designs in
order to increase export potential or introduced special models for
export.
e. Teleprinters
Hindustan Teleprinters produced an Arabic model for export.
Apart from a change in type-face this involved a reversal of the direc-
tion of printing. In 1969 HTL received an export order from Kuwait
for $0.3 million worth of Arabic teleprinters.
f. Water Coolers
American Refrigerator produced special water coolers designed
EPW, 6 May 1967, p. 859.
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for export. In 1969 it received an order for $267,000 worth of water
coolers from Kuwait.
g. Machine Tools (13)
The major Indian machine tool companies, including HMT and
Mysore Kirloskar, concluded by the mid-1960s that the market for their
range of machine tools in developing countries, except a half dozen of
the more industrialized ones and ones receiving Indian tied aid, was
too small to justify sales promotion efforts. They concluded that the
most profitable export markets for machine tools were North America
and Western Europe, where there was a market for conventional general-
purpose machine tools like lathes, milling machines, and drilling
machines for use in repair and maintenance, training, and low-volume
production. At the end of the 1960s, HMT, Mysore Kirloskar, Bharat
Fritz Werner, and PSG Industrial Institute had North American distri-
butors while HMT and Harig Malik were supplying machines to two col-
laborators, Verson Allsteel Press and Harig, for sale in the US.
Indian exports of machine tools to advanced Western countries includ-
ing Australia and New Zealand in 1969-70 were $2.1 million.
This section examines the efficiency of the designs used by
HMT and Mysore Kirloskar for export to these markets and the design
modifications made to improve the profitability of export.
In part because of restrictions on export of newer machines
produced under active collaboration agreements (see Tables VII-5
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and VII-6), MINT was mainly interested in exporting machines produced
under expired collaboration agreements made during 1957-1959 with
West European manufacturers, and Mysore Kirloskar was interested in
exporting machines copied from West European designs during the 1950s.
Since the 1950s there had been design changes in advanced countries,
largely because of the increasing cost of labor relative to capital
and the development of carbide cutting tools. These developments
included increased rate of metal removal or increased cutting speed
and greater accuracy. This involved increased use of alloy steels,
heavy-duty castings and more robust structures, more rigid supports
for the spindles and anti-friction bearings, better lubrication and
cooling systems, inclusion of a range of finer feeds to allow finish-
ing without separate grinding, etc. Also, as noted above, HMT's H
lathes and M milling machines may not have been the best available
designs even in the 1950s, and an Indian machine tool distributor
claimed that Mysore Kirloskar copied second-rate lathes from the U.K.
Finally, there were design differences between West Europe and North
America, and changes in styling made the Indian machines look old-
fashioned.
Distributors in advanced countries recommended that HMT and
Mysore Kirloskar change some of the basic performance characteristics
of their machines, including rate of metal removal and tolerances.
H1. LB, M, and RM series machines, plus the L22TP and E2
designed in India.
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The first North American distributor of Indian machine tools, who had
been dealing with HMT and Mysore Kirloskar since about 1962, had long
recommended that these companies design machine tools specifically for
the North American market rather than selling existing machines or
trying to modify them. However, neither HMT or Mysore Kirloskar
designed a machine from the ground up for the North American market.1
Instead they tried to modify the machines they were already producing.
This left many of the foreign distributors dissatisfied.
HMT redesigned the M2 milling machine produced under a 1957 West
German collaboration to increase its rate of metal removal. The alter-
native spindle speed ranges of 34 to 635 r.p.m. and 68 to 1270 r.p.m.
were replaced by a wider range of 30 to 1500 r.p.m., and the 7.4 h.p.
main motor was replaced by a 9.65 h.p. motor. To accommodate these
changes, HMT redesigned the spindle bearing arrangement, replaced bush
bearings with anti-friction bearings, and redesigned the feed-gear box
and milling heads. However, no change was made in the design or
weight of the main structural parts of the machine. On its G cylindri-
cal grinding machines produced under a 1959 Italian collaboration,
spindles were redesigned to increase accuracy. On its L22TP turret
lathe, produced to HMT's own design developed in 1961-63, the saddle,
apron, and turret head were redesigned to make the machine more
versatile.
INMT's new MITR ram-turret milling machine was a possible excep-
tion.
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Even after making these changes, HMT reported that in 1969 its
North American distributors "wanted us to make various design changes,
in some cases major changes, in order to improve the prospects of
selling HMT machines in large quantities in North America."l
An announcement in 1970 indicated that HMT had finally decided
to produce machines to new designs for export rather than simple re-
designing its existing machines. There was an announcement of an
"agreement between HMT and American Tool under which HMT will produce
for export a wide range of tools using American Tool's technology...
Mr. Frank S. Wyle, Chairman of Wyle Laboratories, which owns American
Tool,...is eager to help HMT develop products suited to the US mar-
ket."2
Mysore Kirloskar redesigned its GD/Western/Westturn lathe on
two occasions and added a higher spindle-speed range and a more power-
ful motor, but it did not increase the rigidity of the machine. North
American distributors reported that the lathe began to chatter at high
speeds and feeds, and an Australian distributor said the bed was too
narrow. According to the distributors, although the Westturn had a
market in North America, the market would have been much larger for a
sturdier machine capable of faster metal removal.
Similarly, according to North American distributors, Mysore
Kirloskar would have to make major changes, including redesign of the
HMT, "Comments," 1969, p. 3.
2FE, 26 November 1970, p. 4.
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spindle, bearing arrangement, tailstock, and structure, before the
Rigiturn lathe could be sold in North America because of the limited
rate of metal removal possible with the existing design. Although
no major innovations were involved, this amounted to design of an
entirely new lathe. Mysore Kirloskar increased the power of the
drive motor from 5 to 7.5 h.p. but did not change the machine design.
Because of their extremely slow spindle speeds, all of Mysore
Kirloskar's other engine lathes, including the Shimoga 25 and RL-R3,
were considered obsolete in advanced countries.
An example of the minimal redesigning required for a machine
tool to make it acceptable for export to the US is provided by the
changes made by Mysore Kirloskar in a lathe which it was producing
without collaboration. Mysore Kirloskar initially exported its
Harihar MBD cone-pulley lathe to the U.S. and Canada, sending 40 in
1963-64, 57 in 1964-65, and 18 in 1965-66. However, on the basis of
the requirements of the US market, the GD all-geared-head lathe with
the same swing was redesigned according to specifications suggested
by the US distributor, and in 1965-66 the first shipment of eight
Kirloskar Western Type 'E' lathes was made. The US distributor sub-
sequently placed an order for 600 Kirloskar Western machines and
120 Harihar MBD lathes to be shipped during 1967-68.1 Nevertheless,
further modifications on the all-geared-head lathe were considered
1 The order was evidently cancelled after the first shipment
arrived in badly damaged condition.
446
necessary and in mid-1968 Mysore Kirloskar sent the first shipments of
this third model, the Westturn. These were favorably received by the
US distributor. However, as noted above, North American and Austra-
lian distributors said there would be a larger market for a sturdier
machine.
With this background, it is instructive to consider the design
changes that were made during the evolution from GD to Western to
Westturn. Relevant specifications are listed in Table V-2.
2. Why Did Not More Firms Produce Special Export Models?
One naturally wonders why firms which exported machines with
inefficient designs did not introduce efficient designs at least for
export. Apart from the matters already discussed in part V.B.3, the
failure of many to do so appears to be explained mainly by the nature
of the incentives under which they exported, which was discussed in
Chapter III.
Exports depended heavily on short-run marginal cost calculations
in the presence of excess capacity and on the high implicit exchange
rate on the first 5 to 10 percent of production which was exported.
For the long-run, on the basis of the relative profitability of and
risk involved in production for the domestic market and export or of
long-run costs, few firms were interested in exporting over 10 percent
of production. Consequently, their investment and design decisions
were not very responsive to export considerations. This was largely
a result of government discrimination in favor of import substitution
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TABLE V-2
Design Modifications in Mysore Kirloskar Lathe for Export to U.S.
Madras-GD
(Pre- 1965/66)
Headstock all geared
Swing over bed, mm 330
Bed gap Optional
Admit between centres,( 600
mm (1000
5. Net weight, Kg
600 mm
1000 mm
6. Horsepower
7. Electrical equipment
8. Speed range, rpm
9. Feed range per spindle
revolution
Longitudinal
Transverse
10. Bedways
11. Cross-slide screw
and guideways
12. Spindle nose
13. Diameter of hole
through spindle,mm
14. Tailstock scale
15. Tailstock cross-
section
637
680
1
Provided
48-1000
.028-1.596
.015-0.857
Not hardened
Not hardened
Threaded
41
No
Rounded
Rounded
16. Handwheel rim cross-
sections Round
17. Location of apron hand-
wheel for longitudi-
nal movement Right
18. Location of feed, re- Outside
versing on headstock
19. Location of electric On headstock
switch
20. Toolpost type (and Square (12.5
tool size) mm sq.)
21. Change gears
Provided to cut Metric threads
Optional to cut Inch threads
Western Type
'E' (1965/66)
all geared
330
Not provided
( 600
(1000
615*
640*
1.5*
Not provided
48-1000
.028-1.596
.01-0.543
Hardened
Hardened
Threaded
41
No
Squared Off
Square
Left
Outside
Separate
bracket
American (5/
Item
On headstock
8")n.a.
Inch threads n.a.
Metric threads n.a.
*:Electrical equipment not provided with machine, and K.P. not specified
in export brochure. 1 H.P. motor supplied for use in India.
n.a.: not available.
Westturn
(1968)
all geared
330
Optional
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
2
Provided
54-1200
n.a.
n.a.
Hardened
n.a.
Cam-lock
38
Yes
Squared Off
n.a.
Left
Inside
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and against exports.
Moreover, where there was no domestic market for a product for
which the design was efficient for export, either because of lack of
domestic demand or government restrictions, the alternative to export
of products with inefficient designs would have been production of
special export models. The latter was not an attractive alternative
in general. To justify production of a special export model, it would
have been necessary to recover on export all the overhead costs of pro-
duction including costs of designing or technical collaboration, spe-
cial equipment and tooling, and development of ancillaries. In the
case of firms exporting 5 to 10 percent of production, it might have
been more profitable to continue to export products manufactured to
inefficient designs. Moreover, there were a number of risks faced in
production of a special export model without a domestic market, espe-
cially given a gestation period of about two to three years.
Finally, there were some specific government obstacles to produc-
tion of special export models, in spite of the fact that the government
often indicated that industrial licensing, import licensing, and
approval of foreign collaboration would be relaxed for projects export-
ing over 75 percent of output. According to Mysore Kirloskar in 1969:
With excess capacity, many a time machine tool manufacturers
are in a position to manufacture other machines which dealers
in foreign countries desire, but the manufacturers are unable
to undertake the job as they are not licensed to manufacture
such machines. 1
ILetter, 1969, p. 5.
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Kirloskar Oil Engines claimed that in denying its application in
1969 for foreign collaboration for production of a sophisticated
engine which initially would have been primarily for export, one of
the government's explanations for not approving production was that
such an engine would not have been justified by domestic demand for
another decade. A similar argument seems to have been used in a
press conference by the Minister of Foreign Trade:
Question: Is it practical to think in terms of an export-
oriented economy (i.e., export-oriented industries) like
Japan's?
Answer: An economy like ours with a very large domestic
market and low per capita income cannot. If, however,
proposals for economic cooperation or expansion of trade
among the developing countries on a preferential basis
succeed, we can have the assurance of a large export market
which will permit us to plan exclusively export-oriented
production. Meanwhile, we must develop production where
the large domestic market permits reaping of economies of
scale and cushioning off of the external changes. 1
In 1969-70 Philips India reported that it was unable to secure govern-
ment approval for a project even though the entire output would have
been exported.
1Times of India, 9 June 1969, p. 9.
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CHAPTER VI
EXPORT MARKETING, PRICING, AND SPECIAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS
This chapter examines marketing problems and practices involved
in export of Indian engineering goods. The importance of marketing as
a distinct problem is revealed by the fact that the demand for exports
of Indian engineering goods is not perfectly elastic at the landed
prices obtained for the same products by competitors from advanced
1
countries even though India is a marginal supplier. The result is
export prices lower than those received by competitors and hence pre-
sumably a lower export volume than would be predicted on the basis of
costs of production and export incentives alone.
The discussion indicates that, apart from problems beyond
India's control, even among Indian engineering firms engaged in export
most have allocated few resources to marketing activities as a way of
increasing export demand at a given price and possibly reducing the
cost of foreign exchange earned and that the contribution of the Indian
government in this area has been small. Like the East European coun-
tries, India has relied heavily on price concessions and to a signifi-
cant extent on bilateral arrangements and tied financing to secure
orders for goods facing marketing problems.
1Evidence for this is discussed in part VI.B.I.a.
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A. Export Marketing Problems
For a number of reasons both beyond and within their control
Indian exporters are not able to secure orders at the prices received
by competitors from advanced countries:
(1) India does not have a reputation for industrial production.
(2) Established suppliers have advantages over new suppliers.
(3) Performance by many Indian exporters has been poor.
(4) Few resources have been allocated to export marketing for Indian
goods. These are discussed below on the basis of information collected
for this study in India and in a number of its foreign markets, supple-
mented by published foreign market surveys.
1. Reputation for Industrial Production
Demand in one country for the engineering products of a foreign
firm depends on the reputation of the supplier's home country for pro-
duction of industrial goods. This can be explained largely by diffi-
culties in determining quality in specific cases. There is a prefer-
ence in foreign markets for engineering goods from advanced countries
because Indian industry is less developed and because few people out-
side India are informed about its development.2 Export market surveys
1Among the latter, the three most recent and comprehensive are:
NCAER, 1970; II, 1969; and UNCTAD-GATT, 1969.
2Damrong Machine Tool Co., Bangkok, has marketed Indian R.K.
drilling machines as "Made in England." According to two other Indian
companies it is likely that some of the machine tools marketed abroad
by India's collaborators also have been sold without informing the
customers that the products were from India. The value of such ex-
ports is not significant, but this practice is indicative of the dis-
advantage faced by Indian exporters.
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for Indian industrial products invariably report that even in neighbor-
ing countries and markets with the greatest potential demand importers
and users do not know that India manufactures and could export many of
the goods which are in its present range and that they underestimate
the quality of goods available from many major Indian manufacturers. 1
Cultural and other traditional associations provide another basis for
a general preference for goods from advanced countries.2
2. Advantages of Established Suppliers
Indian exports compete with goods from firms which are estab-
lished suppliers. Importers and users know that established suppliers
and their agents, products, and brand names are reliable on matters of
quality, delivery, and after-sales service, their designs and specifi-
cations are often accepted as standard, and their products are some-
times status symbols. Indian companies, products, specifications, and
national standards are generally unknown and untested, although when
they produce in collaboration with international companies this may
reduce, but does not eliminate, marketing disadvantages. 3
A report on the Australian market for diesel engines states:
"Only two of all the companies contacted conceded any awareness at all
of an Indian diesel engine industry. Others, when the question was
posed, responded with expressions ranging from mild surprise to out-
right disbelief." GOI, MC, 1967c, p. 14.
2See, for example, the report on the role of France in its
former African colonies in NYT, 8 February 1971, p. 12.
3
"The situation is little better when items are produced in
India under internationally known brand names. Even here because of
the old prejudice we encounter a purchaser reaction that the goods
coming from India are not as good qualitatively as those from other
I M J
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A number of related advantages are enjoyed by established sup-
pliers. Major import houses handling engineering goods in developing
countries are commonly owned by interests in developed countries and
are reported to have a bias in favor of handling their products. It
is difficult for a new supplier to find a local agent with comparable
scale, financial and technical resources, reputation for service, or
contacts. Availability of shipping, banking, government representa-
tion, and related commercial services often link developing countries
to former imperial countries, reducing the cost to the importer of
trade in traditional channels. 1 Tenders are frequently restricted to
known suppliers2 and sometimes specifications are written in a way
that favors the traditional supplier, e.g. incidental details elimi-
nate other designs or there are requirements for proprietary items. 3
Indian exporters claim that procurement by certain ex-British colonies
through Crown Agents in London favors British sources 4 and that
sources though under the same brand name." NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1,
pp. 44, 164.
1Established suppliers also have direct cost advantages, e.g.
lower ocean freight and trade preferences. However, these would not
explain a differential in landed prices that could be obtained by
established suppliers and India as a marginal supplier.
2See, for example, UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, p. 14.
3NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 49; UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A,
pp. 53-54, 56.
4However, large orders have been secured by Indian firms through
Crown Agents, eg. railway wagons to East Africa. See also Commerce,
21 February 1970, p. 326, for the complaint and another order secured
through Crown Agents.
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reliance of the governments of some developing countries on expatriate
technical personnel biases them toward products with which the advis-
ers are familiar, i.e. from their home countries.1 Samples from a new
supplier may have to be certified by a foreign testing agency on the
basis of laboratory and in-use testing, sometimes requiring a number
of years, before regular orders can be made.2
3. Performance of Indian Exporters
Foreign agents, importers, and users in neighboring countries
have had very poor experience with Indian exporters and government com-
mercial agencies. They have found that Indian suppliers frequently do
not fulfill the terms of contracts and that many other other problems
arise in dealing with them. The problems encountered with Indian
exporters are reported to be more common and serious than those with
suppliers from any competing country. In contrast, the small east
Asian countries and Mainland China have good reputations in most
respects.
These problems have caused a reduction in demand for Indian
exports involving not only the importers and exporters directly con-
cerned but, as an external effect, other importers and exporters.
Many importers state that they have switched procurement to other
INCAER, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 31.
2
According to UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. B, pp. 25-26, 37, it
could take years to obtain mandatory approval from the Association
of American Railraods for sale of Indian railway equipment in the
U.S.
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countries and refuse to handle Indian goods. This, rather than ties
between distributors and established suppliers and similar problems
discussed above, explains much of the difficulty that Indian export-
ers have experienced in finding good distributors. 1
Among the common complaints against Indian exporters and govern-
ment agencies are:
(a) Goods are not supplied according to specifications and samples.
Quality is often below that specified and rates of initial rejection
and subsequent failure in use are high and unpredictable.
(b) Goods are not supplied by the date specified. This leads to inter-
ruption of operations or higher inventory requirements on the part of
the buyer; service and interest costs on letters of credit and prior
deposits are increased, and the realization of import markups is delayed;
import licenses have to be revalidated or are lost, etc. Supply of
spare parts is slow.
(c) Goods are damaged or unattractive because packing and packaging
are poor.
(d) Agency commissions are not paid in time. It is common for commis-
sions to be more than a year overdue.
(e) In the case of exports to nearby countries including East Africa and
Burma, documents necessary to clear shipments at the port of entry
this is not new nor confined to engineering exports. A 1961
study reported that "Indian exporters have a bad reputation in world
markets for unreliability, poor quality, late delivery." (Economist
Intelligence Unit, 1961, p. 54.) NCAER, 1970, reports the same prob-
lems for textiles, etc.
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arrive after the goods. This leads to demurrage charges.
(f) There are cases where exporters have charged higher prices than
those originally quoted, where they have refused to bear losses arising
out of devaluations, and where they have bypassed their agents or
importers and supplied goods directly at a lower stage in the distri-
bution chain, etc.
(g) Exporters do not settle claims arising from the above practices and
Indian government representatives (commercial attaches, the EEPC, the
STC) provide no assistance in settling the claims.
(h) Exporters and government agencies do not answer correspondence in-
volving trade inquiries or complaints.
(i) Government agencies do not help in determining the competence or
reliability of an Indian supplier. In the absence of such information,
foreign importers are reluctant to deal with any new Indian party be-
cause of risk of encountering the above problems.
Complaint (a) was heard mainly in interviews at businesses
importing from small Indian firms1 and was not based on experience
with India's major export orders or with the exports of large firms
producing with foreign collaboration. There do not appear to have
ISuch complaints are particularly common for automobile and
bicycle parts. For example, I was shown a consignment of truck leaf
springs in which a large number were so brittle they snapped under a
man's weight while others soon flattened. Tests by the Kenya govern-
ment laboratories showed that the metal used did not meet the speci-
fications and that the heat treatment had not been done correctly.
Nevertheless, the Indian supplier refused to accept the test results
or settle the complaint.
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been complaints about quality in connection with India's large orders
of railway and power distribution equipment. TELCO, India's largest
engineering firm, is known in a number of foreign markets for its high
2
standard of quality control in Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles.
There are few if any complaints about steel tubes, which rank first by
value among Indian exports of engineering goods.3 Nevertheless, market
reports commonly note complaints of high rejection rates on individual
1In connection with the supply of 727 railway wagons by TEXMACO
and Jessop, it was reported that "the East African Community are satis-
fied with the performance of Indian wagons but are not happy with their
finish." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1i, p. 171.) Another report on the same
orders states that "in the railway sphere there does not appear to be
the slightest antipathy to products received from India as compared with
specified types previously purchased from other countries...Inspection
of a batch of the Jessop supply showed that the workmanship was of com-
mendable standard." (UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 65, 242.) In con-
nection with electric transmission projects it was reported that in
Ethiopia "recently one Indian company had obtained a tender for a turn-
key job, providing transmission lines. Its work was appreciated." It
was also reported that "The Philippines Electricity Corporation has
been importing transmission towers and aluminium conductors from India
and is satisfied with the quality." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 146, 147.)
2UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. C, p. 181. According to another report,
"the quality of Mahindra and Mahindra jeeps and Mercedes-Benz trucks of
TELCO is rated high all over." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 172, 175.)
3This is based on interviews in East Africa. According to another
survey of the Indian Ocean basin, in the case of steel and steel tubes,
"there is practically no complaint on the quality of the Indian prod-
ucts." An exception was reported in the case of Iran, where the "gen-
eral impression is that the quality of Indian pipes and tubes was not
up to expectations...Indian exporters fail to stick to specifications.
They do not protect the pipe ends. Tubes often get rusty." Another
exception was that "the New Zealand Railway...is not very happy with
Indian performance in the recent past. Indian rails had manufacturing
defects." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1i, pp. 137, 138, 170.)
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orders in the case of products which are exported by both small and
large Indian manufacturers, e.g. electric fans, bicycles, small tools
and hand tools, and some of these might involve the large companies.1
However, the rest of the complaints apply to many large Indian
companies as well.2 A letter exemplifying these problems is repro-
duced below by permission of the Nairobi firm involved.
In the case of electric fans exported to Australia, it was
reported that "Indian consignments are defective and the rejections
are often 10 to 15 percent. This is because of poor packing."
"Importers in Tanzania and Uganda complain that frames and tubes of
Indian bicycles crack even within the guarantee period of one year."
"Quality of Indian tools has been accepted in the region except in
Burma and Singapore...Singapore's complaint was that the tools cracked
during operation." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 150, 177, 183.) In East
Africa, "a supply of track fittings from one of the iron and steel
works in Calcutta...was virtually completely rejected by the Railway's
civil engineering authorities after receipt." (UNCTAD-GATT, 1969,
Vol. A, p. 66.) In Libya, "even goods sent by reputed Indian firms
have turned out to be shoddy. There appears to be no control on
quality at manufacturing stage." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 58.) In
New Zealand, HMT's distributor complained that machines were sent with
defects that could easily have been avoided. In about 1966 Mysore
Kirloskar lathes cracked during shipment to the US, with the result
that an order for about $0.5 million was cancelled.
2For example, in the case of machine tools, in 1968 HMT's New
Zealand distributor complained about a number of such problems. See
also NCAER, 1970, for numerous examples.
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EXHIBIT VI-1
Letter of Complaint from Importer of
Indian Engineering Goods
REG ISTERED
8th July, 1968
Auto Dept.
The Engineering Export Promotion Council,
Post Bag No: 7907,
Bombay 34,
India
Attention: Mr. V. Kumar
Dear Sirs,
Re: Messrs. Fitwell Auto Corporation
We have received a copy of your letter Reference: COMPLAINT/
2885 dated 3rd of June, 1968, addressed to Messrs. Fitwell Auto Cor-
poration and we must say that the contents of your letter are indeed
very surprising.
If you look up the correspondence that we have exchanged with
Messrs. Fitwell Auto Corporation, you will observe that there was no
complaint made against Messrs. Fitwell Auto Corporation.
The fact is that Messrs. Fitwell Auto Corporation approached
us with a view of pointing us the Representatives for the three East
African countries which we refused due to the very unsatisfactory
results from our past association with a number of manufacturers/
exporters from India.
You will remember that at one time we had to request your inter-
vention in the case of Messrs. Transworld Agencies for the non-payment
of commission. This claim was settled after a delay of over three
years.
Again in 1965 we had to approach you once again for your assist-
ance and finalising the question of non-payment from Messrs. G. K. In-
dustries. Although a number of letters have been exchanged from 1965,
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EXHIBIT VI-1 (Continued)
The Engineering Export Promotion Council.
no positive results have been achieved so far.
The writer during his visit to India in November 1967 personally
approached Messrs. G.K. Industries and was surprised to see copies of
correspondence wherein Messrs. G.K. Industries had requested The State
Bank of India, Ghatkopar, to transfer us the necessary commission. It
appears that The State Bank of India took no action in this respect and
this matter was brought to your notice. When the writer called at your
office in Bombay during November 1967, at that time every assurance was
given to him that this matter will receive immediate attention but on
his return to Nairobi, the writer was surprised to see that there was
no action what-so-ever from your side in this respect and he wrote to
you again on the 17th of January, 1968 and 19th of March, 1968. Much
to our regret both our letters todate remain even without the courtesy
of an acknowledgment.
Copies of our above two letters were sent to The Engineering
Export Promotion Council of India, Nairobi, and here again we have not
received even an acknowledgment. Since all the letters were sent under
Registered post, it certainly cannot be the case of your not receiving
the letters in question which can only mean that both our letters have
been ignored. You will appreciate when an organisation like yours
simply does not bother to acknowledge business letters, there is hardly
any sense in doing business with manufacturers/exporters from India.
In view of the present circumstances, we do sincerely hope that
this letter will be acknowledged by you and we will also appreciate
your comments as to whether we may or not look forward to your assist-
ance in settling the unfortunate affair with Messrs. G.K. Industries.
Yours faithfully,
ACHELIS MOTOREX (KENYA) LIMITED.
SADRUDEEN B. MDHAMED.
Manager,
AUTOMOTIVE DEPARTMENT.
SD/PA
c.c. The High Commission for India, Nairobi
c.c. M/S. Fitwell Auto Corporation.
1
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4. Indian Export Marketing Input
The problems considered above under (1) to (3) reflect in part
the fact that most Indian engineering firms, even those that are export-
ing, have allocated few resources to marketing activities as a way of
increasing export demand and that the contribution of the Indian govern-
ment in this area has been small. This is a contrast to the pattern
followed by Japan, which invested heavily in marketing to expand exports
against established competition. This section describes Indian market-
ing activities, considers their relation to the pattern of Indian
exports, and then discusses several factors which have limited the
willingness and ability of Indian suppliers to make the more extensive
marketing expenditures which many market surveys suggest. It also dis-
cusses the role of government commercial services, export regulations,
and control of foreign exchange for marketing expenditures.
a. Reasons Allocated to Marketing by Exporters
Measured in terms such as amount of publicity and qualifications
of distributors, the marketing efforts of Indian exporters rank below
those of most of their competitors. After several years of increasing
exports of engineering goods, few Indian companies had by 1969 made
expenditures to develop a steady foreign market even for products for
'For examples of proposed marketing plans, see T. Griffiths and
A. Hone, "Marketing Hand Tools in North America," EPW, 6 December 1969,
pp. 1877-78, and IIIC, 1969, pp. 66-108.
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which competitors devote significant resources to marketing or enjoy
price advantages because of their established positions. Jay Engi-
neering (electric fans and sewing machines), Kirloskar Oil Engines
(stationary diesel engines), HMT (machine tools), Tata Exports (TISCO
steel and TELCO commercial vehicles, etc.), and the public sector STC
were among the few that had gone to the extent of setting up foreign
offices and warehouses. Several other companies exported through their
foreign collaborators and hence did not have to make independent
marketing efforts.1
The typical marketing activities and arrangements of companies
which exported were quite different. Through a combination of short
trips abroad by Indian officials, manufacturers, and traders, govern-
ment-sponsored participation in foreign exhibitions, and visits to
India by foreign purchasing officials and traders, Indian companies
made direct sales and appointed foreign agents and importers to handle
sales and service. However, there was little market research, public-
ity, selectivity in appointment of foreign representatives, or tech-
nical or financial support for representatives to improve distribution
and service. Apart from these cases, there was no Indian export market-
ing effort whatsoever for many companies and most countries, e.g. no
service facilities, nor were there exports.
IBM, Siemens India, Dunlop India, Atlas Copco, Ralliwolf, and
SKF are examples. Dunlop India also made some marketing efforts, e.g.
trips and exhibitions abroad.
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b. Government Commercial Services
The government has Set up a number of organizations in India and
abroad to provide services to exporters and foreign customers. There
are commercial sections of the Indian embassies, overseas trade centers,
the STC, the EEPC, the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, the Department
of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics, the Indian Council of Trade
Fairs and Exhibitions, the Ministry of Foreign Trade's Export Promotion
Service', and the Ministry of Industrial Development's cell to promote
exports of small scale manufacturers. These do not provide the types
of assistance to exporters and foreign importers which are provided by
government organizations of competing suppliers. This weakness can
evidently be explained partly by the limited resources allocated to
those organizations, by the absence of coordination among them, and by
the fact that their personnel often do not have commercial or technical
training. The commercial posts in Indian embassies are normally filled
with civil servants. 1
Little information on overseas markets is made available to
exporters either on a regular basis or by special request. The govern-
ment does pay for ad hoc commodity and country studies, but as a rule
these have little value for commercial purposes. Exporters are forced
1See also the 1961 criticism of the organization of STC as a
government department and its staffing with civil servants ignorant of
trading methods. (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1961, p. 55.) Personnel
changes were made in 1968 with appointment of P.L. Tandon, former head
of Hindustan Lever, as Chairman.
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to do virtually all their own market research, not only on technical
matters like design but even to secure basic data about foreign eco-
nomies. Complaints about lack of commercial services are common:
The government now attaches great importance to promotion of
trade. But our missions are not well equipped for this work
...In many countries of Latin America and Southeast Asia our
missions do not have economic sections. As a result we have
very little information about the commercial conditions in
these countries. Even where we have commercial sections,...
their slovenliness is clearly visible in the reports and
survey they submit. Indian businessmen visiting foreign coun-
tries often find our commercial secretaries neither well in-
formed nor helpful...They do not even have basic information
on such matters as tariffs, shipping freight, prices at which
goods are imported from the competing countries, etc. 1
These problems are illustrated by the difficulties encountered
by TELCO in carrying out a foreign market survey for excavators in
1964. TELCO reported that "the EEPC could not assist us in the market
survey as they are familiar with traditional light engineering goods
and manufactured consumer goods only." TELCO sent a questionnaire to
Indian embassies and concluded:
It is evident from the replies received from these offices
that they are not adequately equipped with staff and lack
commercial background. When requested repeatedly,...only
some appear to have made genuine efforts to contact the
concerned sources.2
Similarly, the government organizations do little to pursue
export opportunities. It was reported that in East Africa
ABP, 3 July 1969. See also NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 56-57;
Vol. 2, pp. 5, 15, 61, 199; and Textile Machinery Manufacturers'
Association, FE, 9 November 1968, p. 7.
2
TELCO, "Report on Market Survey for the Export of Excavators
and Vehicles," 1964, typed, pp. 1-2.
___
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The trade representatives of several countries, especially
of UK, West Germany, and the East European countries, are
active in canvassing for bulk orders. Relatively, the
Indian embassies are inactive. 1
Exporters commonly complain that Indian exhibitions in foreign trade
fairs are badly organized so that much of the commercial value of par-
ticipation is lost.2
There are also many complaints from importers. In particular,
the local offices of the government commercial organizations provide
no assistance on such matters as judging the technical competence of
potential Indian suppliers and settling disputes. A report on India's
railway equipment exports states that "India's representative in
Nairobi (High Commissioner's office and STC) being non-technical were
in no position to answer any queries raised by the (East African)
Railway authorities" concerning the technical competence of a particu-
lar Indian supplier who submitted the lowest bid in an important
tender.3 Another survey reported that "in very many places our teams
were told that enquiries to the relevant ministries, export promotion
councils, STC, etc., often remained unattended," and that "unfavourable
reactions even applied to government organisations such as STC, which
often failed to abide by commitments." 4
1NCAER, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 27.
2IIMC, 1969, pp. 89-91; NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 54.
3UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 66, 21, 80. See also NCAER,
1970, Vol. 1, p. 56; Vol. 2, p. 44.
4NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 56, 50. See also the letter reproduced
in Exhibit VI-I.
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c. Lack of Controls over Export Performance
There are virtually no effective controls over Indian export
activities. The discussion above notes that there has been a consider-
able amount of activity, especially by small firms on matters of qual-
ity, which has damaged the reputation of Indian suppliers in neighbor-
ing markets and reduced the demand for Indian exports. The lack of
effective controls over exports in India contrasts with the situation
in Japan, where the government has long imposed compulsory quality
standards and inspection procedures as well as price floors, quotas,
and other regulations on exports of a wide range of products both to
assure satisfactory performance by exporters and to reduce competition
among them.
India has an Export Inspection Council and since 1965 has made
quality control in manufacture and/or preshipment inspection compulsory
for steel and for a large number of light engineering goods, e.g.
utensils, cutlery, hand tools and small tools, automotive parts, elec-
tric fans, bicycles and parts, etc. There is a provision for inspection
and certification of the export worthiness of manufacturing units in
certain industries, including automobile parts, based on their produc-
tion and quality control facilities, and there is a provision for dis-
qualifying units for export subsidies if they have "indulged in any
form of unfair, corrupt or fraudulent practice, or failed to fulfill
any export obligation." However, based on the experience of importers
with Indian products and information supplied by Indian officials
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familiar with these provisions, it is evident that as of 1968-69 these
measures were largely ineffective or even unimplemented. There were
many complaints about high rejection rates to meet contract specifica-
tions, no list of export-worthy firms was available to foreign import-
ers, and evidently no exporters were disqualified for subsidies for
failing to fulfill contracts. Based on its survey of 26 foreign markets
during 1968-70, the NCAER reported that
Judging.from this study, a great deal remains to be done to
make the Export (Quality Control and Inspection) Act, 1963
effective...This is supported by innumerable instances in
which Indian exporters do not ship goods in accordance with
samples .I
Japanese industrial production and export of many goods have been
based heavily on small manufacturers. For example, in 1967 only 40 per-
cent of the 2.6 million household sewing machines exported by Japan
were manufactured by the top eleven companies; the rest were from small
firms. Although Japan differs from India in the level and control of
quality in many areas of production and small firms in Japan are gen-
erally more competent technically than small firms in India, the Japan-
ese government has imposed a number of regulations, often administered
by industrial export associations, to control the quality of exports.
Since the early 1950s, the government has imposed several restrictions
on sewing machine exports, including compulsory registration by export-
ers with the government, use of designated parts, quality standards and
1NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 58. It also reports that "Thai import-
ers have no faith in the Export Inspection Agency set up by the Govern-
ment of India." (Vol. 2, p. 152.) See also Engineering Times, 21 May
1970, p. 9, for a report by an Indian exporter of automobile parts that
government quality controls over export are weak.
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inspection, and qualifications for foreign distributors.1 Similarly,
binoculars and cameras can be exported only if they have been inspected
and approved.2  In addition, both the Japanese government and export
houses have provided technical assistance to small firms to improve
designs and quality, and the government has been selective in provid-
ing assistance in export marketing.
Exporters in Hong Kong and Taiwan are known for adherence to
specifications. No evidence could be found on existence of export
controls in Hong Kong. Taiwan has provisions for compulsory export
inspection for a number of products and for suspension of export
licenses for "breach of contractual obligations or commitment of mal-
practices that defames foreign trade or international reputation" or
"involvement in disputes with foreign customers for reasons attribut-
able to the traders themselves." Even in the absence of export con-
trols, one might expect a high level of quality control by firms in
1Oriental Economist, March 1969, p. 46; Research Monthly, July-
August 1958, p. 725.
2Research Monthly, January-February 1957, pp. 612-16; Japan Trade
Monthly, June 1963, p. 31. In 1958 the government of Japan decided that
only cotton cloth of washable color or better could be exported.
(Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 388.)
3See, for example, the survey of US importers reported in FE,
29 November 1969, and NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 58.
4There is compulsory inspection for aluminum, wires and cables,
electrical appliances, bicycle chains, and a number of major non-engi-
neering products, e.g. textiles, plywood, and canned foods. (Foreign
Trade Quarterly, December 1967, pp. 41-42.)
C-
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Hong Kong and in the Taiwan export processing zones since they have no
protected domestic market. Also, production at firms involved in ex-
port from Hong Kong and Taiwan is often highly export-oriented; by
contrast, exports are a small part of production for most Indian engi-
neering firms involved in export.
d. Organizational Weaknesses of Indian Marketing
This section discusses weaknesses in the organization of Indian
engineering exports, some of which can be traced to the limited expendi-
tures already discussed.
(i) Fragmentation of Export
Most Indian manufacturers of engineering goods handle their own
exports on an independent basis and deal directly with foreign agents,
importers and even customers. This contrasts with the organization of
exports by many of India's competitors, particularly those which have
increased their market shares recently, e.g. Japan and the East European
countries. A major share of Japanese exports is handled by giant trad-
ing companies. The governmental Japan External Trade Organization and
1The small volume of exports by the leading exporters Indian
engineering goods in 1968-69 is indicated by the following data:
Value of Exports (US$000) Number of Firms
Over 1,000 16
500 to 1,000 15
100 to 500 71
20 to 100 149 Source: EEPC
This includes firms which exported through collective channels.
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Japanese trade associations organize collective export marketing
efforts. Italy has export houses specializing in product groups,
e.g. automobile parts, and carrying the complementary products of
a large number of manufacturers. The same is true of the U.S., e.g.
for export of machine tools to Latin America. The East European
countries export through state trading agencies.
There are a number of advantages to marketing through an organ-
ization handling the products of a number of companies and dealing
with a larger turnover and range of products, particularly in the case
of complementary goods. Export houses can take advantage of economies
of scale, develop expertise, and hence can offer more economical and
better service to the manufacturer and customer. A 1969 study of
automobile parts exports to east Africa and west Asia reports:
The most successful parts exporters of the post-war years
were those countries which were able to rationalize their
automotive parts export marketing and sell ranges of prod-
ucts. This rationalization went furthest in Japan and
Italy...Importers and distributors of parts are interested
in wide product ranges, not single products. They need one
supplier able to offer many parts for many vehicle makes.
Small ranges or single products are purchased at a dis-
counted price...Individual export marketing efforts through
small agents are unlikely to be desirable from India's point
of view.
There are, however, some significant exceptions to the general
pattern of individual exporting. First, some companies with large
foreign equity participation export through the collaborator's organ-
ization. Second, manufacturers of a few products have formed export
1UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. C, pp. 31, 19, 25.
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consortia to bid for ihajor export contracts, successfully in the case
of transmission line towers, PILC power cables, textile machinery, and
railway wagons, in the latter two cases through the STC. However,
exporting is still handled on an individual basis for these products
in spite of ad hoc cooperation on large bids and turnkey projects.
Five public sector companies set up a consortium to undertake power
generation and transmission projects in India and abroad, but so far
it has received no export orders. Third, the companies in the Tata
group export through their export house, Tata Exports, and offices in
the US, UK, West Germany, and Switzerland. Tata Exports also handles
products of some non-Tata companies. Some of the trading companies
which originally handled imports and later diversified into distribu-
tion of indigenous products and manufacturing have diversified into
export on an agency basis, but none has an overseas organization.
Fourth, there are a number of trading companies handling exports of
small engineering companies, light engineering goods, and non-engineer-
ing products imported by small importers in developing industries.
Indian manufacturers of engineering goods have handled their own
exports in part because there are no established Indian trading houses
with expertise in this area. However, Tata Exports has found that
Indian manufacturers are rarely interested in having an independent
export house handle their exports.l The main explanation seems to be
lB. S. Bhatnagar (Tata Exports), "The Strategy for Export Market-
ing Organisation," ET, 17 December 1969, p. 5; interview.
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that most companies are not interested in investing in the development
of export markets and therefore are not interested in the services that
an export house could provide. They handle their own exports to avoid
paying an export commission. Even when manufacturers export through
Tata Exports, they will not give a commission large enough to finance
the sales promotion and other aspects of export marketing that the
export house considers necessary. Also, it is not surprising that non-
Tata companies are reluctant to market through a Tata company, and it
is possible that some firms handle their own exports because this pro-
vides an opportunity for the management to travel and allows more dis-
cretion in the accuracy of invoicing.
(2) Small Foreign Agents
It is common for Indian engineering goods to be handled abroad
by relatively small distributors with more limited experience, technical
and financial resources, and service facilities than those of distribu-
tors handling competing products from advanced countries. According to
a report on railway equipment exports to East Africa and West Asia:
1In the case of Indian export merchants that handle automobile
parts, it is reported that "agents are usually small, handling only a
limited range of automotive parts, and their small turnover forces
them to charge relatively high commission rates (up to 10 per cent.)"
"For servicing smaller firms in the railway goods and automotive parts
fields charges are said to be 10 per cent or more. In comparison,
Japanese companies charge 2-4per cent in similar circumstances and
European trading firms 2 1/2 - 5 per cent." (UNCTAD-GATT, 1969,
Vol. C, p. 48; Vol. A, p. 220.)
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There is a tendency for Indian firms to appoint small agents
.... Having non-technically trained small agents has serious
disadvantages in a technical field like railway goods. Not
only do they fail to get any business but they create a bad
impression regarding Indian railway goods generally. 1
Often in the developing countries in the Indian Ocean basin, represent-
atives for Indian engineering goods belong to the group of local
merchants of Indian origin while major competitors often sell through
European trading houses. There are, of course, many exceptions, e.g.
where imports are nationalized. Foreign market surveys often express
doubts about the qualifications of distributors handling Indian goods. 2
HMT concluded that many of its first group of distributors were not
competent and has replaced them. These difficulties of even major
Indian firms in finding established distributors appear to be related
to all the points discussed in parts V.A.1-4.
e. Reasons for Limited Input and Weakness of Marketing
(1) Limited Return Expected on Marketing Inputs
Returns on export marketing expenditures are realized as higher
export prices on subsequent sales. The shorter the time horizon, the
lower is the expected return. Chapter III'discussed the fact that,
based on profit considerations, many engineering firms have been in-
terested in export because of excess capacity and ad hoc export incen-
tives and not as a long-term activity, although export promotion
1UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, p. 201.
2See NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 90; Vol. 2,.p. 4.
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policies have led a number of firms to report in interviews that they
plan to export 5 to 10 percent of production even in the absence of
excess capacity.1 It is not surprising that firms without a long-
term interest in export have not invested much in the development of
foreign markets.
Similarly, there are significant economies of scale in export
marketing. The large trading companies which handle products from
advanced countries in developing countries achieve economies of scale
and reduction of risk in marketing both because of their established
market shares and by handling a wide range of products and operating
in a number of countries. The expected return on Indian marketing
expenditures in developing countries in competition with established
suppliers may be low where the markets are small and variable and
long-term prospects are limited by import substitution, particularly
if Indian companies handle a limited product range. In other cases,
especially in developed countries, while markets are large, Indian
export targets--or supply elasticities in the relevant range--are
1In 1968 foreign importers frequently expressed the opinion
that the behavior of Indian firms reflected the fact that they had
only a short-term interest in export. There is also evidence of a
certain amount of exporting done with the intention of defrauding
the buyer or the Indian government and without any intention of secur-
ing repeat orders or developing a market, e.g. to take advantage of
profitable opportunities for overinvoicing under the .import entitle-
ment scheme. This has contributed to the reputation of Indian export-
ers for poor performance. (See Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 457.)
"By granting export incentives indiscriminately we have entered
the export market with a number of products that are not truly com-
petitive. The result has been to get a microscopic share in market
which is not adequate to build either good long-term distribution or
brand name promotion." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 44.)
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often so low (e.g. 5 to 10 percent of production) that the expected
return on marketing expenditures directed at the entire market may
be small.
(2) Lack of Marketing Experience and Expertise
The fact that marketing is much more important for sale of many
engineering goods in world markets than for either sale of the same
goods in the Indian market or traditii6l exports appears to explain
some of the weaknesses in Indian marketing of engineering goods abroad.
This fact suggests why most Indian firms have little appreciation of
the role of market research, design adaptation, or after-sales service
as variables to be adjusted to maximize ptofits and why they have
little in the way of personnel, organization, or expertise in such
areas. It also helps to explain the weakness of the Indian infrastruc-
ture for export marketing, including export houses and government com-
2
mercial services.
(a) Domestic Marketing
In the noncompetitive Indian "sellers' market" which prevailed
for most engineering goods until 1966 because of protection from
imports and limitations on domestic production imposed by licensing,
firms often had advance orders for whatever they could produce and
A related factor which seems to play a role here is what
Bhagwati and Desai describe, in lamenting the general paucity of analyt-
ical-empirical economic research in India, as "a certain lack of
empiricism in the Indian make-up." (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 5-6,
p. xiii.)
2Lack of foreign languages is another problem.
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typically ignored market research, sales promotion, provision of
service, and adaptation and improvement of designs as means of increas-
ing profits. Controls on ex-factory prices and dealers' margins on
some products like vehicles further reduced the incentive to allocate
resources to marketing. In 1966 a report stated:
Indian industries generally do not find marketing a serious
problem these days in view of the wide gap between demand
and supply. Most of the small scale units are also in this
fortunate position and their marketing problems are not
perceptible. 1
Complaints about service were common even in 1968-69. According to a
report on the construction equipment industry:
It is the consensus of an average user of equipment in the
country that apt attention is not paid by manufacturers
and dealers of construction equipment to rectify faults
in the performance of indigenously manufactured machines
in proper time. This results in prolonged idleness of
equipment. 2
Interviews with Indian machine tool producers and users revealed that
virtually no producers had market research departments3 or devoted re-
sources to determining what users wanted or to forecasting demand,
relying instead on government targets; there was little effort to
GOI, MIS, 1966b, p. 217.
2GOI, MIDCA, 1968b (Construction Equipment), p. xix. For a com-
plaint by the Indian Cotton Mills Federation about lack of after-sales
service for domestic textile machinery, see Capital, 12 August 1965,
p. 219. For a statement about shortage of vehicle spare parts and
resulting idleness of trucks, see EW, 2 January 1965, pp. 33-34.
3HNT set up a unit in about 1968.
See also GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, p. 39, and IEMA, FE, 13 July 1970,
p. 7.
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promote sales; and users often found pre-sales engineering service,
after-sales service, and availability of spare parts inadequate. In
the case of the major Indian machine tool producers, users were more
critical of lack of service than of machine quality.
A report on the railway equipment industry states that "in a
protected home market...selling did not require efforts. This seems
to have created a situation in which many capable manufacturing com-
panies are simply not geared for even simple export administration."1
(b) Traditional Exports
The important role of marketing in export of many engineering
goods distinguishes these products from many of India's traditional
exports. Export of standardized commodities like tea involves little
marketing input because international markets are well organized,
goods are sold in bulk on the basis of price and delivery, and often
the foreign purchaser handles all activities related to export, in-
cluding financing, transport, and subsequent distribution. By con-
trast, for many engineering goods markets are imperfect and quality
characteristics which are not easily verified and overseas sales and
service facilities are important determinants of export demand. In
addition, while competition in the former products is largely from
other developing countries, in the latter it is from developed coun-
tries.
UNCrAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, p. 209.
2This does not apply to the "commodity-like" engineering
products discussed in part VI.B.
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(3) Availability of Foreign Exchange for Export Promotion
Access to foreign exchange for export promotion is under the
jurisdiction of the governmental Reserve Bank of India, although policy
decisions are also made in the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Trade.
The RBI sanctions blanket releases of foreign exchange to "export
houses" recognized by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and to firms with
non-traditional exports of $67,000 or more in the previous year. The
blanket release covers expenditures for business visits, market studies,
advertising, participation in exhibitions, and samples. The RBI deter-
mines the release largely on the basis of past export performance. One
major machine tool manufacturer was sanctioned 5 percent of the value
of exports of the previous year, although more had been requested.
Sanctions for use of foreign exchange for export promotion by firms
with exports of less than $67,000 in the previous year are made on a
case-by-case basis and only for a specific use, such as a particular
business trip.
In practice, Indian firms have sometimes found that foreign ex-
change releases based on past exports were too small to permit the
expenditures they considered necessary or optimal to build a market
abroad. For a company just entering export, little or no foreign
exchange was available for market development. In the case of a com-
pany which began trying to export machine tools in 1967 and had not
yet reached $67,000 of exports in 1967-68, in 1968 the RBI denied a
request to release foreign exchange for publicity in Ceylon with the
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explanation that such a request could be entertained only after the
company had made "sizable exports." This is a long-standing com-
plaint. In 1965, the EEPC reported that "the government was not re-
leasing sufficient foreign exchange to undertake publicity work on an
extensive and long-term basis,"2 and in 1966 it was reported that "Hin-
dustan Steel faces several difficulties in trying to increase exports.
It does not have enough foreign exchange for carrying out market
surveys to assess the demand abroad for steel." 3
Apart from the overall allocation of foreign exchange for
export promotion, there are many complaints about limitations on per
diem expenditures during business trips connected with export, for
example:
The Reserve Bank and the Government would appear to have little
idea of what export promotion involves. This particular indus-
trialist, who is connected with an export promotion council,
was given a daily allowance of only $24. In Jakarta there is
only one hotel in which a businessman who wants to build con-
tacts can stay, and this hotel charges $20 per day for room
alone. How can one make an impression on Indonesian business-
men with a daily allowance of $24 unless he is expected to
raise resources in Indonesia for his own food, taxi fare and
entertaining local businessmen.4
1GOI, RBI, Letter to manufacturer, 1968.
2 Commerce, 13 November 1965, p. 872.
3Capital, 21 July 1966, p. 113.
4Commerce, 12 July 1969, p. 90.
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B. Adjustment in Terms of Sale to Compensate for Marketing Problems
That Indian engineering exports were as high as they were in
spite of the marketing problems and limited marketing expenditures
discussed above appears to be explained by three facts:
(i) Commodity-like products for which marketing problems are minimal
accounted for about 65 percent of total exports of engineering goods
and steel or 40 percent of exports excluding steel.I
(ii) Excluding these commodity-like products, 50 percent of the remain-
ing exports were made under bilateral trade agreements, barter deals,
tied Indian aid, and tied Indian equity financing. On such sales com-
petition and marketing problems were generally limited by the nature
of the transaction.
(iii) This leaves 20 percent of the total exports of engineering goods
and steel or 30 percent excluding steel as non-commodity-like products
exported for hard currency. These exports were typically made at
1Percentages are for 1969-70. All products listed by the EEPC
as "miscellaneous manufactured articles," "non-electric machinery,"
"electrical apparatus and appliances," and "transportation equipment,"
except bearings, dry batteries, and electric cables and wires have been
treated as non-commodity-like products. All products listed as manu-
factures of metals have been treated as commodity-like products except
agricultural implements, malleable iron castings, forgings, steel cast-
ings, steel furniture, fabricated steel structurals, and transmission
line towers. The main commodity-like products were iron and steel,
aluminum ingots, bright steel bars and shaftings, cast iron pipes and
fittings, hand, small, and cutting tools, steel pipes, tubes, and fit-
tings, steel wire ropes, dry batteries, and electric cables and wires.
Because the division of exports into two groups is necessarily arbi-
trary to some extent, the pertcentages should be regarded as indicative
only.
481
discounts of 20 percent or more below the prices received for the same
products by suppliers from advanced countries.1
The extensive reliance of Indian exporters on price concessions
and special trading arrangements rather than marketing expenditures to
compensate for problems faced in marketing non-commodity-like goods
has been pointed out in foreign market survey reports. The contrast
between the Indian approach to securing export orders and the typical
marketing practices of competitors from advanced Western countries and
new suppliers that have successfully expanded sales against established
suppliers is significant.2 A study of railway equipment exports to
East Africa and West Asia compared sales promotion techniques of sup-
pliers from different countries:
(i) The "established suppliers" (from West Europe and the U.S.),
with long traditions in the markets, operate chiefly through
their well-established agency houses and rely largely on
the reputation of their products, the reliability of their
replacement services, the experience of their technical
sales representatives, and their longstanding personal con-
tacts with senior railway officials...
(ii) The "successful new marketers of the post-war years" (from
Japan and Italy) are the keenest organizers of trade shows
and the most generous providers of teaching materials for
There were also price discounts on some commodity-like products,
but to a lesser degree. In addition, India provided subsidized medium-
and long-term credit on some exports. However, often this probably
only matched credit available from competitors and did not offset other
marketing problems.
2Nevertheless, tied aid and preferential trading arrangements
were also used by these countries, and Japanese firms exported at sig-
nificant price discounts to win a substantial share of a market.
____________~_~______~_
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schools...They rely heavily on brochures and catalogues,
often emphasizing brand names but more frequently inform-
ing buyers of the range of products available. The
Japanese are regarded as outstanding in zeal to keep rail-
way authorities up-to-date on new products...Their spe-
cialized technical salesmen and railway engineers canvass
the markets intensively...They are known for the excellence
of their shipping arrangements and the promptness of their
correspondence...They tend to quote competitive prices and
offer the best credit terms...
(iii) The "new suppliers of the last decade," with India (and
East Europe) among them, are best known for low prices or
for government negotiated business arrangements.1
A study of Indian exports to countries in the Indian Ocean basin found:
Too many of our manufacturers...resort to selling their goods
through price factor rather than concentrating on the problems
of quality, design, packaging, sales qromotion. This is true
even of the big Indian export houses.
Export pricing, bilateral agreements, barter deals, and other
topics such as credit which are related to export marketing are dis-
cussed in detail below because they bear directly on the incentive to
export and the cost of foreign exchange. In explaining the increase
in exports in the late 1960s, in projecting future exports, and in
making inferences about gains from exports it is important to recognize
that price concessions, special trading arrangements, and in certain
cases non-commercial factors played a role in exports.
1
UENCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 17-18, 223-25.
2NMER, 1970, Vol. 1, p. 27. See also FE, 29 November 1969.
r __
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1. Export Pricing
a. Price Discounts
This section compares the landed export prices of Indian engi-
neering goods with those received for the same products and markets
by competitors from advanced countries. The purpose of the compari-
sons is to determine the price discount, if any, required to sell
Indian goods. The comparisons are confined to prices at which exports
actually occurred and do not include list prices set too high to com-
pete. The landed prices asked by Indian manufacturers were often
reported .to be higher than those from other countries. However, since
no sales were made at such prices, they are not included here. Compari-
sons are restricted to hard currency exports and cases when medium- and
long-term export credit was not involved in the sale. Comparisons are
made in third markets, not in the home country of the competing sup-
plier.
Table VI-1 presents the price comparisons; detailed explanatory
notes follow the table. The comparisons appear to justify two conclu-
sions: (i) Indian engineering goods other than commodity-like products
were exported for hard currency only at prices below those received by
competitors from advanced countries, and (ii) the price discounts neces-
sary to sell Indian goods were positively related to the marketing
requirements of the products. Our explanation for these discounts and
their pattern was discussed in part V.A. However, while an attempt
was made to hold quality constant in comparisons, some of the discounts
TABLE VI-1
Discounts Below Competitors' Landed Prices for Indian Exports of
Engineering Goods for Hard Currency
Product
I. Commodity-like Products
a. Steel bars and*
structurals(1l)
West European
Competitor
unspecified
Competitor
Indian
discount
0 to
negligible
Semi-Industrial
Competitor
Competitor
Indian
discount
Market
unspecified Indian
exporter
b. Steel tubes(2) W.Europe 7 to 10
c. Steel wire ropes(5)
d4. Power cables(6)
Aluminum con-
ductors (6)
Insulated wires
(6)
II. Simple Products
e. Hand tools(7)
Twist drills(7)
unspecified 0 to negligible
W.Germany 0 to 2.5
U.K.
W.Germany
unspecified
U.K. and
W.Germany
unspecified
Ghana
Japan
Taiwan
Japan
Indian
exporters
Indian trade
representative
unspecified Indian
exporters
Thailand NCAER,1970,Vol.1
pp.148-49.
Singapore
unspecified
unspecified
15 to 20
12
Czech
NCAER,1970,Vol.1
pp.148-49.
Indian exporters
Little et al.,
1970,p.194.
Denmark GOI,EEPC,1968b,
pp.98-99.
Source
Poland
-2.5 Kenya Importers
~
---- .- --
TABLE VI-1 (continued)
Product West European
Competitor
f. Dry batteries(16)
g. Light electricals,
e.g. bulbs and their
components
h. Tires(26)
Tubes (26)
III. Machinery Products
i. Automobile parts(21)
J. Sewing machines
k. Electric fans (24)
1. Bicycles(19)
U.K.
Competitor
Indian
discount
Semi-Industrial Competitor
Competitor Indian
discount
Hong Kong
Singapore
negative
negative
Netherlands 10 to 20
U.K.
U.K..
unspecified
(perhaps
U.S.)
France and
Italy
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
U.K.
43 to 50
50
15 to 20
25 to 40
5 to 36
50 to 62
31
18 to 21
East Europe
Singapore
Japan
East Germany
China
Hong Kong
Hong Kong
Japan
Japan
0 to 25
40 to 50
40 to 50
Market
Ghana
unspeci-
fied
Iran
Source
Importer for
Union Carbide
Indian exporter
NCAER,197.0 ,Vol.1,
p.182.
Indonesia Importer for Jeeps
in EE,3 April 1970,
p.655
Ghana and Importers for
Nigeria Singer, Usha, etc.
5 to 48 Australia, NCAER,1970,Vol.1,
Kuwait,Iraq pp.150-51.
Iraq IIFT,1967,pp.73-75.
14 Ghana Importers for Usha,etc.
25 East NCAER,1970,Vol.1,
Africa pp.150-51.
Kenya Importer for Raleigh
18 to 21 Canada Sarangan,1967,p.93.
- -----------__,---- ------ ::l;;;.-;;;--r;;;-_-~-;-~rct;-- l .. ,,_..,_.. II .I ;"~.-. I -~-I--~ ..
West European
Competitor
TABLE VI-1 (continued)
Competitor Semi-Industr
Indian Competitor
discount
ial Competitor
Indian Market
discount
a. Stationary diesel
engines(20)
n. Machine tools(13)-
o. Unspecified machinery
U.K.
U.K.
18 to 20
10
West Europe 20 to 30
Japan
Japan
-30
-15 to:-20
Libya,Iraq
Thailand
Thailand
NCAER,1970,Vol.1,
pp.165-66.
NCAER,1967b,pp.
27-28.
U.S,Canada Indian exporters
and their importers,
W.Germany and GOI,EEPC,1968c,
p.7 on HMT
unspecified NCAER,1970,Vol.1 ,p.54;
Vol.2, p.30.
West Europe 20 to 25
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses following product names are ranks of products in Table II-1.
Indian price discounts are expressed as a percentage of the competitor's price. A negative discount means
the Indian price was higher.
a. Steel bars and structurals:
The observation in the table is based on an interview with a major exporter. However, according to a
press report, "structural steel...is currently beingTexported from the country at prices appreciably
lower than the world market rates. A large firm is reported to have recently struck an export deal for
a sizable quantity of structural steel at around 140 dollars f.o.b., against 160 dollars prevailing in
leading world markets." (ET, 20 December 1969, p. 1). Perhaps this is partly explained by freight costs.
Steel exports were subject to floor prices set by the government. In the event that these floor prices
were set below international prices, competition among Indian exporters may have reduced the Indian price
to the floor. In the case of steel there were in fact "reports of inter se competition among Indian exporters.
For instance, "from Saudi Arabia it is reported that such competition has on occasion brought down the
prices 6 to 10 percent below the international price." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. I, p. 137.)
Product
Source
I
- --- i - ly-r-~i~LII-r___ I-l--~ll---- -L i--- I . -ii _ __rl~l-- _- - .1 i----qj .1-.. - I~ ~--- C r ---  -
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Notes to Table VI-1 (continued)
b. Steel tubes:
There was also a compulsory floor price on exports for steel tubes
to limit price competition among Indian suppliers. The price was set
so that Indian suppliers could still deliver tubes at a landed price
lower than virtually any competitor. Because of competition among Indian
suppliers, the price charged was equal to the floor price in the case
of the observation cited.
Also, because of the Indian price discount and advantages on delivery
time, India supplied a large share of the market. The European price may
therefore have been redundant.
Because of uncertainty of delivery schedules from Poland, India was
preferred as a source in spite of the slightly higher price.
e. Hand tools:
Little et al. report "f.o.b. prices (of Indian exports) being about 17
percent below c.i.f. prices (of Indian imports)" in the case of forged
hand tools. (Little et al. 1970, p. 194.) Since freight and insurance
were about 5 percent of value on hand tools, this would suggest that the
c.i.f. prices of Indian hand tools were about 12 percent below those of
advanced countries in third markets.
Twist drills:
This comparison is based on the customer selling price. According to a
report on the Danish market for Indian twist drills:
The (Indian) drills have been tested by several Danish
industrial firms, and they are all really impressed by the
extremely high quality...Interchangeable tools from India
will first of all meet competition from the cheap East European
manufacturers. As an example the prices for high speed twist drills
(as a percent of the price for a drill from the U.K. or West
Germany) are:
Czechoslovakian twist drills, 50 percent; Indian, 39 percent.
(GOI, EEPC, 1968b, pp.98-99)
According to a report on the U.S. market for Indian twist drills:
All importers were satisfied with the quality of drills received
from India to date...Nevertheless, we were told over and over again
that due to the necessity of 'India' mark on the tool it was not possible
to obtain more than 50 percent of the price for a U.S. drill, even if
the quality was as good, from the American user. Once the tool was
classified as non-U.S. it made little difference which country it
came from.
(GOI, MC, 1968c, p. 20.)
f. Dry batteries:
The importer from whom this observation was obtained noted that prices
had been changing and the Indian batteries were being sold to customers
at a loss to the importer. Consequently, the discounted listed is
probably an underestimate of the equilibrium value.
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Notes to TABLE VT-1 (continued)
i. Automobile parts:
An UNCTAD-GATT study of Indian exports of automobile parts reports
the following:
(In Iraq) Indian manufacturers have to meet the quality and
delivery standards of traditional.suppliers and in the
early stages of market entry prices must be at least 15 percent
lower than prices of original parts...In the East African markets
...Indian manufacturers and agents call on the same members of
the Asian trader community and frequently undercut each other.
Equally frequently the 'lowest quotes' are not able to deliver
the goods. Partly for this reason and partly because of the
widespread prejudice against the quality of Indian goods, the
latter are generally expected to sell at 10 to 15 percent less
than other motor vehicle parts and accessories...At this early
stage of market penetration, Indian goods (leaf-springs) would
appear to have to be between 10 and 20 percent cheaper than
those of their competitors from Europe or Japan.
(UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. C, pp.,294, 89, 95.)
.k.Electric fans:
The NCAER.report is for 56" ceiling fans. The discounts below prices
of U.K. fans were 5 percent in Australia, 10 to 22 percent in Kuwait,
and 33 to 36 percent in Iraq. It is important to note that Australia
accounted for only 1 percent of Indian exports of electric fans in
1969-70 while Iraq and Kuwait were the top two markets, accounting for
44 and 13 percent of exports respectively. Moreover, while India
presumably accounted for only a small-share of the Australian market,
it supplied 50 percent of the Iraq market and "dominates the (Kuwait)
market."
The IIFT report is for landed prices of 56", 5-speed ceiling fans
from 4 major Indian manufacturers (Usha, Calcutta, Orient and Crompton,)
and fans from Holland (Indola, 50 percent)' and U.K. (GEC and Crompton,
62 percent) in Iraq (which then accounted for 33 percent of Indian fan
exports) in 1966. In terms of retail prices, the discounts were 21
to 51 percent. Fans from Pakistan and China were priced at 9 percent
below the Indian fans on a landed basis, but the report states that
"their quality is not considered up to the mark."
Since India was the dominant supplier to Iraq and Kuwait at these
prices, the-comparison may be misleading; the West European prices
could be considered uncompetitive.
m. Stationary diesel engines:
The 1970 NCAER report states:
In a few cases it was found that established brands could enjoy
a premium over even comparable Indian goods; diesel engines in
Iraq is a case...In Iraq for diesel engines, U.K., for similar
machines, enjoys a 20-25 percent premium over the Indian engines in
the sense that they are preferred notwithstanding that they are
25 percent costlier.
(NCAER, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 87, 16!.)
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Notes to Table VI-1 (continued)
The 1967 NCAER report on Thailand states with reference to Cooper and Kir-
loskar engines that "according to prominent local dealers in the line, the
quality and performance of Indian engines are good, but in finish and
appearance they are poor. The price, though roughly 10 percent
lower than those of the British and German engines, is about 15
to 20 percent higher than those of Japan, and since Japan is the
main competing exporter of low-powered engines, the competition for
India-with Japanese engines is intense." It should be noted that
the report indicates that, compared to most Indian exports, India's
marketing effort here was significant. Kirloskar was a pioneer
exporter of engineering goods, Kirloskar had its own office/showroom
in Bangkok, and both Cooper and Kirloskar were reported to have been
well known in Thailand and to have had prominent local distributors
with satisfactory after-sales service, although they did not have
well-organized publicity campaigns.
(NCAER, 1967b, pp. 27-28.)
n. Machine tools:
Discussions with importers and distributors of machine tools in
areas like Thailand, Australia, and North America in 1968 invariably
suggested that in order to "make a break-through" in these markets
against established suppliers, Indian machines would have to be supplied
at about 20 percent below the prices, on a c.i.f. basis, of existing
suppliers of machines of comparable design and quality from countries
like Japan.
According to the Indian ambassador, in West Germany "Indian (machine
tool) prices were between 15 and 20 percent below those of European
firms." (FE, 12 September 1970) According to an EEPC report, "An
official of HMT pointed out that the prices of HMT machine tools are
lower by 20 to-30 percent as compared with competitors' prices in West
Gekmany.
(GOI, EEPC, 1968c, p. 7.)
The f.o.b. export price on Indian Praga-Jones & Shipman 310 tool
and cutter grinders was 20 percent below the export price f.o.b. U.K.
According to Praga's export agent, even at this lower price and with
the additional advantage of lower freight to some areas, distributors
of the U.K. Jones & Shipman machines were reluctant to handle the Indian
machines because of buyer preferences. Praga had sold one machine to
each of several distributors in trial orders.
o. Unspecified machinery:
The NCAER report stated:
In general, Indian machinery is 5 to 15 percent cheaper than
most of its dompetitors. But...importers feel that Indian
prices should be lower by 20 to 25 percent than those of the
West European suppliers...Indian machinery is often not acceptable
unless prices were 20 to 25 percent cheaper than those of our
competitors.
(NCAER, Vol. 1, p. 154; Vol. 2, p. 30.)
1
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may reflect lower or more variable quality of Indian goods, particu-
larly in regard to appearance. Furthermore, in cases where compari-
sons were taken from published sources rather than interviews, it was
not possible to confirm that the specifications and designs of the
products compared were identical. However, data from published
sources were used only incases where the source itself made an expli-
cit price comparison. Because of the difficulty of assuring the
accuracy of published reports, Table VI-1 lists the source of each
comparison to distinguish those which were based on interviews.
The first conclusion is straight-forward. Not a single case
was found where Indian goods were exported at prices higher than
those from West Europe, and not a single case was found in which a
non-commodity-like product was exported without a price discount.
The only product for which Indian prices were reported to have been
higher than those of apy supplier other than a developing or East
European country was stationary diesel engines, which were reported
in published sources to have been priced at 15 to 30 percent more than
ones from Japan.
To test the hypothesis underlying the second concluson, the
products were divided into three categories on the basis of their
marketing characteristics: Group I, pure commodity-like products,
which are standardized, bulk products for which marketing factors like
brand names and service play a negligible role; Group II, simple
products, which do not require service but which are sold in smaller
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lots and are subject to brand considerations; and Group III, machinery
for which brand and after-sales service considerations are important.
While the difference between the means of the price discounts
for Groups I and III is statistically significant at the 0.05 level,
the differences for Groups I and II and Groups II and III are not.
However, most of the observations where the actual value is far from
the group mean come from published sources (insulated wires, twist
drills, tires and tubes), which are less reliable a priori. Using
only data collected in interviews for the present study, all observa-
tions but one (dry batteries) conform to the following pattern:
Group I, zero to 10 percent; Group II, 10 to 20 percent; and Group III,
20 to 40 percent.
Moreover, if ad hoc explanations are admitted, not only is the
one nonconforming observation eliminated but the generalization can be
tightened so that the range for Group I is zero to 2.5 percent. In
the case of dry batteries, the importer stated that prices had been
changing and that the Indian batteries were being sold at a loss to
the importer. In the case of steel tubes, the only product in Group I
with a discount over 2.5 percent, the Indian price was equal to the
government floor price for export because of competition among Indian
suppliers and at this price India supplied a large share of the market.
The relatively low discount on dry batteries and high discount on steel
tubes compared to other products in the same groups may be explained by
these situations.
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However, this pattern of price discounts should be considered
only an approximation in any case. A priori there is no reason to
expect discounts to have such a consistent pattern, since the discounts
presumably vary with marketing input of the Indian exporter, degree of
competition from suppliers from developing and East European countries,
the market share of the Indian exporter, etc.
Similar price discounts are found on exports from East European
and other semi-industrial countries. East European suppliers are notor-
ious for poor marketing, particularly lack of after-sales service and
failure to supply spare parts. East European exports of consumer dur-
ables and machinery for hard currency were often sold at landed prices
20 percent or more below landed prices of goods from advanced Western
countries. These data are summarized in Table VI-2 and discussed in
the notes to the table. Price discounts were also found for Latin
American exports. It was reported that the Volkswagen subsidiary in
Mexico planned "to reduce the export price below that of German-produced
models for sale in the American (US) southwest."1 Discounts of 20-30
percent were also reported for exports of Argentine bagging machinery
and Brazilian paper-making equipment.2
Two observations should be added concerning the price discounts
discussed in this section. First, no attempt has been made to deter-
mine the efficiency of price concessions relative to marketing
Reynolds, 1970, p. 15.
2 BI, BLA, 17 July 1969, p. 230, and Business International,
1965, p. 30.
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TABLE VI-2
Discounts below Competitors' Landed Prices for East European Exports
of Engineering Goods for Hard Currency
Product East European Market Discount
Supplier (% of World
Price)
1. High speed steel Czech. Denmark 50
cutting tools
2. Parts for con- Poland U.K. over 50
sumer goods
3. Sewing machines E. Germany Ghana 27
4. Bicycles Czech., Australia up to 40
Hungary,
Poland
5. Machine tools
a. unspec'ed unspec'ed 20
b. Czech. Denmark significant
6. Tractors USSR Malaysia 20 to 25
Note: All comparisons except the last are to prices from West European
suppliers. The last is to prices from U.S. and Japanese suppliers.
1. High speed steel cutting tools: GOI, EEPC, 1968b, p. 98.
2. Parts for consumer goods:
According to the study which reported this discount, it "is clearly
the result of insufficient knowledge of the British market." "The PEP
survey showed that, although the bulk of trade seems to take place at
world market prices, there are some items that are sold by the East
Europeans for prices far below those levels." "There is little doubt
that there are numerous similar cases...The formula used in the latest
British trade agreements, which require goods to be sold at 'reasonable
prices' and so as not to cause 'material injury' is wide enough to prevent
serious market disruption. On the other hand, British producers appear
to have some justification for feeling that they are exposed to 'unfair
competition' even when East European prices are near enough to their
own to conform to the trade agreements' requirements." (Political and
Economic Planning, 1965, pp. 144, 165, 143.)
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Notes to Table VI-2 (continued)
3. Sewing machines: Information supplied by importer in Ghana.
4. Bicycles: The Australian Tariff Board established a violation
of Australian anti-dumping legislation in the case of A$175,000
worth of bicycles supplied by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland in 1961-64 at prices up to 40 percent below the 'normal
value' established on the basis of prices of bicycles in Italy.
(Australian Tariff Board, Report on Bicycles, Canberra, 25 May
1965, pp. 3-6, cited by Wilczynski, 1966, pp. 217, 219-20).
5. Machine tools:
a. According to Indian import houses, East European countries
which supply machinery to India at prices that are competitive
or even low compared to world prices sell the same machinery
to Western buyers for hard currency at prices that are 15
to 20 percent below the prices charged to India, at official
exchange rates.
b. GOI, EEPC, 1968b, pp. 74-76.
6. Tractors: A report on a 1969 Soviet trade fair in Malaysia states
with respect to tractors: "The Soviets sold only about $80,000
worth of them, even though the salesmen quoted prices 20 to 25
percent lower than those of Japan or US models and offered two-
year credits." At least part of the problem here was apparently
quality (or design). The article reports that "tractors brought
in for demonstrations had the embarrassing habit of breaking
down." (Time, 17 October 1969, p. 104).
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expenditures as an export strategy for Indian firms. Second, it could
be hypothesized that as foreign importers and users gain experience with
Indian suppliers price discounts will be reduced. According to North
American and Australian importers that did occur for Japanese machine
tools during the 1960s. It is too early for evidence on this for India.
b. Limited Input of Indian Firms on Export Marketing
One of the explanations for price discounts on Indian exports
was the limited input of most Indian firms on export marketing. A
case reported by one exporter explicitly supported this connection be-
tween price discounts and marketing input by the Indian firm. A major
Indian firm reported that it exported light electrical products to the
UAR, under bilateral agreements, without any discount below the inter-
national price1 but that another Indian company quoted in tenders there
at 15 to 20 percent below the international price. According to the
first company, this was an avoidable price concession made because the
second had made no investment in export marketing and had no export
organization. It was said to have simply cut its prices as much as was
necessary to win orders because earlier it had made a commitment to
export 15 percent of its output to get licenses.
1 India had a rupee payment agreement with the UAR, and this
enabled it to get higher prices than elsewhere because the UAR gave
preferences to Indian sources. See Table VI-4.
El"
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c. Weak Bargaining Position and Lack of Information
In addition to the marketing problems discussed above, one factor
which may have led to acceptance of export orders at prices below inter-
national levels for non-commodity-like products was the poor bargaining
position of Indian exporters in markets which were not perfectly competi-
tive, based partly on their ignorance of market conditions abroad.
With excess capacity, export subsidies, and export obligations,
many Indian companies were willing to undercut world prices in order to
secure an export sale (at least until they had exported 5 to 10 percent
of output), and the Indian government increased subsidies on an ad hoc
basis rather than lose large orders. It was obvious during interviews
in East Africa that foreign customers, particularly traders of Indian
origin, were well informed on the export incentives operating in India
and knew that many firms would sell below world prices rather than lose
a sale.1 Since they could always buy elsewhere at the world price while
Indian suppliers were having trouble securing orders, the foreign buyers
were in a monopsonistic position to bargain for discounts below world
prices.
The foreign buyers' position was further strengthened by the
fact that often Indian companies did not know the prices at which
1Similarly, it was reported that at a conference on Indian
exports "some of the participants complained...many...Indian exporters
had struck poor bargains in the export market as importers abroad
cashed on their knowledge about assistance being offered here."
(FE, 2 October 1970, p. 8.)
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competitors were supplying the same product abroad, and hence did not
know the maximum price at which the products might actually be accept-
able to the foreign importer. Sometimes the importer quoted prices at
which it claimed to buy from others, but the Indian firm had no check
on the figures.1
d. Competition among Indian Exporters
A large number of products were manufactured in India by several
firms, and competition among Indian exporters appears to have reduced
export prices on certain products to important neighboring markets.
There were many reports of price competition among Indian ex-
porters below the lowest price of non-Indian supplies.2 An exporter
reported that Indian firms had submitted the two and three lowest bids
on foreign tenders for transformers. In Iraq, "in a recent tender for
supply of electric motors, four Indian firms competed under-cutting
each other." 3 A study of Indian railway materials exports reports
cases of three Indian firms bidding 10 to 43 percent below the next
lowest bids for supply of automatic couplers and states:
Ipryor notes that in negotiation of prices for trade among East
European countries, "market information seems to have been scarce and
a source of some power." (Pryor, 1963, p. 137.) Examples of bluffing
on prices of supplies from other sources are conmmon in accounts of
East-Weat trade negotiations.
2See also the reports for steel and steel tubes in the notes to
Table VI-1.
3NCAER, 1970, Vol. 2, p. 77.
I 
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Indian firms often compete very hard against each other. Cases
were reported of price-differentials of 40 per cent between
Indian firms quoting for the same business.
In the case of railway wagons, it was reported that "very often manu-
facturers had been submitting differing quotations undercutting each
other."2  In the case of orders involving less than $0.5 million of
PILC power cables, Indian exporters competed with each other and in
some cases, including a Kuwait tender, submitted the two lowest bids.
An exporter reported that Indian diesel engine firms were competing
in some foreign markets by undercutting each other on export prices.
According to a report on the UAR market:
There is competition in prices from (i.e., between) Indian
exporters. There is a well known Indian ceiling fan that
was selling in Egypt for Rs 92 for quite some years.
Another (Indian) manufacturer appeared on the scene recently
and offered his product for Rs 80. The purchasing authority
referred this to the first supplier who decided to retain
his market and immediately knocked down his price to Rs 79. 3
Interviews with a number of importers in Kenya indicated that
such competition was common where the same product was offered by
several Indian suppliers, particularly in the case of export merchants
handling products of small Indian firms. The importers reported fre-
quent visits by Indian exporters offering to supply almost anything
at a lower price than alternative Indian sources.4 Competition among
1UNC!AD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 95-96.
2pFE 27 October 1970.
3G0I, EEPC, 1964, p. 19. Parentheses added.
4The importers reported that this led not only to a decline in
price but to a deterioration in quality and to many complaints as sup-
pliers tried to make a profit by using inferior materials. According
Eu'
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Indian exporters was also common in Ceylon, which attracted attention
because of its proximity and because it received tied loans to import
Indian engineering goods.
In a few cases, particularly for commodity-like products, the
Indian government and exporters agreed to floor prices on export to
limit price compeition and possible losses in joint export earnings.
Floor prices operated for steel, steel pipes and tubes, cast iron
pipes, cast iron manhole covers to the UK, steel wire ropes and ACSR
conductors to certain markets, steel furniture, and bicycles.1  In
to an UNCTAD-GATT report, "automotive parts have no fixed prices in
East Africa. Neither are there any Indian standard export or floor
prices. The result is that traders are secretive and play one Indian
supplier against the other...Indian manufacturers and agents call on
the same members of the Asian trader community and frequently under-
cut each other. Equally frequently the 'lowest quoters' are not able
to deliver the goods...The small general export merchants and agents...
often quote low prices on single shipments but are unable to provide
either continuous supplies or regular prices...There is considerable
competition among Indian exporters." (UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A,
pp. 89, 25, 59.)
1This list was provided by a government official. For steel
the floor prices are published in GOI, MSMM, ISCMB, for each export
license issued. Interviews in Kenya confirmed that steel tubes were
being sold at export floor prices by all Indian manufacturers.
A report on Taiwan exports states: "Many industries in Taiwan
are operated by small and medium size firms. Unorganized production
and export often led to excessive production and cut-throat competition
in foreign markets, which inevitably cause a sharp decline in price,
deterioration in quality, and finally loss of the export market. To
combat these shortcomings, the government has encouraged unified and
joint marketing of exports in foreign markets through limitation of
production by means of export quotas, improvement of quality and
unified quotation of export prices." (Economic Review, Jan.-Feb. 1968,
p. 23.) There were floor prices for canned pineapples and canned
mushrooms. Japanese manufacturers imposed floor export prices by
mutual agreement under the Export and Import Trading Law, e.g. on
TV sets.
El"
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several cases Indian firms also collaborated on bids in international
tenders, but generally this was done not to avoid competition but to
allow them to bid for larger orders and faster delivery times than any
one of them could handle.
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2. Bilateral Trade
Bilateral trade implemented by reciprocal source-tying in import
licensing or preferences in procurement by government agencies was used
largely to simulate selective devaluation. Countries with overvalued
currencies or other disincentives to export and budgetary constraints
are sometimes interested in increasing the incentive to export without
devaluing or increasing cash subsidies. This applies particularly to
manufactured goods in which the country is less competitive than it is
in traditional exports. The incentive to export can be increased by
bilateral arrangements which give exporters a sheltered foreign market
and consequently higher f.o.b. export (accounting) prices. While this
increases the private rupee realization on soft currency exports, there
is also an increase in c.i.f, import (accounting) prices. Consequently,
one important aspect of bilateral agreements is selective export subsidi-
zation involving a transfer from importers to exporters and implicit
multiple exchange rates discriminating between exports to different
destinations.
Table VI-3 provides data for 1964-65 to 1969-70 on exports of
engineering goods and steel to countries with which India had bilateral
trade agreements. In 1968-69, 20 percent of exports of engineering
goods and steel (19 percent excluding steel) were to these eleven coun-
tries; in 1969-70 the percentage was higher (30 percent excluding
steel).
1 See Table IV-15.
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TABLE VI-3
Exports of Engineering Goods and Steel under Bilateral Trade Agreements,
1964-65 to 1969-70
$ millions
(% of exports to
all countries)
Total for 11 Countries
Engg.Goods
and Steel
Engg.
Goods
Steel
8 East European Countries
Engg.Goods Engg.
and Steel Goods
Steel
U.A.R., Sudan and Afghanistan
Engg. Goods
and Steel
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
3.3
(8.0)
7.0
(13.6)
8.8
(13.0)
1967-68 24.4
(19.3)
1968-69 36.3
(19.7)
1969-70 n.a.
2.9 0.4
(8.2) (6.8)
5.2 1.8
(13.2) (15.5)
6.4 2.4
(15.4) (9.2)
1.2
(2.9)
3.2
(6.2)
5.2
(7.7)
11.7 12.8 18.3
(21.2) (18.0) (14.5)
21.3 15.0 25.4
(18.8) (21.0) (13.8)
42.2
(29.8)
n.a. n.a.
1.2 0.0
(3.4) (0.0)
3.0 0.2
(7.6) (1.7)
4.3 1.0
(10.3) (3.8)
8.8 9.5
(15.9) (13.4)
12.0 13.4
(10.6) (18.7)
14.2
(10.0)
n.a.
2.1
(5.1)
3.8
(7.4)
3.6
(5.3)
6.1
(4.8)
10.9
(5.9)
n.a.
1.7 0.4
(4.8) (6.8)
2.2 1.6
(5.6) (13.8)
-2.2 1.4
(5.2) (5.4)
2.9 3.2
(5.2) (4.5)
9.4 1.6
(8.3) (2.2)
28.0
(19.8)
n.a.
Source: GOI, EEPC, HB.
Year
Engg.
Goods
Steel
1~____ _ _ _
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India's bilateral agreements were of two types, those with eight
East European countries on the one hand and those with the UAR, the
Sudan, and Afghanistan on the other. All trade with East European coun-
tries after 1959-1961 was in non-convertible currency, with trade bal-
anced bilaterally except where credit was extended by the East Euro-
pean countries or serviced by India. Debt servicing by India was in
non-convertible currency, i.e. exports. Bilateral trade with the UAR,
the Sudan, and Afghanistan was on a more limited basis, with some items
excluded and trade therefore not completely balanced. Its main feature
was balancing of part of India's imports of cotton from the UAR and the
Sudan and fruit from Afghanistan with restricted categories of exports
including most but not all engineering goods.1
The operation of these bilateral agreements in the late 1960s
was confirmed by statements in the press announcing that source-tied
licenses had been issued by the Indian government for import from the
UAR, the Sudan, and Afghanistan as well as East Europe.2 Furthermore,
1There was an agreement that at least 15 percent of Afghanistan's
imports from India under bilateral trade would be non-traditional goods.
India's bilateral trade arrangements with Afghanistan are described in
GOI, MC, 1966, Pt. II, pp. 29-31. Not all Indian engineering goods were
eligible for export to the UAR under bilateral arrangements, e.g. in
1970-71 the Indian government banned export of nylon tires under the
arrangements and in 1971 it was reported that exporters of PILC aluminum
conductor power cables were having difficulty securing government
approval for exports under the arrangements. Presumably this was
because both had a large hard currency import content. (FE, 20 April
1971, p. 5, and Commerce, 15 May 1971.)
2 9, 6 September 1970, reports that tied licenses were issued
for import of raw cotton from the UAR.
El"
504
it was reported that:
The value of import licenses issued (by the Import and Export
Trade Control Organisation) under special trade agreements
with Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, etc., for the years 1967-68,
1968-69, and 1969-70 up to February 28, 1970 were Ra. 10.7
crores ($14.3 million), Rs. 16.9 crores ($22.1 million) and
Rs. 18.28 crores ($24.4 million) respectively.l
No other information on bilateral agreements with Iraq and Iran is avail-
able. The preceding statement may refer to ad hoc barter deals like
those discussed in the next section. However, by confining discussion
to East Europe, the UAR, the Sudan, and Afghanistan, the present analy-
sis may understate the role of bilateralism.
Bilateral trade with countries outside East Europe was not a
recent development. India made bilateral, non-convertible currency
agreements with Burma, Egypt, and Pakistan by 1953, each specifying
export of Indian iron and steel and engineering goods as well as tra-
ditional products.2 These three countries accounted for 24 percent of
Indian exports of steel and engineering goods in the period 1956-57
through 1962-63; on an annual basis they accounted for between 14 and
31 percent, the amount varying without a trend. This suggests that
bilateralism was a significant factor in early Indian exports of steel
and engineering goods. 3 In 1959-61 India was importing rice from
1 E, 1 April 1970, p. 8.
2For details of India's bilateral trade agreements in the early-
and mid-1950s, see Srivastava, 1956, pp. 181-199. Singh, M., 1964,
p. 249, reports that by 1959 there were also bilateral arrangements with
Afghanistan. G01, RBI, 1961, p. 117, refers to India's bilateral non-
convertible payments arrangements with Burma, Egypt, and Pakistan in
1960-61.
3Until 1959 there were also preferences implemented by licensing
U-
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Burma under rupee payment arrangements which involved export of engi-
neering goods. Between 1959 and the early 1960s, the proceeds of
Egyptian rock phosphate and rice imported by India were used to import
non-traditional Indian products including engineering goods. Reports
in 1961 and 1963 attributed Indian exports of engineering goods to
the UAR, including stationary diesel engines, electric fans, sewing
machines, dry batteries, and electric lamp bulbs, to the bilateral
arrangements.1
In addition to general bilateral agreements, India exported
some engineering goods to Nepal under a form of bilateralism involving
supply of Indian goods under tied credit with amortization and interest
in non-convertible rupees, i.e. exports from Nepal.2
It appears that these bilateral agreements enabled India to
export engineering goods at higher prices and with lower inputs on
marketing than would have been possible in hard currency markets.
Because of their own balance of payments and export marketing prob-
lems and India's comnitment to balance trade, because they were able
to get higher prices and perhaps more favorable terms of trade (net of
within the sterling area, of which India was a member, and with the
OEEC.
1GOI, BPC, 1961, pp. 30-31; GOI, EEPC, HEB, 1 July and 15 August
1959; S. L. Kirloskar, Chairman's Speech, GOI, EEPC, B, 1963.
2It is quite likely that the tied aid to Ceylon and Indonesia
discussed in part VI.C.4 was also repayable in non-convertible cur-
rency, but the form of repayment could not be determined. There was
an announcement of source-tied import licenses for rubber and an agree-
ment to buy tires from Ceylon, suggesting bilateralism, (FE, 6 Febru-
ary 1971, p. 8; 3 September 1970, p. 3.)
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aid) for their own goods in India than in hard currency markets, and
because some East European countries had accumulated undesired rupee
balances,1 the East European countries allocated non-convertible rupees
at a discount,2 i.e. they imported goods from India at prices higher
than India obtained in hard currency markets.
Table VI-4 lists price differences reported by Indian firms for
exports made to East Europe under bilateral agreements and exports sold
for hard currency. These confirm Narain's report that:
According to...knowledgeable business circles...prices paid by
some of the socialist countries for India's internationally
traded commodities have been 5 to 10 percent higher than those
prevailing in the rest of the world.3
1Apart from current export earnings, there was a tendency to
accumulate rupee balances unless imports were expanded because of
service on previous credits to India. Bhagwati and Desai report that
during the third plan amortization and interest payments were 9.6 per-
cent of Indian exports to East Europe. (Bhagwati and Desai, 1970,
p. 430.)
2 This discount is also evident in East European price discrimina-
tion on exports to different markets (though this might be explained
by source-tying of licenses by its partners) and in switch-trade at a
discount. According to the export agent for TISCO, there was quite a
bit of switch-trading in steel, e.g. Yugoslavia was reported to have
sold Indian steel in the Middle East for dollars, at prices 5 percent
below the dollar equivalent of the rupee prices at which purchases were
made from India. According to a press report, "there have been com-
plaints that switch deals take place in non-traditional items like
rolled steel," (FE, 5 May 1970, p. 10), and an importer in Kenya re-
ported that the USSR was selling Indian steel in East Africa. To reduce
the incentive for East European countries to engage in switch trade, the
Indian steel exporters' association set the price floor for exports under
rupee payment about $10 per ton higher than that for sales under hard
currency. The discounts from the official exchange rate for converting
clearing rupees held by East European countries into freely convertible
currencies was reported in 1970 to be 7 to 9 percent. (BI, BI, 15 May
1970, p. 156.)
3Narain, 1968, p. 15.
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TABLE VI-4
Difference Between Price Received on Hard Currency and
Bilateral Exports of Indian Engineering Goods, 1969
Product Excess Received on Exports
to East Europe as per cent
of Hard Currency Price
1. Steel 6
5. Steel wire ropes 0
7. Hand tools 5 to 10
21. Automobile parts Positive
Light electricals 10
Unspecified engineering goods 15
exported by large trading house
Source: Major Indian exporters of the products listed.
U-
508
Moreover, in a detailed analysis of primary and traditional manufac-
tured products accounting for 68 to 81 percent of India's exports to
East Europe, Narain finds that a weighted average of annual unit values
of Indian exports was 4 to 20 percent higher for exports to East Europe
than other countries in 1957 to 1966.1
In addition to the advantage given to Indian exporters because
rupees were allocated at a discount, India's competitive position for
engineering goods relative to other foreign suppliers was probably
better in East Europe than in hard currency areas because marketing was
less important. Few resources were devoted to marketing domestically
in East Europe, Western suppliers were not well established, and (except
in Yugoslavia) imports were monopolized by state agencies.
Yugoslavia's non-convertible rupee balances reached $40 million
in 1967-68. To use these and prevent further accumulation, the Yugo-
slav government required its exporters to import from India 120 percent
of the value of their exports to India and provided a subsidy of 20 per-
cent of shipping costs and special credit facilities for import from
India.2 This attempt to reduce rupee balances coincided with an in-
crease in Yugoslav imports of Indian engineering goods from $0.7 mil-
lion in 1967-68 to $5.6 million in 1969-70.
According to Indian exporters, the UAR discriminated in favor of
1 Ibid. Before 1959 there were bilateral agreements but balances
were convertible to sterling.
2 v, 2 May 1969, p. 923.
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Indian sources in import licensing and Import of engineering goods by
nationalized trading agencies. Kirloskar Cummins, Siemens India,
Philips India, and India Pistons all reported that UAR procurement of
finished products, components for original equipment, and spares was
switched to Indian subsidiaries because of the bilateral agreements.
A recent study reports:
In the UAR and the Sudan, economic policy favours India....
As far as (automobile) spare parts are concerned, there are
separate import quotas for parts from hard-currency sources
and from countries which have bilateral payments agreements
with the UAR as, for example, India. Imports from the latter
sources are encouraged.1
The study also states that while India had to offer discounts of 10 to
20 percent below prices of West European suppliers in markets where
there was no official discrimination, "because of the UAR's balance of
payments situation, the price of Indian parts does not need to be lower
than the price of competing goods." 2
In addition to such discrimination in licensing, under a recip-
rocal tripartite agreement Indian exports received concessions of half
the tariffs applied to certain engineering goods by Yugoslavia and the
UAR starting in 1968.3 Furthermore, by the end of 1970-71, the UAR had
accumulated a rupee debt to India of $30 million because of a cumulative
11UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. C, pp. 26, 172.
2 Ibid., p. 176.
3India also received preferential tariff treatment under the
British Commonwealth scheme. However, Indian engineering exports were
not based on tariff preferences to the extent that LAFTA trade appar-
ently was.
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excess of its imports over exports of goods traded under the bilateral
payments arrangements, i.e. there was "indirect aid to the UAR...built
into the trade between the two countries."l
3. Barter Deals
In addition to bilateral trade agreements, the Indian government
used ad hoc barter deals implemented through import licensing and state
trading to promote exports of engineering as well as other goods.
Table VI-5 provides details of deals announced in 1969-1970. Several
of these involved trade handled by the STC, and judging from the number
of announcements this was an increasingly important aspect of the STC's
operations. While such deals were initially made with foreign state
trading agencies,. in 1970 they were extended to include trade with
private firms in West Europe and Japan.
Although data on terms of trade are not available, the existence
of such barter deals suggests additional subsidization of exports
through the STC beyond the explicit losses described in Chapter III.C.1,
and together these two aspects of the STC's operations suggest that the
rapidly increasing value of state trading in 1969-1971 was accompanied
by a significant increase in hidden export subsidization. The govern-
ment evidently accepted such subsidization in principle. The Ministry
of Foreign Trade defended the government policy of monopolizing import
of industrial materials through state agencies on the grounds the state
agencies had used the bargaining strength in exporting non-traditional
1ET 11 May 1971, p. 1.
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TABLE VI-5
Barter Deals for Export of Engineering Goods Announced
in 1968-1971
Country
New Zealand#1
Greece#
Tunisia*
Syria*
Burma* 3
Jordan*4
Indian Export
Steel pipes (13,500 tons)
and rails (5,700 tons)
Engineering goods including
drill steel, compressors,
rock drills, and spare parts
Engineering goods
Railway wagons and track
material
Alumina, steel structurals,
and equipment for railway,
power and water development
Manufactured goods, including
engineering goods, which are
not part of normal exports to
Burma
Non-traditional goods, in-
cluding iron and steel, and
tea
Indian Import . .. Value of
Export
($ million)
Milk powder
(4,000 tons)
Fertilizer
(25,000 tons)
Rock phosphate
(200,000 tons)
Rock phosphate
Sulphur, liquid
phosphoric acid
Rice (100,000
tons per annuml
Rock phosphate
(300,000 tons)
2.3
1.7
4.0
10-16
ammonia Average
17 per
annium
3.3
Date Reference
1968-70 Journal of Industry
and Trade, March 1969,
p.354.
1969-71 FE, 30 August 1969,
25 February 1971
1970 FE, 28 October 1969.
1970 FE, 7 October 1969.
1970-78 Commerce, 31 May 1969,
p.1061; 7 March 1970,
p.4 48 ; FE, 2 June
1969, 2 January 1970.
1970-72 Times of India, 18
October 1969, ET, 6
February 1970; FE,
29 May 1970.
1971 ET, 2 February 1971,
p.5 .
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TABLE VI-5 (continued)
Indian Export Indian - Value of Date
Import Export
($ million)
Western European
Private Firms
(Total deals to
end-1970)
1. Austrian Firm
2. Swedish Firm
Italy (Private
Firm)
Japan (Private
Firms)
Thailand5
Non-traditional exports
including aluminum con-
ductors, steel pipes,
PVC resin, rayon tire
cord, yarn, ethyl alcohol
Aluminum extrusions, all
aluminum conductors, ACSR
conductors, aluminum chairs,
rayon tire cord, PVC resin,
human hair products,
leather
Non-traditional items not
previously exported to
Sweden
Industrial materials,
mainly special,
alloy, and stain-
less steel
Tool and alloy steel,
machinery spares
Unspecified
1.75.
3.0
Steel pipes and tubes Automobile accessories 1.2 -
2.4
Pig iron (100,000 tons)
Industrial machinery
Steel flat products
rice (100,000 tons
annually)
6.6
n.a.
1970 FE, 1 December 1970,
p.8.
1970 FE, 21 April 1970,
p.8; Engineering
Times, 18 June 1970,
p.6.
1970-
72
FE, 27 October 1970.
1971 FE, 21 February 1971,
p.1.
1970-71 FE, 1 October 1970,
p.8; 19 December 1970,
p.8.
1971- Commerce, 29 August
1973 1970, p. 437.
Country Reference
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Notes to Table VI-5
# Export statistics or reports confirmed that the exports took place.
* Based on preliminary announcements.
n.a.: not available.
1
Imports and exports under the deal did not balance.
2
The main part of this deal fell through. However, it was reported that
"it has ... been stipulated in the agreement that the foreign exchange
accruing to Iran from sale of these items (sulphur, 170,000 to 240,000
tons) during 1970 and 1971 will be utilised by that country for the
purchase from India of wagons, billets, railroad equipment, machinery
and capital goods." (Commerce, 7 March 1970, p. 448.)
3The announcement of the final agreement suggests that there was no
binding agreement by Burma to import Indian manufactures. The pre-
liminary announcement states that it was a barter deal.
4
It was reported that "under these arrangements, India imports mainly
rock phosphate and exports a variety of goods on a balanced trade
basis, the main items being tea and iron and steel."
5
It was reported that "the Indian exporter will not have to go through
the usual procedure of competing against global tenders."
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goods. Moreover, there was reported to have been pressure to cancel
the preliminary agreement to buy liquid ammonia from Iran, which was
to use the proceeds to buy engineering goods from India, because:
When it came to actual signing of the contract, it was found
that Iranian prices for liquid ammonia were 50 US cents higher
than those offered by Kuwait (for hard currency). The (Indian)
External Affairs Ministry is, however, insisting that the agree-
ment should be honoured. It has pointed out that the ammonia
deal with Iran is part of a bigger package which will enable
India to balance the import of liquid ammonia with the export
of its goods.2
In addition to these cases based on official announcements there
were several rumors of attempts to link specific items of import and
export, even within general bilateral trade agreements. It was gener-
ally believed in 1969 that:
The mammoth (railway) wagon deal which we have been negotiating
with the USSR for over a year and a half hinges on our purchas-
ing Soviet planes, however much we and the Russians may (offi-
cially) deny any link.3
Both deals failed. In 1970 India negotiated with East Germany for
export of Indian railway wagons, sale of which was reported to be
contingent on Indian imports of East German tractors. The deal ran
into trouble when East German tractors were found to be defective. It
was alleged in interviews in 1968 that Honeywell (US) bought $0.25 mil-
lion of HMT machine tools as part of an arrangement under which the
1ABP, 29 September 1969.
2 F_, 22 June 1970, p. 1.
3Commerce, 6 September 1969, p. 437. See also Jessop and Co.,
AR 1966-67, p. 8.
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Indian government was to license import of Honeywell computers, and
perhaps manufacturing in India. In view of these alleged deals with
the USSR and Honeywell involving airplanes and machine tools, it may
not be a coincidence that within weeks after the Indian government
decided to purchase $40 million worth of aircraft from Boeing (US)
against competition from the USSR, the chairman of HMT visited Boeing
to discuss the possibility that Boeing might purchase HMT machine
tools.
C. Export Credit
The discussion of marketing problems and practices above did not
consider the fact that foreign demand for engineering goods depends on
the supply conditions for "complementary" credit offered by the exporter.
This aspect of export marketing, and particularly government subsidiza-
tion of export credit, is considered in this section.
1. Credit and Trade in Capital Goods
Tied credit over six months and aid extended by exporters and
their governments finance an important share of international trade
in capital goods. "Commercial" supplier credits over one year, and
typically 5 to 10 years, are common on orders of capital goods larger
11n 1969 Honeywell was given a license to set up a wholly-owned
subsidiary in India "to facilitate exports of machine tools produced
by HMT." (EE, 24 April 1970, p. 820). For reports of Honeywell's
interest in selling used computers in India, see EPW, 18 November 1967,
pp. 2005-06, and 23 December 1967, p. 2188.
2Engineering Times, 26 February 1970, p. 41.
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than $0.25 million, not only to developing but to East European and
developed Western countries. Intergovernmental tied aid, particularly
East European state credit, has been concentrated on financing capital
goods but also finances industrial inputs like steel. However, apart
from orders for capital goods involving $0.25 million or more and
imports of some countries with balance of trade problems, "commercial"
credits are usually for 180 days or less after delivery.1 The "prob-
lem" of export credit therefore arises mainly for capital goods in
large orders.
Both export credit and aid are subsidized by the governments of
advanced countries. In 1969 typical terms for supplier credits on
large export sales of capital goods from Western countries were 10 years
with 6 to 6.5 percent annual interest. Western aid terms varied con-
siderably on the liberal side of these. The standard terms on aid
from the East European countries were 12 years with 2.5 to 3 percent
annual interest and all payments in non-convertible currency. East
European credits were also given at terms between these and the terms
on Western supplier credits.
Export finance affected Indian exporters of capital goods because
exporters from advanced countries and East Europe were able to supply
tied credit at terms more favorable than those at which the individual
importer could obtain either local or untied foreign capital, or at
which the importing country could obtain untied foreign capital. There
1Mohammed, 1970.
El
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were two reasons that the exporter could provide funds on such terms.
First, there were special government institutions, guarantees and in-
surance, and interest subsidies for tied export credit, and governments
gave tied aid. Second, where the scarcity value of capital or liquid-
ity preference was greater in the importing country or where the domestic
capital market in the latter was imperfect, capital could have been
cheaper abroad than from local sources; however, international capital
markets were imperfect and the exporter (e.g. an international corpora-
tion) may have had some real cost or risk advantage over other foreign
sources in supplying capital. Since the cost of capital supplied as
tied export credits was less than that available independently, one can
assume that there was a price preference for goods from exporters sup-
plying such credit. A number of developing countries with balance of
payments problems reinforced this with preferences or even restricted
imports to sources which provided credit (or equity capital, or which
traded bilaterally), regardless of the trade-off between lower cost of
credit and higher prices of goods. In India itself, a "significant
aspect of the import policy of the second plan was that imports of
capital goods for new projects were allowed only under deferred payment
arrangements."l According to Leff:
Most Brazilian capital goods imports have been financed by
foreign resources. Indeed, more than 80 percent of the...
equipment imported by Brazil during the period 1957-1963
was financed by...either suppliers' credits or direct
foreign investment...By a government decision, foreign
IGOI, LSS, 1968, p. 45.
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suppliers' credits were reserved almost exclusively for capital
goods imports...The government suspended import restrictions
for equipment supplied with foreign credits. 1
This situation increased the Indian resource cost of the present
value of foreign exchange earned by export of the capital goods involved
and would have biased India's comparative advantage away from capital
goods. In India, however, the "problem" was perceived in different
terms: as the lack of financial institutions providing export credit
on the same terms that it was available in advanced countries. The
government directed its programs not to supplying capital at the Indian
scarcity value but to matching the subsidized terms at which credit was
available to exporters from competing countries. The result was a sig-
nificant but selective increase in the implicit exchange rate on export
earnings, or on their present value at a given discount rate. Thus,
especially after 1967-68, export credit facilities became an important
channel for export subsidies, limited mainly to large orders of capital
goods.
2. Subsidization of Export Credit
Programs to subsidize credit, especially medium- and long-term,2
for export were developed during the 1960s as part of the government's
increasing emphasis on export promotion. Measures taken in 1967-68 in
particular led to a significant increase in subsidization.
1Leff, 1968, pp. 33-34, 140.
2Short-term refers to credit up to six months; medium, six months
to five years; long, over five years.
El
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Initially the government emphasized insurance for exporters
extending credit to foreign buyers (1957)1 and guarantees for banks
extending credit to exporters (c. 1960). It then set up refinance
facilities for short (1958), medium (1963), and long (1967) term
export credit extended by banks; provided refinance at a concessional
interest rate of 4.5 percent (or 5 percent if the bank charged more
than 6 percent on the loan) per year, compared to 5.5 to 6.5 percent
for other industrial refinancing (1963); excluded export credit from
calculation of bank liquidity for regulatory purposes (1967); and in-
troduced interest subsidies of 1.5 percent per year for bank credit
which was not refinanced (1968). It set an interest rate ceiling of
6 percent per year on export credit extended by banks (1967-1968),
compared to the prevailing rate of about 9.0-9.5 percent prevailing
on domestic credit.2 Finally and most important, it began direct
government financing of medium- and long-term export credit at an
interest rate of 4.5 percent per year (1968) for up to 70 percent of
the value of an order, so that credit was supplied at an average
interest rate of about 5,0-5.5 percent, including bank financing of
the residual, compared tothe .Industrial Development Bank of India's
1Comnercial and political risks were covered but there was no
insurance for changes in exchange rates. Exporters could cover ex-
change risks for up to six months.
2Whether or not the government realized it, such an interest
rate ceiling is a restriction on supply. However, to the extent that
availability of export credit was determined by government policies
through government financial institutions, particularly after bank
nationalization, the ceiling implied further subsidization.
IEl
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interest rate of 8 percent per year on direct loans to industrial con-
cerns for purposes other than exports.
Simultaneously, there was an extension of the maximum period of
credit allowed by the foreign exchange control authorities. Each
scheme was liberalized a number of times, and by 1968-69 credit was
extended for a number of important export orders for capital goods at
5 to 6 percent annual interest for periods up to 10 years. Subsidized
credit was available to cover working capital costs during manufactu-
ring, credit extended to foreign buyers, and delayed receipt of govern-
ment export subsidies.
A one percent interest rate subsidy on export credit extended
for 10 years, with interest and 10 percent of the principal paid at
the end of each year, has a present discounted value of 3.6 percent of
the initial value of the order, assuming a discount rate of 12 percent.1
Thus, the government's explicit interest rate subsidy of 1.5 percent on
export credit was worth 5.4 percent of the f.o.b. value of exports. The
3.5 percent difference between the private cost of export credit and
credit for domestic industrial investment was worth 12.7 percent of the
initial loan value, while the 6 percent difference between the private
cost of export credit and an assumed social discount rate of 12 percent
was 21.7 percent of the initial loan value. Clearly these were impor-
tant subsidies.
The rate of 12 percent was taken as a rough estimate of the
social discount rate. Assuming a private discount rate of 9 percent,
the present value of subsidies would be higher.
~
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Subsidized credit was neither automatically nor equally avail-
able to exporters, however, and thus contributed to implicit multiple
exchange rates. First, apart from capital goods and certain consumer
durables, exporters were not only ineligible for subsidized post-ship-
ment credit for a period longer than six months but were required to
repatriate earnings within six months after exports were shipped.
Certain consumer durables and capital goods normally sold in small
orders were eligible for subsidized post-shipment credit up to 18 months.
Thus, only certain capital goods were eligible for subsidized export
credit up to 7-10 years. Second, only large orders for capital goods
were eligible for direct government finance. Third, direct government
finance and some of its terms (e.g. the share of the order financed by
the government) depended on ad hoc approvals by the government IDBI.
Moreover, there were complaints that export credit was not
readily available from the commercial banks I and that banks charged over
6 percent annual interest.2 One explanation was that export credit at
6 percent plus a subsidy of 1.5 percent was less profitable for banks
than domestic credit at 8.5 percent.3 Toda reports that
Exporters...face difficulties in obtaining the necessary credit
from their banks...In spite of the refinance facilities..., the
commnercial banks hesitate to extend medium-term export credit...
First of all,...at present there is no sufficient inducement for
banks to provide finance to such exporters...Second,...this kind
IFE, 1 February 1969, p. i.
2 FE, 6 February 1969, p. i.
3 Conmmerce, 27 September 1969, p. 587.
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of credit is quite unfamiliar with them and (they) are afraid
of the large risk. 1
The dubious credit-worthiness of some companies, particularly after a
period of recession and labor troubles which led to closure of some
major firms, was also a deterrent to extension of credit.2
3. Utilization of Medium and Long-Term Indian Export Credit
Table VI-6 provides an incomplete list of export contracts in-
volving medium and long-term credit. Table VI-7 summarizes the medium
and long-term export credit operations for engineering goods in 1964-
1970 of the government Industrial Development Bank of India, which was
in charge of (i) refinancing medium and long-term export credit extended
by commercial banks and (ii) direct government financing of medium and
long-term export credit. The $38.9 million sanctioned by the IDBI is
less than total export credit committed since the program for direct
government financing was operated in cooperation with commercial banks,
whose share of these credits was not eligible for refinance. Including
the share of commercial banks in the program for direct financing, the
total was $52.8 million for sanctions and $24.5 million for disbursals. 3
This credit was heavily concentrated in the late part of the period,
i.e. 1968-1970.
This amount is consistent with the following information on the
1Toda, 1969, p. 12.
2FE, 15 December 1970, p. 7.
3Based on data in ET, 17 April 1971, p. 5.
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TABLE VI-6
Exports Financed by Medium- and Long-Term Credit from Indian
Source Other than Tied Aid
Importing Value
Country ($ mil.)
Duration of
Credit -
(Years)
1. Steel rails Iran
1. Steel rails, track Burma -
materials, and
girders
2. Steel pipes
6. Electric cables
6, 9. Electric
cables, and trans-
mission line
towersa
9. Transmission line
towersd
11. Railway wagonsa ,b
12. Cotton textile
machinerya, c
15. Commercial ve-
hicles
Sugar machinery
New Zea-
land
Iran
Iran
Nigeria
Yugoslavia
UAR
Indonesia
Uganda
Coach screws, etc. n.a.
a: IDBI provided direct financing.
b: Announced in the press late in
VI-7.
3.5
9.1
1.7
3.9
20.0
2.5
n.a.
4.5
5
5
7-10
n.a.
50.0
16.0
0.4
0.5
0.4
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
EE, 5 September
1969, p. 449.
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
FE, 9 October
1970, p. 1.
FE, 22 November
1969, p. 8.
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
EE, 24 January
1969, p. 163.
1970 but not covered by data in Table
c: Interest rate of 3 percent per year, repayment in rupees.
d: May have been financed by a World Bank loan rather than Indian credit.
See Table VI-9.
n.a.: Not available.
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TABLE VI-7
Medium- and Long-Term Export Credit Operations of the IDBI,
1964-1970
Program
Refinance of medium-
and long-term export
credits granted by
banks
Direct government
loans to exporters
Total
Dates ......
Sept. 1964-
June 1970
July -
December 1970
December 1968-
June 1970
July -
December 1970
Sept. 1964 -
December 1970
Amount of:Credit ($ million)
Sanctioned
13.7 a
0.2
Disbursed
8.9
1.8
3.923.7
1.3 6.1
38.9 20.7
a: 28 cases
Sources: FE, 15 December 1970, p. 4; 6 February 1971, p. 8.
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government Export Credit and Guarantee Corporation which insured export
credit:
One of the major developments in the Corporation's functioning
during 1968 has been risk insurance on account of large export
orders involving deferred payment terms (over 180 days) extend-
ing up to ten years. Such export orders totalling about
Rs 7.96 crores ($10.6 million) have been underwritten by the
Corporation during the year (for copper conductors, steel pipes,
sugar machinery, and railway wagons.)1
In 1969 the EGGC underwrote medium and long-term export credits on $34.1
million of large orders for transmission line towers, commercial vehi-
cles, cotton textile, sugar, and fertilizer machinery, railway wagons,
steel rails and railway accessories.2
4. Indian Aid
Apart from subsidizing export credit, the Indian government ex-
tended about $30 to $35 million in subsidized long-term tied aid (very
likely repayable in Indian rupees, i.e. exports) to Ceylon and Indonesia
between 1966 and 1969, about $15 to $20 million of it for engineering
goods and steel.
In this period India made a series of tied loans to Ceylon total-
ling about $20 million.3 The loans were to be repaid over 10 years
beginning two years after exports were made and the interest rate was
1 EGGC, AR 1968, p. 3. See also FE, 15 March 1969. The EGGC in-
sured export credits for engineering goods and steel totalling $8.0 mil-
lion in 1966; $15.6 million, 1967; $22.7 million, 1968; and $53 million,
1969. These data include short-term credits.
2 EGGC, AR 1969, p. 5, and FE, 29 October 1969.
3Utilization was 1966-67, $2.9 million; 1967-68, $4.1 million;
1968-69 (8 months), $3.3 million.
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5 percent per year. The first $6.7 million credit was good for a wide
range of products, including non-engineering consumer goods, but sub-
sequent credits were restricted to capital goods. It was reported that
"the second credit of Rs. 50 million ($6.7 million) has been almost
completely allocated for the import of commercial vehicles, electrical
equipment, industrial machinery, telephone equipment, and railway
coaches and wagons.L Moreover, specific allocations of the tied aid
were made for each industry, e.g. $1.1 million was earmarked for machine
tools.
In late 1966 India was made a $13.3 million tied loan to Indo-
nesia. This was not restricted to engineering goods and steel, and
by mid-1969 Indonesia had used the entire loan to import $9.8 million
of cotton and jute manufactures, $2.6 million of metals and engineering
goods consisting of steel ($1.2 million) and bicycle and other parts
($1.4 million),2 and $Q,9 million of paper, drugs, etc.
In addition, India gave a number of grants and credits to Nepal.
In the 5-year period 1966-1970 Indian aid to Nepal was $116 million,3
chiefly for social overhead projects. It was not possible to determine
whether this aid financed exports of engineering goods to Nepal; judg-
ing from the composition of those exports at least half were not for
1ABP, 6 August 1968.
2Bicycle parts, $1.21 million; oil mill parts, $0.13 million;
automobile parts, $0.06 million.
3FE, 3 May 1971, p. 8.
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aid-financed projects. However, in 1964 India made a $2.1 million
tied loan to Nepal for imports of Indian capital goods, repayable over
15 years in Indian rupees at 3 percent interest.1
Table VI-8 shows the value of exports of engineering goods and
steel to these three countries in 1964-65 to 1969-70.
5. Third-Party Financing
Indian exports of engineering goods benefitted from eligibility
in tenders financed by the World Bank and, during the first half of the
1960s, by US aid to southeast Asia.2 The World Bank requires that
projects it finances be awarded on the basis of the lowest bid in com-
petitive tenders open to all members, with the exception that develop-
ing countries are permitted to give a 15 percent price preference to
local suppliers.3 An important feature of World Bank financing is that,
because tenders must be awarded to the lowest bid from countries which
are bank members, Indian suppliers probably can obtain higher prices
than on ordinary hard currency sales, since they do not need to set
1Bhasin, ed., 1970, p. 150. Under a trade agreement with Nepal,
there were no tariffs or quantitative restrictions on trade with Nepal,
except for revenue duties imposed by Nepal.
2Although the Asian Development Bank has not done so, the Inter-
American Development Bank refinances export credits extended by member
countries for intra-regional trade in capital goods. In 1964-1967 it
provided refinance for $27 million of exports. (International Trade
Forum, April 1968, pp. 4-7, and UNCTAD Document TD/7/Supp. 16, 1968.)
India has been pressing the ADB for similar facilities. (FE, 27 March
1971, p. 8.)
3Because of the preference for local suppliers, Indian bidders
lost a tender in Latin America even though their bid was lowest. When
the US replenished IDA funds for soft loans in 1967-68 it made dollar
releases conditional on purchases in the US though tenders against loans
remained global. (EPW,.15 April 1967, p. 700, and 30 November 1968,
p. 1841.)
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TABLE VI-8
Exports of Engineering Goods and Steel to Countries Receiving Tied Indian Aid
1964-65 to 1969-70
Ceylon Indonesia
$millions
(% of exports to
all countries)
Nepal
Engg. Goods Engg.
and Steel Goods
1.2
(2.9)
1.5
(2.9)
1.9
(2.8)
3.6
(2.9)
8.5
(4.6)
n.a.
Steel Engg.Goods
and Steel
1.2 0.0 0.3
(3.4) (0.0) (0.7)
1.5 0.0 0.4
(3.8) (0.0) (0.8)
1.7 0.2 0.1
(4.1) (0.8) (0.1)
1.8 1.8 1.2
(3.3) (2.5) (1.0)
5.4 3.1 2.4
(4.8) (4.3) (1.3)
9.3
(6.6)
n.a. .a.
Engineering Steel
Goods
0.1
(0.3)
0.2
(0.5)
0.1
(0.2)
1.0
(1.8)
1.2
(1.1)
2.2
(1.6)
Engg.Goods Engg.1
and Steel Goods
0.2 1.0
(3.4) (2.4)
0.2 2.3
(1.7) (4.5)
0.0 2.2
(0.0) (3.3)
0.2 • 2.2
(0.3) (1.7)
1.2 3.8
(1.7) (2.1)
n.a. n.a.
IIndian exports of engineering goods to Nepal did not exceed $0.3 million until 1964-65.
Sources: GOI,EEPC,HB.
- I.
Year
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
Steel
0.0
(0.0)
0.2
(1.7)
0.1
(0.4)
0.0
(0.0)
0.0
(0.0)
n.a.
1.0
(2.8)
2.1
(5.3)
2.1
(5.1)
2.2
(4.0)
3.8
(3.4)
3.9
(2.8)
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prices at a discount below bids from advanced Western countries and
East European countries can not bid. However, competition among
Indian firms led to a loss of this advantage in some tenders for rail-
way equipment.
Indian engineering firms received several export orders for
electric cables, transmission line towers, railway wagons, and electric
machinery financed by World Bank loans. See Table VI-9 for an incom-
plete list.
From the initiation of US aid-tying in 1959 until 1966, Indian
exporters of steel and engineering goods benefitted from restrictions
on procurement against US aid to South Vietnam to suppliers in the US
and certain developing countries. Table VI-10 indicates the heavy
It is reported that "World Bank projects gave the country its
first chance to get into the East African markets;" that financing from
"the IBRD...has governed India's ability to secure wagon orders" in
East Africa (UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. A, pp. 11, 41); that "the IBRD's
dictum that purchases made from funds made available by it be governed
by acceptance of the lowest-to-specification-tendered-offer from the
widest possible range of countries, has governed India's ability to
secure wagon orders;" and that "India has been a major supplier in the
recent past because the credit was from the World Bank...In future, the
prospects for India will depend upon further availability of World Bank
credit." (NCAER, 1970, Vol. 1, pp. 41, 171.)
2Since the export earnings were evidently tied US funds, which
India had to spend in the US, the gains to India were less than to
exporters, i.e. this involved export subsidization. (See Bhagwati
and Desai, 1970, p. 199.)
See GOI, EEPC, 1963, pp. 4, 11. Indian exporters benefitted
from preferences on US aid to Pakistan in the early 1960s. Since
exports to Pakistan dropped when aid was tied to the U.S., it was sug-
gested that perhaps Indian firms were interested in export earlier
only at higher than world prices at which procurements were made under
the DLF aid programme. Pakistan, for instance, was buying some steel
from us with US funds which carried the stipulation that purchases be
made from developing countries if prices did not exceed the world level
by more than 10 percent. With U.S. aid linked more firmly to dollar
I_ I _
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*TABLE VI-9
Exports Financed by World Bank Loans to the Importing Countries,
1
Product Importing.
Country
6. PILC power Singapore
cables
6, 9. Electric Sudan
cables and trans-
mission line
towers
9. Transmission line Nigeria
towers
9. Transmission line Thailand
towers
.1. Railway wagons East Aftica
Railway wagons South
Railway wagons Sudan
Electric machinery,
including power Malawi
transformers
Earth moversa Nepal
Korea
Note: In several cases the value of
Indian export statistics.
as Asian Development Bank loan.
.965-1971
SValue-. "
($ mil.)
0.2
8.0
1.9
4.6
2.9
10.0
1. 3
n.a.
0.1
.Date o
Order
1966
1971
1965
1967
1969
1971
1971
the order has been
f .... Source
Indian manufacturer
EEPC, IEE, May
1968, p. 205.
EEPC
ET, 18 April 1971.
NCAER, 1970, vol.
1, p. 171.
GOI, MF, ES 1967-
68, p. 31.
EEPC
FE, 27 March
1971, p. 3.
Commerce, 6
February 1971,
p. 250.
estimated from
1
1
1
1
1.
1.
4.
c
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dependence of Indian exports to South Vietnam between 1963-64 and
1966-67 on the terms of this aid.
These procurement restrictions played an important role in
Kirloskar Oil Engines' early exports of stationary diesel engines.1
South Vietnam imported $1.0 million or 43 percent of Indian exports
of diesel engines in 1964-65. Baranson reports that exports of TELCO
Mercedes-Benz commercial vehicles to South Vietnam
were conditioned by US AID procurement policies which require
90 per cent American content. Special exemptions are granted
to industrial goods manufactured in developing countries.
Thus, Daimler-Benz can sell its Indian truck in Vietnam, but
not one manufactured in Germany.2
With the tying of US aid to US sources, Indian exports of engineering
goods to South Vietnam declined from an average of $4.3 million in
1963-64 to 1966-67 to an average of $0.8 million per year in 1967-68
and 1968-69. Thus, the growth of total Indian exports of engineering
goods and steel between 1966-67 and 1968-69 took place in spite of the
loss of a sheltered market for 10 percent of these exports. In December
1970 it was reported that the US partially untied some loans given
through USAID, permitting use of funds for purchases in developing
countries provided import content from advanced countries other than
purchases, this sheltered market has dried up and exports brought to a
standstill." (EW, 18 May 1963, p. 831.) This decline in exports of
steel could be explained by supply factors, however. See
Chapter III.B.l.b.
1 0ther important exports were steel, steel tubes, brass sheets
and circles, and electric wires and cables.
2Baranson, 1969, p. 77.
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TABLE VI-10
Exports of Steel and Eagineering Goods to South Vietam,
1960-61 to 1969-70
Percent. of total.--ndian exports
of steel and engineering goods
0.0
2.7
2.9
7.9
8.9
10.0
9.6
0.8
0.2
0.4a
a: Excludes steel
Source: GOI, EEPC, HB.
Year
1960-61
1961-62
1962-63
1963-64
1964-65
1965-66
1966-67
1967-68
1968-69
1969-70
* Value .....
($ mil.)
0.0
0.6
0.6
2.4
3.7
5.1
5.9
1.2
0.4
0.5a
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the US was not more than 50 percent.1
6. Tied Equity Capital
Chapter III.C.5 discussed the scheme under which, between 1959
and the end of 1970, the government approved export of $21 million in
capital goods to finance Indian equity investment in 105 manufacturing
projects abroad. (See Table VI-11.) It appears that exports averaging
$1.5 to $2.0 million per year were made in 1965-66 to 1969-70 to finance
these investments.
D. Implications for Export Subsidization
The preceding sections have described several schemes which sub-
sidized exports of engineering goods. These can be grouped in three
categories: (i) soft currency schemes, i.e. bilateral trade agreements,
ad hoc barter deals, and tied aid;2 (ii) medium and long-term export
credit; and (iii) tied equity financing. This section considers the
development of these schemes over time and the industry breakdown of
exports covered by these measures in 1969-70.
Not only the absolute amount but the share of total exports
accounted for byeach of these categories increased between 1964-65 and
1969-70, indicating increasing subsidization of exports. This is evi-
dent in the export data for bilateral trade areas (Table VI-3);
1FE, 25 December 1970, p. 1. In early 1971 an Indian company
exported ultramarine blue under US aid to South Vietnam. (FE, 4 March
1971, p. 5.)
2Tied aid is included with soft currency rather than credit
exports because thil is more convenient for the presentation in Table
III-7 and tied aid may have been repayable in rupees.
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TABLE VI-11
Indian Manufacturing Investments Abroad Approved by June 1970
Project
Ethiopia
Textiles
Soap
Woollen textiles
Textiles
Malt
Aluminum sheets
Indian .
Investment
($ mil.)
0.12
0.21
0.18
0.12
n.a.
n.a.
Indian Company
Birla Brothers
Bombay Soap
Duncan Brothers
Birla Brothers
Mohan Meakin Breweries
Hooseini Metal Rolling
Date Status
Approved
1959
1965
1965
1967
Operating
it"
it
it
Ghana
Small tractors
Kenya
Textiles
Gripe water
Light engineering goods
Corks
Woollen textiles
Printing inks
Paper and pulp
0.07 Escorts International
0.35
0.02
0.28
0.10
0.44
0.11
1.80
R.M. Goculdas
K.T. Dongre
H.L. Malhotra
Indian Cork Mills
Raymond Woollen Mills
Rainbow Ink
Birla Brothers
0.17 Indian Hume Pipe 1963 Operating
Mauritius
Mosaic tiles, rolling
shutters
Rubber products
Canning
Morocco
Corks
Nigeria
Engineering goods
Solvent extraction
Textiles
Palm kernel crushing
Razor blades
Textiles
Air-coolers
Tanzania
Pharmaceuticals
Togo
Radios
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Sidharth Jasubhai
Swastic Rubber Products
Ayurved Sevashram
0.01 Indian Cork Mills
0.34
0.05
0.85
0.14
0.34
n.a.
n.a.
Birla Brothers
Birla Brothers
Birla Brothers
Birla Brothers
H.L. Malhotra
T. Maneklal Mfg.
Turner Hoare
0.04 Mrs. Sarla Somant
n.a. Semiconductors
Pipes
1967
1964
1966
1966
1967
1966
1966
1968
Operating
I,
"
t
((
"t
Operating
1963
1964
1963
1964
1965
Operating
Operating
Operating
1965
-I
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TABLE VI-11 (continued)
Project
Uganda
Sugar refining
Jute manufactures
Ceylon
Sewing machines
Glass
Tea-processing machines
PVC leather cloth
Trucks
Mica mining
Air-coolers
Pharmaceuticals
Filters
Textiles
Textile machine parts
Electric motors, pumps
Iran
Automobile parts
Electric motors and
transformers
Indian
Investment
($ mil.)
Indian Company
11.40 Consortium
n.a. Birla Brothers
0.11
0.03
n.a.
0.05
0.72
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Jay Engineering
Swastic Glass
General Industries
Bhor Industries
Ashok Leyland
Krishna Mining
Electronics Ltd.
Themis Pharmaceuticals
Fritz & Singh
Birla Brothers
Metro Wood Engineering
Kirloskar Electric
0.07 Mahindra and Mahindra
Electric Const. &
0.16 Equipment
Date Status
Approved
1964 Cancelled
by host
1961
1967
1965
1967
1967
Operating
Operating
Operating
1966 Operating
1965
Lebanon
Pesticides 0.06 Pest Control
Saudi Arabia
Asbestos cement products
Vanaspati
.Transistors
Afghanistan
Sewing thread balls
Malaysia
Steel furniture
Cotton textiles
Glass bottles
Electric cables
Small tools
Electric fans, sewing
machines
Confectionary
Cosmetics
Electric motors, pumps,
diesel engines
0.53
0.31
n.a.
Birla Brothers
Ahmed Oomerbhoy
United Agency
0.02 Darbar and Co.
0.35
1.29
0.15
0.12
0.08
Godrej and Boyce
Birla Brothers
Jog Glass Industries
Indian Aluminium Cables
Gupta Mechanical Tools
n.a. Jay Engineering
n.a. Parry's Confectionery
n.a. Dabur
n.a. Kirloskar Electric
1967
1965
1965
1968
1965
1964
1968
1968
1968
Operating
Operating
-L
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TABLE VI-11 (continued)
Project Indian.
Investment
($ mil.)
Pharmaceuticals,
cosmetics
Enamelled wires
Speedometer cables
Singapore
Welding electrodes
Electric fans, sewing
machines
Automobile parts
Thailand
Steel re-rolling
Synthetic fibre
Newsprint mill
Philippines
Diesel engines
Ireland
Nylon bristles
Tufted carpen yarn
West Germany
Hose clips
Diesel engines
n.a.
n.a.
Indian Company
G.C. Narang Industries
Ajit Industries
Southern Industrial
Corporation
Date Status
Approved
n.a. M.S. Alloy Electrodes
n.a. Jay Engineering
n.a.. Teksons
0.04
n.a.
n.a.
Sacha Exporters
Birla Brothers
Kuljian Corpn.
n.a. Kirloskar Oil Engines
0.05 Garware Plastics
0.34 Mafatlal Gagalbhai
n.a. N. Krishnan
n.a. Kirloskar Oil Engines
1968
1966
1968
1966 Operating
U.K.
Asbestos cement products 0.44 Birla Brothers
0.79 Anil Hardboards
n.a. T. Maneklal Mfg.
1965 Operating
U.S.
Hardboard n.a. Anil Hardboards
Colombia
Twist drills 0.11 Indian Tool Manufacturers 1965
Source: IEA, HS, 1969-70, pp. 256-59.
Canada
Hardboard
Textiles
1965
CI~_I___
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announcements of ad hoc barter deals were found mainly after mid-1969,
although the same sources were examined for earlier periods; with the
exception of Nepal, tied aid was given starting in 1966; apart from
concessional rates for refinance, explicit subsidization and direct
government financing of export credit began in 1968; of the 105 Indian
foreign investments approved, all but 10 were in 1965 or after.
Details of the industrial coverage of the schemes are provided
in Table 111-7. Significantly, each breakdown reveals a substantial
range in the subsidization of exports for different industries and a
bias toward subsidization of exports of capital goods.
(i) Soft currency: All exports to the eight East European countries,
the UAR, the Sudan, Afthanistan, and Ceylon are considered soft currency
exports, in the first eleven cases because of bilateral agreements and
in the last because of tied aid. In 1969-70, 36 percent of total
exports of engineering goods were sold for soft currency. A country
breakdown of these exports is provided in Tables VI-4 and VI-8 while
an industrial breakdown is provided in Table 111-7. For the 24 engi-
neering industries in Table 111-7, the share of exports for soft cur-
rency varied from zero to 93 percent. This indicates that soft currency
arrangements were important in the average level and industrial struc-
ture of export subsidies.1 The figures involve some underestimation,
since they do not include exports covered by the ad hoc barter deals
1 Because consumer goods were not eligible for export under the
second and subsequent tied credits to Ceylon, the industry breakdown
of exports somewhat overstates the percentages of consumer goods
exported under soft currency.
I _ _ _ _ __ __ I_____ ~_
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in Table VI-5.
(ii) Medium and long-term export credit: On the basis of the data
presented in Tables VI-6 and VI-7, it appears that at least $10 mil-
lion of exportsI during 1969-70 were financed by subsidized medium and
long-term export credit at interest rates of 5-6 percent, accounting for
about 4 percent of exports of engineering goods including steel. Table
111-7 provides an industrial breakdown of sanctions made in 1968-70.
As a matter of government policy, such credits were restricted to
capital goods, and in the case of direct government financing, to large
orders.
(iii) Tied equity financing: About $1.5 to $2.0 million in exports
appear to have been made in connection with tied equity financing
during 1969-70. As a matter of government policy, these exports were
restricted almost entirely to industrial machinery. Among the indus-
tries listed in Table 111-7, only cotton textile machinery and machine
tools were affected to a significant extent, while fabricated steel
structures and electric machinery were affected to a lesser degree.
1 Exports of cotton textile machinery to the UAR alone accounted
for over $6 million in 1969-70.
1_ -
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CHAPTER VII
BARRIERS TO EXPORT
This chapter examines briefly factors other than government poli-
cies which limited the transition from import substitution to export,
particularly as a short-run response to excess capacity and government
export promotion schemes. The factors considered here are (A) discrim-
ination against exports by foreign collaborators, (B) transport costs,
and (C) trade barriers abroad. A fourth factor which could be consid-
ered in this context has already been discussed in Chapter VI.B.1:
the necessity of large discounts below the prices of goods exported
from advanced countries.
A. Discrimination against Exports by Foreign Collaborators
Chapters II.B and V.A discussed the extent of foreign ownership,
control, and technical collaboration in the engineering and tire indus-
tries. Heavy reliance on foreign collaboration suggests a question
which has been raised in other semi-industrial countries and Australia,
Canada, and Japan: do foreign investors and licensors discriminate
between domestic sales and exports by their Indian subsidiaries and
licensees?
I __~_ _~_ _ _ __
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1. Formal Discrimination in Collaboration Agreements
A review of written foreign collaboration agreements in India
revealed the seven conditions listed below which discrimipated between
domestic sales and exports by licensees while the agreements were in
force, which was typically 5 to 10 years from the start of commercial
production. It should be emphasized that all these conditions were
approved by the government.
(a) Total prohibitions of exports and requirements for prior approval
of all exports by the foreign collaborator;
(b) restrictions on countries to which licensees could export;
(c) higher royalty rates on exports;
(d) restrictions on export marketing channels, mainly requirements to
sell through the collaborator or its agents;
(e) restrictions on use of the collaborators' trademarks in export;
(f) restrictions on export pricing;
(g) limitations on the volume of exports.
The findings with respect to export restrictions of an RBI survey
of the terms of all written foreign collaboration agreements
in 1961-1964 are presented in Tables VII-1 and VII-2. The survey ques-
tionnaire asked explicitly only about restrictions of types (a), (b),
and (e), but the RBI also received and tabulated some answers concern-
ing restrictions of types (d) and (g).1 Table VII-1 reveals that
1The survey asked firms to "indicate if there are any clauses in
your agreement which prevent exports as such or exports to a specified
area. Also indicate whether trademarks, if obtained under the agree-
ment, can be used for purposes of export." GOI, RBI, 1968, p. 137.
El
I _~ _ ___~__
~I
541
TABLE VII-1
Export Restrictions in Foreign C611aboration Agreements in
Force in 1961-65
(Number of Agreements)
Basic Metals All
and -Engineering Manu-
Industries facturing Total
Private Sector, Total
Export Restrictions* 329 441 455
Total 634 1026 1051
Percent 52 43 43
Firms with over 50 percent
foreign ownership
Export Restrictions %32 52 56
Total 80 132 144
Percent 40 39 39
Firms with 50 percent or
less (but some) foreign
ownership
Export Restrictions 154 220 230
Total 245 442 445
Percent 63 50 52
Firms with Technical Collabo-
ration without foreign equity
Export Restrictions 143 169 169
Total 309 452 462
Percent 46 37 37
Government Firms
Export Restrictions n.a. n.a. 35
Total n.a. n.a. 70
Percent n.a. n.a. 50
n.a.: not available
*: number of agreements with export restrictions
@: includes 14 agreements in private sector non-manufacturing activities.
coverage: same as Table II-11.
Source: GOI, RBI, 1968, pp. 35, 62, 84, 97.
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TABLE VII-2
Export Restrictions in Foreign Collaboration Agreements in Force
in 1961-65, by Tyge of Export Restriction
Private Firms
Type of Restriction
Over 50 per-
50 per- cent or
cent less (but
foreign some)
owner- foreign
ship owner-
ship
- (Number of Agreements)
Government Total
Tech-
nical
collabor-
ation
without
foreign
equity
Firms
a. Export prohibited 36 97 56
For all products
Explicit prohibition
Permission of collabor-
ator.required for
export
For some products only
b. Export allowed to some
but not all countries
Countries listed where
export is allowed
Countries lipted where
export is prohibited
d. Restriction on export
marketing channel
e. Restriction on use of
trademark in exoort
g. Restriction on volume
of exports
32 80
2
118
16 101
3 17
1 13
0@ 0#
TOTAL 56 230 169* 490
*: 5 agreements with restriction on use of trademark have one other restriction
each, and therefore the column adds to 174.
@: The RUI report reTers to two agreements in this category (pp.36-37) but
does not include them in the tables on which this table is based.
#: The RBI report refers to one agreement in this category (p.64).
coverage: Same as Table VII-1,.including agreements not in engineering and
basic metals industries.
Source: GOI, RBI, 1968, pp. 34, 61, 83, 96.
III
197
102
193
41
152
4
261
217
44
25
i"-e
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export restrictions, mainly of types (a) and (b), existed in about half
the agreements in the basic metals and engineering industries. The per-
centage of agreements with export restrictions differed between owner-
ship categories but without a consistent relationship to the share of
foreign ownership. In addition to the data presented in tabular form,
the text of the RBI study refers to at least 10 replies reporting re-
strictions of type (c) and one reporting a restriction of type (f).1
The findings of the Dutt Committee with respect to export re-
strictions in 270 written foreign collaboration agreements approved by
the government in 1956-1965 are presented in Tables VII-3 and VII-4.
Just over 60 percent of the agreements contained export restrictions,
and the share of foreign ownership appears to have had little effect
on this percentage. Unlike the RBI study, this report recorded data
on restrictions of type (c), which were found in 21 percent of agree-
ments in the engineering industries. Table VII-4 shows that export
restrictions existed in 14 of the 15 industries selected for detailed
examination in the present study which were represented in the sample
of agreements covered.
The following sections discuss the various types of export re-
strictions on the basis of information gathered in India.
a. - b. Total Prohibitions and Territorial Restrictions
Total export prohibitions of type (a) were unusual among firms
interviewed, although they were reported in a few cases, for a simple
1 Ibid., pp. 36, 64, 65, 87, 98.
TABLE VI-3
Export Restrictions in Foreign Collaboration Agreemeit Approved in 1956-1965
Type of Export Restriction
(b) (c) L I None
Number of agreements
Percent of Agreements
with Export Restrictions
All Manufacturing Industries 6 76 72 12 9 95 65
Firms with over 50 percent
foreign ownership 3 34 44 5 4 38 70
Firms with less than 50
percent foreign ownership,
private sector 3 41 27 7 5 56 60
Government firms 0 1 1 0 0 1 67
Engineering Industries 6 69 45 7 8 84 62
@: Only agreements with total prohibitions on exports.
#: Includes agreements which require approval of collaborator for all exports, agreements wit
restrictions on export marketing channels, etc.
coverage: approximately 11 percent of the collaboration agreements approved during 1956-1965.
Source: GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, p. 134, and Appendix V-C.
h
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(a) 1 (a,d) I
TABLE VII-4
Export Restrictions in Foreign Collaboration Agreements Approved in 1956-1965 in Fifteen
Selected Industries
CNumber of Agreements)
Type of Restriction
(a)_ (b Cc) (g) (a,d)# none
4. Iron and steel castings
Iron 1 2
6. Electric wires and cables 4
Aluminum conductors 1
Plastic insulated 1
Paper insulated 1
Unspecified 2 1
7. Hand, small, and cutting tools 3
Twist drills 1
Tungsten carbide tipped tools 1
Small tools 1
10. Fabricated steel structures 2 7 2
12. Cotton textile machinery and parts 4 1 3
13. Machine tools (and accessories) 3 1
14. Electric machinery 5 1 3
Transformers 1 1
Motors 3 1
Motor starters 1
Other switchgear 1 1
-- 
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TABLE VII-4 (continued)
Type of Restriction
(a) " (b) Ccl (g (a,d) I
15. Commercial vehicles and jeeps
Jeeps
16. Dry and storage batteries
Dry
Storage
17. Radios and components
19. Bicycles
20. Stationary and other diesel engines
& 22.
21. Automobile parts other than (22)
22. Vehicular engine parts
23. Bicycle parts
TOTAL
Notes and source: same as Table VII-3.
1 3
3 4 1 1
1
1
2 29 17 2 2
none
1
29
~--- , ~--
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reason: Indian firms typically were allowed to export to Ceylon. Con-
sequently, the fact that exports were not totally prohibited did not
mean that export territories were liberally defined. Kidron has noted:
Where an export territory is permitted, it is usually confined
to the narrow regional market: Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Nepal,
Afghanistan. In the few cases in which the export territory
is more liberally defined, it is usually in need of development
from scratch, e.g. developing countries yr East Europe, where
the parent has not established a market.
While this overstates the relative frequency of such restrictions, it
correctly points out that many of the restrictions of type (b) were
severe. It is relevant that most of the restrictions of type (b) in
Table VII-2 list countries where exports were allowed rather than where
they were prohibited, the former involving the smaller number of coun-
tries. The same point is apparent in Table VII-5, which lists the
export restrictions in HMT's 13 collaboration agreements for machine
tools in force in 1967. All 13 permitted exports to Ceylon, and hence
there were no restrictions of type (a), but restrictions of type (b)
occurred in nine, and all of these excluded the markets which HMT con-
sidered to have the greatest potential.
As this suggests, the range of machine tools which Indian licen-
sees could export freely to all markets, or to advanced Western coun-
tries, was narrowly limited by territorial restrictions in 1968.
Table VII-6 provides an incomplete list of active collaboration agree-
ments for machine tools with prohibitions on export to all areas of
North America and West Europe; generally they prohibited exports to
IKidron, 1965, pp. 283-84.
w __ iT __ _
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TABLE VII-5
Export Restrictions in Hindustan Machine Tools' Foreign Collaboration Agreements in Force in 1967
Foreign
Collaborator
Period of Machine
Agreement Licensed
1. Limex, East Germany 1961-1971
2. Regie Nationale
des Usines Renault,
France
3. Drummond Brothers,
U.K.
4. Fritz Werner,
West Germany
S. Manufacture de
Machine du Haut-
Rhin, France
Surface grinding
machines, SWF
1961-1968 Special purpose
machines, trans-
fer lines
1963-1970 Gear shapers,
2A and 3A
1963-1970 Electrically con-
trolled milling
machines, D
1964-
1971/
1974
Single spindle
automatic lathes,
TR
Export Conditions
Non-exclusive right to sell in all countries-
Non-exclusive right to sell in Burma, Ceylon,
Pakistan, Nepal, and Indonesia; permission of
collaborator required for other countries
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon;
non-exclusive right to sell in other countries
subject to payment of 10 percent. commission and
through collaborator's agents only.
Exclusive right to sell in Ceylon; non-exclusive
right to sell in other countries subject to the
restriction that sales to such countries not ex-
ceed 25 percent of production in any year.
Type of
Export
Restriction
None
b
-c,d
g
Exclusive right to sell in Ceylon; non-exclusive b,c,d
right to export to 28 other countries through col-
laborator's agents on commission basis. The 28
couptries were: Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, Mainland
China, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Laos, Malaya, Nigeria,
Niger, North and South Korea, North and South Vietnam,
Pakistan, Sudan, Tanganyika, UAR, and (at 10 percent
commission): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East
Germany, Poland, Rumania, USSR, Finland, and Israel.
L --- -~-~----
Foreign
Collaborator
Period of
Agreement
Machine
Licensed
TABLE VII-5 (continued)
Export Conditions Type of
Export
Restriction
6. Effehag Effekten-
Handels und Lizenz-
verwertungs
Switzerland, and
Hans Liebherr
Maschinenfabrik,
West Germany
7. Gildemeister, West
Germany
8. Manufacture de Ma-
chine du Haut-Rhin
France
9. H. Ernault-Somua,
France
1964-1971 Gear hobbing
machines, L
1966 - 8 Multi-spindle
years from automatic
date of lathes
first pur-
chase order
1966 - 8 Single sindLe
years from automatic
date of lathes, PF
first pur-
chase order
1966 - 10 Copying
years frm lathes,
date of Pilote
first pur-
chase order
Non-exclusive right to sell in all countries. Sales c,d
to USA and West Europe were restricted to collaborator's
agents on payment of commission of 15 percent.
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon; non-
exclusive right to sell without outright competition
with collaborator in USA, Canada, Latin America,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and other Asian countries
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon; non-
exclusive right to sell as under agreement #5.
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon; non-
exclusive right to sell without outright competition
with collaborator in all Asian countries except Japan
and Mainland China.
b
b,c,d
b
10. Jones and Lamson,
U.S.A.
1966 - 5
years
from date
of first
purchase
order
Automatic
lathes,
Fay
Exclusive right to sell in Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan; b,d
non-exclusive right to sell without outright competition
with the collaborator in all other Asian countries,
Australia, New Zealand, and Africa excluding South
Africa; sales in Japan, Australia, Tasmania, and New
Zealand only through collaborator's agents.
- -- 
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TABLE VII-5 (continued
Foreign
Collaborator
11. Gildemeister,
West Germany
12. Pegard, Belgium
13. Osward Forst,
West Germany
Period of Machine
Agreement Licensed
1966-1971 Drum-type
and there- turret
after un- lathes, RTV
til termi-
nated by
one party
1967-1972 Horizontal
and there- boring
after un- machines,
til termi- AF, FA, U
nated by
one party
Horizontal
boring
machines to
be designed
jointly by
Pegard and
HMT
1967-1977 Broaching
and there- machines
after un-
til termi-
nated by
one party
Export Conditions Type of
Export
Restriction
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon; non- b
exclusive right to sell without outright competi-
tion with collaborator in Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, Laos,
Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan; permission of collaborator
required for other countries.
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon.
Exclusive right to sell in: Asia excluding USSR; Australia;
New Zealand; Polynesia; African countries belonging to
British Commonwealth except South Africa; UAR; Sudan;
Ethiopia; Somalia; Libya. Export to other countries
by permission of Pegard only.
Exclusive right to sell in Burma and Ceylon; non-exclusive b
right to sell in 22 other countries without outright competi-
tion with the collaborator: North Vietnam, South Vietnam;
Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan,
Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAR, Tanzania, Uganda,
Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan, North and South Korea, USSR;
collaborator to give non-exclusive right to export to
Australia, New Zealand, and USA at an unspecified later
date; permission of collaborator required to export to
other countries.
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Notes to Table VII-5
Five other agreements had expired by 1967 so that HMT was free to
export the machines:
(a) Oerlikon, Switzerland (1957-1966), lathes - H22
(b) Fritz Werner, West Germany (1957-1963), milling machines - M2 and
M3
(c) Hermann Kolb, West Germany (1958-1965 ), radial drilling machines
- RM
(d) H. Ernault -Batingnolles, France (1959-1966), lathes - LB
(e) Olivetti, Italy (1959-1966), cylindrical grinding machines - G
It could not be determined what export rights HMT had while these agree-
ments were in force.
In 1967 and 1969 HMT made collaboration agreements with Verson Allsteel
Press, USA, for presses, press brakes, and other metal-forming machines.
According to the collaborator, there were restrictions on HMT's export
rights.
-I
__
552
TABLE VII-6
Foreign Collaboration Agreements in the. Machine. Tool Industry with
Territorial Restrictions -on Exports, 1968
Indian Company Machine Type Percent
Foreign
Equity
HMT
Mysore Kirloskar
Cooper Engineering
Traub India
Scottish Indian
Ex-Cell-O
New Standard Ergineer-
ing
Batliboi
Praga Tools
Special purpose machines, transfer
lines
Sing3 -spindle automatic lathes,
TR and PF
Multi-spindle automatic lathes
Copying lathes, Pilote
Automatic lathes, Fay
Drum-type turret lathes
Horizontal boring machines
Broaching machines
Metal-forming machines
Capstan, turret, and single-spindle
automatic lathes
Copying lathes
Cylindrical grinding machines
Vertical turret lathes
Gear hobbing machines
Single-spindle automatic lathes
Metal-forming machines
Fine boring machines, special purpose
machines, and many other types
Forging hammers
Milling machines, radial drilling
machines
Copying lathes*
*: Agreement made after 1968.
-I
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-TABLE VII-7
Foreign Collaboration Agreements in the Machine Tool Industry
with No Territorial Restrictions on Exports, 1968
Indian Company Machine Type Percent
Foreign
Equity
Other Restrictions
on Exports
HMT
Bharat Fritz Werner
Praga Tools
Batala Engineering
Surface grinding
machines
Knee-type milling
machines, mechanical
Tool and cutter
and surface
grinding machines
Center lathes
Planing machines 0
None
None
Type d
Type c
Type c
II
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TABLE VII-8
Territorial Restrictions Imposed on Exports by Collaborators with
Equity in the Indian Licensees
Product
5. Steel wire ropes
7. Hand tools
13. Machine tools
Indian Company.
Usha Martin Blacka
Gedore Tools
Ex-Cell-0 India
Percent Foreign
Equity
19. Bicycles
26. Tires and tubes
27. Miscellaneous
Bearings
Scottish Indian
Traub India
Sen Raleighb
Dunlop Indiad
SKF/Associated Bearing
a: Exports permitted to all countries except U.K., Canada, and U.S.A.
b: Agreement and export restrictions expired in about 1968
c: Foreign ownership is probably much more than 17 percent
d: Important export markets were allocated to the Indian company
although exports were not permitted to other areas.
Note: In spite of export restrictions, Usha Martin BlackGedore Tools,
and Sen Raleigh were among the top 100 exporters listed in Table II-18,
and Dunlop India was the largest exporter of tires and tubes.
17c
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some or virtually all other countries as well. Table VII-7 provides a
list of active collaboration agreements with no territorial restric-
tions on export.
The most striking feature of Tables VII-5 through VII-7 is that
virtually all of the more sophisticated machine tools produced with
foreign technical collaboration by the three largest Indian companies --
HMT, Mysore Kirloskar, and Cooper Engineering, which together accounted
for about 60 percent of Indian production of machine tools -- are in
Table VII-6 and could not be exported, except to developing countries
where demand was negligible.
Also of interest is the fact that only one of the four machine
tool companies with foreign equity participation for which information
is available had unrestricted export rights. Table VII-8 lists eight
Indian companies with export restrictions of type (b) iposed by for-
eign collaborators holding 17 to 80 percent of the equity, including
three machine tool companies.
c. Royalty Rates
According tP the Dutt Committee, which studied the terms of
270 agreements:
Where export of commodities is permitted, the royalty rates on
the exported part of output are usually high...The extra
royalty on exports is usually at 2 to 3 percent (of sales
value) above the royalty permitted for internal sales. Such
extra royalty might be justified if special services for
export purposes are made available by the collaborating
firm. This does not seem to be always the case. The extra
royalty is apparently asked mainly as a compensation because
of the fear of the loss of export market by the collaborating
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firm. 1
Table VII-3 indicates that higher royalty rates on exports were speci-
fied in 21 percent of a sample of 219 collaboration agreements approved
in the engineering industries in 1956-1965.
Table VII-9 lists details of 13 agreements approved in 1960-1965
which specified a higher royalty rate on exports. In eight cases the
excess was 1 to 2 percent of the value of sales, but in four cases it
was 3 to 5 percent.
Among HMT's 13 collaboration agreements, four specified a commis-
sion of 10 to 12 percent on exports, but this would not necessarily
restrict exports since a commission would have to be paid to a distribo-
tor in any case, except possibly in East Europe.
d. Export Marketing Channels
Foreign collaborators often permitted Indian licensees to export
only through the collaborator's agents and distributors in any market
which was already served by the collaborator. In the case of machine
tools, such restrictions applied to five of HMT's collaborations and to
Praga Tool's collaboration with Jones and Shipman.
According to the company in charge of Praga's exports, some
foreign agents which were handling Jones and Shipman products from the
UK were unwilling to take the Indian machines even at a 20 percent dis-
count below the UK price because of anticipation that their customers
might not accept machines from India. Under these circumstances, the
1GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, pp. 133, 135.
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TABLE VII-9
Foreign Collaboration Agreements Specifying a Higher Royalty Rate on
Exports Approved in 1960-1965
Indian Company Licensor's
Share of
Equity
Royalty as Percent of Sales
Dometic.
Sales
Exports Difference
7. Hand, small and cutting
tools
Hard metals for small
tools
Widia. India
12. Cotton textile machinery
and parts
Parts
13. Machine tools
Suessen Textile Bearings
Batala Engineering (two
agreemehts)
3,2, 1a
21. Automobile parts
Dump truck tipping
gears
Brake linings
27. Miscellaneous
Bearings
Welding electrodes
Auto-cycles
Graphic art
machines
Unspecified
Usha Telehoist
Rane Brake Linings
Precision Bearings
Asiatic Oxygen
Power Cables
Ahura Welding Electrode
Manufacturing
Mopeds India
Indian Graphic
Arts Equipment
Usha Refrigeration
Product
6 3,4,5
31
some
3
$1.22c ea.
2
1
1
1
$0.61 ea.
4
$1.83 ea.
~I
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NoteS to TableVII-9
a: Sliding scale royalty rate on domestic sales
b: rate converted from tax-free rate specified in agreement
c: ppecific rate could not be converted to ad valorem basis
Source: Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, Volsi 1 and 2,
1968 and 1969, and GOI, MIDITCA, 1969, Main Report, p. 125.
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restriction to sell through the collaborator's agents meant that the
Indian company could not appoint a competing agent and hence could not
export to the country. This would probably be a conmon experience for
machine tool exports to the US where there was a strong tendency, re-
inforced by a difference in trade associations, toward specialization
in distribution not only by type of machine but source. Machines from
countries like Spain, Yugoslavia, and India were usually distributed
by special importers or used machine tool dealers, not by the distrib-
utors of US and northwest European machines. In any event, since
machine tools were distributed through independent dealers, distribution
through the parent's network required agreement of both the parent and
each individual distributor (e.g. one for each section of the US), and
collaboration agreements gave no assurance that such agreement would
be forthcoming on the part of distributors.
Beyond this, it might be inefficient for a multi-product firm
like HMT to export a particular machine through its collaborator's
agents because HMT was already setting up overseas offices, appointing
agents, and participating in exhibitions for its other machines. The
requirement to use the collaborator's agents would lead to duplication
of effort and limit economies of scale in marketing. A similar prob-
lem was faced by a producer of diesel engines, a 50-50 joint venture,
which was allowed to export only through the foreign collaborator's
agents. The Indian management of the subsidiary would have preferred
to export through the Indian parent company.
El1
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In some cases not only was the Indian company required to use
the collaborator's overseas agents but all export orders went through
the collaborator's head office. Indian firms sometimes complained that
this arrangement restricted Indian exports because the collaborator pre-
ferred to supply orders from its home plant.
e. Trademarks
It was common for foreign collaborators to prohibit use of their
trademarks in export by their Indian subsidiaries and licensees if there
were no restrictions of type (d). Philips India (radios and components
and light electricals, 52 percent foreign equity), ABMEL (storage bat-
teries, 30 percent), Usha Martin Black (steel wire ropes, 21 percent),
and India Pistons (automobile parts, 17 percent) were not allowed to use
their collaborators' trademarks in export although they used them in
India. Since the Indian company names gave away the collaboration in
the case of Philips and Martin Black, the Indian companies were forced
to export under assumed names. Philips India used the alias Pex India
to export "Osler" equipment, "Exide" batteries were exported under the
name "Index," and Usha Martin Black shortened the company and brand
name to "Usha".
f. Export Pricing
Collaboration agreements sometimes restricted the export prices
charged by subsidiaries and licensees, mainly to prevent them from cut-
ting prices. When export marketing of the Indian subsidiary was highly
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integrated with the parent's, as in the case of Dunlop India (tires
and tubes, 51 percent foreign equity), export prices were set by the
parent. Mysore Kirloskar (machine tools, no foreign equity) could
export its turret lathes only at prices approved by the collaborator
and therefore its ability to cut prices to penetrate foreign markets
was limited. Since the restriction prevented Mysore Kirloskar from
undercutting its collaborator by more than about 5 percent, while the
evidence presented in Chapter VI.B.1 suggests that Indian companies were
able to export machinery only when prices were 20 percent or more below
those of competitors from advanced countries, this would have been an
effective restriction on exports. 1
2. Effective vs. Formal Restrictions
The formal restrictions reviewed above, which were contained in
written agreements approved by the government, could have been supple-
mented by informal restrictions or direct discriminatory behavior by
the foreign collaborator in cases where the latter controlled the Indian
company. Kidron and Dericks report such informal restrictions on exports
from India, and Brash and Hughes and Seng report them for Australia and
Singapore. 2
On the other hand, it was not unusual for foreign collaborators
to permit exports to countries where sales were not allowed under the
1For additional examples and for restrictions on non-price com-
petition, see Brash, 1966, pp. 229-30.
2
Kidron, 1965, p. 311; Wim Dericks in conversation; Brash, 1966,
p. 266; and Hughes and Seng, eds., 1969, p. 197.
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original written agreement, particularly to areas where Indian sup-
pliers received preferences because of bilateral trade agreements or
tied aid, e.g. Ceylon, the UAR, and East Europe.
Consequently, the terms of written agreements do not provide an
exact measure of effective discrimination by foreign collaborators. How-
ever, from the point of view of the data in Tables VII-1 to VII-7, the
main effect of the latter relaxations was only to convert written re-
strictions of type (a) to effective restrictions of type (b). With
one exception, the changes reported in interviews and in the press in-
volved permission to export to developing countries, East Europe, or
Australia and New Zealand. Only one firm reported that the collaborator
eliminated territorial restrictions, and this was for a machine no longer
produced by the collaborator only a year before the collaboration agree-
ment was due to expire.
3. Export Assistance by Foreign Collaborators
Foreign collaborators that had substantial investment in Indian
companies appear to have been the most liberal in relaxing territorial
export restrictions and even assisting exports from India when the in-
centive to export increased because of government export promotion
schemes and the recession. This process of relaxation of restrictions
and increasing assistance is illustrated by the experience of Traub
India:
Apart from West Germany, Traub Co. have their factories in
Brazil and Switzerland with cent per cent German capital
... In view of their worldwide activities, the Indian enter-
prise with only 60 percent German investment has been
II
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subjected to severe restrictions in matter of export. Last
year (1967) this restriction was relaxed by Traub Co. in
view of the boom in the domestic demand in Germany. This
year (1968) export rights to the Indian enterprise have been
conceded with little reluctance.1
In 1970 Traub of West Germany helped its Indian subsidiary to export
25 percent of its output.
By 1969 many foreign investors with a majority of the equity of
an Indian company had decided to help the Indian subsidiary achieve an
export target of 5 to 10 percent of production. The following companies
received large export orders from or through their foreign parents by
1970: Ashok Leyland (60 percent foreign equity), Atlas Copco (100 per-
cent), Dunlop India (51 percent), Hindustan Brown Boveri (slightly
over 50 percent), IBM (100 percent), Ralliwolf (45 percent), Siemens
India (51 percent), Traub India (60 percent).
In these cases the foreign majority investors were responding
to the same incentives that led Indian companies to export. Foreign
collaborators without a substantial investment in the Indian company
did not provide similar assistance in export.
4. Effect of Restrictions on Export
It has not been possible to test statistically the hypothesis
that foreign collaborators discriminated against exports as opposed to
domestic sales. There are several reasons why this could not be done.
It is difficult to find firms in the organized sector without foreign
collaboration and even harder to find comparable firms within an
1
Interview at Perfect Machine Tool, 14 November 1968.
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industry operating with and without collaboration. Among firms with
collaboration, published information does not permit determination of
whether collaboration agreements have expired, and in the case of firms
producing goods both with and without collaboration, published informa-
tion often does not permit determination of which were exported.
Use of systematic data permits only one conclusion. Firms with
foreign technical collaboration accounted for the majority of engineer-
ing exports, and of the top 100 exporters of engineering goods listed
in Table 11-18, 16 had 50 percent or more foreign ownership. This
proves that foreign collaboration did not prevent export. However, it
cannot be inferred that the written restrictions discussed above were
not effective, much less that there was no discrimination by any foreign
collaborators.
Beyond this, one is forced to rely on information gathered in
interviews.
(i) In two cases territorial restrictions were reported on products
similar or identical to ones being exported by the same Indian company
to other countries and by other Indian companies to the restricted ter-
ritories.
Mysore Kirloskar (no foreign equity), which exported $0.3 of
machine tools in 1969-70, was not allowed to export Herbert turret
lathes to advanced Western countries. It was exporting engine lathes
produced without collaboration to these countries, and its distribu-
tors were interested in handling the turret lathes. HMT, which
II
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exported $1.3 million of machine tools in 1969-70, was exporting
similar turret lathes produced without collaboration to advanced coun-
tries. Mysore Kirloskar's application for export rights was rejected
except for sales to Australia. The foreign collaborator was exporting
the turret lathes from its UK plant.
Geddre Tools (60 percent foreign) exported $1.3 million worth of
hand tools in 1968-69, 10 percent of them to North America, but was not
permitted to export to West Europe, which was supplied from the parent's
plant in West Germany.
(ii) Several machine tool distributors from advanced countries who were
visiting India in search of distributorships in 1969 stated that Indian
companies were not allowed to export a number of machines in which they
were interested. HMT's export manager and agent for Australia stated
that sales to Australia would have been greater in the absence of export
restrictions.
(iii) Cooper Engineering (no foreign equity), which exported $0.4 mil-
lion of other engineering goods in 1969-70, was unable to secure addi-
tional rights to export vertical turret lathes and gear hobbing machines
to advanced countries. It did obtain rights to East Europe.
(iv) New Standard Engineering (no foreign equity), which exported
$0.3 million of engineering goods in 1969-70, received a protest from
its West German collaborator when it exported textile machinery to
Poland, and it therefore decided to observe the export restriction in
the future. 1
1Similarly, when its Yugoslav licensee tried to export tractors
M ME
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(v) Kirloskar Pneumatic (no foreign equity), which exported $0.3 mil-
lion of engineering goods in 1969-70, reported to its shareholders:
Your company has been andeavouring to devl export trade in
its products in territories which for export are severely
restricted by the licence agreements with its foreign col-
laborators. 1
(vi) In addition to the above cases, there were a number of cases where
a company was exporting in spite of some written or formal restrictions
on export, e.g. Dunlop India ($4 million in 1970), Usha Martin Black
($1.1 million in 1969-70), TELCO ($1.7 million in 1967-68, prior to
expiration of the collaboration agreement and export restrictions), Sen
Raleigh ($0.3 million in 1967-68, prior to expiration of the collabora-
tion agreement and export restrictions). This suggests strongly that
at least written export restrictions were not redundant at existing
implicit exchange rates on exports.
On the basis of systematic evidence concerning written export
restrictions and the preceding examples of enforcement of such restric-
tions, it can be concluded that discrimination against exports by for-
eign collaborators was a significant export barrier. At a minimum
export restrictions were sometimes a binding constraint on the ability
of Indian firms with excess capacity to export in the short-run and at
least in the short-run on the ability of the Indian government to expand
to India, Massey-Ferguson "succeeded in halting that export activity
because it was in contravention of the licensing agreement." (Neufeld,
1969, p. 335.) Massey-Ferguson's 49 percent Indian subsidiary "is pre-
cluded, except by agreement, from competing with...other supply sources
in export markets." (Powell, 1966, p. 15.)
EPW, 11 October 1969, pp. 1651-52.
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exports by increasing incentives. The barrier appears to have been
greatest for exports to advanced Western countries and where foreign
collaborators did not have a substantial investment in the Indian com-
pany. It has not been possible to make any further quantitative esti-
mate of the effect of such discrimination.
5. Government Policy on Limitation of Export Rights
The written export restrictions discussed above were approved
by the Indian government prior to 1968. In 1968 the government
announced that it would not approve or renew collaboration agreements
with export restrictions of types (a) and (b) which prevented exports
to any areas other than the country of the foreign collaborator or
countries where the collaborator had manufacturing affiliates.1
Prohibition of such export restrictions faced two problems.
First, although the government had the power to prohibit written re-
strictions, the foreign collaborator could still discriminate against
exports if it had a substantial equity investment in the Indian company
or if it enjoyed a significant measure of control for other reasons,
e.g. continuing technical dependence of the Indian company. Second,
depending on the bargaining situation, gaining export rights might
involve a cost in terms of the other conditions of the collaboration
agreement or even the technologies which could be licensed.2
1Directory of Foreign Collaborations in India, Vol. 2, 1969,
Special Supplement, p. xiii.
2or examples of foreign firms unwilling to license technology
or to invest where export was likely or compulsory, see Brash, 1966,
p. 222n; Kidron, 1965, p. 280; and Powell, 1966, pp. 15-16.
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6. Export Restrictions in Other Countries
Available evidence on export restrictions in collaboration
agreements in other countries indicates that the incidence of written
restrictions of types (a) and (b) was broadly similar to that in India.
Systematic data comparable to those in Table VII-1 are available for
Australia and Japan. In both countries there were restrictions of
types (a) and (b) in at least 60 percent of all cases.1 Less system-
atic or small sample data which do not permit reliable inferences
about relative frequency of written restrictions are available for
Brazil, Trinidad and Tobago, South Africa, and Canada.2
With the exception of Brash's study for Australia, these studies
do not cover other types of export restrictions or the difference be-
tween written and effective restrictions. Brash collected data on the
territorial export restrictions in 1963 on 80 Australian companies with
25 percent or more U.S. equity. He reports that among the 19 companies
which reported that they were free to export to all countries, "exports
On Australia see Arndt and Sherk, 1959, pp. 239-42; Australia,
Commnittee of Economic Enquiry, 1965, p. 286; Roderick Campbell, "An
Investigation of Various Aspects of United States Corporate Investment
in Australia," MBA Thesis, Ohio State University, 1965, cited by Midle-
ton, 1969; and Brash, 1966, pp. 224-39. On Japan see Tsurumi, 1968,
pp. 286-89, 302.
2On Brazil see Leff, 1968, pp. 94, 108n; Trinidad, McIntyre and
Watson, 1970, p. 48; South Africa, Kleu, 1967, p. 65; Canada, Safarian,
1966, pp. 142-43. Safarian identifies some form of restriction or
adverse effect of collaboration on exports for 15 percent of the firms
in his sample. However, since he did not secure information on this
from a majority of the firms in his sample, his conclusion that "the
total number of situations where actual or potential restrictions might
exist" is about 15 percent almost certainly involves substantial under-
estimation.
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of the majority were restricted in some way despite the absence of any
overt restriction on markets," including restrictions of types (d),
(e), and (f). He reports both that there were informal restrictions
in addition to those in the written agreements and that "many export
franchise restrictions have undoubtedly been relaxed in recent years."
Finally, he reports that "eight of the twenty-six companies not export-
ing in 1962 gave parental restriction as the main reason for this
'failure'," and that "in the absence of such restrictions bhere are a
number of companies which could have exported a very much larger frac-
tion of their total output than they did.1r
B. Transport Costs
This section makes a simple point which was important in the
transition from import substitution to export: the incidence of ocean
freight costs on the f.o.b. value of Indian exports of engineering
goods was high. It follows from this that there was a significant gap
between production costs at which firms could have competed with imports
and those at which they could have exported to most markets (i.e.,
markets where c.i.f. prices from advanced countries were not signifi-
cantly higher than in India) at the same implicit exchange rate.
1. Incidence of Freight Costs
Tables VII-10 and VII-11 provide data on the incidence of
freight costs on exports of engineering goods as a percent of f.o.b.
value. The data in Table VII-10 are of greatest interest because they
1Brash, 1966, pp. 224-39.
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TABLE VII-10
Incidence of Ocean Freight Cost on Exports of Steel and Engineering Goods, 1965
(freight cost as percent of f.o.b. value)
Destination
'Developing countries . - ..... Weighted
in Asia and Africa U.K. U.S. & Canada Averagea
1. Iron and steel
Steel bars 13-26 14 n.a. 17
2. Steel pipes and tubes 10-15 n.a. , 19-20 17
4. Iron and steel castings
Cast iron pipes and fittings 15-28 n.a. 25 21
19. Bicyclesb 16-48 n.a. n.a. 38
20. Stationary diesel enginesc 3-9 6 n.a. 7
24. Electric fans 15-32 13 n.a. 24
27. Miscellaneous
Sewing machines 11-27 36 76-90 35
n.a.: not available (not a major market)
a: average for major markets weighted by exports to each market in 1964-65
b: judging from other information presented by Sarangan (p.93), incidence may have been half that
listed here.
c: judging from other information presented by Sarangan (p.92), incidence may have been twice that
listed here
coverage: Products accounting for 36 percent of exports of steel and engineering goods in 1964-65, and
6 to 11 markets for each.
Sarangan's calculation for centrifugal pumps has been omitted because it is inconsistent with data he
presents at another point (p.91) and with EEPC data.
Source: Sarangan, 1967, pp.77-83.
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TABLE VII-11
Incidence of Ocean Freight Cost on Exports of EngIneering
Goods to Developing Countries in Asia and Africa, 1966-67
Product Freight Cost as Percent of f.o.b.Value
21. Automobile parts 4a, 40-50
26. Bicycle tires 26
27. Miscellaneous
Steel furniture and safes 16-36
Buckets, drums 40
Enamelware 43-50
Electric lamps P 11-47
Concrete mixers 13-56
Trailers 26-39
coverage: one to three miscellaneous countries for each product, often
ones where no exports were sold
source: a: UNCTAD-GATT, 1969, Vol. c, p. 249.
others: IIFT, 1967d, pp. 110-120.
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apply to major export products and markets and thus reflect the inci-
dence of freight costs on actual exports. They show that the average
incidence of freight for each of several products ranged between 17
and 35 percent of f.o.b. value.1
The miscellaneous data in Table VII-11 indicate an even higher
incidence of freight costs for a number of products and markets which
were of less importance in total exports.
The incidence of freight costs was substantially lower on prod-
ucts with a high value-to-weight or measurement ratio. However, in
the case of machine tools, while the incidence of freight costs to
North America on HMT's medium-heavy machines was about 10-13 percent,
it was twice this on Mysore Kirloskar's small lathes because of their
lower value-to-measurement ratio.
Apart from freight costs, there were many complaints in the
late 1960s concerning the frequency of shipping services to important
markets, and in any case voyages to destinations outside the Indian
Ocean basin took several months. Consequently, it was difficult for
Indian firms to match delivery terms of competitors in many areas, and
interest costs on goods in transit amounted to as much as 3 percent of
the realization from export (including subsidies) beyond the incidence
of freight costs.
1This excludes the incidence of freight costs for bicycles and
stationary diesel engines for reasons stated in the notes to Table VII-
10.
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2. Exports Subject to Unusually High Freight Rates
The data in Table VII-10 do not reflect unusually high freight
rates per mile which applied in two cases: (a) on minor export prod-
ucts and (b) to markets where there were no direct shipping services.
a. General Cargo Rates on Minor Exports
Freight rate schedules typically list specific rates for impor-
tant export products and a higher general cargo rate for other products
which are not listed individually. As an illustration, Table VII-12
lists freight rates per cubic meter which applied to Indian exports of
electric fans, machinery not elsewhere specified including machine
tools, and general cargo to eleven destinations in 1968. For nine of
the eleven destinations there were specific rates on electric fans
which were lower than the general cargo rates, by amounts up to 48 per-
cent. However, for machine tools there were specific rates below the
general cargo rate on only five of the eleven routes listed in Table
VII-12 and on only 24 of the 45 routes examined.
Because electric fans had been an important export product since
the 1950s, specific rates were set for electric fans on almost all
routes by 1968. By contrast, only about half the routes had specific
rates for machine tools, a more recent export product, and the same was
true for many other items. Although specific rates were gradually set
on the basis of applications by exporters during the 1960s, there were
time lags in the process. Consequently, because of the absence of
specific rates on numerous engineering goods, there was discrimination
El
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TABLE VII-12
Freight Rates on General Cargo, Machine Tools, and Electric Fans, 1968
Percent of Rate on General Cargo, Per Cubic Meter
Destinations Machinery not elsewhere Electric fans
specified including
machine tools
Aden 100 77
Kuwait 100 93
U.A.R. 72 63
Kenya 100 79
Nigeria 100 100
Brazil 100 100
Singapore 86 * 77
Japan 86 91
Australia 100 65
U.K., horth Europe 72 52
U.S.A. east coast 74 54
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against new exports in the short run.1 This is not reflected in Table
VII-10, which is based mainly on products and destinations for which
specific rates had already been set.
b. Transshipment
Because of the limited volume of trade between India and a
number of developing countries, there were no direct shipping services.
Exports therefore required transshipment and sometimes went by circuit-
ous routes. There were no direct shipping services to West Africa,
Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, or New Zealand.2 Transshipment
increased freight costs per mile above those on other routes, and in
the case of West Africa freight rates were higher than to West Europe
when transshipment took place in Europe.
3. Discrimination in Freight Rates
It was frequently alleged in India that freight rates discrim-
inated against Indian exports compared to those from advanced countries.
Although comparative data are difficult to obtain since rate schedules
generally are unpublished, the limited data available do not support
this allegation. After eliminating the influence of the two factors
discussed under (2) above, the data presented by Sarangan do not indi-
cate any systematic excess of the relation between freight rate and
1See Sarangan, 1967, p. 128.
2There was direct service every three months to New Zealand.
3Little et al., 1970, p. 309, reached the same conclusion on
the basis of much of the same evidence.
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distance for a given product for exports from India over that from
Japan. Freight rates on Indian exports to the UK and USSR appear low
compared to what would be predicted on the basis of the length of the
routes.
There were a number of cases where the freight rate on Indian
exports was higher than on Indian imports of the same product on the
same route, e.g. in trade with Japan and the west coast of North
America, but the reverse was true in trade with the UK. There were
also cases where the freight rate from India to a particular market
was higher than that from an advanced country much farther from the
market, e.g. compared to Japan on exports of automobile parts to
Turkey or to the UK on steel rails to New Zealand. However, there is
no evidence that such freight rate differences existed for more than
a minute share of Indian exports.
4. Subsidies of Ocean Freight Costs
The government did not explicitly subsidize ocean freight costs
on a regular basis but it did give ad hoc subsidies in certain cases
where freight costs to a market were higher from India than from a com-
peting country. As of 1967 the Ministry of Commerce was authorized to
grant ad hoc cash subsidies up to 5 percent of f.o.b. value to overcome
freight cost differences on exports of railway wagons, and in Chapter
III.C.l.b. two cases are reported where such subsidies were given on
railway wagons and transmission line towers. There was also a provision
1EE, 15 September 1967, p. 495.
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in the published rates for an extra cash subsidy of 5 percent of f.o.b.
value on transmission line towers exported to South America and South
Vietnam in 1969-70 and steel wire ropes exported to the European or
American continents in 1970-71, obviously to subsidize freight costs
on longer routes. Finally, according to an EEPC circular in 1968, the
Ministry of Commerce was considering subsidizing ocean freight costs
where Indian goods were competitive on an f.o.b. basis but not on a
c.i.f. basis. 1
C. Trade Barriers Abroad
Import barriers imposed by foreign governments were a rela-
tively minor although not insignificant obstacle to the transition
from import substitution to export for the Indian engineering indus-
tries for two reasons. First, on the whole the main competition with
Indian exports was from suppliers in West and East Europe and Japan,
and these suppliers faced the same trade barriers in most of India's
export markets. Second, trade barriers in engineering goods were re-
latively low.
There were three main exceptions to these generalizations:
(1) exports to East Europe faced high implicit barriers and were
largely~ aditional on temporary. shortages in East Europe; (2) exports
of simple consumer goods faced prohibitive barriers in some developing
countries undergoing import substitution; and (3) exports of capital
goods to some developing countries were conditional on supply of credit
or acceptance of payment in kind under bilateral arrangements.
1EEPC Circular No. 08/166/68-69, dated 3 September 1968.
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CHAPTER VIII
EVALUATION OF EXPORT POLICY
The fundamental weakness of the Indian approach to export was
that comparative advantage and export potential were disregarded by
the government in planning and in virtually all important policies
affecting industrial development, including the structure of effective
protection, public sector investment, and licensing of industrial cap-
acity, foreign collaboration, and import of inputs. In spite of in-
creasing emphasis on exports, there was no change during the 1960s in
the inward-oriented approach to industrialization aimed at self-suffi-
ciency in the domestic market. No attempt was made to base investment
on comparative advantage, even for a special export sector or zone.
Export was regarded not as a matter related to industrial strategy or
structure but as a problem to be dealt with by the Ministry of Foreign
Trade, committees, and concessions.
Although many other economic policies affected the incentive
to export and the domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned,
the following sections are confined to a discussion of policies directly
concerned with promoting exports. Chapters IV and V discuss other major
areas of policy which influenced exports.
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A. Inefficiencies in Export Promotion
This section discusses incentives created by export promotion
policies for inefficient allocation of the resources devoted to exports
of iron and steel, engineering goods, and tires.1 Emphasis is placed
on the effect of export subsidization on the implicit exchange rate on
net earnings of foreign exchange. The major shortcoming of the poli-
cies was that no attempt was made to set implicit exchange rates at a
uniform level to equalize the domestic resource cost of net earnings
of foreign exchange for exports of different engineering goods.
Because of the large number of export promotion schemes, lack of
uniformity in treatment of different products under each, the importance
of ad hoc incentives, and the lack of published details and other data,
it was impossible to calculate the implicit exchange rates resulting
from the combination of all the schemes. Examination of individual
schemes (e.g. the data in Table III-7) reveals large ranges in the
effect of each on implicit exchange rates for different industries,
firms, products, and destinations, and hence an irrational pattern of
multiple exchange rates.
Some of these differences in subsidy value were due to incom-
plete coverage of schemes, large differences in rates, and ad hoc
subsidies. Others were a result of unequal dependence on subsidized
inputs like iron and steel, rail transport, and export marketing, on
subsidized credit, or on inputs which were allocated to exporters on
1See also Bhagwati, 1968, and Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, Chap-
ter 20, for discussions of inefficiencies in export promotion.
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a preferential basis, including imported materials and capital goods.
Still others were due to differences in what could be imported under
replenishment licenses and in resulting prenia, in excess prices paid
on inputs from tied sources, in priority under regular allocation poli-
cies, or in excess capacity and profit rates in the domestic market.
For example, policies which relaxed constraints on production for the
domestic market or gave access to imports from the cheapest source of
supply on the basis of exports provided a very high implicit subsidy
of exports for firms facing such constraints or with a large import
content and no subsidy for firms not facing such constraints or with
no import content.
Not only were the schemes individually irrational but there is
no grounds for believing that the schemes were coordinated in such a
way that their total subsidy was proportional to net earnings of
foreign exchange on different product.
This pattern of subsidies reveals a complete neglect of the
domestic resource cost of foreign exchange earned. Export promotion
like import substitution was indiscriminate. Not only was there a
wide range of subsidies but there was no effort to set an upper limit
on subsidization or even to assure that export did not involve a loss
of foreign exchange. Data in the next section illustrate the wide
range that existed in the cost of foreign exchange earned. The loss
resulting from such an inefficient structure of incentives is empha-
sized by, although not confined to, cases where the schemes made it
privately profitable for a firm to export when there was negative
value added at international prices. A number of cases which
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involved a loss of foreign exchange are identified in the following
section.
The major conclusion to be drawn is not that it was a mistake
to promote exports of engineering goods, except in cases where there
was a net loss of foreign exchange, but that greater export earnings
could have been secured at the same cost by policies providing incen-
tives for a more efficient allocation of resources. This would have
been achieved by a uniform exchange rate for imports and exports.I
The structure of multiple exchange rates created by the export
incentive schemes was not random. Systematic biases are considered
below:
1. Relection of Comparative Advantage
A wide range of subsidy rates was not accidental. Schemes
designed to encourage all firms to export a certain fraction of out-
put or to earn their own foreign exchange requirements regardless of
cost ruled out uniform subsidies since investments aimed at import
substitution were not made on the basis of cost of foreign exchange
saved.
More perverse were measures which related the subsidy to Indian
cost disadvantages in an attempt to equalize the profitability of
export regardless of the cost of foreign exchange earned. The "export
'For economic justifications for departures from unified ex-
change rates see Bhagwati, 1968. The present chapter does not con-
sider efficient departures from unified rates since actual discrim-
ination among engineering industries had little if any relation to
these.
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problem" was often viewed as a matter of removing obstacles to export,
particularly if they were beyond the control of the exporter. The
fact that often such "obstacles" reflected real costs was neglected.
Even subsidies 'which simply eliminated negative protection by enabling
exporters to procure tradable inputs at international prices encour-
aged inefficient allocatidn if the real costs of the inputs to the
economy were higher than their international prices because of import
substitution policies.
2. Inverse Relation of Subsidy to Share of Output Exported
The rate of subsidy on exports was a declining function of the
percentage of output exported by a firm. Firms exporting 5, 10, or
25 percent of output were given preferences in licensing, but there
were no additional preferences for firms exporting more than 25 per-
cent of output.
Moreover, a number of export promotion schemes were designed
to give exporters preferences in exploitation of the Indian market.
This was true of ad hoc licensing involving export commitments, pref-
erences for exporters in licensing of maintenance imports for produc-
tion for the domestic market, and the scheme under which the data
processing machine industry was allowed to use all the foreign exchange
earned by exports to import inputs for the domestic market. As a
result, there was substantial discrimination in export subsidization
against firms producing entirely for export.
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Finally, although transfer of import replenishment licenses
became increasingly liberal, to the extent that there were restrictions
on transfer the subsidy given by the import replenishment scheme would
have declined as the share of output exported by a firm increased, since
the marginal value of the licenses for the firm's own use and premia
in a thin market would have declined.
3. Low Priority Industries
By classifying industries into priority and non-priority groups
for purposes of licensing and then relaxing restrictions on firms in
non-priority industries on the basis of exports, the government gave a
higher export subsidy to non-priority industries. Apart from efficiency
losses arising from multiple exchange rates, these policies and the use
of import replenishment licenses (including ones purchased in the mar-
ket) by non-priority industries involved an additional cost in terms
of sacrifice of plan priorities since they permitted expansion of non-
priority production for the domestic market. This was one reason for
the conflicts discussed in Chapter III between the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and other ministries over preferences to exporters and one explan-
ation of why preferences were concentrated in decisions within the
control of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
ISee also Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 458-61.
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4. Exports for Non-Convertible Currency
In spite of other departures from uniform exchange rates, in one
case where efficiency considerations called for discrimination the
government gave equal subsidies. After devaluation the same incentives
were given on exports that earned one dollar of hard currency and 7.5
accounting rupees of non-convertible currency even though the govern-
ment clearly placed a premium on hard currency at official exchange
rates in its import policy and relative import and export prices sug-
gest that it was correct for it to have done so. The only discrimina-
tion in export policy was a general ban, subject to ad hoc exceptions,
on export for soft currency of products with a direct current hard
currency import content greater than 30 percent f.o.b. value.1
B. Bureaucratic Decision Making
Examination of bureaucratic decision making in export promotion
leads to the conclusion that an outcome involving inefficient alloca-
tion was predictable. First, among the personnel concerned, the con-
cept of real resources was not universally understood. Second, the
ministries involved operated under incentives which conflicted with
an efficient allocation of resources. The success of export policies,
and of the Ministry of Foreign Trade in particular, was judged by
1GOI, EEPC, HE, 17 April 1969, p. 68. Prior to devaluation,
entitlement licenses issued against exports to rupee payment countries
were restricted to imports from rupee payment areas, although by 1964
part of the licenses (e.g. 40 percent for chemicals) could be used for
hard currency imports.
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whether export targets were achieved, without reference to net foreign
exchange earned or its cost. The Ministry of Foreign Trade appeared
willing to use the powers of government to increase exports on as wide
a base as possible, and the natural result was that directives to the
STC and preferences in licensing under the ministry's control were
important export incentives. Other ministries and state and local
governments were mainly concerned with the direct budgetary costs of
export incentives or with the costs in terms of politically sensitive
issues like concentration of economic power. While sacrifices of effi-
ciency may have been justified where there was conflict with other
goals, incentives for incorrect measurement of benefits and costs
almost certainly led to unnecessary sacrifices.
C. Cost of Foreign Exchange Earned
1. Range of Domestic Resource Cost of Foreign Exchange
Because of policies designed to make all industries export
regardless of costs and because of the wide range of implicit exchange
rates resulting from export subsidization, one would expect a wide dis-
persion of the private and social costs of foreign exchange earned by
different engineering products. The available evidence confirms this
expectation. Krueger found that in the automobile and automobile parts
industries, for 20 products the domestic resource cost per dollar of
foreign exchange earned by export had a median of Rs.17.7, a range
from Rs 7.9 to negative value added at international prices, and an
inter-quartile range from Rs 12.1 to Rs 27.8.1
1Krueger, 1970, p. 110. Calculations are for average cost and
F
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This wide range of costs indicates the inefficiency of export
promotion. The same net foreign exchange could have been earned at a
lower cost by setting a uniform implicit exchange rate on net foreign
exchange at a level high enough to induce a larger volume of exports
by firms with relatively low costs without inducing exports by firms
with relatively high costs.
2. Negative Value Added at International Prices1
Other studies have indicated that import substitution policies
in developing countries, including India, led to investment in indus-
tries operating with negative value added when all tradables were
valued at international prices.2 With one exception noted below, any
process which yields negative value added at international prices for
the domestic market would do so for export. In addition, factors dis-
cussed in previous chapters make negative value added more common
among industries for export.
Two issues arise in connection with negative value added at
international prices: (a) how could it be profitable for a firm to
export? (b) how could international prices be compatible with this?
are made with a shadow rate of return on capital of 20 percent.
See also Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, pp. 363-67.
2For examples of negative value added at international prices
in engineering industries in India, see Bhagwati, 1968, p. 53; Cilin-
giroglu, 1969, p. 78; Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 353; Little et al.,
1970, pp. 58, 64, 180, 184, 186, 193-95. For other countries see
Soligo and Stern, 1965; Lewis and Guisinger, 1968; and King, 1970,
p. 148.
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a. Private Profitability,
The private incentive to produce goods in spite of negative value
added at international prices depends on the existence of implicit mul-
tiple exchange rates, e.g. a higher implicit exchange rate on the f.o.b.
value of exports than on the c.i.f. value of imported inputs. This
situation sometimes occurred in India as a result of export subsidiza-
tion schemes, particularly those which made exploitation of the domestic
market contingent on a relatively small volume of exports. Another
factor reported to have contributed to the incentive to export despite
negative value added prior to devaluation was overinvoicing, which in-
creased the incidence of incentives based on reported f.o.b. value.
According to Bhagwati,
Since, in India, overinvoicing has been a widespread phenomenon,
the incidence of negative value added arising is not to be dis-
counted and instances have been readily found.1
b. Compatibility with International Prices
There are five possible explanations of negative value added at
international prices in production for the domestic market:
(1) Inefficient production, or anything which raises input-output ratios
(for tradable inputs) above the international level, e.g. small scale,
low utilization of equipment, process wastage or high rejection rates,
failure to recover by-products, or inefficient technology. Two related
explanations are production of low quality goods and production of goods
to inferior designs. All of these problems are found in Indian manufac-
turing and a number are illustrated in Chapters IV and V. Little et al.
IBhagwati, 1968, p. 54.
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report a case in which an Indian chemical plant had negative value
added because of lack of demand for a by-product with a positive value
abroad.1
(2) Excess prices of inputs imported under tied licenses or purchased
at London Metal Exchange rather than producer prices.2 Examples of
such imports are given in Chapter IV.F.
(3) Repatriation by foreign collaborators of high profits earned in
the Indian market, whether as fees, royalties, dividends, or transfer
prices on imported inputs.3 Evidently because of transfer pricing,
it was reported that when production of the Cummins engine began in
India there was negative value added at international prices:
It may actually have cost the Indian economy more for compo-
nonts and parts than it would have cost to import an assembled
engine.
(4) Marginal cost pricing of output for export by foreign competitors
could result in import price levels below the average foreign exchange
cost of production in India allowing for the foreign exchange costs of
know-how, equipment, and tooling, which are fixed costs for the foreign
company and might not be recovered on their exports. Little et al.
1Little et al., 1970, p. 193.
2In the case of purchases under tied licenses, higher prices of
imported inputs might be matched by higher prices of imported final
products, but this would not apply to exports.
3Where repatriation was based on dividends, negative value added
would have been less likely for exports than for domestic sales assuming
the profit rate was lower on exports.
4Baranson, 1967, p. 82.
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report that a planned Indian ball bearing project would have had nega-
tive value added at international prices because the average export
prices of ball bearings from developed countries were 40 percent below
internal prices. 1
(5) Freight costs for imported inputs higher than for the final product,
e.g. in an assembly industry where the import component is high and
requires more expensive packing and handling and higher shipping cost.
Cases of negative value added in automobile assembly have been reported
in other countries. 2
There are three additional explanations for negative value added
for export:
(6) Transport costs and foreign tariffs on exports, discussed in Chap-
ter VII.
(7) Discounts on a c.i.f. basis below the prices of the same goods from
an advanced country required to induce distributors or customers to buy
Indian goods. Such discounts are discussed in Chapter VI.B.1.
(8) More generally, because the export demand for Indian goods was less
than perfectly elastic, it is possible that a product could have been
produced at a cost below the scarcity value of the foreign exchange
saved on import substitution or earned on initial exports and yet for
excessive export subsidization to have led to a reduction in export
ILittle t al., 1970, p. 194. See also Cilingiroglu, 1969, for
a discussion of dumping in the case of heavy electrical equipment.
2See Ehagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 366.
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prices to the point where there was negative value added for export.
In addition to the cases noted above where there was negative
value added at international prices in production for the Indian mar-
ket, several cases were found where goods were exported in spite of
negative value added and a loss of foreign exchange:
(i) The most important case was transformers. According to the develop-
ment council for heavy electrical industries, "selling transformers
outside the country resulted in losing foreign exchange rather than
earning it." Commenting on exports of transformers, the Indian Elec-
trical Manufacturers' Association stated .that "the foreign exchange
expended on the import of raw materials which go into the manufacture
of these transformers is hardly covered by the earnings made from the
export of the finished product," even before allowing for overhead
2
costs.
(ii) The IEMA protested against the imposition in 1969-70 of an obliga-
tion to export 5 percent of output of electrical winding wires, arguing
that "exports of copper winding wires actually result in a drain on
foreign exchange instead of earning any." 3
(iii) Krueger cites an IIFT study which reported that the current
direct import content was greater than the f.o.b. export price in the
1GOI, DGTD, AR 1966-67, p. 56.
2EMA, 1968, p. 13.
3EMA,j AR 1968-69, p. 65. See also Engineering Times, 16 April
1970.
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case of automobile radiators.1
(iv) In Krueger's study of the aVtomobile and automobile parts indus-
tries, one of 20 products had negative value added at international
prices for export.2
(v) Bhagwati and Desai state:
Value subtraction, in a different sense, could arise under the
Indian trade regime in yet another way, with identical items
being exported and imported -- the loss then being proportional
to the excess of the unit import price over the unit export
price. This phenomenon could, and in fact did, arise in India
occasionally (e.g. with PVC exports).3
(vi) Similarly, in a case cited in Chapter III, Little et al. report
that in the hand tool industry,a "firm had been exporting (to the
extent of Rs 1.4 million -- $0.3 million -- in 1965/6), in order to
obtain entitlements for its import requirements...The domestic market
was unsatisfied, and these tools were being imported."4
D. Conclusion
This study supports the conclusions reached by Bhagwati and
Desai, by Little, Scitovsky and Scott, and others who have analyzed
Indian industrial and trade policies. Higher levels of economic
growth, industrialiszation, employment, and exports of non-traditional
manufactures could have been achieved under a more efficient set of
'Krueger, 1970.
2Lbid., p. 110.
3Bhagwati and Desai, 1970, p. 464.
Little et al., 1970, p. 174.
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policies including a realistic exchange rate and import liberaliza-
tion, greater reliance on market mechanisms for the allocation of
resources, use of benefit-cost criteria in bureaucratic decision mak-
ing, and rational incentives for decentralized decision making.
I do not, however, view with optimism the prospect for bringing
about a major change in the regime of industrial and trade policies by
demonstrating its inefficiency. This regime has worked to the advan-
tage of the politically powerful class of industrial capitalists, and
it is this distributional consequence which explains its persistence.
Since the existing capitalist system cannot be defended even on the
grounds of efficiency in production of goods, a strong case can be
made for fundamental changes in the economic system which would permit
both greater equality in the distribution of gains from economic
development and greater efficiency in the production of goods.
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APPENDIX
PWRBLEMS IN COST CALCULATIONS
Attempts to compare production and procurement costs in India
with the c.i.f. prices of imports face serious difficulties which
make such data both expensive and unreliable. The following are
major problems:
(i) Indian firms are often reluctant to disclose their costs, partly
because of competitors but chiefly because government control prices,
prices paid for government purchases, and export subsidies all
depend on what the government believes to be their costs.
(ii) Cost accounting at Indian companies is typically oriented to
the demands of tax laws rather than management control and hence is
economically irrational, e.g. depreciation follows tax laws and
allocation of overheads (the majority of the cost of value added) is
arbitrary. Since overheads are often allocated in proportion to
direct labor costs, there is a bias against discovering comparative
cost advantages for labor-intensive products, parts, or operations.
(iii) Even worse, one often hears that fake cost records are used
to cover black market transactions and to reduce tax liabilities.
(iv) Excess capacity is 6ommon because of material shortages and
insufficient demand. Calculations of average costs under these cir-
cumstances are useful in measuring the actual costs of import
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substitution, but they do not provide reliable estimates of what
costs or their ranking by industry would be under different cir-
cumstances, e.g. under a more liberal economic regime.
(v) Since public statements by companies about their costs are
usually made to justify increases in prices or subsidies, there is
a bias in the sample collected from such sources: companies talk
only about their disadvantages.
(vi) In the case of components for assembled products, there are
a number of problems in interpreting the c.i.f. prices of imports.
First, because of the policy of banning imports when production
begins in India, often Indian companies do not know the current
c.i.f. import prices for components which they produce or procure
in India. Second, the sources of imported components are largely
foreign parent corporations and technical collaborators, and import
prices are often arbitrary transfer prices or deletion allowances.
Transfer prices involving over-invoicing are used by international
corporations where joint ownership, tax advantages, or public rela-
tions considerations make it preferable to realize profits in the
home country or where .the host government restricts payments in the
form of royalties or taxes them at a rate higher than the duty on
imported components. The deletion allowance, or reduction in the
total price of the remaining items in the completely-knocked-down
pack of components when one item is no longer imported, is typically
less than the proportional share of the item in the original price
of the complete c.k.d. pack.
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(vii) There are serious problems valuing the stock of capital
used by a company. Apart from the usual problems of price level
changes and the cumulative effect of arbitrary depreciation rates,
the price paid for a particular machine depends on the exchange
rate at which it was imported, the source to which the import
license was tied, whether it was imported or procured in India,
etc.
(viii) In addition, to arrive at social costs, there are the
usual problems of shadow pricing. The most important distortion
is underpricing of capital, particularly to public sector firms.
-I
596
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Annual Reports
Annual Reports (AR) are listed in footnotes with the name of the com-
pany, trade association, or government agency and its financial year,
e.g. HMT, AR 1967-68.
Periodicals
Abbreviation used
in footnotes.:
ABP: Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, daily.
BI, BI: Business International, Business International,
New York, weekly.
BI, BLA: Business International, Business Latin America,
New York, weekly.
Capital, Calcutta, weekly.
Commerce, Bombay, weekly.
EE: Eastern Economist, New Delhi, weekly.
EE, R&S: Eastern Economist, Records and Statistics,
New Delhi, quarterly.
EPW: Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, weekly;
formerly EW.
Economic Review, Bank of China, Taipei, bi-
monthly.
ET: Economic Times, Bombay, daily.
EW: Economic Weekly, Bombay, weekly.
Engineering Times, Calcutta, weekly.
FE: Financial Express, Bombay, daily.
I-7---- I---
El
597
GOL, CSO, MSPSII:
GOI, DCIS, MSFTI:
GOI, EEPC, HB:
GOI, EEPC, IEE:
GO1, JPC, Bulletin:
GOI, MSMM, ISCMB:
GO,1 RBI, Bulletin:
Central Statistical Organisation, Monthly
Statistics of the Production of Selected
Industries of India, Calcutta, bi-monthly.
Department of Commercial Intelligence and
Statistics, Monthly Statistics of the Foreign
Trade of India, Vol. I (Exports), Calcutta,
monthly.
Engineering Export Promotion Council, Home
Bulletin, Calcutta, semi-monthly.
Engineering Export Promotion Council, Indian
Engineering Exporter, Calcutta, monthly.
Joint Plant Committee, Bulletin, Calcutta,
bi-monthly.
Ministry of Steel, Mines and Metals, Iron and
Steel Control Monthly Bulletin, Calcutta,
monthly.
Reserve Bank of India, Bulletin, Bombay,
monthly.
India in Industries, Calcutta, quarterly.
Indian Express, Bombay, daily.
Industrial Times, Bombay, bi-weekly.
International Financial Statistics, IMF,
Washington, D.C., monthly.
International Trade Forum, UNCTAD-GATT, Geneva,
bi-monthly.
Iron and Steel Review, Calcutta, monthly.
Japan Economic Journal, Tokyo, weekly.
Japan Trade Monthly, Tokyo, monthly.
Journal of Industry and Trade, GOI, MCI, New
Delhi, monthly.
Machine Tool Engineer, HMT, Bangalore, quarterly.
Metalworking News, New York, weekly.
-I
598
MC IBEC: Monthl Comentary on Indian Economic Conditions,
Indian Institute of Public Opinion, New Delhi,
monthly.
NYT: New York Times, New York, daily.
Oriental Economist, Tokyo, monthly.
Research Monthly, Nippon Kangyo Bank, Tokyo,
Monthly.
Statesman, New Delhi, daily.
Tata quarterly, Tata Industries, Bombay, quarterly.
Time, Chicago, weekly.
Times of India, Bombay, daily.
_ __ I _ __~~
599
Government of India (GOI) Publications (New Delhi unless otherwise noted)
Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), Report of the Study
Team on Public Sector Undertakings, 1967.
Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), Annual Survey of Indus-
tries, CalcuttA, annual.
(Date in text refers to date of survey, not publication.)
Chemicals and Allied Products Export Promotion Council (CAPEPC),
Export Statistics, 1970.
Director of Public Information (DPI), India in 19XX-XX,
Calcutta and Delhi, annual.
(Volumes cover 1922-23 through 1934-35; date in text refers to
year covered, not year of publication.)
Directorate General of Technical Development (DGTD), Import
Policy for Actual Users for Machinery and Equipment, 1965.
, Handbook of Industrial Data, 1968.
"Import Substitution and its Impacts," Eastern
Economist, 19 September, 1969, p. 567ff.
Engineering Export Promotion Council (EEPC), Report of the
Trade DelegationtOWest Asian and West European Countries,
Calcutta, 1961.
, Report of the Study-cum-Sales Team for Non-ferrous
Products to Southeast Asian Countries, 1963.
, Report of the Study-cum-Sales Tour of the Middle
East and African Countries, Calcutta, 1964.
, Report of the Sales-cum-Study Team for Bicycles and
Parts.Sent to Countries in Southeast Asia, Calcutta,
1966.
, Statement Showing Percentages of Import Replenish-
ment and Cash Assistance, Calcutta, 1967.
, Export Assistance, Calcutta, 1968a.
, Market Survey Report on Selected Indian Engineering
Products in Denmark, Calcutta, 1968b.
-I
~~-~- -~-----
600
, West Germany's Market for Machine Tools, Calcutta,
1968c.
Freight Concessions, Calcutta, 1968d.
"Note on Steel Shortage," Calcutta, mimeo, 1969a.
Things an Exporter Should Know, Calcutta,
1969b.
Lok Sabha Secretariat (LSS), Public Accounts Committee, Export
Promotion Schemes and the Allied Matters, 1966.
, Estimates Committee, Foreign Exchange, 1968.
, Committee on Public Undertakings, Materials ManjaRe-
ment in Public Sector Undertakings, 1969.
Ministry of Commerce (MC), Report of the Indian Tariff Board
on the Machine Tools Industry, 1947.
Handbook of Export Promotion, 6th edition, 1965a;
7th edition, 1967d.
Report of the Study Team on Import and Export
Trade Control Organisation, Part I, 1965b;
Part II, 1966.
Guide for Exporters, 1967a.
Market Survey for Sewing Machines in USA, 1967b.
Market Survey for Diesel Engines in Australia,
1967c.
Import Trade Control Policy (1968-69), Vols. I and
II, 1968a.
The Customs and Central Excise Duties Export Draw-
back (General) Rules, 1960, Incorporating Amend-
ments up to 30-4-1968, 1968b.
, Marketing Prospects in USA for Indian Steel and
Engineering Products, 1968c.
El
-ia IIm
-I
r
601
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI), Report of the Export
Promotion Committee, 1957.
, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Automobile
Industry, 1960.
, Report of the Import and Export Policy Committee,
1962a.
, Statistics of Industrial Development, 1962b.
Production and Programmes of Manufacture of
Machinery and Equipment in 1961 and in the Third
Five Year Plan of India, 1962c.
Ministry of Finance (MF), Economic Survey, annual. (Referred
to as ES 1967-68, 1968-69.)
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Supply (MFTS), Import Trade
Control Policy (1969-70), Vols. I and II, 1969.
Ministry of Industrial Development and Company Affairs (MIDCA),
Report of the Committee on Foreign Collaboration, 1967.
, Report of the Motor Car Quality Enquiry Committee,
1968a.
S
S
Planning Group for Machinery Industries, Report of
each of the twelve Working Groups: Electric Power
Equipment, Transport Equipment, Construction Equip-
ment, Agricultural Equipment, Machine Tools, Metal-
lurgical Industries Equipment, Mining and Drilling
Equipment, Fertiliser and Chemical Equipment, Indus-
trial Machinery, Textile Machinery, Structurals, and
Engineering Industries, mimeo, 1968b.
Report of the Planning Group for Machinery Indus-
tries, 1969.
Ministry of Industrial Development, Internal Trade and Company
Affairs (MIDITCA), Report of the Industrial Licensing Policy
Inquiry Committee, Main Report and Appendix Volumes 1 to 4,
1969.
El
,
602
Ministry of Industry and Supply (MIS), Report of the Committee
on Scarce Raw Materials, 1966a.
. Report of the Subgroup on Small Scale Industries.
1966b.
Report of the Foundry Pig Iron Panel (1965), 1967.
Ministry of Steel and Heavy Industries (MSHI), Report on Steel
Control, 1963.
, Report of the Steering Group on Iron and Steel, 1969.
Ministry of Steel and Mines (MSM), Report of the Committee on
Cost of Production of Steel, 1966.
. Report of the Committee on Rationalisation of Steel
Sections (1964), 1968.
Ministry of Steel, Mines and Metals (MSMM), Report of the Com-
mittee of Inquiry, Steel Transactions, 1968.
Planning Commission (PC), Programmes of Industrial Development
1951-56, 1953.
, The Third Plan Mid-term Appraisal, 1963a.
, Third Five Year Plan Progress Report 1961-62, 1963b.
, The Third Plan Progress Report 1963-65, 1967a.
, (R. K. Hazari), Industrial Planning and Licensing
Policy: Final Report, Vol. I, 1967b.
Draft Fourth Five Year Plan 1969-74, 1969.
Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Report on Currency and Finance
(1960-61), Bombay, 1961.
, "Finances of Indian Joint Stock Companies, 1965-
66," Bulletin, Bombay, December 1967, pp. 1530-
1614.
, Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry, Bombay,
1968.
II
I I III
... .. llI v
603
, "Finances of Public Limited Companies, 1967-68,"
Bulletin, Bombay, October 1970, pp. 1617-1708.
State Trading Corporation (STC), A Decade: 1956-57 to 1965-66,
1966.
Tariff Commission (TC), Report on the Continuance of Protection to
the XXXXXXX Industry (Date of Inquiry):
Electric Motor (1955), 1955.
Sewing Machine (1954), 1956a.
Aluminium (1955), 1956b.
Motor Vehicle Battery (1955), 1956c.
Bare Copper Conductors and ACSR
(Aluminium Conductor Steel Reinforced),
(1957), 1958a.
Cotton Textile Machinery (1957), 1958b.
Machine Screw (1959), 1960a.
Wood Screw (1960), 1960b.
Cotton Textile Machinery (1960), 1961a.
Bicycle (1960), 1961b.
Electric Motor (1962), 1963a.
Engineers' Steel Files (1963), 1963b.
Diesel Fuel Injection Equipment (1963), 1964.
Aluminium (1964), 1965.
Electric Motor (1965), 1966a.
Automobile Sparking Plug (1965), 1966b.
Ball Bearings (1965), 1966c.
Non-ferrous Metals (1965), 1966d.
Transformer (1965).
Cotton Textile Machinery (1966), 1967a.
ACSR (Aluminium Conductor Steel Reinforced)
and AAC (All Aluminium Conductor), (1966),
1967b.
Piston Assembly (1966), 1968.
Aluminium (1968), 1969.
El
__~_ l____ ~ il _t~sIIYIIIIIIIIIIII
604
Books and Articles
Ahmad, J., "Import Substitution and Structural Change in Indian
Manufacturing Industry, 1950-1966," Project for Quantitative
Research in Economic Development, Memorandum No. 17, Harvard
University, Cambridge, 1966.
American Machinist, Tenth American Machinist Inventory of Metalworking
Equipment, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1968.
Arndt, H.W., and D.R. Sherk, "Export Franchises of Australian Companies
with Overseas Affiliations," Economic Record, August 1959,
pp. 239-42.
Arya, P.N., A Study of India's Bilateral Trade and Payments Arrange-
ments, USAID, New Delhi, 1968.
, Iron and Steel for India's Export Sector, USAID, New Delhi,
1969.
Australia, Comnittee of Economic Enquiry, Report, Vol. 1, Canberra,
1965.
Bagchi, A.K., "European and Indian Entrepreneurship in India, 1900-30,"
in E. Leach and S.N. Mukherjee, eds., Elites in South Asia,
Cambridge University Press, 1970.
Bank of Japan, Japanese Industry 1967, Tokyo, 1967.
Baranson, J., "Transfer of Technical Knowledge by International Cor-
porations to Developing Economies," American Economic Review,
May 1966, pp. 259-67.
, Manufacturing Problems in India, Syracuse University
Press, Syracuse, 1967.
, Automotive Industries in Developing Countries, IBRD,
Washington, D.C., 1969.
, "International Transfer of Automotive Technology to
Developing Countries," IBRD, mimeo, 1971.
Basu, S.K., and A. Ghosh and S. Ray, Problems and Possibilities of
Ancillary Industries in a Developing Economy, World Press,
Calcutta, 1965.
Behrman, J.N., Some Patterns in the Rise of the Multinational Enter-
prise, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1969.
El
--- ^ -----^
605
Bhagwati, J.N., "The Tying of Aid," UNCTAD Document TD/7/Supp. 4,
Geneva, 1967.
, The Theory and Practice of Commercial Policy: Departures
from Unified Exchange Rates, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, 1968.
, and P. Desai, India: Planning for Industrialization,
(OECD, Paris), Oxford University Press, London, 1970.
Bhasin, A.S., ed., Documents on Nepal's Relations with India and
China, 1949-66, Academic Books, Bombay, 1970.
Boon, G.K., Economic Choice of Human and Physical Factors in Production,
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1964.
Brash, D.T., American Investment in Australian Industry, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1966.
Buchanan, D.H., The Development of Capitalistic Enterprise in India,
Frank Cass, New York, (first published in 1934), 1966.
Business International Corp., Organizing for Latin American Operations,
Geneva, 1969.
, The New Brazil, New York, 1965.
Central Machine Tool Institute, Central Machine Tool Institute,
Bangalore, 1966.
Cilingiroglu, A., Manufacture of Heavy Electrical Equipment in Develop-
ing Countries, IBRD, Washington, D.C., 1969.
Cohen, B.I., "A Study of the Export Policies of the Indian Government,
1951/52 to 1965/66," Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Economics,
Harvard University, 1963.
, "The Stagnation of Indian Exports, 1951-1961," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November 1964, pp. 604-20.
da Costa, E.P.W., "The Necessity for Export Incentives," in USAID,
Participant Journal, New Delhi, February 1968, pp. 24-26.
Dagli, V., ed., The Public Sector in India, Vora and Company,
Bombay, 1969.
Datta, B., and M. Bhattacharya, S. Chakravarti, and S. Ghosh, Economic
Development and Exports, World Press, Calcutta, 1962.
Eld
~LLL-- - I I
606
Dericks, W., "Foreign Collaboration in Indian Industry," Belgian
Foreign Trade Office, Brussels, mimeo, 1969.
Desai, P., "Growth and Structural Change in the Indian Manufacturing
Sector: 1951-1963," Indian Economic Journal, October-December
1969, pp. 205-33.
de Vries, B.A., "The Competitiveness of Capital-Goods Industries in
Developing Countries," Pakistan Development Review, Summer
1968, pp. 226-39.
Director of Foreign Collaborations in India, de Indiana Overseas
Publications, Delhi, Vol. 1, 1968; Vol. 2, 1969.
Eckaus, R. S., and K.S. Parikh, Planning for Growth, M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge, 1968.
Economic and Scientific Research 1oundation (ESRF), Research, Tech-
nology and Industry, New Delhi, 1964.
, Exports of Leading .edipm and Large Companies, New Delhi,
1967.
Economist Intelligence Unit, The State Trading Corporation, Council
for Economic Education, Bombay, 1961.
Edelberg, G.S., "The Procurement Practices of the Mexican Affiliates
of Selected United States Automobile Firms," DBA Thesis,
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University,
1963.
Felix, D., "The Dilemma of Import Substitution: Argentina," in
G.F. Papanek, ed., Development Policy. Theory and Practice,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1968, Chapter 3.
Ford Foundation, Development of Small-Scale Industries in India,
New Delhi, 1963.
Frankena, M., "Export-Oriented Industrialization in East Asia,"
unpublished, 1970.
Gadgil, D.R., The Industrial Evolution of India in Recent Times,
Oxford University Press, 4th edition, 1942.
Garratt, G., "Modern Industry in India," a series of eleven articles
in Machinery and Production Engineering, U.K., 26 July to
20 December 1967.
El
1
607
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), "Exports of Engi-
neering Products from Selected Industrializing Countries,"
International Trade 1968, Geneva, 1969.
Gulati, I.S., "Export Promotion through Bonus Imports: An Appraisal
of India's Experiment," The Developing Economies, September
1967, pp. 503-11.
Haq, M. ul, "Tied Credits: A Quantitative Analysis," in John H.
Adler, ed., Capital Movements and Economic Development,
Macmillan, London, 1967, pp. 326-59.
Hughes, H., and Y.P. Seng, eds., Foreign Investment and Industrial-
isation in Singapore, Australian National University Press,
Canberra, 1969.
Indian Electrical Manufacturers' Association (IEMA), Fourth Five
Year Plan Development Programme for Electrical Equipment,
Bombay, 1968.
Indian Engineering Association (IEA), Survey on Productivity in the
Engineering Industry, Calcutta, 1967.
, Handbook of Statistics, Calcutta, annual. (Referred to
as HS 1967, 1968-69, 1969-70.)
Indian Investment Centre (IIC), Special Financial Institutions,
New Delhi, 1966.
, Foreign Investment and Collaboration: Guidelines,
New Delhi, 1968.
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT), India's Trade with East
Europe, New Delhi, 1966a.
, Grey Iron Castings, New Delhi, 1966b.
, Difficulties in the Shipment of Export Cargo at the
Bombay Port, New Delhi, 1966c.
, Electric Fans, New Delhi, 1967a.
, Exports of Machine Tools, Calcutta, 1967b.
, Export Potential of Okhla Industrial Estate, New Delhi,
1967c.
, Ocean Freight Rates and India's Exports, New Delhi,
1967d.
-I
608
, Export Marketing Operations, New Delhi, 1969.
Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta (IIMC), Survey of India's
Export Potential for Machine Tools, Calcutta, 1969.
Indian Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association, Guide to Indian
Machine Tools, Bombay, 1968.
Islam, N., "Commodity Exports, Net Exchange Earnings and Investment
Criteria," Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1968, pp. 582-
605.
, "Tariff Protection, Comparative Costs, and Industrializa-
tion in Pakistan," in T. Morgan and N. Spoelstra, eds.,
Economic Interdependence in Southeast Asia, University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1969, pp. 65-95.
Johnson, W.A., The Steel Industry of India, (Rand, 1966), Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1967.
Kapoor, A., 'Research and Development and Product Modifications,"
Oriental Economist, October 1968, pp. 30-37.
Kidron, M., Foreign Investments in India, Oxford University Press,
London, 1965.
, "Indo-Foreign Financial Collaboration in the Private
Sector," in R.K. Hazari, ed., Foreign Collaboration, University
of Bombay, Bombay, 1967, pp. 152-64.
King, T., Mexico: Industrialization and Trade Policies since 1940.
(OECD, Paris), Oxford University Press, 1970.
Kleu, S.J., "Import Substitution in the South African Automobile
Industry," DBA Thesis, Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion, Harvard University, 1967.
Krueger, A.O., "The Benefits and Costs of Import Substitution in India:
A Microeconomic Study," University of Minnesota, mimeo,
October 1970.
Kust, M.J., Foreign Enterprise in India, University of North Carolina
Press, Chapel Hill, 1964.
Lal, D., "A Quantitative Analysis of Aid-Financed Imports of Certain
Chemicals into India," UNCTAD Document, TD/B/C.3/59, Geneva,
1968.
mi
I
609
Lary, H.B., Imports of Manufactures from Less Developed Countries,
National Bureau of Economic Research, New York, 1968.
Leff, N.H., The Brazilian Capital Goods Industry, 1929-1964, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
Lewis, S.R. and S.E. Guisinger, "Measuring Protection in a Develop-
ing Country: The Case of Pakistan," Journal of Political
Economy, November-December 1968, pp. 1170-98.
Liedholm, C.E., "An Analysis of Comparative Advantage in Indian Iron
and Steel," Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Economics, University
of Michigan, 1965.
Little, I., and T. Scitovsky and M. Scott, Industry and Trade in
Some Developing Countries, (OECD, Paris), Oxford University
Press, London, 1970.
MacDougall, D., "India's Balance of Payments Problem," in P.N. Rosen-
stein-Rodan, ed., Pricing and Fiscal Policies, MIT Press,
Cambridge, 1964, pp. 175-211.
Machinery Dealers National Association, Used Machine Tools, Washington,
D.C., 1967.
Manne, A.S., "The Aluminium Industry," in A.S. Manne, ed., Investments
for Capacity Expansion, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1967, Chapter 3.
McIntyre, A., and B. Watson, Studies in Foreign Investment in the
Commonwealth Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago, Institute of
Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies,
Mona, 1970.
Midleton, G., "American Attitudes to Investment in Australia,"
Business Review, June 1969.
Mohammed, A.F., "The Use of Commercial Credits by Developing Countries
for Financing Imports of Capital Goods," IMF Staff Papers,
March 1970, pp. 29-109.
Myers, C.A., and S. Kannappan, Industrial Relations in India, Asia
Publishing House, Bombay, 1970.
Narain, D., "Aid through Trade: A Case Study of India," UNCTAD
Document TD/B/C.3/57, 1968.
National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER), Under-utiliza-
tion of Industriaf Capacity, New Delhi, 1966a.
, Indian Economy 1961-63, Niw Delhi, 1963.
El
610
, Indian Eouomy, Review and Prospects, 1962-64,
The 11-hi -1964.
, Indian Economy 1961-66, New Delhi, 1966b.
, Maintenance Imports, New Delhi, 1967a.
, Export Prospects of Diesel Engines, New Delhi, 1967b.
, Demand for Cotton Textile Machinery, New Delhi, 1967c.
, Long Term Projections for Iron and Steel, 1968.
, India's Export Potential in Selected Countries, 2 Vols.,
New Delhi, 1970.
National Productivity Council, Radio and Electronics, New Delhi, 1965.
Neufeld, E.P., A Global Corporation: A History of the International
Development of Massey-Ferguson Ltd., University of Toronto,
1969.
Pack, H. and M. Todaro, "Technology Transfer, Labour Absorption,
and Economic Development," Oxford Economic Papers (N.S.),
November 1969, pp. 395-403.
Paul, Samuel, "Competitiveness of Indian Steel Exports," Economic
and Political Weekly, 29 May 1971, pp. 1087-1093.
Political and Economic Planning, "East-West Trade," Planning,
London, May 1965.
Powell, H.A.R., "Why Operate Overseas?" in Planning and Managing an
Overseas Business, British Institute of Management, London,
1966, pp. 11-16.
Pryor, F.L., The Communist Foreign Trade System, MIT Press, Cambridge,
1963.
Reynolds, C.W., "Changing Trade Patterns and Trade Policy in Mexico:
Some Lessons for Developing Countries," Food Research Institute
Studies, Stanford, 1970, p. 15.
Rosen, G., Industrial Change in India, (MIT), Asia Publishing House,
Bombay, 1958.
, Some Aspects of Industrial Finance in India, (MIT), The
Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.
-I
__l_~=______lh__~__ _ ___ __
611
Safarian, A.E., Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry, McGraw-Hill,
Toronto, 1966.
Sarangan, T.K., Liner Shipping in India's Overseas Trade, UNCTAD
Document TD/B/C.4/31, Geneva, 1967.
Sathe, A.V., "Redesign of Machine Tools," in Central Machine Tool Insti-
stitute, Cet-ra&lj.-achine Tool Institute, Bangalore, October 1966.
Shils, E., "The Academic Profession in India," in E. Leach and S.N.
Mukherjee, eds., Elites in South Asia, Cambridge University
Press, 1970.
Singh, M., India's Export Trends, Oxford University Press, 1964.
Singh, R.K., Prosperity through Exports, Engineering Export Promotion
Council, Calcutta, 1965.
Soligo, R., and J.J. Stern, "Tariff Protection, Import Substitution
and Investment Efficiency," Pakistan Development Review,
Summer 1965, pp. 249-70.
Srivastava, S.K., Trade of India, S. Chand, Delhi, 1956.
Subrahmanian, K.K., "Do Collaboration Agreements Hamper Exports?"
Economic and Political Weekly, 1 October 1966, pp. 273-76.
Tandon, L.N., "Tool Design and Tool Room Facilities in the Automobile
Industry," Machine Tool Engineer, HMT, Bangalore, July-September
1965.
Toda, Y., Report on the Export Credit System of India, Reserve Bank
of India, 1969.
Tomlinson, J.W.C., "Some Problems of US Firms in Joint Ventures in
Less Developed Countries, with Particular Reference to
Pakistan, India and Iran," MS Thesis, Sloan School of Manage-
ment, MIT, 1966.
, The Joint Venture Process in International Business:
India and Pakistan, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1970.
Tsurumi, Y., "Technology Transfer and Foreign Trade: The Case of
Japan, 1950-1966," DBA Thesis, Graduate School of Business
Administration, Harvard University, 1968.
-I
_~d
612
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (UNCTAD-GATT), International
Trade Centre, Document ITC/MR/2/151, "The Markets for Indian
Railway Products," Vol. A (East African and West Asian Coun-
tries), Vol. B (North America); "The Market for Motor Vehicle
Parts," Vol. C (East African and West Asian Countries), Vol. D
(North America), Geneva, 1969.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), "Case
Studies of the Causes of Excess Capacity in Industry,"
Industrialization and Productivity, Bulletin No. 15, New York,
1970a, pp. 49-53.
, "Industrial Excess Capacity and its Utilization for
Export," Industrialization and Productivity, Bulletin No. 15,
New York, 1970b, pp. 54-84.
United Stated Congress, Committee on Ways and Means, Tariff and Trade
Proposals: Hearings, Washington, D.C,, 1970.
Wilczynski, J., "Dumping in Trade between Market and Centrally Planned
Economies," Economics of Planning, Oslo, 1966, pp. 211-227.
Wilkins, M., and F.E. Hill, American Business Abroad, Ford on Six
Continents, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1964.
U.
_ _
613
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Mark Frankena is an assistant professor of economics at the University
of Western Ontario.
